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This thesis shows how democratic politics requires a commitment to 
pluralism as engagement and encounter of the other in their otherness. I 
contend that it is necessary to commit to such an idea of pluralism because of 
the problem of incomplete understanding. I establish this premise by drawing on 
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s account of human finitude. Based on this premise, I 
argue that the instantiation of Gadamer’s principle of openness leads 
democratic politics to pluralism as engagement and encounter of the other. 
Further, I develop accounts of asymmetric reciprocity, reflexivity, and agonism 
as modes of democratic politics that instantiate the principle of openness.  
In chapter 1, I establish discourse as a necessary element for democratic 
politics by drawing from the way Jurgen Habermas uses ‘discourse ethics’ to 
address the problems of understanding in plural societies. In chapter 2, I 
demonstrate how incomplete understanding poses a problem for discourse and 
gives rise to interpretive conflicts by drawing from Gadamer’s account of human 
finitude. Here I also develop an account of openness as a suitable principle for 
beings with incomplete understanding based on Gadamer’s idea of 
hermeneutical experience. In chapters 3-5, I develop accounts of asymmetric 
reciprocity, reflexivity, and agonism as modes of democratic politics that 
instantiate the principle of openness. I do so by drawing from Iris Young’s, John 
Dryzek’s, and Chantal Mouffe’s approaches to the problems that plurality poses 





I became interested in this topic after reading Gadamer and Habermas 
as complementary thinkers. Originally, I intended to write on the critique of 
ideology by drawing from the Habermas-Gadamer debate. It was supposed to 
be a critique of ideologiekritik informed by Gadamer's philosophical 
hermeneutics and Habermas' turn from the paradigms of the first generation 
Frankfurt School to the theory of communicative action. I believed that modern 
ideologiekritik must involve a critical theory that is more focused on the way 
situated understanding and prejudices constitute self-consciousness. I believed 
that Habermas and Gadamer can help understand the kind of dialogical 
engagement in which people can become aware of their situatedness and 
prejudices.  
However, reading the broader literature in political theory on Habermas 
made me realise that this research can help address the problem of plurality, 
which is the focus of such deliberative democrats as Young and Dryzek. 
Therefore, I became interested in writing on this topic with hopes that I could, 
perhaps, show how Gadamer can help contribute to addressing the problem of 
plurality in democratic politics. 
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People cannot coexist without understanding each other. One of the 
problems in plural societies today is that people often do not understand each 
other. This is most acute when they try resolving social and political affairs in a 
way that would be acceptable to all. When plurality of sources of understanding 
try to answer the question ‘what ought we do?’ disagreement and division 
emerge.  
The pluralist argument clarifies this problem based on three theses. The 
first thesis claims the fact of plurality. There is a plurality of sources of values, 
ways of life, and ways of understanding the world. The second thesis claims 
incommensurability. These sources are incommensurable and cannot be rank-
ordered. The third thesis makes a claim about the cost and value of conflict. 
There is always a possibility of conflict between sources. The conflict between 
sources is the stuff of politics because, in part, politics is about rank-ordering 
values. The problem is the fact that no form of politics can guarantee an 
outcome where one side does not gain at the cost of the other. There are many 
ways to manage such conflict in politics. Arguably, the best method so far is 
democratic politics. In democratic politics, conflict between sources becomes a 
value because a democratic way of contestation allows the inclusion of all 
voices and leads to wiser decisions that address the wider complexity of issues. 
Yet, the problem of understanding does not make democratic politics an 
easy solution for the problem of incommensurability and conflict. Democracy is 
effective in resolving difference of opinions, not at reaching a common 
understanding. Understanding is more fundamental, it is part of one’s being and 
identity. Therefore, when there is a conflict between different understandings, 
often one’s being and identity are at stake. Since pluralism is, as Berlin defined, 
“the conception that there are many different ends that men seek and still be 
fully rational, fully men, capable of understanding each other and sympathizing 
and deriving light from each other” (1990, 11), democratic politics must 
approach this problem through a commitment to pluralism. The question I ask is 
what understanding of pluralism can help democratic politics in dealing with the 
problem of understanding in plural societies and how can such pluralism 
translate into politics?  
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 This thesis shows how democratic politics requires a commitment to 
pluralism as engagement and encounter of the other in their otherness. The 
thesis has multiple objectives. First, it will establish discourse as a necessary 
element for democratic politics that is committed to pluralism. This objective will 
be achieved by drawing from the way Jurgen Habermas uses ‘discourse ethics’ 
to address the problems of plural societies (Chapter 1). Second, it will 
demonstrate how incomplete understanding poses a problem for discourse and 
gives rise to interpretive conflicts in pluralism. This objective will be achieved by 
drawing from Hans-Georg Gadamer’s account of human finitude (Chapter 2). 
Third, it will establish Gadamer’s idea of openness as a suitable principle of 
disposition for beings with incomplete understanding. This objective will be 
achieved by drawing from Gadamer’s use of ‘hermeneutical experience’ in his 
philosophical hermeneutics (Chapter 2). Fourth, it will establish the ideas of 
asymmetric reciprocity, reflexivity, and agonism as modes of instantiation of 
Gadamer’s principle of openness in democratic politics. This objective will be 
achieved by drawing from Iris Young’s, John Dryzek’s, and Chantal Mouffe’s 
critiques and appropriations of discourse ethics in light of the problems facing 
democratic politics in plural societies (Chapters 3-5).  
The idea of pluralism as engagement and encounter of the other in their 
otherness is necessary today because, in politics, contestation on different 
values goes beyond the values. In part, politics is about rank-ordering values 
that everyone will follow. A democratic way to do that involves collective action 
and contestation that comply with the principles of freedom, autonomy, and 
equality. However, today, contestation in politics can quickly become 
contestation of the very being of the other, of the other’s right to be, contestation 
about our right to be, and our identity. Committing to pluralism as engagement 
and encounter can help in turning away from this kind of conflict and share the 
world with each other while preserving the value of contestation in the form of 
interpretive conflicts.  
Interpretive conflicts are a kind of contestation in which parties engage 
and encounter one another respectfully and with openness. Interpretive conflicts 
value difference for its epistemic benefits. A different interpretation usually 
discloses something that changes current understanding. Therefore, in 
interpretive conflicts parties engage and encounter not despite but for their 
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differences. It is very hard to implement this idea in today’s plural societies. The 
actual content and quality of political contestation between different others is 
testament to that. 
Part of this reality is the fact of plurality and the challenge of 
incommensurability. Value pluralism has shown that there is no value that can 
have a rational priority for all people. The big challenge is, of course, sharing 
the world together in light of this fact. The more immediate challenge is in 
reaching some kind of agreement in a democratic way. This challenge is 
exacerbated by the nature of human understanding and the mistake people 
make about it. One’s understanding is always already limited and incomplete. 
The mistake is in forgetting about this feature of understanding.  
Deliberative democrats are right to note that the problems of 
disagreement and division in plural societies are attributable to incomplete 
understanding. However, they are wrong to assume that disagreement and 
division are due to incomplete understanding itself, as if this could be remedied 
by a more complete understanding. Incomplete understanding is a permanent 
feature of human understanding. People who disagree and divide forget about 
this nature of understanding. They usually assume that they know the truth, 
understand things better, and are convinced that it is ‘the other’ who has the 
incomplete understanding. The challenge of plurality is especially acute when 
some engage with the other as Joseph Heller’s General Peckem who “thought 
of himself as aesthetic and intellectual. When people disagreed with him, he 
urged them to be objective”. 
It is necessary to ask how can beings with incomplete understanding 
engage and encounter one another in democratic politics. This thesis answers 
this question by positing that there is an interpretive dimension to all 
understanding based on Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics and by defining 
the normative requirements of pluralism according to Gadamer’s principle of 
openness. Gadamer helps clarify why beings with incomplete understanding 
must accept that their understanding is an interpretation that is limited within 
their hermeneutical situation. Building on that premise, he helps clarify why one 
must be open to ‘the other’, who has a different understanding. In order to 
expand understanding, one must be open to engaging and encountering the 
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other in their otherness. Based on these premises, it is possible to posit that 
Gadamer’s principle of openness leads to engagement and encounter of the 
other in their otherness. The benefits of this approach for democracy are gains 
in people’s disposition towards common good, equality, and expansion of 
democratic practices into the everyday experience of plurality in the life-world.  
In this thesis, I argue that if we acknowledge the nature of incomplete 
understanding, then instantiation of Gadamer’s principle of openness leads 
democratic politics to pluralism as engagement and encounter of the other in 
their otherness. Democratic politics can instantiate this principle through 
asymmetric reciprocity, reflexivity, and agonism. These must be understood as 
the modes in which the principle of openness can be instantiated in politics. The 
foundational assumption of this argument is the ontological dimension of human 
finitude, which makes understanding incomplete and situated within 
particularities that are contingent upon culture, historical moment, and social 
position. This type of reasoning contrasts with the type of reasoning that is 
based on detachment from particularity in order to achieve objectivity. 
Adam Sandel (2014) has recently countered the argument for detached 
reasoning by making a distinction between two conceptions of judgement and 
understanding: the “detached” and “situated” conceptions (2-3). The detached 
reasoning is upheld by theorists of the Kantian persuasion such as Habermas, 
while the situated conception is upheld by theorists of Heideggerian persuasion 
such as Gadamer. Detached reasoning believes in attainability of objective and 
universally true judgment through the standard rules of logical inference. The 
‘detached’ thesis posits that reason can transcend its context and is suspicious 
of any reasoning situated within cultural and historical particularities. By 
contrast, situated reasoning has reflexivity in the sense that it looks back into its 
own conditionality and context boundedness. The ‘situated’ thesis posits the 
ontological dimensions of finitude in understanding and is suspicious of 
reasoning that claims to have detached itself from its context.  For those who 
support the argument for situated understanding, detached reasoning is 
impossible in virtue of the nature of understanding itself. The foundational 
assumption of this thesis will be contested by those who support the “detached” 
conception and accepted by those who accept the “situated” conception.  
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The dominant theories of democracy are of the Kantian persuasion. 
Therefore, they will reject turning towards pluralism as engagement and 
encounter of the other in their otherness. They favour detached reasoning that 
transcends context and brackets difference and particularity. Thus, they cannot 
fully commit to engagement and encounter of the other in their otherness. For 
example, Rawls and Habermas view plurality and difference as an obstacle to 
consensus, the final legitimizing moment of democratic politics. They both 
require that participants transcend their context and bracket their particularity in 
order to engage in a rational deliberation aimed at reaching consensus. They 
would take issues with pluralism as engagement and encounter because it 
requires that participants take part in politics without bracketing their 
particularities and differences. Rather, it requires that they encounter one 
another’s difference and engage in a dialogue with one another in their light. 
From the perspective of the ‘situated’ thesis, transcending and bracketing 
difference and particularity poses problems for democracy. Requiring such a 
thing contributes to democratic deficit in relation to common good and equality. 
To be sure, for Rawls and Habermas, an intellectual disposition towards the 
common good is a requirement. Participants take part in politics with an eye on 
what is good and just for all. However, it is the particularities and differences 
that are the best indicators of how the outcome affects all. Some groups may 
not be able to express their experience of injustice without a reference to their 
particularity, and so they may be excluded from consensus because they do not 
fulfil the basic requirement of transcendence and bracketing. Therefore, there 
can be democratic deficit in relation to the common good. 
Next, there can be democratic deficit in relation to equality in democratic 
politics based on the ‘detached’ thesis. To be sure, Habermas avoids the 
substantive principle of equality. He uses a non-political principle of equality. It 
requires that every opinion is weighed equally, participants are given equal 
opportunities and time to state their case, that every participant receives equal 
attention from the rest, and that all participants are equally free from influences 
of power and coercion. However, detached reasoning may result in reinforcing 
the influence of one group of people over others because the standard rules of 
rational discussion may have exclusionary functions. Some groups may be 
deprived of equal opportunity to share their particular experience of injustice 
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simply because they will not be able to abstract from their situation, or because 
current discourse lacks the means to disclose their situation (think how the 
language of sexism did not exist before women started sharing their particular 
experiences publicly). Therefore, not allowing encounter of difference and 
particularity contributes to deficit in equality in democratic politics. 
Thus, Sandel’s conceptions of “detached” and “situated” reasoning help 
distinguish between two ways of addressing the challenge of plurality. One is 
the argument that disagreement and division are better kept away from public 
matters, and therefore political engagement in plural societies must not involve 
particularities that are subject to historical, cultural (in the broadest sense), and 
linguistic contingencies. Here, pluralistic fragmentation is to be kept in the 
private sphere of each subject and protected by the principles of individual 
rights and freedoms that put constitutional constraints on political institutions. 
Habermas advocates for political deliberation in which subjects participate by 
abstracting from their particularities to achieve the perspective of detached 
understanding and judgement.  
The second way of addressing the problem of plurality is based on the 
argument that understanding is always already influenced by prejudices and 
other particularities contingent to historical, cultural, and linguistic influences. 
For this reason, it is necessary to let particularities be expressed in deliberation 
by different groups. The premise in this argument is that it is impossible to 
abstract one’s reasoning and assume the perspective of detached 
understanding and reasoning. This kind of assumption makes the problems of 
disagreement and division more acute. In each case, the abstract position can 
masquerade as something that is detached from particular interests and ways 
of life whereas it is actually prejudiced towards certain interests and ways of life 
over others.  
This thesis takes Gadamer’s hermeneutical perspective on situated 
conception of understanding. However, rather than taking position among the 
ranks of postmodern thinkers, it will be argued that Habermas’ discourse ethics 
allows one to conceive a form of deliberative democracy that can address the 
problem of understanding from the hermeneutical perspective.  
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Habermas’ discourse ethics is valuable because of his reformulation of 
the Kantian “categorical imperative”. It has advantages over the other cognitivist 
derivatives such as Rawls’ because it establishes the “imperative” in a dialogical 
rather than monological fashion. Furthermore, the critical attention that 
Habermas has received shows that discourse ethics is amenable to 
appropriations that can accommodate the hermeneutical perspective. This 
thesis will draw on Young’s, Dryzek’s, and Mouffe’s critiques and appropriations 
of discourse ethics. These three theorists take into account the situated nature 
of understanding and appropriate discourse ethics accordingly. Based on their 
work, I establish that democratic politics can instantiate Gadamer’s principle of 
openness in the modes of asymmetric reciprocity, reflexivity, and agonism. 
It is necessary to instantiate Gadamer’s principle of openness because of 
the ontological dimension of human finitude in understanding. Gadamer’s 
account of human finitude shows that understanding is incomplete in the sense 
of its situatedness within particular hermeneutical situation. Incomplete 
understanding gives rise to interpretive conflicts when different others engage 
and encounter one another. Since incommensurability leads to conflict, it is 
better to transform the conflict into interpretive conflicts in democratic politics. 
The reason we cannot rely purely on Habermas’ discourse ethics is because its 
requirements for rationality and detachment suppress interpretive conflicts. 
Gadamer’s principle of openness is a way to allow and approach interpretive 
conflicts. Therefore, democratic politics that relies on discourse as an element 
and makes commitment to pluralism possible must instantiate Gadamer’s 
principle.  
Approach and rationale 
The aim of this thesis is to show how democratic politics requires 
commitment to the idea of pluralism as engagement and encounter of the other 
in their otherness and what a democratic politics committed to such an idea 
consists in. There are democratic theories that address the problem of plurality 
besides deliberative democracy. However, I claim that such idea of pluralism is 
compatible with the Habermasian deliberative democracy because it has the 
element of discourse.  
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Most democratic theories approach plurality by a commitment to what 
can be called the classical conception of pluralism. The classical conception 
was formed under the influence of the liberal discourse (Lassman 2011; Bevir 
2012). It conceives pluralism in two senses: political pluralism and value 
pluralism. 
Political pluralism conceives plurality as consisting in different interests. 
Its normative function requires neutral processes of government and state 
institutions in which different interests can compete. The most prominent 
theorist of democratic politics that is committed to political pluralism is Robert 
Dahl (1956; 1971). Dahl’s theory of democracy is known as polyarchy, which is 
driven by the dynamics between different interest groups. However, he was not 
interested in addressing value pluralism. For Dahl, there has to be consensus 
on the underlying values. Democratic politics can commit to pluralism only when 
there is cohesion in political culture and a sense of common direction that 
competing groups cannot violate (Dahl 1956, 132-3). Dahl’s democratic politics 
does not meet the requirements for pluralism because it lacks the element of 
discourse that could make such engagement and encounter possible.  
Value pluralism conceives of plurality as consisting of a plurality of 
incommensurable values. When applied to democratic politics, it also requires a 
form of political pluralism that is instantiated in the liberal constitutional 
democracies such as John Rawls’ and deliberative democracies such as 
Habermas’. They address the fact of disagreement about values and moral 
division (see Lassman 2011, 96). Of course, the most notable liberal theorist 
who addresses these problems is Rawls (1993). From his perspective, political 
pluralism and value pluralism are intimately linked with liberalism and 
democracy. Here, liberalism acts as an idea over which there can be 
disagreement, and moreover, as a discourse which does not require agreement 
about itself. While democracy requires homogeneity and agreement on values, 
liberalism endorses discourse in which it is acceptable that people never reach 
agreement over ultimate values (Lassman 2011, 97). However, Rawls is in 
tension with value pluralism because, as Galston argues, he seeks to establish 
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“lexical priorities among heterogeneous goods” (Galston 2002, 7)1. For me, the 
problem with Rawls’ framework is that it cannot allow the inclusion of 
particularities into deliberation. By contrast, Habermas’ discourse ethics allows 
the inclusion of particularities because the discourse principle requires that 
people are present with their interests in the deliberative forum. 
Across the Atlantic, there is a different conception of pluralism known as 
corporatist pluralism with a similar emphasis on decentralization and neutral 
processes of government as political pluralism. It was developed by Harold 
Laski (1925). Dahl was influenced by Laski’s work. Laski argued that corporatist 
decentralization of power would widen access and help fight economic and 
political inequalities. Despite some fundamental difference between Laski and 
Dahl – Laski thought in Marxist terms and understood groups more in class 
terms whereas Dahl understood groups as based on interest – they share a 
normative emphasis on the role of decentralization and sharing power and 
influence in plural societies. This too is not suitable as a democratic politics 
committed to the idea of pluralism as engagement and encounter because my 
emphasis on the problem of understanding the other requires a conception of 
discourse.  
In Europe, Arendt Lijphart’s (1974; 1999) consociationalism deals with 
the challenges of plurality and has an element of discourse. Europe had a 
different experience of plurality. It was not only based on difference in interests 
and values but also difference based on significant historical, cultural, and 
linguistic contingencies. Lijphart asked: why isn’t there conflict in some of the 
most diverse countries in Europe while there is conflict elsewhere with similar 
conditions. For Lijphart, democratic politics could commit to pluralism through 
the processes of negotiations and bargaining between elite members of groups, 
whereas his Anglo-American counterparts emphasise the competitive 
processes of democratic politics. However, Lijphart’s democratic politics is 
geared less towards engagement and encounter of difference and values and 
more towards trading, bargaining, and trimming of plurality of interests and 
values in the process of negotiation between elite representatives.  
                                            
1
 For Galston, Rawls’s Political Liberalism is an example of “monist” political theory 
because “it seeks to decouple political theory from other domains of inquiry while preserving the 
various lexical orderings defended in A Theory of Justice” (2002, 8).  
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None of the theorists are interested in pluralism as engagement and 
encounter of the other in their otherness. They focus on conceiving democratic 
politics with difference (besides interests) bracketed, rather than engaged and 
encountered. As established above, bracketing difference is not useful in 
democracy because one’s particularities still inform and are taken up in one’s 
public and political life.  
In part, politics is rank-ordering values. Political pluralism allows 
competition of interests by means of neutral institutions and processes of 
government and treats values as something that can be kept outside politics in 
the private sphere. But interests are not pre-given, they are subject to change in 
the process of competition as well as they are subject to initial conditions of 
one’s social, cultural, and historical position. Plurality of modern democratic 
societies is complex. It is necessary to acquire an ability to understand how 
plurality of interests comes about and bring the processes of formation of 
interests into democratic politics. It is necessary to focus, as deliberative 
democrats argue, on the process of formation of interests. With regards to 
values, it is necessary to focus on the way they influence understanding 
because democratic politics is inevitably an engagement between different 
others that must understand one another. Values influence the way people 
understand each other.  Moreover, it is necessary to understand how values 
themselves are subject to change and so, just as with interests, it is necessary 
to be conscious of the processes behind the way values come about and the 
way they can change as a result of change in understanding between different 
people. These necessities mean that a different idea of pluralism is necessary, 
an idea of pluralism, the normative structure of which requires engagement and 
encounter that addresses these problems.  
I follow the idea of pluralism as engagement and encounter of the other 
outlined in Diana Eck’s essay “From diversity to pluralism” (1997)2. There, she 
                                            
2
 The essay is part of the Pluralism Project in which Diana Eck and a large research 
team consisting of students, faculty and staff at Harvard have been engaged since the 1990s. 
The project’s main focus is researching and gathering data on religions, religious groups, and 
religious practices across America from major ones to the most marginal and unknown. Its 
mission is primarily to answer the question ‘how to appropriate plurality to shape a positive 
pluralism’, in which they do not take the fact of plurality as the sole constituent of pluralism, by 
helping “Americans engage with the realities of religious diversity through research, outreach, 
and the active dissemination of resources”. One of the major outcomes of this project is the 
multimedia application On Common Ground: World Religions in America (Columbia University 
17 
 
insists that we distinguish plurality as a fact from pluralism as a normative idea 
that requires a kind of engagement “that creates a common society from all that 
plurality” (1997)3. 
This argument leads her to conclude that “pluralism is the dynamic 
process through which we engage with one another in and through our very 
deepest differences” (Eck 2007, 267). Here she distinguishes pluralism as a 
response to plurality much different from other possible responses that, as she 
writes, have been practiced in history. The kinds of responses from which she 
distinguishes pluralism are exclusion, inclusion, and syncretism. Following Eck’s 
assessment, it is evident that these three ways to appropriate plurality are not 
democratic because “exclusion signals an inability or unwillingness to recognize 
or engage the religious or cultural other at all” while inclusion means “wanting 
the religious or cultural other to be included under the umbrella of one’s own 
world, on one’s own terms, in one’s own language, in the structures already 
made – by us” and “it stops short of effective agency for the included” (Eck 
2007, 246). Finally, syncretism is a way of appropriating plurality by “seeking to 
fuse difference into a new creation” thus blurring the specific ways in which 
individual and group autonomy may manifest itself (Eck 2007, 246).  
Inclusion and syncretism might have merit. However, it is not clear how 
these two ways of appropriation can overcome the problems that arise between 
mutually exclusive groups, especially, if they are designed for appropriating 
religious plurality. Much different is pluralism, which is about maintaining the 
integrity of the other and encountering the other in their otherness (Eck 2007, 
246). It “does not require the shedding of distinctive cultural, religious, or 
political differences, but is the effort to create a society out of all these 
differences (Eck 2007, 246). 
The normative idea of pluralism advocated here is democratic in 
character. It can be seen in the three normative criteria it upholds. First, 
                                                                                                                                
Press: 1997) which showcases the religious plurality in America and where Diana Eck takes a 
strong position on distinguishing the empirical fact of plurality from pluralism as an ideal in her 
essay “From diversity to pluralism”. Resources and references of the project are available 




 Essay available in On Common Ground: World Religions in America by Diana Eck and 
the Pluralism Project at Harvard University (Columbia University Press: 1997). It can also be 
accessed at http://www.pluralism.org/encounter/challenges 
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pluralism is “active seeking of understanding across lines of difference” and not 
tolerance because tolerance “is too thin a foundation” for plurality and “it does 
nothing to remove our ignorance of one another, and leaves in place the 
stereotype, the half-truth, the fears that underlie old patterns of division and 
violence” (Eck 1997)4. Second, rather than seeing pluralism as bearing 
resemblance to relativism, Eck argues that pluralism is about “the encounter of 
commitments” because “the new paradigm of pluralism does not require us to 
leave our identities and our commitments behind, for pluralism is the encounter 
of commitments” (Eck 1997). Third, pluralism must be based on dialogue. For 
Eck, “the language of pluralism is that of dialogue and encounter, give and take, 
criticism and self-criticism” (1997). It is not necessary for the outcome of this 
dialogue to be universal agreement between parties. What matters for the 
dialogue is that it “involves commitment to being at the table with one’s 
commitments” (Eck 1997) 
Perhaps, not every democrat will agree to these normative demands as 
characteristically democratic. The case with the third criterion is specifically 
contentious. It is possible to see how it is democratic according to the 
deliberative theory of democracy. However, if we conceive of democracy as a 
form of government where all take part in decision making by some form of 
participation, and if we accept that the demos now consists not in a single 
identity but in plural, then we can see how these criteria promote participation of 
all the groups. In other words, these criteria push for a more inclusive 
democratic politics. 
Eck’s idea of pluralism exemplifies what I am reaching towards with 
Gadamer’s help. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics helps to understand 
why it is necessary to engage with the other in their otherness. He shows that it 
has to do with the problem of understanding itself. I have kept in mind Eck’s 
idea of pluralism when reading Gadamer in order to draw out the relevant 
aspects of his philosophy. As Gadamer established, we read texts with a 
particular question and interest, and with particular prejudices in the foreground. 
Eck’s idea of pluralism has defined the question and interest in reading 
                                            
4
 Reprinted at http://www.pluralism.org/encounter/challenges from Diana Eck’s “From 
diversity to pluralism” in the revised 2006 edition of On Common Ground: World Religions in 
America (Columbia University Press) 
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Gadamer’s Truth and Method for this thesis. It has helped draw Gadamer’s 
principle of openness from his account of hermeneutical experience. 
In order to achieve the aim of this thesis, I have divided it into two main 
parts. In the first part, I look at Habermas’ discourse ethics and Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics. In second part, I show the modes in which 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics can be instantiated in democratic 
politics.  
In Part 1, I establish the role of discourse in democratic politics by 
adapting Habermas’ discourse ethics as oriented towards reaching 
understanding. Discourse ethics helps me secure the link between pluralism, 
discourse, and democratic politics. With Gadamer’s help, I establish the 
problem of incomplete understanding as it emerges in a discourse oriented at 
reaching understanding. Philosophical hermeneutics is particularly useful in 
clarifying how incomplete understanding complicates the commitment to 
pluralism as engagement and encounter. I also appropriate Gadamer’s principle 
of openness from the way he uses ‘hermeneutical experience’ as a type of 
genuine experience that shows one’s finitude and changes one’s 
understanding. 
I am not pitting Habermas and Gadamer against each other. Rather, I 
think that they are close in articulating engagement in dialogical situations 
between people that have little in common but who encounter one another in a 
discourse to reach understanding. I treat them as mutually complementary and 
useful for thinking about bringing the ‘situated’ and ‘detached’ conceptions of 
reasoning together. Gadamer helps push discourse ethics towards taking into 
account the situated nature of understanding by providing an argument about 
the ontological dimensions of human finitude. 
This might seem strange given that Habermas’ and Gadamer’s debate 
about methodologies in social sciences is well known and it is generally 
understood that these two thinkers represent two opposing schools of thought. I 
do not treat the fact that Habermas and Gadamer debated as grounds to 
conclude that they are on the opposite sides. Habermas’ discourse ethics is not 
opposed to hermeneutics. I follow Jean Grondin (2003, 310-311) who writes 
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about the aftermath of Habermas’ debate with Gadamer with a reconciliatory 
tone for the schools of Critical Theory and philosophical hermeneutics. 
Soon after Habermas headed the second generation of the Frankfurt 
School, the platform of ideologiekritik has given way to his theory of 
communicative action. The theory of communicative action is not founded on 
the models of psychoanalysis and critique of ideology, based on which 
Habermas criticized Gadamer. As Grondin puts it, communicative action is 
formed “on the presuppositions embodied in the verbal understandings implicit 
in our life world” (2003, 310). This has led Habermas to abandon the 
“sociologically broadened psychoanalytical model” and connect “himself to the 
concrete dialogical situation” (Grondin 2003, 311). As a result, “Habermas can 
be viewed as approaching precisely the hermeneutical position he had criticized 
at the beginning of seventies” (Grondin 2003, 311). Habermas’ discourse ethics 
is now oriented more towards “the hermeneutic model of coming to an 
understanding” (Grondin 2003, 311). 
Since understanding emerges as a central problem for democratic 
politics in its commitment to pluralism, I read Habermas and Gadamer as 
mutually complementary authors for addressing the challenges that democratic 
politics faces in its commitment to pluralism. Discourse ethics is a suitable 
approach for the problem of incomplete understanding because it provides a 
rationale for rank-ordering values in a world without a common measure of 
value. Since incomplete understanding is a permanent feature of human 
understanding, Habermas too cannot account fully for the problem of 
understanding. Gadamer is helpful in clarifying the problem that incomplete 
understanding poses for democratic politics. He is also helpful in suggesting 
how to address those problems, which is where his principle of openness 
comes in.  
I draw Gadamer’s principle of openness from his account of 
hermeneutical experience. In Truth and Method, Gadamer argues that 
hermeneutical experience is the highest type of experience because it 
recognizes the situatedness of understanding and it is open to the otherness of 
the other. By appropriating this principle from Gadamer, I define its normative 
function in the following manner: openness starts with the recognition of one’s 
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finitude and incomplete understanding. Without this kind of self-understanding, 
there cannot be genuine openness to the other. Following such self-
understanding, the other must be encountered by a question that comes from a 
genuine interest in the other’s otherness, and ends with an engagement where 
the otherness of the other challenges one’s prejudices and, perhaps, changes 
one’s self-understanding and understanding of the other. What one needs to be 
open for is precisely difference and otherness that challenges what one already 
knows, assumes, and understands.  
It is necessary to pause here in order to establish what the concepts of 
‘the other’, ‘understanding’, ‘engagement’, and ‘encounter’ mean and how they 
function in the thesis.  
I appropriated the concept of ‘the other’ from Gadamer. For him, ‘the 
other’ has strangeness and alienation, which “is inextricably given with the 
individuality of the Thou” (Gadamer 2013, 186). This individuality is a product of 
the totality of life-experience of the Thou that cannot be reduced to any of its 
parts. It is not possible to fully overcome or appropriate this strangeness 
because the whole life-experience of the Thou cannot be reduced to one of its 
parts. It is also not possible to relive the totality of “the other’s” life-experience. 
Therefore, a genuinely open relationship with the other can only be the kind 
where the other discloses their otherness to us and we allow this otherness to 
confront us.  
Thus, in this thesis, I do not limit ‘the other’ to the culturally, religiously, or 
ethnically different people. I use it more broadly as an entity that has an 
irreducible strangeness to “me” as a subject encountering “the other”. This 
encounter must not mean that “I”, the subject, encounter “the strange other”, an 
object. “I” must not appropriate the strangeness; on the contrary, “my” aim is to 
allow this strangeness to confront “me” in this encounter. This strangeness 
comes with the individuality of each person. In each and every case, the other is 
one whose otherness is his/her own. But “the otherness” between two entities is 
embedded in their relatedness because “the other” is strange in relation to “me”, 
not to itself. So the idea of pluralism as engagement and encounter requires 
that rather than stripping our differences, which breaks from this relatedness, 
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we need to engage and encounter one another as different others, i.e. in our 
otherness to each other. The encounter is between two subjects.  
With regards to ‘understanding’, this thesis makes two claims on the 
concept of understanding. On the one hand understanding is always incomplete 
in virtue of the ontological dimension of human finitude as shown by Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics. This is an ontological claim that underpins all forms 
understanding; it is the fundamental presupposition I make in using the term “to 
understand” or “understanding” in this thesis. Therefore, understanding is 
incomplete. On the other hand, pluralism requires that we always engage and 
encounter the other in their otherness to reach an understanding with them. 
Incomplete understanding means that there is never a point in engagement and 
encounter that can be identified as the final point in understanding. This renders 
the requirement of pluralism as engagement and encounter of the other in their 
otherness a radical demand to always remain open for the other to assert their 
otherness.  
Keeping in mind the fundamental presupposition of incompleteness, the 
concept of understanding operates in two modes in this thesis. First, it applies 
to the dialogical engagement about something that requires agreement. Here, 
understanding operates in its epistemological mode as a cognitive process of 
making sense of an object like a text or a speech-act. This mode of 
understanding involves interpretation, and therefore, understanding is 
interpretation of what the other is saying in a dialogue about something. 
Second, understanding operates in the mode of self-understanding, which 
enables one to have a world-view, an understanding of the world that comes 
from one’s hermeneutical situation. For Gadamer, it is one’s finite horizon; 
whereas for Habermas it is the perspective one holds, something that one has 
within the “provincial limits of their own particular form of life” (Habermas 1990, 
202). Given the hermeneutical argument that understanding is conditioned by 
one’s hermeneutical situation, it follows that the epistemological mode of 
understanding directed at agreement is conditioned by self-understanding. 
Therefore, I subject understanding as it operates in the mode of self-
understanding to the principle of openness at the level of pluralism as 
engagement and encounter of the other in their otherness. I believe that 
openness to the otherness leads to a more critical self-understanding: a 
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hermeneutical awareness of one’s finitude and incomplete understanding, 
which leads to greater openness to what the other has to say. The 
understanding that is reached by engagement and encounter is a form of 
understanding that, in Gadamer’s case has expanded one’s horizon and in 
Habermas’ case has taken one beyond their “provincial limits”. There is no 
paradox in saying that coming to awareness of one’s finitude leads to 
expansion. An encounter with the other discloses the limits of one’s world-view, 
one’s incomplete understanding, one’s finitude. What the other discloses apart 
from their otherness to one’s self in this encounter are one’s prejudices that 
make up that finitude. It is precisely awareness of one’s finitude that leads one 
to be open for the otherness to assert itself against one’s prejudices and allows 
one to expand the limits of incomplete understanding.  
The understanding to be reached by engagement and encounter in the 
context of pluralism is different from agreement, which is required in contexts 
where there is disagreement with the other about something. The principles of 
pluralism apply to engaging and encountering the other in their otherness, 
which is on a different level from engaging and encountering the other in order 
to reach an understanding about something. Reaching an understanding about 
something is usually an end of a dialogical engagement with the other on 
something about which there might be disagreement. Here, understanding 
conceived as agreement involves the epistemological mode of understanding 
whereby one understands the other’s point of view and what the other is saying 
by interpreting it. This mode of understanding, however, cannot extend to the 
level of pluralism and lead to understanding the other in their otherness in the 
form of cognitive reduction of the other and intellectual appropriation of their 
otherness. The ontological dimension of human finitude in incomplete 
understanding does not allow that. Ignoring this thesis and extending 
understanding the other’s point of view and agreement reached, or not reached, 
about something to understanding the other as such betrays the principle of 
pluralism. 
Moreover, incomplete understanding means that the agreement itself 
cannot be final. This claim has radical implications when taken to its improbable 
extreme. For example, there is no disagreement about the constitutional 
essentials such as separation of powers, due process, rule of law, and freedom 
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of speech. These are all ideas that are capable of withstanding a debate on 
whether they are actually the right ideas for a democratic constitution. However, 
in keeping faithful to the ontological claim of finitude, it makes sense to render 
agreement on these constitutional essentials as not final and open for 
contestation. If we are to remain faithful to incomplete understanding, despite 
the rightness of our agreement, then all agreements, even constitutional ones, 
cannot have finality because they are achieved by beings with incomplete 
understanding. This does not amount to rejection of the binding character of the 
constitution or forfeit the idea of constitutionalism. Constitutional essentials, and 
the very idea of constitutionalism, I think, have a binding character only if they 
are capable of withstanding the challenge by an otherness, however radically 
other that otherness may be.  
We reach an understanding with the other in pluralism through 
engagement and encounter of the other in their otherness.  By engagement I 
mean holding a dialogue. The phrase “encountering the other”, however, 
requires a critical account of the way it is operating in the thesis.  
In ordinary language, an “encounter” involves meeting, facing, or 
experiencing something unexpected. We can “encounter” an unexpected 
situation, a person, an experience, or a problem. Some people “encounter” 
death. If we follow language, the root word “counter”, coming from Latin contra, 
unavoidably points at one being against the other. Therefore, “encounter” 
denotes a coming upon, a meeting of an adversity, or an adversary, something 
that needs to be overcome right in the time and space the “encounter” takes 
place. Why then pluralism as engagement and encounter of the other in their 
otherness according to the principle of openness? Does not encounter pre-
define the form of engagement as hostile or at least adversarial? And how can 
such a denotation of “encounter” be associated with openness?  
In this thesis, I show how encountering the other in their otherness 
enables hermeneutical experience that leads to hermeneutical consciousness. 
In chapter 2, I develop an account of hermeneutical experience as a negative 
experience that leads to expansion of one’s horizon based on Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics. With Gadamer’s help, I argue that negative 
experience is a genuine kind of experience because it has the potential to 
25 
 
illuminate not only one’s misconceptions and misunderstandings, but also the 
particularity and situatedness of one’s incomplete understanding. Negative 
experience illuminates the prejudices of one’s understanding. Hermeneutical 
consciousness, on the other hand, is consciousness of one’s prejudices. It is a 
form of self-understanding that is aware of its finitude, particularity, and 
situatedness. Hermeneutical experience and consciousness lead to openness, 
but they are not possible without encountering the other in their otherness.  
Encounter is, therefore, from the start a coming upon and meeting of 
other in their otherness because the otherness is part of the other’s individuality 
and that otherness is other only over and against what is my own self-
understanding. In the encounter, we do not extinguish the otherness by 
adopting a neutral stance. It is ourselves that we put forwards against the 
otherness of the other. It is our prejudices we put to the challenge by the 
otherness, not the other as an adversary to us. And if this encounter and 
engagement is at all hermeneutical according to the principle of openness, then 
it must lead to revision of prejudices and a change in our own self-
understanding if necessary, or a more enlightened awareness of the conditions 
of our own understanding.  
The implication of such a notion of encounter precludes moral respect 
accepted in deliberative democracy in its Kantian formulation. An encounter is 
not neutral, we do not extinguish ourselves. If we do, the other ceases to be 
other to us; the relationality and belongingness between us is lost. Moral 
respect requires neutrality and extinguishing ourselves in order to take the 
other’s perspective. In chapter 2, I develop an account of “transposing” that falls 
short of the idea of moral respect. I develop this account based on Gadamer 
and suggest that encounter requires “transposing” of ourselves into the other’s 
situation. It is ourselves that we transpose into the other’s perspective in order 
to see them in their alterity, their otherness. We transpose ourselves with our 
prejudices and situated understanding. The other can present themselves as 
such and assert their otherness against our prejudices only if we foreground the 
prejudices of our hermeneutic situation that condition our incomplete 
understanding. It gives the other agency and autonomy. Moral respect robs 
them of this kind of agency and autonomy because by practicing moral respect 
we imagine and understand things for them. 
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In Part 2, I draw from Iris Young, John Dryzek, and Chantal Mouffe in 
order to politicise, concretize, and democratize Gadamer’s idea of situated 
understanding and principle of openness. In a certain sense, I establish how 
Gadamer’s account of hermeneutical situation and principle of openness 
translate into democratic politics. I show how Young’s concept of “social groups” 
and Dryzek’s conception of “discourse” gives a concrete and political 
expression to hermeneutical situation. I also show how Mouffe’s concept of 
“antagonism” shows the problems that can emerge when situated 
understanding is given its expression in politics. I appropriate “asymmetric 
reciprocity” from Young, “reflexivity” from Dryzek, and “agonism” from Mouffe as 
the modes in which Gadamer’s principle of openness can be instantiated in 
democratic politics.  
Since Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics helps push discourse 
ethics towards recognizing the role of situated understanding and accepting 
particularities in deliberation, Young, Dryzek, and Mouffe help articulate the 
ways in which situated conception of understanding can be incorporated into 
discourse ethics. All three thinkers argue that the rationality of discourse ethics 
must be weakened in order to allow other forms of communication that let 
people express their particularities and situated understandings of social and 
political affairs. They also recognize the significance of interpretive conflicts in 
democratic politics, which is particularly useful given that I aim to preserve 
conflict between different others in the form of interpretive conflicts. I 
appropriate Young’s idea of “social perspective”, Dryzek’s idea of “contestation 
between discourses” and Mouffe’s “agonistic contestation” as modes in which 
interpretive conflicts can take place in democratic politics.  
Now, while Young’s and Dryzek’s proximity to Habermas’ deliberative 
democracy is uncontested, serious concerns can be raised about including 
Mouffe among these theorists. Indeed, it is strange to include Mouffe here given 
that she styles herself as an opponent to the deliberative models of democracy 
and proposes an alternative model known as ‘agonistic pluralism’.  
I argue that the terms and definitions of Mouffe’s agonism bring her 
closer to the core ideas of deliberative democracy than she is willing to admit. 
The core ideas of deliberative democracy are contained in Habermas’ discourse 
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ethics.  I show that she needs to rely on the assumptions of discourse ethics in 
order to articulate an agonistic mode of contestation that requires a 
transformation of enemies into adversaries. By definition, agonism is a struggle 
between equal adversaries who agree to the same rules of contestation and 
engage with one another discursively based on a meta-consensus in the form of 
prior agreement on adherence to such principles as liberty and equality. These 
are procedural agreements that are at the core of deliberative democracy. They 
are made possible by discourse ethics. I show how Mouffe appropriates 
discourse ethics and has to rely on it in order to sustain agonistic contestation 
the way she intends.  
Mouffe may not endorse this claim because agonistic democracy is 
intended and accepted as an alternative theory to deliberative democracy. In 
order to address this problem, it is necessary to clarify the version of 
deliberative democracy to which agonism will not bond. Agonism is an 
incompatible alternative to the forms of deliberative democracy that have not 
recognized her concerns about antagonism, consensus, and the deliberative 
procedures. For example, an agonism that emphasises passion is incompatible 
with deliberative democracy that is intransigent about its emphasis on neutral 
and rational argumentation; agonism that denies the very possibility of inclusive 
consensus is incompatible with deliberative democracy that binds legitimacy to 
consensus; an agonism that emphasises conversion is incompatible with a 
deliberative democracy that emphasises persuasion; and agonism that upholds 
the value of conflict as a resource for democratic politics is incompatible with 
deliberative democracy that upholds cooperation and compromise.  
It must be evident that Mouffe’s theory of agonistic democracy is not 
compatible with Habermas’ model of deliberative democracy. This 
incompatibility, however, cannot extend to Young and Dryzek, who are critics of 
Habermas’ model, who are concerned with the rationalism, universalism, and 
the abstractions of Habermas’ discourse ethics, who have accepted consensus 
in a form that is open to further challenges by other groups, and who have 
explicitly shown how their appropriations of discourse ethics accommodate the 
agonistic criticisms of discourse ethics (see Dryzek 2010, 113; Young 2000, 49-
50). Furthermore, given that philosophical hermeneutics shows how situated 
understanding gives rise to interpretive conflicts, it is valuable to read these 
28 
 
three thinkers as compatible in addressing different dimensions of this problem 
in politics and how the principle of openness can be instantiated in accordance 
with each. With Young, we come to understand that one of the dimensions of 
interpretive conflicts is group perspective that is a valuable resource for 
democratic politics in shifting the playing field and giving a more differentiated 
picture of the common, and that openness here must be instantiated as 
asymmetric reciprocity; with Dryzek, we come to understand that the other 
dimension of interpretive conflicts is the way particular discourses constitute 
politics, their role in including the lateral complexities of an issue and 
representing the whole system of interconnected elements in the social 
structure, and that openness here must be instantiated as reflexivity. With 
Mouffe, we come to understand that yet another dimension of interpretive 
conflicts is the way they allow for democratic outlets that express antagonism, 
which otherwise risks returning in the form of extremist populism and violence, 
and that openness here must be instantiated as agonism. Thus, these three 
thinkers show different but complementary aspects of democratic politics as 
they emerge when we accept the situated nature of understanding.  
An additional question I aim to address with Mouffe is how to practice 
openness towards the other who challenges our basic principles and who might 
pose an antagonistic relationship to us. I develop an account of agonism as an 
instantiation of openness in cases of antagonism by building on Mouffe’s 
categorical distinctions between enemy and adversary and her theory of 
agonistic contestation. Her categories, I believe, allow us to distinguish between 
those against whom we will struggle while remaining open to their 
interpretations of the same principles, and those against whom (racists, sexists, 
extremists) we might engage in a struggle for the principles themselves and our 
rights to uphold them. 
The main value that Mouffe offers this thesis is a way to envision an 
honest commitment to pluralism. If we are to remain committed to pluralism, 
then we must be ready to engage and encounter the kinds of others that deny 
pluralism its rightful place in democratic societies. Thus, in chapter 5, I consider 
how pluralism can still be possible if we acknowledge the antagonistic 
dimension of politics. Mouffe helps us observe openness when encountering 
others with whom we might have mutually exclusive claims, or others that deny 
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the principles that we abide by. In these cases, if democratic politics is 
committed to pluralism, then it is necessary to find an appropriate instantiation 
of the principle of openness. I worry that this principle does not give guidance 
about encountering the kinds of others that might deny the principle itself. I 
worry about people that claim ultimate truths and superior positions. I worry that 
these people can hijack the expression of particularity and situated 
understanding in deliberation and appeal to the principle of openness to 
threaten the very commitment to democratic politics and pluralism. Mouffe helps 
me answer the question ‘how can we practice openness towards the other that 
is our enemy, with whom we are in a conflictual relationship that entails mutual 
exclusion’. To answer this question, I appropriate ‘agonism’ as a mode of 
openness for engaging and encountering others who deny the very principles of 
openness and democracy. 
Outline of chapters 
The structure of this thesis consists in five chapters.  
In Chapter 1, I establish the connection between pluralism, discourse, 
and democratic politics. Drawing on Habermas’ discourse ethics, I show the role 
of discourse as a required element of democratic politics that is committed to 
pluralism as engagement and encounter. I start with the general outline of the 
deliberative theory of democracy and identify incomplete understanding as one 
of the main problems in plural societies. I draw this problem from Gutmann and 
Thompson, who argue that moral disagreement and division are in part 
attributable to incomplete understanding. They describe this problem as part of 
the human condition. Given that I am pushing for the idea of pluralism as 
engagement and encounter of the other, understanding across differences is an 
important element to consider. Since incomplete understanding is part of the 
human condition, I posit it as the central problem that must be addressed by 
democratic politics committed to pluralism.  
Habermas helps establish the role of discourse in addressing the 
problem of incomplete understanding in plural societies. For him, discourse is a 
problem solving mechanism for situations when understanding breaks down. In 
order to function as a problem solving mechanism, discourse must be 
deontological, cognitivist, formal, and universal. I show how discourse ethics 
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fulfils these requirements in virtue of its elements of rational discourse and 
consensus, and the discourse and universalization principles. Thus, I treat 
discourse ethics as consisting in the procedures and standards of rational 
communication through which incomplete understanding can be addressed. 
From Habermas’ perspective, communication can break down because 
of incomplete understanding. Parties may misunderstand the general norm that 
underlines communicative action, or contest it. Democratic societies have 
discourse to fall back on in order to restore understanding. By contrast, non-
democratic societies can resort to violence and coercion in order to restore 
understanding. Thus, discourse allows maintaining the link between democratic 
politics and pluralism. Given the plurality of values, communicative action and 
understanding are bound to break down because of misunderstanding or 
contestation. In these situations, parties fall into discourse mode of 
communication where they apply norms and principles of discourse ethics in 
order to restore understanding. 
In chapter 2, I show why incomplete understanding is a permanent 
feature of human understanding that gives rise to interpretive conflicts and how 
to approach this problem in pluralism.  I do so by turning to Gadamer, whose 
philosophical hermeneutics is helpful in clarifying how incomplete understanding 
complicates engagement and encounter of the other. Based on Gadamer’s 
account of the ontological dimensions of human finitude, I conceive incomplete 
understanding as partial and situated understanding within the hermeneutical 
situation.  
With Gadamer’s help, I also establish the role of encountering and 
engaging the other in addressing the problem of incomplete understanding. I 
argue that an integral part of addressing incomplete understanding is self-
understanding. Gadamer’s principle of openness suggests that a fuller self-
understanding can be achieved by being open to encounter and engagement of 
the other in their otherness. I draw this principle from Gadamer’s use of 
hermeneutical experience and consciousness as constituting the structure of his 
‘historically effected consciousness’ as a regulative idea in ‘fusion of horizons’. 
More specifically, I draw the principle of openness from Gadamer’s use of 
‘hermeneutical consciousness’, which he regards as a genuine form of 
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experience that shows things in a new light and changes one’s self-
understanding.  
In the concluding section of the chapter, I show how interpretive aspects 
of understanding impact discourse ethics by drawing on Georgia Warnke’s 
hermeneutical critique of deliberative democracy. Given the hermeneutical view 
of incomplete understanding, encounter and engagement across differences 
can take the form of interpretive conflicts. Having shown that interpretive 
conflicts cannot be avoided, I argue that Habermas’ division between ethical 
and moral forms of discourse cannot be sustained because interpretive conflicts 
blur the distinction. The conclusion of this critique is that interpretive conflicts 
are unavoidable but are significant for democratic politics. Habermas resists 
admitting their significance, but it can be shown how discourse ethics can allow 
interpretive conflicts by drawing on his critics Iris Young, John Dryzek, and 
Chantal Mouffe. Therefore, in the chapters that follow, I turn to these theorists. 
In chapters 3-5 I examine Young’s, Dryzek’s, and Mouffe’s critical 
appropriations of Habermas’ discourse ethics. My main aim is to establish how 
these theorists recognize the significance of interpretive conflicts and how 
Gadamer’s principle of openness can be instantiated in democratic politics. The 
common claim I make in these chapters is that if the hermeneutical argument 
on incomplete understanding is accepted, and if the critique of discourse ethics 
in light of the problem of interpretive conflicts is accepted, then it is necessary to 
turn to Young, Dryzek, and Mouffe in order to reckon with the problems of 
incomplete understanding and interpretive conflicts in pluralism.  
 In chapter 3, I develop an account of asymmetric reciprocity as a mode 
of instantiation of Gadamer’s principle of openness in democratic politics. To do 
so, I draw from Young’s account of “social groups” and “asymmetric reciprocity”. 
I establish three aspects of her work. First, I establish how Young’s concept of 
“social groups” expresses Gadamer’s idea of hermeneutical situation. Social 
groups, for Young, characterize the plurality in modern societies. They are 
different from other kinds of groups because membership in a social group is 
based on affinity rather than aggregation or association. One is a member of a 
social group in virtue of one’s social position, and one’s understanding of social 
and political affairs is situated within the social position. Second, I establish how 
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Young’s idea of social groups leads her to recognize the significance of 
interpretive conflicts. For Young, interpretive conflicts allow social group 
perspectives to be included as a resource for democratic politics. Discourse 
ethics comes short in including perspectives because of its requirements of 
rationality, universalism, and abstraction. Thus, Young offers procedural 
correctives that allow greeting, storytelling, and rhetoric as modes of 
communication through which social groups can disclose their social 
perspectives. I establish it as Young’s way of engaging and encountering the 
other in their otherness. Openness to otherness can be practiced by allowing 
the others to tell their stories and use rhetorical devices in ways that influence 
and change current understanding. Third, I establish Young’s asymmetric 
reciprocity as a mode of instantiation of Gadamer’s principle of openness in 
democratic politics. Asymmetric reciprocity is a mode of moral respect in which 
social groups present their perspectives through different forms of 
communication and challenge established prejudices. I appropriate it as a mode 
of openness that comes from recognition of finitude and allows the encounter 
and engagement of the other in their otherness.  
Asymmetric reciprocity contrasts with the Habermasian idea of moral 
respect, which requires one to take a moral point of view by hypothetically 
imagining the other’s point of view. I draw on Young’s argument that such moral 
respect is impossible because taking another person’s point of view requires 
reliving the totality of their life-experience, which is an impossible task.  
Asymmetric reciprocity comes from the recognition that the other poses a 
certain strangeness that cannot be reduced to any part of the totality of its lived 
experience. People are asymmetric with regards to their temporality and 
position. People are asymmetric in temporal sense because of the history of 
their position. I draw on Young’s argument that “each position brings to a 
communication situation the particular experiences, assumptions, meanings, 
symbolic associations, and so on, that emerge from a particular history, most of 
which lies at the background to the communicative situation” (1997, 51). In the 
mode of asymmetric reciprocity, history is always subject to retelling in new 
contexts and therefore, one cannot assume to view things accurately from 
another’s historical lived experience. There is also asymmetry with regards to 
what Young calls “specificity of position”, which is one’s social position 
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“structured by the configuration of relationships among positions” (1997, 52). 
One cannot view things from the social perspective exactly as the other does. 
Therefore, one must approach the other in the mode of asymmetric reciprocity, 
which requires being open to the other sharing their perspective from their 
position. These features of asymmetric reciprocity are consonant with 
Gadamer’s principle of openness. Thus, I appropriate asymmetric reciprocity as 
a mode of instantiating Gadamer’s principle in democratic politics. 
 In chapter 4, I develop an account of reflexivity as a mode of 
instantiation of Gadamer’s principle of openness in democratic politics. I do so 
by drawing from Dryzek’s account of the constitutive features of particular 
discourses and the reflexive action that is required to counter these features. I 
establish three aspects of his work. First, I establish how Dryzek’s take on 
particular discourses is the expression of Gadamer’s idea of hermeneutical 
situation. Dryzek argues that particular discourses in part constitute politics and 
identity. Therefore, it can be established that one’s understanding is in part 
situated within particular discourses. Second, I examine the terms in which 
interpretive conflicts can take place when plurality is conceived in terms of 
particular discourses. For Dryzek, it is important that interpretive conflicts do not 
manifest as conflict between identities. Therefore, given his argument that 
discourses constitute identities, he proposes to conceive of interpretive conflicts 
as contest between particular discourses. Third, I establish reflexivity as mode 
in which Gadamer’s principle of openness can be instantiated in democratic 
politics.  
By drawing on Dryzek, I develop an account of reflexivity as a kind of 
(critical) reflectiveness that is induced by encountering the other. I develop it as 
a mode of self-understanding that makes one aware of one’s particular 
discursive space that has had a history of effect from past and present 
understandings, interpretive articulations, persuasions, prejudices, and 
traditions. A reflexive person is one who is aware that his/her understanding is 
always incomplete, who is aware that his/her understanding of the other is 
always subject to what one already knows/holds and therefore subject to 
change, and who is aware that his/her position is always from within 
hermeneutical situation, and who is aware that his/her reflexivity is induced and 
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supported by openness to the other. Also included in reflexivity is awareness 
that actions and practices constitute and reconstitute the world.  
 In chapter 5, I develop an account of agonism as a mode of openness 
towards the other, who might pose an antagonistic relationship. I do so by 
drawing on Mouffe’s account of the ontological dimension of antagonism and 
her normative move from the category of “enemy” to “adversary” in order to 
transform “antagonism” to “agonism.” I establish four aspects of Mouffe’s work. 
First, I establish how in interpretive conflicts understanding between different 
others can break down and transform the relationship into a form of 
antagonism. Second, I show Mouffe’s reliance on discourse ethics in order to 
make the normative move from “enemy” to “adversary”. For her, we can 
transform our relationship as enemies into relationship as adversaries if we 
have a common political-ethical bond in our allegiance to such values as liberty 
and equality. I show why this move must presuppose discourse ethics. Third, I 
establish how agonism allows the recognition of significance of interpretive 
conflicts. Agonistic struggle between adversaries is by definition struggle 
between different interpretations of common political-ethical values. Fourth, 
based on these three aspects, I establish how agonism can be understood as a 
political instantiation of Gadamer’s principle of openness that gives democratic 
politics capacity to protect the ideal of pluralism from those that deny the 
principle of openness and its instantiations in democratic politics. 
I appropriate agonism as a protective mode of instantiation of openness. 
I appropriate it with its central category of “adversary”, “the opponent with whom 
one shares a common allegiance to the democratic principles of ‘liberty and 
equality for all’, while disagreeing about their interpretation” (Mouffe 2013, 7). In 
this appropriation, I follow Wenman’s suggestion (2003) that Mouffe offers a 
quasi-republican constitutional framework for democratic politics. In the mode of 
agonism, openness can be practiced against those who contest the very 
commitment to pluralism and democratic politics within set constitutional 
constraints. Agonism is a mode of openness in which engagement and 
encounter of the other takes place in light of a common ethical-political bond in 
adherence to such values as liberty and equality, and a common commitment to 
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Foreword to Part One 
Habermas and Gadamer help approach the problem of incomplete 
understanding through a conception of discourse that can be based on the 
presuppositions of ordinary use of language that does not require people to 
have a lot in common. I treat discourse ethics and philosophical hermeneutics 
as complementary with regards to the question of coming to understanding 
through discourse. Their apparent similarities have been noted before (see How 
1995; Simms 2015). Gadamer expresses it himself during their debate: “I no 
longer know what we are arguing about” (1986, 286). 
In this part, I will establish the problem of incomplete understanding as it 
is recognized in deliberative democracy. Then, by drawing on Habermas’ 
discourse ethics, I will show how the problem of incomplete understanding can 
be addressed through discourse without breaking the link between pluralism 
and democratic politics. In chapter 2, I will show how Gadamer helps clarify the 
way incomplete understanding complicates the commitment to engagement and 
encounter of the other in democratic politics. Drawing on philosophical 
hermeneutics, I show why incomplete understanding is a permanent feature of 
human understanding and how it gives rise to interpretive conflicts. Based on 
Gadamer’s account of hermeneutical experience, I will establish that his 
principle of openness is suitable for beings with incomplete understanding. On 
the basis of this principle, I will argue that discourse ethics must accept situated 
understanding in its partial and particular expressions in order to fully address 
the problem of incomplete understanding through engagement and encounter of 




Chapter I  
Pluralism and Discourse 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to establish the connection between pluralism, 
discourse, and democratic politics. I argue that discourse is an indispensable 
element for democratic politics committed to affirming pluralism as engagement 
and encounter. This argument is possible from the perspective of deliberative 
democracy. In Section 1.1, I establish the way deliberative democracy 
characterizes the challenges of plurality in terms of incomplete understanding. 
In Section 1.2, I establish that the problem of incomplete understanding in plural 
societies can be approached through Habermas’ discourse ethics. In Section 
1.3, I establish the role of discourse as a problem solving mechanism and 
medium for dialogical engagement in democratic politics committed to pluralism. 
Here, I will also question the extent to which Habermas’ discourse ethics is able 
to affirm pluralism as engagement and encounter of the other. I show that his 
conception of understanding and moral claim of intersubjectivity fall short in 
affirming engagement and encounter of the other in their otherness. 
Deliberative democracy is often presented and understood in contrast to 
aggregative models of democracy. Deliberative democrats like Manin argue that 
aggregative models of democracy understand pluralism in terms of pluralism of 
the market (1987, 353ff). The general argument in deliberative democracy is 
that this pushes aggregative models to use the language and logic of the free 
market. A free market system requires a plurality of agents and products that 
compete for the consumer. Pluralism in the market keeps prices competitive 
and quality of the products reasonably high. It also means possibility of choice, 
which keeps the consumer free from suffering the consequences of a 
monopolized market. When applied to the political sphere, for deliberative 
democrats, it means that democratic politics operates in terms of the neoclassic 
economics. Just like producers compete for consumers in market pluralism, 
political pluralism consists in competition among different interests and 
preferences. According to the deliberative critique, political pluralism of the 
aggregative models inundates democratic politics with the logics and methods 
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of bargaining, trimming, and negotiating among the different interests. This way, 
democratic politics operates in terms of the methods of appealing to those 
interests according to the market logic. As James Fishkin puts it: aggregative 
models assume citizens to make political choices the way they choose 
detergents (1991, 3)  
The deliberative thesis offers a form of democracy in which the 
processes of formation of interests and preferences are also part of democratic 
politics. In Section 1.1, I establish the merits of the deliberative thesis for 
democratic politics. The aim of this section is to show that in the deliberative 
camp theorists engage with plurality in a way that is closer to the problem of 
understanding (they call it consensus). I focus specifically on Amy Gutmann and 
Denis Thompson’s version of deliberative democracy. Their work raises the 
curtain on the challenges of plurality that have to do with understanding. For 
them, acute problems in plural societies are attributable to incommensurable 
values and incomplete understanding. In response, they argue that democratic 
politics must include the principles of reciprocity and moral respect. However, I 
argue that their emphasis on deliberation as means to mitigate incomplete 
understanding is limited in addressing the problem of understanding for the idea 
of pluralism as engagement and encounter of the other. Gutmann and 
Thompson conceive of incomplete understanding as a having to do with human 
condition. It is an ontological claim.  
For such a claim, their “deliberation” is too narrow for unfolding the 
problem of understanding to a fuller extent. I aim to establish discourse as a 
more suitable concept for this task. It is broad enough to include the technical 
procedures of deliberation, as well as other forms of engagement and 
encounter of the other. Discourse allows us to work out the challenge of 
incomplete understanding as part of the human condition.  
Therefore, in Section 1.2, I turn to the way Habermas conceives of 
discourse as an element of democratic politics. For him, discourse is a 
necessary problem solving mechanism in democratic politics. He argues that 
when understanding breaks down, modern democratic societies resort to 
discourse in order to restore it. Here I will present the four requirements that 
Habermas thinks discourse ought to fulfil: namely, that discourse must be 
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deontological, cognitivist, formal, and universal. Then, I examine the elements 
and principles of Habermas discourse ethics, which fulfil these requirements. By 
doing so, I aim to establish the role of discourse in democratic politics that aims 
to affirm pluralism as engagement and encounter.  
In Section 1.3, I establish the role of discourse in supporting pluralism as 
engagement and encounter of the other in democratic politics. I argue that 
engagement and encounter of the other is a democratic practice because it 
allows greater autonomy. Engaging and encountering the other in discourse 
allows the other to disclose its otherness to us. I draw three relevant functions 
of discourse: first, I take discourse as a problem solving mechanism for cases 
when communication breaks down between different others; second, as a 
medium in which the problem of incomplete understanding can be unfolded 
more fully and mitigated; third, as a medium where engagement and encounter 
of the other in their otherness can take place. I conclude the section by 
highlighting two ways in which discourse ethics comes short in fulfilling these 
functions: first one has to do with the narrow definition of understanding in 
Habermas and second with the ambiguity that arises with the moral claim of 
intersubjectivity in light of our commitment to engaging and encountering the 
other in their otherness.  
1.1 Deliberative Democracy: moral disagreement and incomplete 
understanding 
 Deliberative theorists of democracy usually contrast themselves with 
aggregative models and argue that “the source of legitimacy is not the 
predetermined will of individuals, but rather the process of its formation, that is, 
deliberation itself” (Manin 1987, 351; see also Bohman and Rehg 1997). One of 
the versions of deliberative democracy is advocated by Gutmann and 
Thompson in their seminal Democracy and Disagreement (1996). I think these 
two thinkers indicate the way in which we can begin to understand the 
challenge of plurality as also consisting in moral disagreement that can be due 
to incomplete understanding. 
It is useful to look at Gutmann and Thompson’s work in the context of 
two common aspects that belong to deliberative theories of democracy: 
deliberation as a will formation process and the Kantian grounds for legitimacy. 
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It will help highlight aspects of Gutmann and Thompson’s theory that are 
important to us (incomplete understanding), and contrast it with Habermas’ 
strand of deliberative democracy based on discourse ethics. Gutmann and 
Thompson reject Habermas’ discourse ethics but remain on similar Kantian 
grounds with him. They rely on rational intersubjective deliberation and 
consensus as grounds for justification of decision-making in plural societies 
(1996, 17; 2004, 95-124). In this research, I take their emphasis on incomplete 
understanding as one of the sources of moral disagreement in plural societies 
but reject their solution. 
Broadly defined, deliberative democracy includes “any one of a family of 
views according to which the public deliberation of free and equal citizens is the 
core of legitimate political decision-making and self-governance” (Bohman 
1998, 401). The common argument in all deliberative theories of democracy is 
about grounding the legitimacy of democratic politics not on the procedural 
methods of aggregation of the wills but on the process of formation of wills – 
deliberation (Manin 1987; Bohman and Rehg 1997, ix-xviii). This makes 
deliberative theories more suitable to the demands of plural societies because 
legitimacy is grounded on the extent of fairness in the form of “rational 
legislation”, inclusiveness of its “participatory politics”, and autonomy of the 
deliberative process (Bohman and Rehg 1997, ix). Furthermore, in contrast to 
democratic theories that adhere to the classical doctrine of pluralism,  
deliberative theories of democracy do not take interests and preferences as 
given (see Dryzek 1990, 2002; Fishkin 1992; Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 
2004; Habermas 1990, 1993, 1996; Macedo 1999; Manin 1987; Young 2000). 
Rather, they see deliberation as a process that can transform interests, change 
preferences, and form the collective will. Furthermore, they do not presume that 
citizens know and understand their needs fully. Therefore, the aim of 
deliberation is “to offer voters not only a range of solutions, among which they 
may choose according to predetermined needs, but also to enlighten them 
about their needs, and have them weigh the options presented by the parties” 
(Manin 1987, 355-356). By implication, deliberative democracy does not employ 
logic and methods of market economy in democratic politics. It does not 
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supplant its understanding of plurality in the political-deliberative forum with 
pluralism in the market5 (see, for instance, Manin 1987, 353ff). 
Another common thread deliberative theories have is the Kantian 
grounding of of legitimacy. They require deliberating parties to demonstrate that 
their interest is generalizable against the background of different other interests. 
Their move from plurality of interests to forming a collective will on one interest 
consists of the “incentives for generalization” that the deliberative process 
inherently has (Manin 1987; Gutmann and Thompson 1996). For example, 
Manin writes: 
[…] universalism […] is not assumed at the start. It seems 
rather to be the ideal term of the process. In truth, no party will 
ever become an actually universal party; there will always 
remain opponents; this is the core of political pluralism. 
Nevertheless the structure of the deliberative system usually 
makes the protagonists strive to enlarge their points of view 
and propose more and more general positions. There is a sort 
of competition for generality. The deliberative process never 
results in strictly universal proposals; universality remains the 
unattainable end, but the system provides an incentive to 
generalization (Manin 1987, 359). 
Gutmann and Thompson develop their version of deliberative democracy 
in Democracy and Disagreement (1996). In Why Deliberative Democracy 
(2004), they define deliberative democracy as follows: “deliberative democracy 
[is] … a form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their 
representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one another 
reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of 
reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to 
challenge in the future” (7). I highlight their emphasis on the way plurality 
                                            
5
 Consider Manin’s distinctions between the citizen and consumer, and, thus, between 
the political fora and marketplace (Manin 1987, 355-357). It is less common that the citizen is 
immediately aware of the scope of the social and political problems that surround him/her, 
whereas it is more common that the consumer understands and knows their own immediate 
problem. The decisions of the citizen as a voter do not give immediate results as do the 
decisions of the consumer. Furthermore, in the case of the citizen, decision indirectly affects 
contexts and groups beyond the immediate situation whereas the consumer’s decision has 
direct effects on his/her own immediate situation. Unlike in the political fora, the exact 
knowledge consumers have on their needs allows them to choose from a plurality of options 
one that directly corresponds to their need. What aggregative models do is just collect citizen 
votes. By contrast, deliberative democrats argue the politics should involve a process for 
clarifying those needs and justifying them as well. Such a process potentially changes interests 
and preferences. In this sense I argue that deliberative democracy does not take plurality as a 
simple given but tries to go beyond into the processes that constitute plurality. 
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harbours moral disagreement, the sources of which can be traced back to 
scarcity of resources, human nature, incompatible values, or incomplete 
understanding. Their response pushes for deliberative democratic politics that 
consists in upholding reciprocity as the central principle, publicity and 
accountability as principles that complement reciprocity, and liberty and 
opportunity as constitutional constraints on deliberative politics. 
Gutmann’s and Thompson’s basic conviction about plurality is that it 
harbours moral disagreement. They give four reasons moral disagreement will 
persist: scarcity, human nature, incompatible values, and incomplete 
understanding (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 18-26). Incompatible values and 
incomplete understanding are endemic to plurality. As far as Gutmann and 
Thompson are concerned, even if scarcity was not a problem and human nature 
was more generous, moral disagreement would persist because in plural 
societies different values can be incompatible, and people can never achieve 
complete understanding of each other. The way Gutmann and Thompson 
attribute moral disagreement to incompatible values and incomplete 
understanding raises the curtain on the complexity of plurality. It is possible that 
incompatibility of values and incomplete understanding are connected and in 
some cases incompatibility of values can be the result of incomplete 
understanding, or even misunderstanding. 
Gutmann and Thompson recognize incomplete understanding as a 
“human limitation” that makes up our human condition (1996, 25). It is so 
fundamental to our being that even if we were to live in a society where there is 
no scarcity and among people of best generosity, we would still have moral 
disagreement. That is because we lack a “perfect understanding” whereby “we 
would discover uniquely correct resolutions to problems of incompatible values” 
(Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 25). They do not mean to “imply moral 
scepticism” by recognizing incomplete understanding as part of the human 
condition. For them, “it is fully compatible with the belief that there are moral 
truths, although it does not presuppose this belief” (1996, 25). There might be 
truths and some problems may have correct solutions “but at any historical 
moment our imperfect understanding, manifested in the fundamental 
disagreements among the most thoughtful and good-willed citizens, prevents us 
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from definitively distinguishing those that do from those that do not” (Gutmann 
and Thompson 1996, 25). 
The aim of deliberative democracy is to provide a forum in which we can 
make decisions in light of this aspect of our human condition. Gutmann and 
Thompson write:  
a well constituted deliberative forum provides an opportunity 
for advancing both individual and collective understanding. 
Through give-and-take of argument, participants can learn 
from each other, come to recognize their individual and 
collective misapprehensions, and develop new views and 
policies that can more successfully withstand critical scrutiny. 
When citizens bargain and negotiate, they may learn how 
better to get what they want. But when they deliberate, they 
can expand their knowledge, including both their self-
understanding and their collective understanding of what will 
best serve their fellow citizens (2004, 12). 
With Gutmann and Thompson, I establish the role of incomplete 
understanding in moral disagreement. Accordingly, I agree with them on the 
role of deliberative forums in addressing the problem that incomplete 
understanding poses. However, in chapter 2, I will look at the problem of 
incomplete understanding from the perspective of Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics. Hermeneutics helps clarify the significance of incomplete 
understanding as part of the human condition. It will be established how 
incomplete understanding manifests itself not only as moral disagreement, but 
also as interpretive conflicts. Thus, this section draws from Gutmann and 
Thompson the notion of incomplete understanding as a recognized problem in 
deliberative democracy and chapter 2 takes this problem further with Gadamer.  
For Gutmann and Thompson, engagement and encounter in the 
deliberative fora can be sustained by mutual respect through reciprocity. Mutual 
respect and reciprocity are possible in deliberative democracy, which harnesses 
“the capacity to seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake” 
(Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 52-53). They understand reciprocity as “a form 
of mutuality in the face of disagreement” (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 14). It 
is a normative principle that regulates deliberation, in which “citizens should 
aspire to a kind of political reasoning that is mutually justifiable” (Gutmann and 
Thompson 1996, 53). It presupposes that everybody has a right to expect that 
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the other will justify their claim in mutually acceptable terms (1996, 55). Mutual 
respect is understood as a disposition towards one another in the conditions of 
moral disagreement; that is, maintaining respect for one another preserves the 
possibility for further deliberation and cooperation in the conditions of 
disagreement (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 1-63). The idea of mutual 
respect is recognized in various forms in deliberative theory6. Chapter 3 will 
examine the benefits of Young’s notion of asymmetric reciprocity as a more 
pluralistic and inclusive idea of mutual respect and reciprocity. It will be 
established that asymmetric reciprocity entails practicing mutual respect and 
reciprocity in terms of genuine wonder at the otherness of the other expressed 
in the form of a question that allows the other to disclose its otherness. 
By contrast, Gutmann and Thompson argue that reciprocity and mutual 
respect can be achieved and maintained by the procedural principles of 
publicity and accountability7 (1996, 95-127, 128-164). This is not to say that the 
two forms of engagement and encounter are mutually exclusive. The problem I 
have with Gutmann and Thompson’s version is that their terms do not conceive 
of deliberation as a transformative dialogue. It has no provisions for world 
disclosure, acknowledgement of difference, and a more inclusive deliberation. 
At least, they are not explicit. Reciprocity requires that the reasons and 
justification for one’s claims are public: “the reasons that officials and citizens 
give to justify political actions, and the information necessary to assess those 
reasons, should be public” (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 95). It also requires 
that each person is accountable to everybody else (Gutmann and Thompson, 
129ff). Without publicity and accountability, reciprocity cannot be achieved and, 
thus, mutual respect has no basis. These elements do not guarantee 
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 See, for instance, Seyla Benhabib’s Situating the Self (1991). We will explore Young’s 
idea of mutual respect, which she calls moral respect in Chapter III. Habermas too presupposes 
the idea of moral respect to sustain engagement and encounter across differences 
 
7
 It is also useful to note that they understand that accountability and publicity should be 
in a kind of deliberation that is fact regarding and “consistent with relatively reliable methods of 
inquiry” (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 56). Furthermore, the grounds for justification by 
appeal to authority must be accepted and understood by all in principle. This however, makes 
them ambiguous with regards to religious authority and they avoid the problem of rejecting 
religious authority just as ambiguously: “to reject moral claims that rely on implausible premises 
is therefore not to repudiate religion. An appeal to divine authority per se is thus not what 
creates the problem for a deliberative perspective. The problem lies in the appeal to any 
authority whose conclusions are impervious, in principle as well as practice, to the standards of 
logical consistency or to reliable methods of inquiry that themselves should be mutually 




agreement where none is possible; however, deliberative democracy aims that 
these principles help mitigate deepest moral disagreements and maintain 
mutual respect for stable democratic politics at the very least. Their precepts 
help sustain the argument that deliberative democracy provides grounds for 
making choices in societies with qualitatively different conceptions of the good 
(value pluralism) and participants with incomplete understanding. 
Though Gutmann and Thompson uphold reciprocity, publicity, and 
accountability as important procedural concepts for deliberative democracy, 
they do not support the idea that they alone determine the legitimacy of 
deliberation. They argue that what matters more than the deliberative procedure 
is the content it upholds.  For them, all deliberation must uphold liberty and 
opportunity as constitutional values. Deliberation is legitimate not only based on 
procedures but also on the way it upholds and does not violate liberty and 
opportunity8. This way of emphasising constitutional constraints, according to 
Gutmann and Thompson, marks their difference with the Habermasian strand of 
deliberative democracy. They criticize Habermas for prioritizing deliberation and 
founding legitimacy on the procedures alone (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 
17; see also Gutmann and Thompson 2005, chapter 3). On this, Gutmann and 
Thompson write:  
In the democratic search for provisionally justifiable policies, 
the content of deliberation often matters at least as much as 
the conditions. The deliberative perspective we develop here, 
then, explicitly rejects the idea, sometimes identified with 
deliberative democracy, that deliberation under the right 
conditions – real discourses in the ideal speech situation – is 
sufficient to legitimate laws and public policies. We open the 
door to constitutional principles that both inform and constrain 
the content of what democratic deliberators can legitimately 
legislate (1996, 200). 
For the focus of this thesis, Daniel Weinstock’s (1997, 498) distinction 
between “radical” and “moderate” pluralism helps to understand the issue here. 
For radical pluralism, we cannot objectively know what values and which 
combination of values we must take up. Any value is replaceable by any other. 
We cannot have objective knowledge of any value by way of reasoning that is 
independent from it being taken up by a cultural group and objectified into an 
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 They write “Deliberative outcomes … would have to respect basic liberty and 
opportunity as an ongoing condition of their own legitimacy” (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 17) 
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institution. For moderate pluralism, philosophical inquiry and reasoning can 
establish some values as irreplaceable independently of them being taken up 
and objectified by a cultural group. Weinstock (1997) and Galston (1999), for 
instance, argue that Berlin was a moderate pluralist. For Berlin, negative liberty 
is a value that can be known objectively through reasoning and agreed as an 
irreplaceable value; that is, no conception of the good, no combination of values 
can override negative liberty.  
Gutmann and Thompson’s advocacy for constitutional constraints should 
be understood in a similar manner. They too want to “moderate” pluralism so 
that some values, liberty and opportunity, are irreplaceable and that the 
outcome of deliberation does not override them. For instance, liberty as a 
guaranteed protection of personal integrity should be respected over public 
good (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 204). Furthermore, the outcome of 
deliberation must not violate person’s basic opportunities for life and a decent 
job (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 216). They argue deliberative democracy 
“cannot do without a principle of opportunity any more than it can do without a 
principle of liberty” (1996, 216). Thus, substance and procedures, according to 
Gutmann and Thompson, should not have priority over one another: “both need 
to be treated as morally and politically provisional” (2004, 25-6).  
No form of democratic politics can sustain the radical idea of pluralism. 
Politics is a sphere of human activity, where values inevitably must be 
prioritised and ranked, in which ends are prioritized and ranked, and in which 
means are decided. In democratic politics this activity must be backed by 
reasons that are acceptable by those who are affected. However, it is 
impossible to come to an agreement between all who are affected by positive 
affirmation. Usually, affected parties assent to the outcome through negative 
affirmation. Here, ranking of values is crucial. The acceptability of an outcome 
often depends on it not violating certain values. Rawls (1996), for instance, 
ranks the values in the first principle of justice as the highest. Gutmann and 
Thompson prioritize liberty and opportunity in a similar fashion. Mouffe, a critic 
of liberalism, recognizes that there must be substantive constraints on the 
procedures of deliberative democratic politics too. For her, political engagement 
and contestation must respect common adherence to liberty and equality 
(Mouffe 1999; 2013).  
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Mouffe has more to offer on this subject. She shows us that constitutional 
constraints are important not only for the sake of coming to agreement in 
democratic deliberation, but also for keeping disagreement from devolving into 
a deadly antagonistic conflict. With her, the moral disagreement that Gutmann 
and Thompson take as a challenge can be transformed into a kind of conflict 
that has democratic value. Therefore, I examine the merits of Mouffe’s 
argument in chapter 5.  
If we evaluate Gutmann and Thompson’s deliberative democracy against 
the criteria of engagement and encounter outlined by Eck, we see that it comes 
close to the ideal of pluralism. There is a sense of engagement across 
differences and encounter of commitments. Their notions of mutual respect and 
reciprocity have the “reason-giving requirement” (Gutmann and Thompson 
2004, 3), which is a type of rational engagement in which participants seek 
mutual understanding by providing reasons that could be accepted by all 
equally. Participants also encounter one another’s interests because the 
procedural principles of reciprocity, accountability, and publicity require 
participants to be present at the fora with their interests. Furthermore, 
deliberative democracy also implies a dynamic process that allows re-
consideration and re-examination and leaves the deliberative channels open for 
further engagement and understanding across difference. 
However, Gutmann and Thompson’s deliberative democracy do not fully 
embrace pluralism as engagement and encounter. What we are looking for is a 
democratic politics that entails deliberative practices in which participants 
engage and encounter one another as others. Engagement across differences 
in Gutmann and Thompson does not entail that. We need not encounter one 
another as different others because our aim is to seek “fair terms of social 
cooperation for their own sake” (Gutmann and Thompson1996, 52-53). This 
implies that we have mutual respect for each other’s difference without the 
actual need for encountering it, without being confronted by it. According to 
Eck’s ideal, we actively seek understanding across difference, not just the terms 
for cooperation. Understanding, unlike cooperation, requires that we encounter 
one another as different others. Although Gutmann and Thompson’s principle of 
mutual respect could mean that participants reciprocate in respecting each 
other’s differences, their deliberative democracy is underspecified in terms of its 
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conceptual content for our purposes. Nevertheless, I would like to note how 
their work contributes this thesis.  
Their argument on how moral disagreement can be the manifestation of 
incomplete understanding has raised the curtain on understanding as one of the 
fundamental aspects of human condition. Indeed, problems in engagement and 
encounter on social, political, or moral matters can come from incomplete 
understanding. Thus, from Gutmann and Thompson, we take incomplete 
understanding as a problem in plural societies. They accept it as part of the 
human condition and accept that we will always already have incomplete 
understanding of some object. I claim that this is not the full picture of the 
problem of incomplete understanding and turn to Gadamer in order to 
understand it and the challenges it poses more deeply. If it is part of the human 
condition, it must be one of the fundamental features of understanding. If we 
take incomplete understanding in terms of our inability to understand an object 
fully, it indicates a way forward for examining the nature of understanding itself 
and how it works. It points towards an ontology that Gadamer examines as 
having to do with human finitude.  Chapter 2 shows how Gadamer’s account of 
human finitude implicates our understanding of pluralism. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to consider Gutmann and Thompson’s 
critique of Habermas’ prioritization of procedures. If our goal is to understand 
what kinds of practices can constitute democratic politics that is committed to 
pluralism as engagement and encounter, then attention must be given to how 
certain values can be upheld over procedures. This is necessary to protect the 
ideal of pluralism and democratic method from racist, sexist, and extremist 
groups. This point resonates with Young, Dryzek, and Mouffe, all of whom 
agree that deliberative procedures must be constrained by such things as 
reasonableness, respect for other’s liberty, dignity, and person.  
From Habermas’ perspective, this critique is trivial. The standards and 
principles of his discourse ethics have the means to constrain procedures from 
allowing such groups to have any impact on deliberation. However, what we 
need to agree on are more substantive principles that we all will respect; what 
Gutmann and Thompson call constitutional values that we will uphold over 
procedures. The reason for this kind of normative move is better explained in 
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Mouffe’s works. That is, we agree on upholding certain constitutional values 
because we do not want to endanger our way of life and being. Yet, Gutmann 
and Thompson’s move is underspecified on this matter. Therefore, I turn to 
Mouffe’s account on upholding certain constitutional values in chapter 5.  
More generally, if the problem of incomplete understanding is to be 
acknowledged in a more fundamental way, then the idea of deliberation is not 
sufficient for addressing it. Deliberation is too narrow of a term. It includes terms 
that are relevant for formal political decision-making. While all forms of 
communication have some sort of a goal, deliberation represents a specific 
genus of communication that is aimed at making decisions. Deliberation must 
always come to an end and produce results. It does not require that participants 
leave with a transformed understanding in the broader sense. Ideally, 
deliberation results in a revision of pre-deliberative preferences or a 
compromise between parties. However, it would be hard to accommodate a 
kind of engagement in which parties can understand each other as different 
others.  
In order to acknowledge the problem of incomplete understanding in a 
more fundamental way, a broader concept that can include more than what 
typically constitutes deliberative democracy is necessary. Discourse is a 
suitable candidate for such a task. Habermas’ conception of discourse found in 
his program of discourse ethics is most suitable. Although for Habermas 
discourse is a narrow term too, his discourse ethics help to understand 
discourse as an element of democratic politics that addresses the problem of 
incomplete understanding in a more fundamental way. Furthermore, discourse 
is a malleable concept and so is more amenable to critical appropriation and 
procedural amendments. As we will see in chapters 3-5, it can also serve as a 
suitable framework for articulating democratic politics in which the principle of 
openness can be instantiated as asymmetric reciprocity, reflexivity, and 
agonism. Below I present Habermas’ conception of discourse and the elements 
of his discourse ethics.  
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1.2 Discourse ethics 
The concept of discourse is contested and the way it is used varies 
depending on the subject field9. For Habermas, discourse is mainly a problem 
solving mechanism. It is a kind of activity for rational intersubjective reflection 
based on universal pragmatics of using language as a means to coordinate 
cooperation. As such, discourse is the domain where normative bases can be 
problematized and disputed between language users. We fall into discourse 
when the presuppositions of our normal mode of cooperation are disputed and 
we need to fall back from the ordinary mode of communication in order to 
restore them. It is a mechanism for restoring understanding, or what Habermas 
calls a consensus between subjects so that communication can resume. Thus, 
there are two distinctions to keep in mind: communicative situation and 
discourse situation. Communicative situation (and action) carries on while the 
validities of normative claims behind it are not disputed. Discourse situation 
arises when the normative claims are disputed (when understanding breaks 
down) and subjects enter into discourse as means to rationally restore 
understanding to restore communicative situation.  
This distinction makes it necessary to review Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action because the two are inextricably linked (1990, 58; also 
see Thomassen 2010; Finlayson 2005). Habermas’ conception of discourse 
includes within itself what he calls the formal-transcendental rules of discourse 
ethics, which he outlines systematically in his Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action (1990). Discourse ethics, to which he refers as practical 
discourse or moral argumentation interchangeably, has within itself elements of 
rational discourse, consensus, and principles of discourse and universalization 
which are conceptually built on his theory of communicative action (see 1990, 
Chapter 3). It is important to understand that Habermas justifies these four 
elements based on the concepts of validity claim and communicative action that 
were developed before his discourse ethics were formulated in its mature form. 
                                            
9
 See for instance, Howarth 2000. The concept is usually tied to the philosophy of 
language. Heidegger, for instance, argued that “the existential-ontological foundation of 
language is discourse or talk [rede]” (1962: 203). This view, however, inverts the relationship 
between language and discourse in what Heidegger called the “metaphysical”, or the standard 
thinking in philosophy. Prior to Heidegger, it was understood that language makes discourse 
possible. In other words, learning a language makes discourse possible. From the point of view 
of Heidegger’s Dasein, we encounter discourse in the world first and then think about language 
in an artificial way – hence the field of philology.  
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Once we review the concepts of validity claim and communicative action, we 
will be able to understand the difference and relationship between 
communicative and discourse situations. 
Communicative action 
Let us begin with an assumption that Habermas makes: the modern 
society can no longer coordinate its social activities by appeals to tradition or 
religion (see 1984; 2001, 147; 1990, 116). Modern societies are characterised 
by their rationalization, or what Weber referred to as “disenchantment”, and 
plurality of traditions, religions, and other commonly shared sources of values 
and worldviews. Given such complex and plural constitution of modern 
societies, something is still necessary to coordinate social action. Further, since 
coordination of any kind requires some form of communication, Habermas turns 
to examine modes of communicative action that coordinate social activities 
(1984, 274). In order to explain how exactly communicative acts “take on the 
function of coordinating action and make their contribution to building up 
interaction” (1984, 278), Habermas builds against the background of Weber’s 
theory of action three distinct types of actions: instrumental, strategic, and 
communicative (1984, 284). Based on their telos, he categorizes these actions 
to ones that orient themselves towards success (instrumental and strategic) and 
one that orients itself towards reaching understanding (1984, 286). 
Distinguishing and understanding concrete actions as one rather than another 
can be possible so long as the manifested attitude of the participants clearly 
indicates whether they are oriented to success or to reach an understanding 
amongst each other (1984, 286). Given that we are looking at the problem of 
understanding, we need to focus on the kind of action that is oriented towards 
reaching understanding – communicative action. 
For Habermas, understanding has two distinct functions in 
communicative situation and discourse situation. For communicative situation, 
we must understand speech acts, whereas in discourse situation understanding 
brings about consensus. Communicative situation presupposes consensus, i.e. 
participants understand speech acts insofar as there is an underlying 
consensus on the validity of general norms. Understanding a speech act 
depends on the connection that participant makes between the act and the 
norm that underlies it.  If there is no consensus, then participants do not 
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understand the speech acts. Therefore, if understanding breaks down in the 
communicative situation, it can only be restored by falling back to discourse 
situation where rational deliberation restores consensus10.  
For Habermas, the structure of communicative action makes up the 
structure of both communicative and discourse situations. That is because his 
theory of communicative action describes the universal pragmatics that we 
share as language users. It describes communicative rationality that we share 
in our species-wide capacity as language users. We are able to reach 
consensus by means of our inherent communicative rationality. Communicative 
action involves precisely this type of rationality because it is a type of action 
where understanding must have a non-coercive cause. Habermas writes, “a 
communicatively achieved agreement has a rational basis; it cannot be imposed 
by either party, whether instrumentally through intervention in the situation 
directly or strategically through influencing the decisions of opponents” (1984, 
287). Here we may observe the qualitative difference between the three types 
of action. Habermas wants to find a basis for the possibility of communicative 
action independently of any culture or tradition. For him, communicative action 
is possible to the extent of our competence and capacity as language users. 
However, having the capacity for communicative action does not imply the will 
for it. We can call an interaction “communicative when the participants 
coordinate their plans of action consensually, with the agreement reached at 
any point being evaluated in terms of the intersubjective recognition of validity 
claims” (1990, 58). The rationality of communicative action demands that what 
should be counted as “common” is reached and agreed upon through rational-
argumentative deliberation, in other words, by the force of the better argument.  
Another thing we need to highlight on this subject is the notion of ‘validity 
claims’. Through this concept we will be able to explain when a communicative 
situation becomes a discourse situation according to Habermas. Validity claims 
is a notion that is closely tied to the regulatory standard Habermas calls the 
“ideals of communicative action” and later on “ideal speech situation”. The 
features of Habermas’ “ideals of communicative action” are absence of any 
forms of coercion, equal opportunity to speak, absence of power relationships, 
                                            
 
10
 Note that these two senses of understanding do not include understanding the other.   
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and that the speaker is as honest and truthful as possible in what he/she 
asserts. The speaker always makes claims to validity in communicative action 
and, when questioned, the speaker must be able to redeem them. Habermas 
describes three validity claims the speaker must satisfy: truth, rightness, and 
truthfulness. Respectively, they make a validity claim on the objective world, 
social world, and the subjective world. In a communicative action where 
“constatives” function as “representation of states of affairs”, the speaker must 
be able to redeem the validity claim of “truth” about the objective world to which 
he/she is referring (1984, 329). Similarly, in a communicative action that 
involves “regulatives” or normative bases which function for “establishment of 
interpersonal relations”, the speaker must be able to redeem the validity claim 
of “rightness” of the normative bases that serves to justify communicative 
interaction in the given social situation (1984, 329). Finally, “expressive” 
communicative actions that function for the purpose of “self-representation” 
must be truthful in its representation of the subjective world to which the 
performer of the communicative act in the given situation is referring (1984, 
329). 
Now we can identify the point at which communicative situation turns into 
discourse situation. We noted that for a speech act to be understood in a 
communicative situation, it requires consensus on the validity claims.  While 
there is consensus on the validity claims that justify their respective 
communicative actions, communicative interaction carries on without 
interruptions as participants understand each other’s speech acts. Such 
interactions take place on a daily basis in situations such as a request not to 
smoke in a public place. For communicative interaction to take place, the 
participants must accept the validity claims of the other. This situation is a 
communicative situation. However, when the validity claims are disputed, 
participants need to restore the consensus on the validity of the norms. The 
type of communication that takes place in this situation is governed by what 
Habermas interchangeably calls discourse ethics, practical discourse, or moral 
argumentation. Until they reach an agreement on the validity of the normative 
bases, the participants remain in discourse situation. Discourse situation is 
inevitable for cases that require resolution of disputes on validity claims of 
“truth” and “rightness” because, according to Habermas, they are redeemable 
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only discursively, whereas the claim for “truthfulness” is redeemable by 
“consistent behaviour” (Habermas 1990, 58-9). Thus, we have a concept of 
discourse with a role for repairing communication when it is broken by 
disagreement over the validity of one or more norms and/or normative bases for 
communicative action. Essentially, discourse is oriented towards repairing and 
reconstructing the conditions of possibility for reaching rational understanding 
and agreement for communicative interaction to resume coordinating social 
action of complex and plural societies of the modern world. 
Four requirements for discourse in plural societies 
Disagreement over validity claims rarely arises in homogenous societies 
(see Habermas 1990, Chapter 5). The more complex a society is, the more 
diverse groups it has, the more necessary discourse becomes in its function as 
a problem solving mechanism. Habermas argues that in plural societies, the 
more complex and diverse their plurality is, the more abstract and morally 
justified norms must be “to control the individual’s scope of action” (1990, 205). 
In order to fulfil its function as a problem solving mechanism in this context, 
Habermas argues that discourse must meet four requirements: it must be 
deontological, cognitivist, formal, and universal (1990, 116-88; 1993;)11. In this 
section, I examine Habermas’ argument on the relevance of these requirements 
for deliberative democracy in plural societies. 
Discourse must be deontological because when participants enter into 
discourse situation, they must reach a consensus based on what is right, not 
what is good. If the resolution of a dispute depends on the settlement of a 
certain conception of the good, then it is a discourse based on ethical concerns. 
It is teleological. The good is always part of ethics that belongs to a particular 
group with a particular culture and world-view. A group’s culture functions as the 
source of the values for the group. Their idea of the good comes from these 
values and therefore communicative interaction based on consensus cannot be 
restored by a teleological discourse. Discourse deals “not with value 
preferences but with the normative validity of norms of action” (Habermas 1990, 
104). For this reason, discourse ethics should always prefer right over good. As 
such, discourse covers only practical questions, and this is why discourse ethics 
is often referred to as ‘practical discourse’ or ‘moral argumentation’. It comes 
                                            
11
 Also see Thomassen 2010, 85f for concise summary  
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into action when the participant supplements his/her question ‘what should I do 
in this particular situation’ with ‘what ought I do’. Here, Habermas’ deontological 
discourse ethics takes its orientation from Kant. 
Nonetheless, Habermas differentiates himself from Kant and, by 
implication, from other Kantian thinkers like Rawls. Habermas argues that his 
“discourse ethics replaces the Kantian categorical imperative by a procedure of 
moral argumentation” (1990, 197). It is important to understand why he sees its 
significance as an element of democratic politics in plural societies. Whereas 
Kant’s categorical imperative is hinged upon the subject trusted to transcend 
the immediacy of his/her own life and reflect on the universal application of the 
norm, Habermas’ discourse ethics require intersubjective reflection. In other 
words, Kant’s categorical imperative can take place in a monological fashion 
and, therefore, cannot be part of the communicative interaction that takes on 
the function of coordinating social action. What one ought to do must be 
reached by means of rational consensus in a discursive manner by 
intersubjective reflection – there must be a dialogue between subjects. The 
rationalized, complex and plural characteristics of modern society requires 
norms that are not settled upon in a monological but dialogical fashion. For this 
reason, discourse ethics must be deontological in order to serve as a 
mechanism for regulating conflicts arising from broken communicative 
interaction and reaching rationally motivated consensus. 
Discourse must be cognitivist in the sense that the reasons for actions 
must be understood independently from any tradition or culture. As Habermas 
notes, “only cognitivist basic assumptions can do justice to the phenomena and 
the experiences of a posttraditional morality that has detached itself from the 
religious and metaphysical contexts from which it arose” (1993, 39). For him, 
the justification of validity of norms must have a “rational foundation” in the 
sense that the participants in moral discourse should be able to define, 
understand, and explain the questions and solutions according to the standards 
of formal logic and rationality they possess in their competence and capacity as 
language users (see Habermas 1990, 120-2, 196-8; 1993, 41ff). In other words, 
a consensus achieved based on cognitivist assumptions should make sense to 




Given the existence of plurality of groups, which have different sources 
for their values, discourse must be procedural. Discourse must be a formal 
mechanism for resolving questions that arise from the encounter between 
different groups which outlines discursive procedure for redeeming validity 
claims of propositions. Habermas’ discourse can be characterized as formal, 
“for it provides no substantive guidelines but only a procedure: practical 
discourse” (1990, 103). In other words, discourse should not contain answers to 
moral questions and problems in plural societies. Rather it is a mechanism by 
which an intersubjective consensus can be achieved on the validity of norms 
that are applied to resolve moral questions. The formal-procedural nature of 
discourse requires that all those affected are included into the deliberation and 
everybody is given equal opportunity to speak without strategic or instrumental 
interventions. 
Finally, for Habermas, universality of discourse is crucial for it to be 
considered as an element of democratic politics. As a formal mechanism for 
resolving conflicts and restoring consensus, it must not be defined and 
understood in terms of any particular culture, historical moment, or a value 
system (Habermas 1990, 120ff, 196ff, 205). It should transcend the particular so 
that the participants in discourse can have equal opportunity to participate and 
equal influence on the outcome of deliberation. For that to be possible, the 
formal-procedural principles must not be defined in terms of principles of the 
dominant community or tradition. Discourse should apply to all across their 
differences. 
The elements and principles of discourse ethics 
I now move on to the elements and principles of Habermas’ discourse 
ethics, which allow his conception of discourse to meet these requirements. The 
main elements of Habermas’ discourse ethics are: rational discourse and 
consensus, while the principles are what he refers to as the discourse (D) and 
universalization (U) principles. Together, they form a conception of discourse 
that is suitable as an element of democratic politics in plural societies.  
Habermas’ theory of communicative action internally links rational 
discourse and consensus. The link is seen in the switch from communicative 
situation to discourse situation. Recall that for Habermas a conflict arises in 
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society when the validity claims are questioned. In these situations consensus 
breaks down and the participants seek to resolve their differences. In some 
societies, the dispute is eliminated by coercion, violence, and other means of 
inflicting pressure on those who dispute. In a free society with democratic 
institutions, disputants resort to discursive restoration of consensus. Thus, we 
can assume, as Habermas does, that discourse is inevitable in free plural 
societies because plurality does not allow justification based on metaphysics 
and tradition. Participants engage in a rational discourse whereby the one 
whose validity claim is disputed must offer a rational argument to redeem the 
claim. Once the argument is accepted and understanding is reached, discourse 
situation ends in a consensus and restores the condition of possibility for 
communicative action. Rational discourse and consensus are always already 
presupposed in discourse ethics.  
Accordingly, a communicatively competent participant always already 
presupposes these elements. It would be a “performative contradiction” to deny 
them. A participant in discourse, by virtue of participating in the discourse tacitly 
accepts the presuppositions of rational discourse: equality of speech, rule of 
reason and rationality, and that no strategic or instrumental action is involved in 
redeeming the truth about the objective world, rightness of the intersubjective 
relations, and truthfulness of representation. Redeeming validity claims are part 
of the procedure of rational discourse and constitute communicative action as 
well. They constitute communicative action when they are consensually 
accepted to validate a norm which justifies certain action. Similarly, they 
constitute rational discourse where validity is redeemed by means of 
argumentation. For Habermas, communicative rationality and competence are 
presupposed in rational discourse and consensus to the degree that they are 
presupposed in one’s capacity as a language user12 (see Habermas 1990, 116-
88).  
                                            
12
 Rational discourse and consensus also serve developmental and educational 
functions insofar as they require constant employment of our species-wide communicative 
rationality and competence. Rational deliberation to reach consensus has a pedagogic function 
in the sense that it forces the speaker to present a better argument, hence defend his or her 
interest “in ever wider forums before an ever more competent and larger audience against ever 
new objections” (Habermas 2001, 36). We may remember examples of rational discourse and 
consensus from Platonic dialogues. Rational dialogue does not proceed to the next step in the 
argumentation until all the participants in the rational discourse assent to Socrates’ arguments 
and counterarguments during the dialogue. In other words, Socrates is only able to take the 
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The two principles, the discourse principle (D) and the universalization 
principle (U), help discourse ethics comply with Habermas’ four requirements 
for discourse in plural societies: deontological, cognitivist, formal, and universal. 
Below I examine their role in discourse ethics and the way they serve as 
elements of democratic politics that can affirm engagement and encounter.  
There are some differences in Habermas’ definitions of (D) in different 
works. These differences have a technical significance. Initially, the definition of 
(D) was: “only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with 
the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical 
discourse” (Habermas 1990, 66). A slightly different wording can be found in 
Facts and Norms: “only those action norms are valid to which all possibly 
affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourse” (1996, 107). I 
would like to focus briefly on the part where “practical discourse” is replaced 
with “rational discourse”. There are two main works in which Habermas works 
out his discourse ethics systematically. They are his Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action (1990) and Justification and Application (1993). His other 
opuses either anticipate or presuppose the discourse ethics found in these two 
works. For instance, the two volume Theory of Communicative Action (1984; 
1987) defines, understands, and explains the functions of speech acts in 
instrumental, strategic, and communicative interactions based on pragmatic and 
moral validity claims in anticipation of the elements and principles of his 
discourse ethics. Conversely,  Between Facts and Norms (1996) presupposes 
the worked out elements and principles of discourse ethics in its development of 
a discourse theory of democracy where rational discourse, consensus, 
discourse principle, and universalization principle play a crucial role in bridging 
the conflict between justice and common good in democratic theory (see 
Habermas 1996, 448). In his earlier works (1990 and 1993) Habermas used the 
                                                                                                                                
dialogue further when all participants understand and assent to the premises of the argument. 
The Socratic questioning presupposes that a consensus can be reached by means of rational 
discourse. He will not take any further discursive steps unless he and his collocutors accept the 
validity of the claims made. Confirming Habermas’ assumption, rational discourse and 
consensus are always already presupposed in discourse and one accepts them by the act of 
entering into one when communication breaks down because there is no understanding and 
agreement on the validity which justifies the propositions. “Performative contradiction” would 
occur if an interlocutor enters into discourse denying these elements because the speaker 
cannot deny them without presupposing that their denial depends on rational argumentation and 
consensus. That is, Socrates cannot undermine the Socratic method of questioning through the 
Socratic method of questioning. 
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terms “practical discourse” and “moral discourse” interchangeably. Their relation 
to rational discourse is presupposed in the sense that both are similar in their 
procedures because they both require compliance with the general rules of 
rational discourse.  
Moral argumentation, or practical discourse, has to do with a type of 
discourse that resolves issues concerning “the right”, i.e. what is just for all. It is 
universal in character, for its outcomes should be accepted by all on rational 
basis. On the other hand, pragmatic and ethical discourses relate to dialogues 
about best means and the good respectively, and thus are context bound. 
However, the common thread in all discourses are that they all are rational 
discourses insofar as they involve the procedures of rational argumentation 
according to the transcendental pragmatic presuppositions of language, which 
we always already possess due to our competence and capacity as a species 
of language users that coordinate social action by means of communication. 
Whereas practical discourse refers to moral questions, “rational discourse” is an 
element in all forms discourses: pragmatic, ethical, moral. Thus, replacing 
“practical discourse” with “rational discourse” make (D) applicable to all forms of 
discourse that fulfil the function of restoring consensus in their respective 
spheres. For instance, issues that require pragmatic resolution do not 
necessarily require moral argumentation. However, when the means are 
questioned, a rational discourse on the best means is in order. By implication, 
the reformulated (D) in Between Facts and Norms (1996) characterizes the 
general conception of discourse in a way that is more suitable for democratic 
politics in virtue of the more inclusive notion of “rational discourse”: 
rational discourse should include any attempt to reach an 
understanding over problematic validity claims insofar as this 
takes place under conditions of communication that enable 
the free processing of topics and contributions, information 
and reasons in the public space constituted by illocutionary 
obligations. The expression also refers indirectly to bargaining 
processes insofar as these are regulated by discursively 
grounded procedures (Habermas 1996, 108). 
In discourse ethics, (D) “already presupposes that we can justify our 
choice of a norm” (Habermas 1990, 66). As such, it is part of the procedure of 
rational discourse by which the participants can come to consensus on whether 
the norm is valid or not (Habermas 1990, 103). In other words, (D) is a principle 
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which applies when communicative interaction breaks down. The principle 
applies to the procedure for discursive redemption of validity claims, i.e. 
according to the rules of rational discourse which presupposes communicative 
rationality. (D) makes it possible that “discourse ethics can properly be 
characterized as formal, for it provides no substantive guidelines but only a 
procedure” (Habermas 1990, 103). A dispute on validity claims, when resolved 
discursively according to (D) can be resolved only by two outcomes: either 
those affected come to consensus and the norm is valid or they do not come to 
consensus and therefore norm is not valid. It does not “generate” new norms 
(see Habermas 1990, 66, 103). Of course, the procedure relies on the 
communicative rationality and competence of the participants. It presupposes 
that the participants can redeem the validity of their positions based on the 
claims of truth, rightness, and truthfulness. More importantly, it relies heavily on 
the condition whereby rational discourse is conducted without strategic and 
instrumental interventions. We can connect this principle to the elements of 
rational discourse and consensus in the following way: (D) has, as its telos, a 
rational consensus which can only be achieved by means of rational discourse 
in which all affected were able to participate without coercion, they stated their 
positions without distortion and can, if necessary, redeem the validity of their 
positions in an environment free from strategic and instrumental actions. 
I will now examine the universalisation principle (U) to understand its role 
in making discourse ethics meet the requirements of deontic, cognitivist and 
universalist discourse in plural societies. (U) contains criteria for determining 
whether norms are just. It is worth noting that (U) takes its orientation from Kant. 
It employs the criteria of universalizability in order to determine whether the 
norm is just or not. Habermas admits that it is similar to all cognitivist ethics of 
Kantian origin in the sense that it shares “the basic intuition contained in Kant’s 
categorical imperative” (1990, 63). However, it is different from Kant’s principle 
and the rest of the cognitivist versions in one crucial way. We need to define (U) 
to see the difference. Again, we may find definitions of the principle in both texts 
(1990 and 1993) with variations in wording (e.g. 1990, 65, 120; 1993, 32). For 
instance, initially the principle is introduced in the following way: a norm is valid 
when “all affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general 
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s 
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interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative 
possibilities for regulation)” (1990, 65; emphasis as in the original). Later in the 
same text, the definition is offered as following: “for a norm to be valid, the 
consequences and side effects that its general observance can be expected to 
have for the satisfaction of the particular interests of each person affected must 
be such that all affected can accept them freely” (1990, 120). The latter 
definition can be found in Habermas’ later work (1993, 32) and is presupposed 
in his discourse theory of democracy (1996) with the added provision in 
parentheses of the earlier definition, namely, the provision that consequences 
are preferred to other alternatives. Thus, we will proceed with the latter 
definition of the universalisation principle (U). 
To return to Habermas’ difference from Kant, Habermas argues that (U) 
has several advantages over the Kantian “categorical imperative” and its 
cognitivist derivatives (this includes the version of deliberative democracy by 
Gutmann and Thompson). First, the principle makes agreement possible, when 
it comes to discourses on moral questions, i.e. what is just (Habermas 1990, 
57). For Habermas, the principle is distinct from “substantive principles or basic 
norms, which can only be the subject matter of moral argumentation” in that it is 
a procedure which yields universal answers rather than contains them (1990, 
93). It is a “moral principle”, “which is conceived as a rule of argumentation and 
is part of the logic of practical discourses” (Habermas 1990, 93). Its role is for 
generating universal norms rather than discovering ones that already exist (see 
Thomassen 2010, 91f). Second, unlike Kantian “categorical imperative”, it 
“precludes a monological application of the principle” (Habermas 1990, 66). It 
does so because, Habermas argues, “first, (U) regulates only argumentation 
among a plurality of participants; second, it suggests the perspective of real-life 
argumentation, in which all affected are admitted as participants” (1990, 66). 
Whereas in the Kantian categorical imperative a maxim which prescribes the 
“ought” is valid if the agent wills monologically that everybody else does the 
same, Habermas’ test of the universalizability of the maxim depends on a 
dialogically achieved consensus. Third, unlike the Kantian derivatives like 
Rawls’ political liberalism, (U) does not ignore interest. (U) stipulates that moral 
norms are valid “if and only if equal consideration is given to the interests of all 
those who are possibly involved” (Habermas 1996, 108). In other words, (U) is a 
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procedure by which answers are yielded in the interest of all, i.e. 
“universalizable” interest. It presupposes that the participants do not leave their 
interests behind in discourse. It requires that interests are present in discourse 
because arriving at a “universalizable” interest is linked to the presence of 
particular interests. For participants to arrive at a consensus in a moral 
discourse, they should be able to take into account particular interests of all and 
the procedure stipulated by (U) requires that each participant is able to take into 
account the interests of the other participants “from the first-person plural 
perspective” (Habermas 1993, 49). A norm is universal when each person can 
accept it individually and the way (U) makes agreement possible in moral 
argumentation partially depends on the condition that “each of us must be able 
to place himself in the situation of all those who would be affected by the 
performance of a problematic action or the adoption of a questionable norm” 
(Habermas 1993, 49). The implication of inclusion of interests in discourse and 
the stipulations of (U) suggest that interests are not just given. They also can be 
formed or acquired as a result of moral argumentation in moral discourse. 
Forms of discourse 
In this section, I examine Habermas’ distinction between three different 
forms of discourse that can take place depending on the nature of the question. 
I am interested in how these forms are internally linked and how Habermas 
relegates difference and particularity within them. I also highlight how the 
tripartite division of forms of discourse recognizes the constitutive role of 
historical and cultural contingencies as well as values and interests. This means 
that in discourse ethics difference (such as interests) are not treated as given. 
Rather, it has the resources for recognizing that understanding can be finite 
within a certain particularity and allows political inclusion of how different 
persons and groups perceive themselves in the ethical formulations of such 
questions as ‘who are we’ and ‘who we want to be’. But, as we will see in the 
following chapters, this requires certain changes in the way Habermas 
separates three forms of discourse and relegates particularities between them. 
Also, here I clarify the application of (D) and (U) to the three forms of discourse. 
In the end of the section, we will be able to understand the significance of 
discourse ethics for our purposes and also parts that, I argue, need to be 
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adjusted in order to promote a fuller engagement and encounter across 
differences in democratic politics.  
Practical discourse is a form of reflective communication that answers 
practical questions such as ‘what ought we do’. It has the communicative 
structure of rational discourse. Rational discourse presupposes communicative 
rationality and competence of each participant in their capacity as language 
users. Every participant, if necessary, should be able to redeem the validity 
claims for every proposition or position put forward, and the speaker should be 
able to do so freely, without coercion or any kind of manipulation aimed at 
distorting the truth, rightness, or truthfulness of a claim. Furthermore, recall that 
justification is presented on rational grounds and accepted on rational grounds 
and that the meaning of “ought” and the decision with regards to “what” 
following the propositions must also be assented to in the form of rational 
consensus among those who are affected. With regards to the meaning of 
“ought”, we now come to Habermas’ differentiation between three forms of 
discourse: 
the meaning of ‘ought’ remains unspecified as long as the 
relevant problem and the aspect under which it can be solved 
are undetermined. I want to specify these aspects along the 
lines of pragmatic, ethical, and moral issues. The standpoints 
of expediency, goodness, and justice each define a different 
use of practical reason (1996, 159). 
The standpoint of expediency speaks from the pragmatic perspective; 
the standpoint of goodness speaks from the ethical perspective; finally, the 
standpoint of justice speaks from the moral perspective. For Habermas, each of 
these corresponds to different forms of discourse (1993, 1-17; 1996, 157-62). 
The same question can be posed from different perspectives and we can often 
find that it can shift between the three perspectives. For example, the answer to 
the ‘ought’ question from the pragmatic perspective can be challenged by the 
ethical perspective, and discourse shifts to ethical perspective whereby the 
pragmatic answer is subjected to questioning from the ethical perspective. 
Similarly, the answer to the ‘ought’ question from the ethical perspective can be 
challenged by the moral perspective resulting in a shift of discourse to the moral 
perspective, where the ethical answer is subjected to moral questioning, i.e. 
whether it is acceptable to all. Sometimes the most expedient solution to a 
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pragmatic problem is not always ethical in terms of its compliance with how the 
person sees him/herself, how he/she wishes to be perceived by the others, or 
even moral in terms of its compliance with whether the agent wishes it be 
practiced by all. Thus, “the question ‘what should I do?’ takes on a pragmatic, 
an ethical, or a moral meaning depending on how the problem is conceived” 
(Habermas 1993, 8). It is, therefore, instructive to differentiate between 
discourses depending on the pragmatic, ethical, and moral perspectives that 
alter the way the problem is conceived. These discourses are ranked 
hierarchically. In ascending order: pragmatic is subordinate to ethical discourse, 
which, in turn, is subordinate to moral discourse.  
For Habermas each tier of discourse presupposes consensus in the 
higher one (see 1993, 1-17; 1996 159f). Pragmatic perspective presupposes 
consensus on ethical level, which, in turn, presupposes consensus at the moral 
level of discourse. Thus, coordination of social action from, say, pragmatic 
standpoint is seamless and straightforward when the rational discourse about 
the best means in strategic and instrumental terms is not questioned from 
ethical or moral standpoints. Participants seek to come to rational consensus on 
the best means among the alternatives based on their knowledge of the 
contingencies of the given context, their own preferences, possible outcomes, 
and other alternatives. Only (D) applies here because the validity of the decision 
on the best means depends on the assent of all those affected in their capacity 
as participants of rational discourse. The reason to speak of pragmatic 
discourse in terms of Habermas’ discourse ethics is that when there is a 
deliberation on choosing the best course of action or means, justification is 
required for each proposition. Put in another way, strategic and instrumental 
action halts when there is no consensus on a means to an end. Therefore, 
participants enter into pragmatic discourse in which “technical or strategic 
recommendations ultimately derive their validity from the empirical knowledge 
on which they rest” (Habermas 1993, 11). 
However, as we often see in the democratic politics of Western 
countries, pragmatic discourses can often be challenged because they conflict 
with the established value consensus at the ethical level.  Thus, “of course, as 
soon as the orienting values themselves become problematic, the question 
‘what ought we to do?’ takes one beyond the horizon of purposive rationality” 
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(Habermas 1996, 160). Value pluralism makes this problem more acute 
because there might be a dispute over appropriateness of the value in question 
compared to other equally applicable values. At this point, discourse shifts to 
the ethical perspective and, thus, becomes ethical discourse. In this shift, 
pragmatic discourse is subordinate to ethical discourse (Habermas 1996, 164-5, 
167). According to Habermas, ethical discourse clarifies the existential 
questions “or any question touching on political culture” (1996, 165) and in 
terms of democratic politics: “ethical-political questions pose themselves from 
the perspective of members who, in the face of important life issues, want to 
gain clarity about the shared form of life and about the ideals they feel should 
shape their common life” (1996, 160). Here, the singular pronoun “I” is replaced 
with plural “We” (1996, 160) in the sense that it becomes a public ethical 
reflection. This ethical reflection must be a public deliberation (Habermas 1993, 
23) in the form of ethical discourse where the deliberation is conducted 
according to the communicative structure of rational discourse. (D) also applies 
here since ethical questions of value and, thus, the good that orient deliberation 
about ethical-political self-understanding must be assented to by all affected in 
their capacity as participants of rational discourse. Habermas’ ethical form of 
discourse has affinities with communitarian theories in the sense that here 
participants discuss what is good for them as a group in relation to their shared 
tradition and way of life. Here, Habermas reconciles his deliberative democracy 
with the republican versions of deliberative democracy13 because in ethical 
discourse participants pursue ethical solutions from given values and assume 
that their given values provide sufficient grounds to solve the problem. To follow 
up from our discussion of pragmatic discourses, ethical clarification and 
consensus restores the possibility of purposive rational deliberation of the 
pragmatic discourse. However, deliberation on the question “what ought we to 
do?” can shift to the moral level too. 
Pragmatic and ethical discourses are subject to consensus at the level of 
moral discourse. Habermas offers a good summary of the former two 
                                            
13
 For republican versions of deliberative democracy, the moral claim for deliberation 
depends on the communitarian view. Here, deliberation is important for choosing a shared way 
of life. Eder (1992) argues that deliberation can be justified by appealing to already existing 
values in political culture. For Beiner (1989), such things as autonomy, mutual respect are part 
of particular political cultures. 
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discourses and an explanation of the moment when participants enter into 
moral discourse. Quoting him at length is instructive: 
In pragmatic discourses, we test the expediency of strategies 
under the presupposition that we know what we want. In 
ethical-political discourses, we reassure ourselves of a 
configuration of values under the presupposition that we do 
not yet know what we really want. In this kind of discourse, we 
can justify programs insofar as they are expedient and, taken 
as a whole, good for us. An adequate justification of policies 
and laws, must, however, consider yet a further aspect, that of 
justice. Whether we should want and accept a program also 
depends on whether the corresponding practice is equally 
good for all. This shifts the meaning of the question “what 
ought we to do?” yet again14 (1996, 161; emphasis as in the 
original). 
(D) applies in pragmatic and ethical discourses. When we move to moral 
discourse, (U) applies because at this level we consider what is right or just for 
all. Whereas in ethical discourse “those taking part in argumentation cannot 
work themselves free of the form of life in which they de facto find themselves”, 
“in contrast, entry into moral discourse demands that one step back from all 
contingently existing normative contexts” (Habermas 1996, 163). Thus, 
Habermas requires that moral discourse is not bound by context, tradition, or 
metaphysics. These include particularities and differences based on historical 
and cultural contingencies. In a stricter sense, moral discourse requires 
detachment from all particularities that constitute identity. It is not bound to any 
subject but is rather intersubjective, as we have discussed in the section on (U). 
Since (U) operates here, moral discourse is about the participants partaking in 
ideal role-taking by which they assent to a moral norm not just from their own 
subjective point of view, but from the point of view of other participants as well15 
(Habermas 1993, 52). Unlike pragmatic and ethical discourses, moral discourse 
                                            
14
 It is in this shifting that I detect a problem concerning understanding and 
interpretation from the hermeneutical perspective in the next chapter. 
 
15
 Young’s notion of asymmetric reciprocity corrects this. It normatively requires that we 
do not look at things from the others’ points of view assuming that we can understand things as 
they do. Her idea pushes more towards asking questions that disclose the other’s point of view, 
rather than assume. Of course, Habermas’ discourse ethics also requires that participants 
speak for their own points of view. This is the main way he is different from other Kantian 
cognitivists. However, in moral discourse he prohibits particularities whereas Young’s 
asymmetric reciprocity is more about bringing particularities to the fore so that the strangeness 
of the other is present.  
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is deontological. The principle of moral argumentation (U) does not decide on 
what is good, rather on what is right or just. 
Therefore, in moral discourse we decide on universal answers to 
practical questions. Sometimes, we might realize that in disputes over 
pragmatic questions the ethical values are at stake. When this occurs, society 
needs to clarify its ethical-political self-understanding: “such questions call for 
discourses that push beyond contested interests and values and engage the 
participants in a process of self-understanding by which they become 
reflectively aware of the deeper consonances in a common form of life” (1996, 
165). However, in the conditions of value pluralism, ethical discourse may take 
issues with moral maxims or with compatibility between ethical and moral 
maxims, or dispute over compatibility between several moral maxims. As 
Habermas notes, “we approach the moral outlook once we begin to examine 
our maxims as to their compatibility with the maxims of others” (1993, 6). This is 
where we enter the domain of moral disagreements in plural societies. We enter 
into moral discourse to test the generalizability of particular maxims, and hence 
in plural societies moral discourse cannot be replaced with ethical discourse 
(see Habermas 1996, 165, 167) because only in moral discourse can we appeal 
to (U). As Habermas argues, “for the justification of moral norms, the discourse 
principle takes the form of a universalization principle” (1996, 109).  
For an agreement to be possible in a moral discourse, (U) requires that 
participants take a “moral point of view”, which “requires that maxims and 
contested interests be generalized, which compels the participants to transcend 
the social and historical context of the particular form of life and particular 
community and adopt the perspectives of all those possibly affected” (1993, 24). 
Thus we see that plurality makes discourse necessary. Habermas’ discourse 
ethics and tripartite distinction between forms of discourse is useful in thinking 
about the role of discourse as an element in democratic politics in plural 
societies. As Habermas puts it:  
modern life is characterized by a plurality of forms of life and 
rival value convictions. For this reason - and not on account of 
the empty misgivings of moral theorists – the traditional, 
established knowledge of concrete ethical life is drawn into a 
dynamic of problematization that no one today can elude 
(1993, 22).  
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The “dynamic problematization” of “concrete ethical life” requires from 
participants a certain extent of reflectiveness. Unreflective participant is usually 
one who holds on to his/her view as ultimate, we call them dogmatic. 
Unreflectiveness closes any possibility for discourse as a problem solving 
mechanism for restoring consensus and communicative action. Given that 
plurality is a permanent condition in modern societies, we can conclude along 
with Habermas that “there is no route back from reflectiveness” (Williams qtd. in 
Habermas 1993, 22.). 
It is important to retain the idea of reflectiveness for our purposes. In 
chapter 4, I argue that Dryzek’s idea of reflexivity is a more appropriate form of 
reflectiveness of for us. The normative function of Dryzek’s term retains and 
fleshes out Habermas more general idea of reflectiveness, which deliberative 
democrats value because it is the way to induce change in attitude and 
reassessment of who one is. It is a principle that enables discourse to “push 
beyond contested interests and values” (Habermas 1996, 165). The shifts 
between pragmatic, ethical, and moral discourses can cause change in 
attitudes and change in the way society defines itself. The reconstitution of 
identity begins occurring because “insights promoted in ethical-political 
discourses can change a group’s hermeneutically clarified self-understanding 
and, along with this, its identity as well; in justifying serious value decisions, acts 
of resolve are induced by insights, for here arguments meet up with the striving 
for an authentic way of life” (Habermas 1996, 163). In this way, Habermas 
discourse ethics can fit in the hermeneutic emphasis on transformative 
dialogue, which I outline in the next chapter. The chain between three forms of 
discourses can illuminate change in attitude induced by reflective 
communication in discourse situation causes, and it can illuminate change in 
one’s self-understanding. 
1.3 Discourse and Pluralism 
So far with Gutmann and Thompson, we saw that incomplete 
understanding poses a fundamental problem to democratic politics in plural 
societies as part of the human condition. Based on this argument, we can 
assume that incommensurability of values can be the result of incomplete 
understanding to some extent. From the point of view of value pluralism, 
incomplete understanding can manifest as moral disagreement. With 
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Habermas, we saw that incomplete understanding can result in the breakdown 
of communicative action. His distinction between communicative and discourse 
situations is helpful for us in understanding the role of discourse in this context. 
Communication can break down as a result of misunderstanding or incomplete 
understanding of general norms that underpin communicative action. This 
breakdown results in a shift from communicative to discourse situation. In 
discourse situation, discourse functions as a problem solving mechanism 
through which understanding of the general norms can be restored in the form 
of rational consensus. 
Given the challenge that incomplete understanding and 
incommensurable values pose for plural societies, we took from Habermas that 
the challenges of plural societies leave us “no alternative except to locate the 
normative basis for social interaction in the rational structure of communication 
itself” (Habermas 1993, xx). For Habermas, a democratic approach to problem 
solving in plural societies must have a conception of discourse as he outlines it 
because a democratic approach in plural societies cannot appeal to particular 
traditions or community values. If by democratic approach we mean respect for 
autonomy, inclusive procedures, and equality between different participants, 
then discourse is the way to go. It makes a moral claim based on the universal 
pragmatics of language. Otherwise, we would either need to coerce different 
people or resort to the principles of majority rule and popular will, which might 
clash with our commitment to value pluralism. On this, Habermas argues:  
there is only one reason why discourse ethics, which 
presumes to derive the substance of a universalistic morality 
from the general presuppositions of argumentation, is a 
promising strategy: discourse or argumentation is a more 
exacting type of communication, going beyond any particular 
form of life. Discourse generalizes, abstracts, and stretches 
the presuppositions of context-bound communicative actions 
by extending their range to include competent subjects 
beyond the provincial limits of their own particular form of life 
(1990, 202). 
If, as Gutmann and Thompson contend, incomplete understanding has a 
temporal and situated feature, that is, our understanding is bound to the 
historical moment and our epistemology in that moment, then Habermas’ 
conception of discourse is a means to overcome this temporality and 
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situatedness. We reviewed Habermas’ argument that in order to fulfil this role in 
democratic politics in plural societies, discourse must be deontological, 
cognitivist, formal, and universal. We also examined how the elements and 
principles of discourse ethics fulfil this role of discourse and make his discourse 
ethics a useful resource for democratic politics. 
Thus, from a Habermasian perspective, democratic and plural society 
maintains its stability through communicative action. Seamless communicative 
action is possible when there is a general consensus on norms and values. It 
requires consensus on norms and values at ethical and moral levels. However, 
given that incomplete understanding and incommensurable values are inherent 
to plural societies, communicative action is bound to break down as a result of 
misunderstanding or contestation of norms and values. Without some form of 
discourse, the breakdown of communicative situation can result in violent, 
manipulative, corrupt means to restore consensus. So long as we can contain 
moral disagreement and deep division within discursive terms, and so long as 
there is a possibility for conflict to be manifested in discourse and resolved by 
means of discourse, pluralism and democratic politics can be maintained. This 
signals to us that pluralism, discourse, and democratic politics are 
interdependent in the context of modern politics. They presuppose one another. 
Therefore, with Habermas, we establish that discourse is an important element 
in democratic politics committed to pluralism as engagement and encounter. 
There is hardly an equivalent element in democratic politics for this 
purpose. Take, for instance, the alternative model to deliberative democracy – 
aggregative models. We can consider Dahl’s theory as an example. He too is 
concerned with the way difference is engaged. He argues in favour of a 
“neutral” democratic politics in which difference is protected in the private 
sphere by respect for individual liberty. In this context, engagement and 
encounter takes a competitive form. Political pluralism makes sure that the 
political institutions do not favour particular groups. This is a good idea insofar 
as we understand pluralism as Dahl does in terms of political pluralism, or as 
Galston (2002) does in terms of value pluralism. In both cases, we confine the 
normative function of pluralism to limiting power and processes of government. 
They do not have an element that would push different groups to engage, for 
instance, in a transformative dialogue. They do not have the means to include in 
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democratic politics active seeking of understanding between these groups. The 
risk of this limitation is that it can result in entrenchment and isolation of different 
groups.  
This risk is a democratic problem. Engaging and encountering one 
another as others is a way to support individual autonomy. The other has 
greater scope for autonomy if his/her otherness is given its right and engaged 
with and encountered in their otherness. Otherness, as I will come to show with 
Gadamer, comes with one’s individuality. Therefore, we need to commit to 
engagement and encounter of the other as other. Discourse, it seems to me, 
enables us to do so. Furthermore, if inclusion is also a defining feature of 
democracy, then supporting Habermas’ claim for discourse is important for the 
way we engage and encounter the other democratically. Finally, through 
discourse, difference needs not fear relativism or nihilism. Discourse can be a 
kind of engagement where what Habermas calls a “we perspective” is possible. 
Discourse ethics provides the elements and principles for deliberative 
procedures to carry on “from the first-person plural perspective, that is, in each 
instance, ‘by us’; for normative validity claims are contingent on ‘our’ 
recognition” (Habermas 1993, 49).  
Politics requires that even in the conditions of radical value pluralism, 
fragmentation, moral disagreement and division, we define a certain moral 
world to which we are all subject despite our differences. In politics, we come 
together to agree on things that we all will follow. I agree with Habermas that 
this moral world can only be intersubjective. That is, the “categorical imperative” 
is not enough for politics; especially, if we accept the argument on incomplete 
understanding. Intersubjectivity presupposes discourse, engagement and 
encounter. The extent of isolation and entrenchment of different groups is the 
measure of the weakness of our moral claims. Nonetheless, we need to be sure 
that we do not reduce isolation to exclusion and non-involvement of some 
groups from politics. The “categorical imperative” is also a form of isolation. It 
implies a sense of privileged position in its justification for taking the “moral 
point of view”, which Habermas argues, “initially appears to be advantageous 
because it promises to liberate the observer from the perspectival 
interpretations of the disputing parties, has the disadvantage that it isolates him 
in a monological fashion from the interpretive horizons of the participants and 
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denies him hermeneutic access to an intersubjectively shared moral world that 
reveals itself only from within” (1993, 49). 
Thus, we take discourse as an important element in democratic politics 
committed to pluralism and can understand the role of discourse in its following 
functions thanks to Habermas. First, we understand discourse as a problem 
solving mechanism for situations when communication breaks down because of 
incomplete understanding, misunderstanding, or contestation. There are several 
tiers of discourse that we can fall back on to restore understanding: pragmatic, 
ethical, and moral discourses. The form of discourse we fall into depends on the 
nature of problem and question that we need to resolve. Consensus in 
pragmatic discourse is subject to consensus in ethical discourse, which in turn 
is subject to consensus in moral discourse. Participants can shift from one to 
another. Second, we can understand discourse as the means through which 
incomplete understanding as Gutmann and Thompson describe it can be 
mitigated.  We take from Habermas that in discourse participants can go 
“beyond the provincial limits of their particular form of life” (1990, 202).  In these 
two senses, discourse provides the required intersubjective medium for 
engagement and encounter across differences. It does so because it “excludes 
surreptitious privileging of individual viewpoints and demands the coordination 
of all of the interpretive perspectives that tend toward individualism and 
pluralistic fragmentation, at least in modern societies” (Habermas 1993, 52). 
Third, discourse is the medium in which engagement and encounter takes 
place. We saw in Eck that active seeking of understanding and encounter of 
commitments must take place in a dialogue. Similarly, for us engagement and 
encounter of the other in their otherness must take the form of dialogue. It is 
through dialogue that the other discloses its otherness. We can take discourse 
more generally as the medium, or the field, in which the other discloses its 
otherness. Dialogue takes place within a discourse where we share the world. 
However, Habermas’ discourse ethics comes short in affirming pluralism as 
engagement and encounter. Some of them will be highlighted with Gadamer’s 
help in the next chapter. We will revisit this discussion in the last section of 
chapter II. Nevertheless, for now I can identify two points at which discourse 
ethics comes short for our purposes. 
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First one has to do with Habermas’ notions of understanding and 
discourse. Habermas’ conception of discourse as a problem solving mechanism 
confines understanding within a limited definition. For him, understanding 
involves understanding a speech act and coming to a consensus on general 
norms. On this basis, discourse ethics is limited in promoting active seeking of 
understanding across differences in its function as a problem solving 
mechanism. If we are to commit to pluralism, we also need to expand the 
concept of understanding to include engagement and encounter of the other. 
This expansion purchases discourse a function besides problem-solving. It also 
functions as a medium for disclosure of the other and coming to understanding 
(accord) with the other.   
Second, if we argue that in our pluralism we need to engage and 
encounter the other in their otherness, then Habermas’ procedures for 
intersubjectivity are limited for supporting this. To be sure, Habermas’ argument 
that intersubjective engagement is means for people to transcend “the 
provincial limits of their own particular form of life” (1999, 202) tackles the 
problem of incomplete understanding as Gutmann and Thompson define it. 
However, discourse ethics requires the kind of transcendence that betrays our 
ideal for engaging and encountering the other in their otherness. By definition, 
the other is other to me. Habermas must still rely on the Kantian “moral point of 
view” as a principle that allows one to see things as others do. That may 
eliminate the other as an active participant in the dialogue. To be sure, 
assuming another person’s perspective involves some form of engagement. 
Habermas highlights that the moral claim of his position is that it is dialogical in 
contrast to Kant’s monological principle. Still, taking the other’s perspective 
implies a certain overcoming of the other as other; it is a form of appropriation 
that betrays engagement and encounter of the other in their otherness.  
The final point I wish to draw attention to is the problem that Gutmann 
and Thompson identify with Habermas’ prioritization of procedure over 
constitutional values. I think that this is not so much a weakness of discourse 
ethics in light of our ideal of engagement and encounter as it is a difference of 
positions depending on one’s concern and perspective. I do not think that 
Habermas’ priority of procedure overlooks the role of constitutional values as 
constraints on deliberation. He does not specify which values should be 
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constitutional constraints, because that is the point of discourse ethics. These 
values are to be agreed on by means of rational discourse and consensus. 
Again, Weinstock’s (1997) distinction between “radical” and “moderate” 
pluralism is useful for our argument.  
The radical thesis argues that reason cannot arrive at an objective 
knowledge of any value independently of particular groups taking them up. The 
moderate thesis argues that reason can arrive at objective knowledge of values 
independently of any particular groups. Given Habermas’ discourse ethics, I 
assume his position is close to the moderate thesis. Given that Gutmann and 
Thompson uphold liberty and opportunity as irreplaceable values, their position 
is also moderate. However, Gutmann and Thompson deny the procedures of 
discourse ethics the capacity to arrive at objective knowledge independently of 
any groups by assuming the position of the radical thesis against Habermas. 
They argue in favour of their deliberative democracy by assuming the position 
of the moderate thesis. Assuming the position of the moderate thesis implies 
use of reason that Gutmann and Thompson understand as standard rules of 
logical inference, reason-giving, and argumentation. They just establish liberty 
and opportunity ahead of the procedure that would validate them, whereas 
Habermas’ position is the reverse. For him, we prioritize procedures that 
validate, for example, liberty and opportunity as irreplaceable values we all 
agree to respect.  
Nevertheless, I claim that we need to take into account the point that 
Gutmann and Thompson make about constitutional values as constraints. The 
concern and perspective that motivate me have to do with the risk that the ideal 
of engagement and encounter pose for pluralism and democratic politics. My 
concern is: if we are to engage and encounter the other in their otherness, what 
about the kinds of otherness that are undemocratic, sexist, racist, extremist, or 
even monist as Berlin defines16. How should we go about engaging and 
encountering them? From my perspective, engaging and encountering these 
kinds of others rarely takes the form of a transformative dialogue because they 
deny the very principles according to which we are in discourse with them. I will 
                                            
16
 Berlin’s 1949 essay on “Democracy, Communism, and the Individual” suggests that 
the philosophical foundations of totalitarianism can be called monism 
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come to this problem again through Gadamer in the next chapter and then 
appropriate ‘agonism’ from Mouffe as a way to approach it in chapter 5. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we took from Gutmann and Thompson that some of the 
challenges of plurality in the form of deep division and moral disagreement can 
be attributable to incomplete understanding. This chapter showed that 
discourse is an indispensable element for democratic politics that looks to affirm 
pluralism as engagement and encounter. Through Habermas, we accepted the 
argument that democratic politics needs a certain conception of discourse as an 
element of democratic politics. Discourse is the medium in which democratic 
politics can affirm pluralism as engagement and encounter across differences. 
For Habermas, discourse is the problem solving mechanism that restores 
communicative action by restoring consensus/understanding of the validity of 
norms. He argues that in order to take on this role, discourse must be 
deontological, cognitivist, formal, and universal. I have looked at how 
Habermas’ discourse ethics fulfils these requirements in virtue of its elements of 
rational discourse and consensus, and the discourse and universalization 
principles. This has allowed me articulate the internal connection between 
pluralism, discourse, and democratic politics as mutually presupposing one 
another. However, Habermas’ discourse ethics works with a narrow definition of 
understanding limited to understanding speech acts and consensus on general 
norms. I also highlighted how the moral claim of intersubjectivity becomes 
ambiguous when looked at with a view towards engagement and encounter of 
the other in their otherness. In the next chapter, I turn to Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics as a resource for thinking about the problem of 
understanding in pluralism, the role of discourse in democratic politics, and how 





Incomplete understanding, openness, and 
interpretive conflicts 
Introduction 
Incomplete understanding gives rise to interpretive conflicts in the idea of 
pluralism as engagement and encounter. The previous chapter established that 
the problem of incomplete understanding can be approached in democratic 
politics through discourse. Gadamer helps clarify how incomplete understanding 
complicates engagement and encounter of the other in democratic politics. 
Based on Gadamer’s account of human finitude, this chapter establishes that 
incomplete understanding is a permanent feature of human understanding. 
Following this premise, it will be argued that democratic politics cannot avoid 
interpretive conflicts and, therefore, should instantiate Gadamer’s principle of 
openness. Gadamer’s principle does not resolve interpretive conflicts. It entails 
a certain disposition that is suitable for beings with incomplete understanding. 
Those who want to commit to pluralism must be open to engaging and 
encountering others in their otherness. 
Gadamer demonstrates how incomplete understanding comes from the 
ontological dimension of human finitude. Finitude is an ontological and 
permanent feature of human understanding. Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics demonstrates human finitude through the concepts of 
hermeneutical situation, consciousness, and experience. I examine how these 
concepts draw our attention to the fundamental role of incomplete 
understanding for the challenges of plurality and how they point towards conflict 
of interpretations in pluralism that cannot be avoided in democratic politics of 
pluralist societies. The previous chapter demonstrated the role of discourse 
ethics in dealing with plurality and incomplete understanding in democratic 
politics. Here I draw the implications of philosophical hermeneutics on discourse 
ethics without having to work them out in democratic politics. I work out the 
problem of incomplete understanding and interpretive conflicts in democratic 
politics in Part II.  
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To support the argument, I proceed in three stages. The first stage 
shows how the problem of incomplete understanding in plural societies can be 
understood from the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics. It will be argued 
that incomplete understanding is a permanent and fundamental feature of 
human understanding because of the ontological dimension of human finitude. I 
establish my premise in Section 2.1 by looking at how hermeneutical situation 
constitutes human finitude through such notions as situation, horizon, and 
prejudice.  
The second stage shows the role of encountering and engaging the other 
in addressing the problem of incomplete understanding from the perspective of 
philosophical hermeneutics. It will be argued that an integral part of addressing 
incomplete understanding is self-understanding. Gadamer’s principle of 
openness suggests that a fuller self-understanding can be achieved by being 
open to encounter and engagement of the other in their otherness. I establish 
my premise in Section 2.2 by looking Gadamer’s notions of hermeneutical 
experience and consciousness and draw his principle of openness from them.  
The third stage shows how philosophical hermeneutics sheds light on the 
interpretive aspects of understanding, which means that encounter and 
engagement across differences can take the form of interpretive conflicts. 
Having shown that interpretive conflicts cannot be avoided, it will be argued that 
Habermas’ division between ethical and moral forms of discourse cannot be 
sustained because interpretive conflicts blur the distinction. I establish my 
premise in Section 2.3 by drawing on Georgia Warnke’s critique of Habermas.  
It took Gadamer many years to work out his idea of philosophical 
hermeneutics. We can learn about it from his monumental volume titled Truth 
and Method (2013). 
In 1958-1959, Hans-Georg Gadamer was completing the final draft of his 
summa which drew attention at our finitude. The original title he intended for this 
manuscript was “Foundations of a Philosophical Hermeneutics.” However, 
Gadamer’s publisher Mohr Seibeck thought that the term ‘hermeneutics’ was 
too unfamiliar and advised Gadamer against such a title for a book of 
philosophy. Gadamer took the advice home to discuss with his wife. One of the 
options they considered was “Understanding and Events”, which was soon 
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dismissed for its similarity to Bultmann’s theological Faith and Understanding. 
Finally, the author and his publisher agreed that “Truth and Method” could 
capture the attention of the public. The title suggested itself in virtue of 
Gadamer’s subject, which was about the ‘event’ of truth that method could not 
capture. Gadamer did not oppose truth to method. Rather, he pointed out that 
methodological investigations championed by natural sciences uncover only a 
fraction of the truth in human experience. Events of truth emerge in human 
experience of the shared world full of affection, ambiguity, and complexity that 
method cannot conceptualise and control. Humans experience this kind of truth 
in different ways and share it with each other via language. As Jean Grondin 
puts it in his biography of Gadamer, the book “takes off from a modest starting 
point of the Geisteswissenschaften [human sciences], rumbles through the 
domains of art, history, language, and the whole of Western philosophical 
tradition, and winds up with a universal ontology” (2003, 284).  
In Truth and Method, I am interested in Gadamer’s account of human 
finitude, the incompleteness of our understanding. The book establishes that 
our finitude is constituted by our situatedness in the world. Gadamer calls 
hermeneutical experience the coming to awareness of finitude and 
incompleteness in understanding, of context-dependency of understanding. 
Hermeneutical experience leads us to awareness that our understanding is 
always already our interpretation from our hermeneutical situation. It is precisely 
this kind of awareness that enables us to grow beyond our limitation and 
expand our horizon. It is precisely this event of truth, of coming to awareness of 
finitude that Gadamer tries to capture in the term ‘hermeneutical experience.’  
Gadamer correctly established that hermeneutic experience leads us 
towards openness, listening to each other, and learning from each other. It is 
only through the encounter and engagement with the other that we can see the 
edges of our understanding, our limits, and finitude – our incomplete 
understanding. In other words, it is this push towards hermeneutical experience 
that makes Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics result in pluralism, 
engagement, and conversation that has been noted by Malpas and Zabala 
(2010, see xvi).  
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In order to understand Gadamer’s concept of hermeneutical experience, 
we must visit other concepts from his philosophical hermeneutics. They are: 
hermeneutical situation and hermeneutical consciousness. The main 
conceptual part of this chapter is divided into two sections followed by a 
discussion of their implications for discourse ethics in Section 2.3. Section 2.1 is 
devoted to what constitutes hermeneutical situation and how it shows the 
ontological dimension of finitude in incomplete understanding. Section 2.2 is 
devoted to the notions of hermeneutical experience and consciousness 
because they are the two sides of the same event of truth that Gadamer 
describes as hermeneutical truth: the truth of our finitude.  
Section 2.1 deals with what the hermeneutical situation consists in and 
how it constitutes human finitude. The term hermeneutical situation is well 
expressed by Inga Farin: “the hermeneutic situation, then, is nothing other than 
a particular, historical, interpretive space at a specific historical time, that is, the 
ensemble of past and present understandings, persuasions, interpretive 
strategies, discourse formations, available conceptualities, and paradigms, 
insofar as they constitute ‘the condition,’ or rather, the possibility for new 
interpretive inventions or departures” (2014, 107-126)17. Here, I establish the 
way hermeneutical situation accounts for human finitude and has a constitutive 
role in human understanding through such concepts as situation, horizon, and 
prejudice in Gadamer’s Truth and Method. These concepts highlight the 
historicality of our being and show how incomplete understanding is a 
permanent feature of human understanding. As Gadamer argues, since we are 
historical beings and as such we belong to history, we cannot attain complete 
understanding. This section forms the foundation of my argument that we are 
always already interpreting things in discourse from concrete situations and 
supports the argument that the interpretive implications of pluralism as 
engagement and encounter are unavoidable in democratic politics.   
Section 2.2 deals with the way in which Gadamer’s concepts of 
hermeneutical experience and consciousness address the problem of 
incomplete understanding described in Section 2.1. Hermeneutical experience 
                                            
17
 The quote is taken from Farin’s essay on Heidegger, where she explores the 
hermeneutical dimensions of his earlier and later work. However, the definition is broad enough 
that it fits the way I understood Gadamer’s term.  
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is experience of finitude. Gadamer’s principle of openness to the otherness of 
the other comes from the concept of hermeneutical experience. One can have 
hermeneutical experience through openness to the other. Hermeneutical 
consciousness can be understood in the sense of the result of hermeneutical 
experience. Hermeneutical consciousness has to do with self-understanding 
and awareness of the finitude as well as the way hermeneutical situation 
constitutes this finitude and is taken up in our understanding, encounter, and 
engagement of the other. In this section, I examine the way in which these 
concepts make up the structure of what Gadamer calls ‘fusion of horizons’ and 
‘historically effected consciousness’. 
This section will begin with looking at Taylor’s essay on Gadamer, where 
he makes the question of understanding central for our times. Taylor is useful in 
highlighting the role of self-understanding in engagement and encounter of the 
other. I establish how self-understanding and engagement and encounter of the 
other are connected in the way that the other enables one to achieve better self-
understanding while better self-understanding pushes one towards openness to 
the otherness of the other. In general, this section establishes the roles of 
encountering the other and self-understanding in overcoming our incomplete 
understanding of the other. I argue that this is possible through Gadamer’s 
principle of openness.  
Section 2.3 deals with the implications of accepting Gadamer’s account 
of the ontological dimensions of human finitude for Habermas’ discourse ethics. 
If we accept the argument on human finitude and the way hermeneutical 
situation constitutes its limits as well as the way it is taken up in understanding, 
then it is necessary to accept the implication that encountering and engaging 
with others across difference results in conflict of interpretations. It must be 
shown how discourse ethics is limited in addressing the interpretive conflicts 
because of its strict distinction between ethical and moral forms of discourse. To 
do this, I draw from Georgia Warnke’s critique of Habermas’ discourse ethics. 
Warnke examines the limits of discourse ethics in dealing with interpretive 
conflicts from the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics. The point she 
makes is that ethical and moral forms of discourse overlap due to the 
interpretive dimension of understanding. Even though consensus can be 
reached on general norms such as freedom of speech and right to life, 
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consensus breaks down with interpretive problems that emerge when concrete 
groups of people apply the norms to concrete situations. 
Before proceeding into the substantial parts of the chapter, Gadamer’s 
‘fusion of horizons’ and the way it supports pluralism must be noted. Diana 
Eck’s idea of pluralism serves as a good lens through which to read Truth and 
Method. Similar to Eck’s idea of pluralism outlined in the Introduction, ‘fusion of 
horizons’ embodies an engagement and encounter that is mutually educative 
and aimed at understanding across differences. ‘Fusion of horizons’ is a model 
of understanding for Gadamer and as such it depicts a kind of understanding 
that results from a relationship based on openness whereby groups treat each 
other as having their own world to disclose, as having something to say.  
If we were to describe a Gadamerian idea of pluralism, we would do so 
with reference to ‘fusion of horizons’, which is enabled by his principle of 
openness. It pushes towards recognizing that when we are confronted with a 
different group, it is one thing to study them, their interests, culture, and values 
as an object of inquiry within the social sciences, it is another thing to encounter 
them as having something to say too, as having some world to disclose to us. 
We need to encounter them as having a horizon which we too need to include, 
bring together, and reconcile with our own. Adoption of Gadamer’s principle of 
openness is one of the ways for democratic politics to support greater 
autonomy, equality, and liberty in plural societies.  
This kind of encounter captured by Gadamer’s ‘fusion of horizons’ can be 
comprehended as Gadamer’s contribution to our understanding of the 
normative definition of pluralism as engagement across difference. For this 
reason, political theorists need to look more closely into Gadamer’s work in 
order to identify the kinds democratic practices that lead to ‘fusion of horizons’18. 
                                            
18
 See, for example, Walhof, Darren “Bringing the Deliberative Back In: Gadamer on 
Conversation and Understanding” Contemporary Political Theory 4 (1 May 2005): 154-174. 
Walhof advocates philosophical hermeneutics as a resource for theorists who seek to make 
deliberation as a place of mutual understanding and transformation. He argues that “Gadamer's 
approach deepens and extends the insights of the deliberative theorists by showing us how 
dialogue discloses a common subject, creates a common language, and puts our prejudices at 
risk”. See also Sandel, Adam Adatto 2014 The Place of Prejudice: a case for reasoning within 
the world. Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Press. Sandel argues that 
prejudice plays a positive role in politics and makes his case based on the distinction between 
detached and situated modes of reasoning. He draws on the works of Heidegger and Gadamer 




I suggest asymmetric reciprocity, reflexivity, and agonism as suitable 
candidates. 
There is no denying that openness is a trivial idea to democrats. Ferrara 
(2014) understands openness as a virtue of a democratic ethos and underlines 
its inherency to democracy by defining as a “democratic passion” which “aims to 
capture an attitude of receptiveness to novelty, of exploration of new 
possibilities for a life form, for a historical horizon, for a social configuration” 
(49). The democratic passion for openness contributes to “a public culture that 
orients opinion in the public sphere in the direction of favouring unconventional 
solutions more often than any nondemocratic public culture does” (Ferrara 
2014, 48). Therefore, I do not pretend to offer openness as a new idea in the 
literature within the democratic “horizon”. However, what we are usually 
interested in is the argument that one makes for upholding certain virtues, 
values, and principles in democracy. Specifying normative functions of 
openness in democratic politics, how exactly it can be practiced in engagement 
and encountering others, and understanding what it accomplishes can be 
contentious.  
Stephen White (2015, 3) notes that Ferrara prefers the idea of openness 
over similar ideas in Taylor’s agape, Derrida’s hospitality, and White’s own 
“presumptive generosity” because the latter are heavily embedded in ethical-
ontological philosophies. Instead, openness as a political disposition that is not 
couched in “comprehensive” or “general moral notions” is more suitable for the 
conditions of plurality (Ferrara 2014, 62; White 2015, 3). Now, the strange 
feature of my argument for openness is that, since I am coming at it from a 
Gadamerian perspective, it can be said to be indebted to an ethical-ontological 
philosophy making it a virtue with an ethical orientation rather than political. I do 
not think I can contest this argument because as it will become evident in this 
chapter and the next part of the thesis, I prefer “openness” for its conduciveness 
as a virtue with ethical orientation that is helpful in addressing the problem of 
incomplete understanding. Its political aspect, by the implication of my 
approach, is secondary to its aim at promoting understanding, engagement and 




My purpose in this chapter is to address the problem of incomplete 
understanding as it emerges from the perspective of philosophical 
hermeneutics. In light of this, Gadamer’s principle of openness is ethical insofar 
as it specifies a disposition that is suitable for recognizing the mutual 
belongingness of I and Thou, and preserving the otherness of the other. It 
answers the question ‘how we should treat one another given the 
incompleteness of our understanding’. However, it is not a thick ethical principle 
because the good it has as its end is respect for the other’s otherness. 
Certainly, that is not a political good. It applies to human relationships and 
interaction in light of the hermeneutical conditions of understanding regardless 
of culture, world-views, or ideas of the good. The principle does not state that it 
will lead to one kind of polity rather than another and Gadamer does not 
suggest any kind of good it will bring about except mutual education. In this 
thesis, however, I aim to instantiate it as a principle that leads to a more pluralist 
democratic politics. In virtue of this goal, I use the principle as a prescription for 
an ethical disposition suitable for beings with incomplete understanding.  
A political conception of openness, on the other hand, imposes 
boundaries on the kinds of otherness one can be open to and is directed at 
political goods such as inclusion, participation, and equality. A political 
conception of openness is faithful to the constitutional essentials of the polity, 
which in the case of democratic polity, are the essentials of a democratic 
constitution. Thus, a political conception of openness is committed to a political 
good as its end. 
We can delineate the distinction between ethical and political 
conceptions of openness with more clarity by referring to the corresponding vice 
of excessive openness. It can be argued that the problem with Gadamer’s 
principle as an ethical disposition can be that it risks an excess of openness that 
endangers the constitutional integrity of democratic politics, while the political 
conception of openness does not run this risk. The problem is whether 
Gadamer’s principle of openness has a limit on the extent of openness that can 
be observed when engaging and encountering the kinds of others that 
endanger the values and principles of democratic politics and pluralism. 
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First, I would like to address this issue from within Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics. We shall see that with Gadamer the process of 
engagement and encounter leads to fusion of horizons. This fusion can occur 
between an interpreter and a text as well as between two people that pose an 
irreducible otherness to each other. This fusion is made possible because of the 
disposition of openness to the otherness of the other. Now, it may be said that 
this openness leads to a fusion with the other regardless of what their otherness 
represents to us. The danger is that the principle of openness imposes no limit 
to the “fusion” as an understanding that is achieved between different others. In 
politics, excessive openness can lead to openness towards the kinds of others 
that deny, for instance, the principles of democracy, pluralism, and the 
constitutional organization of democratic politics.  
In section 2.2, I develop an account of historically effected 
consciousness as a regulative principle for fusion of horizons. Historically 
effected consciousness marks the boundaries for engaging and encountering 
the otherness of a text that prevent a radical rupture with what has been 
traditionally handed down. Therefore, historically effected consciousness is a 
principle that regulates ‘fusion of horizons’. It is a principle that does not let the 
extinction of one’s horizon; rather, it regulates the fusion in a manner that 
maintains the horizon’s integrity and continuity. 
Now, I would like to highlight the distinctiveness of the political 
instantiation of the principle relative the main aim of this thesis, which is to show 
that democratic politics requires a commitment to pluralism as engagement and 
encounter of the other in their otherness and that this commitment is possible 
through the instantiation of Gadamer’s principle of openness. With regards to 
the dangers of excess particularly, the instantiation of openness in the 
democratic modes of reflexivity and agonism avoid such vice. In chapter 4, I 
develop an account of reflexivity as awareness of constraints within a system 
such as a particular discourse. I show how reflexivity has an element of 
historically effected consciousness, which means that that reflexive action 
knows the limits of what is possible to change and reconstitute from the given 
hermeneutical situation. In chapter 5, I develop an account of agonism as a 
mode of openness against those that might contest our interpretation of the 
principles and values of democracy and pluralism, or deny them. 
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This is not to say that these modes render Gadamer’s principle useless. 
It is worth noting that reflexivity and agonism, as well as asymmetric reciprocity, 
do not diminish the importance of Gadamer’s principle of openness because the 
principle provides an ideal against which it is possible to develop an account of 
political openness that is faithful to the principle of pluralism as engagement and 
encounter of the other in their otherness. The difference is that while Gadamer 
only gives us the principle as an ethical disposition for beings with incomplete 
understanding, its instantiations as asymmetric reciprocity, reflexivity, and 
agonism have democratic politics and commitment to pluralism as their aim. A 
political conception of openness in these three instantiations retains the ethical 
disposition of Gadamer’s principle that is suitable for beings with incomplete 
understanding. 
2.1 Human finitude and incomplete understanding 
This section is devoted to Gadamer’s account of human finitude as it 
opens up the problem of incomplete understanding in a more fundamental way. 
Gadamer’s account of human finitude relies on the concept of “hermeneutical 
situation” that consists in the notions of horizon, situation, and prejudice. These 
terms support my claim that human finitude is behind incomplete understanding 
and show how incomplete understanding makes up the human condition as 
Gutmann and Thompson argue. Based on this examination, I claim that 
incomplete understanding is a permanent feature of understanding; no person 
can hold an all-encompassing view of the world and understand it due to the 
structural limitations of the “hermeneutical situation” and the historicality of our 
being contained within it. Then, I show how admitting incomplete understanding 
does not imply a defeatist position according to Gadamer. For Gadamer, 
finitude can be expanded by encountering and engaging with a different other. 
This is possible because the otherness of the other broadens our horizons by 
challenging our prejudices. This will set up my argument for the principle of 
openness in the next section. 
The idea of human finitude suggests the particularity and ‘situatedness’ 
of understanding. It allows me to factor in the particular conditions within which 
we understand the practical and political world. We normally understand the 
practical and political world from a particular perspective and point of view of a 
particular historical and cultural heritage. The practical and political worlds 
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require defining ourselves in terms of who we are and who we want to be. We 
then engage with others based on concretized and particular self-
understanding. We must also engage with others in the practical and political 
worlds. In part, ‘human finitude’ captures the fact that we cannot view practical 
and political matters from all points of view. Given that we ourselves are 
situated in a concrete hermeneutical situation, we need to be open to others’ 
points of view for us to understand things from outside our own finitude. We 
need others to put forward their interests. It is impossible for one person to 
understand and engage for everyone because one is finite within one’s own 
thrownness into a particular hermeneutical situation19. Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics starts exactly with the acceptance of finitude: our perspective, our 
position, our interests, values, ideas may not be the perspective, position, 
interests, values, and ideas of the others. 
To make the argument on incomplete understanding and interpretive 
conflicts stronger, it is necessary to take into account Gadamer’s argument on 
                                            
19
 Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is based on Heidegger’s early work on 
hermeneutics of facticity, which is an account of concrete human existence in the world. Later, 
Heidegger uses “thrownness” as an example of this sort of existence in Being and Time (1928). 
Gadamer first learned about thrownness in terms of hermeneutics of facticity in a short essay 
Heidegger had written for Paul Natorp. Broadly speaking, Gadamer took facticity as 
situatedness in concrete historical and cultural situation. Moreover, he took hermeneutics of 
facticity as a notion that captures the way human existence is informed and constituted by its 
situatedness in hermeneutic situation. This thrownness, or facticity, of human existence is 
captured in Heidegger’s concept of Dasein in his Being and Time (1928). Gadamer’s account of 
human finitude is based on his interpretation of Heidegger’s Dasein and the hermeneutics of 
facticity that underpins it.  
Dasein is a being that is thrown into the world, a being that belongs to the world, and 
finally, a being that always already finds itself in an intersubjective relationship with others. For 
Gadamer, Dasein can be disclosed hermeneutically.  Thus, rather than bracketing the world, 
Dasein needs to disclose itself in an act of self-understanding that is situated in the world. 
Dasein must recognize its situatedness in the sense of finite experiences which underpin its 
existence, sense of meaning, and value. In Heidegger, Dasein’s self-understanding is 
understood in the radicalized fundamental principle of hermeneutics: the relationship between 
the part and whole. Every time we endeavour to understand something, we make a projection of 
the whole and as we pursue this projection by trying to understand the parts of this whole, our 
projection alters and modifies until we have grasped the whole in relation to its parts. This, for 
Gadamer, is the simple every day process of understanding. Dasein’s self-understanding then 
proceeds in a similar fashion, where the subject proceeds to understand its own situatedness in 
the world and the way this situatedness informs and is taken up in human existence. The 
hermeneutical aspect discloses itself when self-understanding of Dasein becomes conscious of 
its own fore-structures, or structures that allow understanding to project itself forward and 
modify as it understands each individual part in relationship to the whole. Here the implication is 
that individual becomes conscious of his/her dependence on tradition in particular and the 
hermeneutic situation in general. Tradition gives pre-conceptions, pre-judgements, a mode of 
categorization that allows an individual to cast a projection in attempt to understand alien 




the universality of the hermeneutical problem20. He made this argument in 
response to Habermas’ critique that began their debate. Gadamer’s response to 
Habermas is important for taking seriously the challenge of “human finitude” in 
plural societies and the interpretative conflicts that it raises in pluralism. If we 
accept the terms within which Gadamer makes his case for the universality of 
the hermeneutical problem, then we also accept that we do in fact need to 
consider the concepts of hermeneutical situation, consciousness, and 
experience when thinking about pluralism and democratic politics.  
Gadamer’s focus on the virtues of situated understanding forces him into 
defence of the universality of the hermeneutical problem against Habermas; 
namely, that there is an interpretative dimension to all understanding. From a 
hermeneutical perspective, the extent of our understanding depends on the 
degree of our self-understanding. It has to do with awareness of one’s own 
Bildung21 within a particular time, culture, and history; in other words, in one’s 
                                            
20
 Gadamer’s account of the universality of the hermeneutic problem are in his 1967 
essay “Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and the Critique of Ideology” (Mueller-Vollmer 2002, 274-292) 
and the 1976 essay “The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem” (Ormiston and Schrift 1990, 
147-158). They were written in response to Habermas’ criticism that concentrated on the 
inability of philosophical hermeneutics to emancipate the social and political sphere from 
ideological distortions. This criticism was first expressed in Habermas’ review of Gadamer’s 
Truth and Method in his study On the Logic of the Social Sciences (1967). The relevant section 
is also available in Ormiston and Schrift 1990, 213-244. 
 
21
 Gadamer’s work is embedded in the Bildung culture of the German philosophy (see 
Sullivan 1989). And that is why in Truth and Method, he argues that it is necessary to bring 
human sciences back to the Bildung culture from contemporary positivism in order to revive the 
concepts of Bildung, sensus communis, judgement, and taste that he considers to be 
fundamental to human sciences (2013, 9-39). Bildung refers to the ontological process of self-
realization and self-understanding (Weinsheimer 1985, 71f). The precise translation of the word 
means culture, education, formation (see Lawn and Keane 2011, 17-18). Human understanding 
forms in the process of Bildung, a process of “organic development, operative at the level of the 
individual and society”; “at the individual level Bildung is the formation of the person as she or 
he is drawn into a specific cultural framework and finds her or his own voice and individuality 
within the larger configurations of culture … at a broader level, Bildung is the movement of 
culture as its customs and traditions develop historically” (Lawn and Keane 2011, 17-18). The 
basic idea common to both senses of the concept is, as Gadamer writes, “to recognize one’s 
own in the alien, to become at home in it, is the basic movement of spirit, whose being consists 
only in returning to itself from what is other” (2013, 13). He writes further: “Hence all theoretical 
Bildung, even acquiring foreign languages and conceptual worlds, is merely the continuation of 
a process of Bildung that begins much earlier. Every single individual who raises himself out of 
his natural being to the spiritual finds in the language, customs, and institutions of his people a 
pre-given body of material which, as in learning to speak, he has to make his own. Thus every 
individual is always engaged in the process of Bildung and in getting beyond his naturalness, 
inasmuch as the world into which he is growing is one that is humanly constituted through 
language and custom” (Gadamer 2013, 13).  
The tripartite translation of its meaning as culture, education, and formation gives the 
impression about moulding people into a homogenous body. Quite the contrary, it refers to the 
individuality of an authentic being that emerges from the formative functions of different 
institutions and customs that a person is thrown into. Bildung is the process whereby a person 
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own finitude. For Gadamer, hermeneutic reflection is necessary everywhere 
where self-conscious awareness is necessary (Gadamer in Mueller-Vollmer 
2002, 289) because, as he argued in Truth and Method: “long before we 
understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand 
ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and state in which we live” 
(Gadamer 2013, 288-89). Our ‘human finitude’ is partly constituted by the 
“family, society, and state in which we live” and partly the lives we have lived 
and the experiences we experienced. For Gadamer, overcoming this finitude is 
connected to the hermeneutical problem which has to do with awareness of the 
way they constitute said “finitude”. The argument that there is an interpretative 
dimension to all understanding builds on the argument that we are constituted 
by this finitude and our understanding of the world is a result of our 
interpretation of the practical and political world from our situatedness in this 
finitude.  
This particular finitude includes within itself the historical moment. But it 
is not a moment isolated from history because our understanding has been 
influenced and developed throughout history. Understanding is something that 
has been handed down to us by tradition. Gadamer captures this finiteness 
within a particularity – or human finitude – with his the term ‘horizon’. Therefore, 
hermeneutical self-knowledge involves awareness of one’s horizon from a 
particular situation, and a consciousness of the effects history has had on one’s 
understanding, and awareness of one’s finitude and limitations in experiencing 
the practical and political world. Hermeneutical situation, consciousness, and 
experience culminate in this sort of self-understanding.  
A closer look at Gadamer’s concept of ‘horizon’ as it is explained in his 
Truth and Method reveals how understanding is limited from a particular 
                                                                                                                                
makes him/herself at home in the external universality like sensus communis and finds 
him/herself in it. Do we not call people authentic when they have found their individuality in the 
commonality and in the shared? We are always striving to be in a certain way of being that we 
can individuate as “my way”. The concept of Bildung captures the ontological process behind 
the finding of this way of being in a shared world. It captures the way in which there can be 
plurality and commonality because it refers to the way people are expected not to live in 
imitation of others and yet in acknowledgement of the formative functions that others had for 
one’s finding one’s own way – my way. A process by which I find “my own way” while always 
already being among others in “our way”. 
Since Bildung is a process in which individuality forms, it leaves the remainder between 
I and Other that account for the strangeness and otherness between us. According to Gadamer, 
our respect for plurality consists in preserving the strangeness and otherness between us based 
on mutual understanding.  
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‘hermeneutical situation’ (2013, 313). To have a horizon means to have a world-
view, a perspective. Gadamer takes Husserl’s idea of ‘horizon’ as underlying 
particular meanings. In a horizon, particular meaning merges with a more 
universal meaning. As can be seen Gadamer’s interpretation of Husserl: “with 
this concept […] Husserl is obviously seeking to capture the way all limited 
intentionality of meaning merges into the fundamental continuity of the whole” 
(Gadamer 2013, 247).  
It is crucial for Gadamer that ‘horizon’ does not denote a fixed and rigid 
boundary for a particular meaning. ’Horizon’ allows an unfixed and constantly 
changing sense of boundary for the particular (see Husserl’s Cartesian 
Meditations p. 44f). Translated into the practical and political world, it means 
that having one’s interpretation couched within one’s own culture, identity, and 
so on does not mean that one will necessarily have a fixed and rigid 
interpretation. Culture and identity themselves are subject to reflexive change 
as they engage with other cultures and identities. They do not remain rigid. 
Rather, they change over time throughout history because, as Gadamer writes: 
“a horizon is not a rigid boundary but something that moves with one and invites 
one to advance further” (Gadamer 2013, 247). Concentrating on the fluidity and 
constantly changing nature of Husserl’s term, Gadamer likens ‘horizon’ to 
Wilhelm von Humboldt’s vision of the role of language.  
For Humboldt, “language is never a mere tool of communication, but an 
imprint of the mind and the world-view of its speakers” (Humboldt qtd. in 
Mueller-Vollmer 2002, 12). As Lawn and Keane explain, Gadamer relies on 
Humboldt’s idea of language to disclose the linguistical nature of ‘horizon’: “as 
one acquires the capacity to use language, and as a result of the process of 
acculturation, one at the same time acquires a ‘horizon’, a perspective on the 
world” (Lawn and Keane 2011, 51). Thus, to have a horizon means to have a 
world-view, a perspective. One has a perspective in language. As our physical 
location draws the boundaries of our horizon, the hermeneutical situation draws 
the finitude of our ‘horizon’ in the practical and political world.  
We can now look at how ‘hermeneutical situation’ constitutes the very 
limits of human finitude; the finitude that makes incomplete understanding a 
permanent feature of human understanding. Gadamer writes: 
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We define the concept of “situation” by saying that it 
represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision. 
Hence essential to the concept of situation is the concept of 
“horizon”. The horizon is the range of vision that includes 
everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point. 
Applying this to the thinking mind, we speak of narrowness of 
horizon, of the possible expansion of horizon, of the opening 
up of new horizons, and so forth (2013, 314). 
Gadamer’s use of ‘horizon’ here points at how ‘human finitude’ is an 
ontological condition for plurality. If understanding is finite due to the 
hermeneutical situation, then there are many different understandings because 
there are many different hermeneutical situations. Thus, there is a plurality of 
horizons, and so, there are as many perspectives. It also points at how finitude 
manifests itself in challenges that are attributed to incomplete understanding. 
The use of the term ‘situation’ above is synonymous with the more common 
term ‘context’, which we use to relativize and differentiate problems and topics 
in the practical and political world. ‘Context’ also represents a standpoint which 
limits the possible interpretations because we understand things against a 
contextual background and from our own context22.  
By establishing an internal connection between ‘situation’ and ‘horizon’, 
Gadamer draws our attention to the connotations the word horizon has in 
German and French languages. Gadamer writes:  
                                            
22
 In Gadamer’s tradition, ‘situation’ gained significance with Heidegger’s overturn of 
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. See David Woodruff Smith’s “Phenomenology” in 
The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition) on Heidegger’s role in turning 
phenomenology from Kantian “transcendental idealism” towards a situated conception of 
experience and understanding. Gadamer’s phenomenology was influenced by Heidegger’s 
Being and Time (1928). For Heidegger, we are always already in the world. It means that things 
(hammers, pens, computers), our activities and experiences can only have a meaning and be 
interpreted in a contextual relationship to other things in the world. 
In political theory, Walzer, for example, uses the term context in a similar way. In 
Thinking Politically: Essays in Political Theory (2007, 38-52), Walzer discusses social meanings 
as derived from constructions of objects within particular contexts. The social meaning of a table 
as an altar depends on constructing the table within a religious context. Thus, the construction 
of the social meanings of objects have, to a certain extent, a context dependency. The very 
same table constructed and understood as an altar, Walzer notes, can be somebody’s desk 
outside the religious context, or a dining table, or a butcher’s block (Walzer 2007, 40). It is 
congruent with and demonstrates Gadamer’s notions of situation and horizon: recall that above 
we looked at how “we define the concept of ‘situation’ by saying that it represents a standpoint 
that limits the possibility of vision” and the way “horizon is the range of vision that includes 




The concept of ‘horizon’ suggests itself because it expresses 
the superior breadth of vision that the person who is trying to 
understand must have. To acquire a horizon means that one 
learns to look beyond what is close at hand – not in order to 
look away from it but to see it better, within a larger whole and 
in truer proportion (2013, 316). 
Jean Grondin posits that while the French and German differ in usage, 
the connotation in both languages suggests a sense in which it can be said “that 
a book, a journey, or a meeting has broadened our horizon, or in the plural, they 
have opened up new horizons to us” (Grondin 2003, 100). He notes that the 
term denotes a certain sense of wisdom and that “this wisdom is essential to 
Gadamer’s concept of horizon” (Grondin 2003, 100). This kind of wisdom 
belongs to a person who is aware of the limitation within his/her standpoint, 
awareness that one understands things in a certain way due to that standpoint, 
and sees things in a certain way from a particular standpoint. In other words, it 
is knowledge and awareness of one’s own ignorance in the manner of the 
Socratic ignorance. But it is not just awareness of one’s own finitude. It is also 
awareness that one’s Bildung belongs to particular tradition, culture, values, 
etc., and, as Gadamer puts it, belongs to history23. This awareness, in Grondin’s 
words, “allows me to open myself to the perspective of others” and makes up 
the dialogical essence of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. Thus, we rely 
on holding a dialogue with others in order to understand things from their 
perspective; we rely on others’ narratives to expand our horizon.  
Having grasped Gadamer’s use of ‘horizon’ as having to do with finitude 
in the manner of the Socratic wisdom, it is important to move to the way this 
finitude manifests itself according to Gadamer. Human finitude manifests itself 
in the prejudices. In Truth and Method, Gadamer writes: “if we want to do justice 
to man’s finite, historical mode of being, it is necessary to fundamentally 
rehabilitate the concept of prejudice and acknowledge the fact that there are 
legitimate prejudices” (2013, 289). Gadamer’s goal here is to rehabilitate the 
                                            
23
 Gadamer wrote: “In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before 
we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a 
self-evident way in the family, society, and state in which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a 
distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of 
historical life. That is why the prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgements, 




notion of ‘prejudice’ from the distortion it got from the Enlightenment. He writes 
a substantive and convincing critique of the way the Enlightenment treated the 
concept (see Gadamer 2013, 283-289) but it is not the focus here24. Rather, it is 
important to highlight the role of “prejudices” in understanding and human 
finitude. With regards to Gadamer’s treatment of the distortion of the concept 
since the Enlightenment, we only need to note that Gadamer wishes the restore 
‘prejudice’ from the negative connotations it received as something diametrically 
on the opposite side of reason. He wants to remind us that “actually, ‘prejudice’ 
means a judgement that is rendered before all the elements that determine a 
situation have been finally examined” (Gadamer 2013, 282). In this sense, our 
‘prejudices’ are ready-to-hand25 in our understanding and are immanent to the 
situation into which we are, in Heidegger’s sense, ‘thrown’.  
Gadamer’s point is that prejudice and reason are not to be polarized. 
Instead, we need to accept that prejudices make up reason and understanding. 
They indicate where the limitations of our reason and understanding are. They 
are the manifestation of our finitude. However, their primary functions are in 
letting us appropriate and understand the world. Gadamer factors into prejudice 
things that allow us to understand something new, something alien. In that 
sense, our native language through which we appropriate and learn foreign 
languages is prejudice. Similarly, anthropologists use prejudices in order to 
appropriate and understand the social organization, traditions, rites and rituals 
of indigenous populations, tribes, and alien cultures. Gadamer brings to our 
attention that there are “legitimate” prejudices in this sense. For him, there are 
true ready-to-hand prejudices that allow us to understand new things in the 
world and which also allow us to find our way and make ourselves at home in 
                                            
24
 For useful commentary, see Wachterhauser 1988 (231-253), Simms 2015 (69-77), 
and Sandel 2014 (chapter 4). I proceed by taking at face value the validity of Gadamer’s 
argument for rehabilitating prejudice, tradition, and authority and his critique of the 
Enlightenment.   
 
25
 This is in reference to Heidegger’s distinction between entities that are ready-to-hand 
and those that are present-at-hand. For instance, when using a hammer for hammering things, 
the hammer is ready-to-hand. We do not think about the hammer, what makes it a hammer and 
its hammerness. We are focused on that for the sake of which we are hammering. However, if 
hammer breaks, the hammer is present-to-hand. That is, we are aware of the hammer, what 
makes it a hammer and its hammerness. Later in the chapter, Heidegger’s distinction will be 
engaged to show that the significance of Gadamer’s philosophy is precisely in calling out how 
certain prejudices are ready-to-hand in our practical and political encounters with others and 
how in this encounter of the other, if we are open to its otherness, our prejudices can become 
present-at-hand, whereby we can overcome our finitude and incomplete understanding.   
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the ethical/practical world through Bildung. In encountering the other, its 
otherness can challenge our prejudices. When challenged, our prejudices turn 
from ready-to-hand to present-to-hand, allowing us to reflect on them and, 
perhaps, reconsider them.  
Let us look at some insights gained in Gadamer’s rehabilitation of 
‘prejudice’ with regards to plurality. First, it demonstrates the impossibility of 
absolute reason. It explains there can be plurality of differentiations with equal 
claims for truth and validity by disclosing how understanding is historically 
termed and limited. So it takes us to the fundamental reason for why in 
pluralism we need to accept that there cannot be one undisputed truth claim.  
In hermeneutics, vis a vis ‘prejudice’, “reason exists for us only in 
concrete, historical terms –i.e. it is not its own master but remains constantly 
dependent on the given circumstances in which it operates” (Gadamer 2013, 
288). We speak of plurality of ideas, values, principles, and world-views when 
we see that reason can be differentiated due to particularity of history, culture, 
and language. If we accept that reason exists within concrete circumstances, 
then by implication we must accept that our understanding is interpretation that 
changes depending on the hermeneutical situation. Prejudices also express our 
historicality that also accounts for incomplete understanding. We have 
incomplete understanding primarily because we are historical beings and 
belong to history.  
The second insight in Gadamer’s rehabilitation of ‘prejudice’ establishes 
the significance of encountering the other for broadening our horizon. Gadamer 
insists that all understanding essentially proceeds from self-understanding 
(2013, 261). If we agree with Gadamer here, then we accept that to understand 
other values, ideas, or cultures, we first of all need to understand ourselves. It is 
necessary to be aware of the historicity and situatedness of our understanding 
because they mark its incompleteness.  
Previously, it was noted that prejudices manifest the historicity and 
particularity of understanding. Warnke recognizes this and brings it to bear upon 
deliberative democracy (2000; 2002). For her, and Gadamer, in order to act and 
engage with one another, as for instance we would in a debate on ethics, we 
must first of all understand “who and where we are and who and where we want 
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to be” (Warnke 2002, 79). For that kind of self-conscious awareness, we must 
come as close as we can to full realization of our situatedness in the 
hermeneutical situation and of the limitedness of our understanding within the 
finitude that our situation marks. Therefore, “from the beginning then, we are 
involved in the practical task of deciphering the story in which we are a part so 
that we know how to go on” (Warnke 2002, 80). The kind of self-conscious 
understanding that Gadamer and Warnke emphasise requires awareness of 
one’s prejudices. Prejudices are ready-to-hand things in understanding and 
dealing with others. They partake in the event of understanding because 
“prejudice means a judgement that is rendered before all the elements that 
determine a situation have been finally examined” (Gadamer 2013, 282)26.  
Prejudices come to the foreground and become present-at-hand in the 
encounter and engagement with the other. The otherness of the other broadens 
our horizons by challenging our prejudices. It is in this engagement with the 
other that our prejudices become present-to-hand. Hermeneutics is about 
encountering and understanding the other, the alien, in their otherness. 
Gadamer highlights the significance of encountering the other in their otherness 
for self-understanding. This is evident in his use of the term ‘horizon’. In most 
encounters of something strange and alien, there is something to learn if one is 
open to it. In reading a new text, an open reader constantly challenges and 
revises his/her prejudices. In encountering a person with a different perspective, 
an open dialogue partner challenges and revises his/her prejudices about that 
person’s perspective. In both cases, the educational aspect shows that there is 
not only a change in understanding of the book or the person, but also a change 
in self-understanding.  
When it comes to practical and political world, it is often the case that the 
inclusion of a different group brings a change in perspective. This becomes 
especially significant when the debate reaches an impasse. Even in the more 
dramatic scenarios of personal life, a look at one’s circumstances from a new 
                                            
26
 For Gadamer, foregrounding and testing one’s own prejudices is part of 
hermeneutically conscious mind. This mind is open and sensitive to the otherness of the text; it 
is prepared for the text to say something new and expects to disclose its own alterity. We learn 
from Gadamer that “this kind of sensitivity involves neither ‘neutrality’ with respect to content nor 
the extinction of oneself, but the foregrounding and appropriation of one’s own fore-meanings 
and prejudices … the important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text can 




perspective makes a world of difference. The new perspective is usually gained 
by talking to somebody. As Gadamer shows, all cases of changed 
understanding and/or perspective require openness to the new and to the alien. 
In opening up to the other and encountering it, a hermeneutical task is 
performed in the same way a text is read. The text must be read with openness 
to its otherness because that is the only way something new can be learned 
from and about it. Thus, as in the case of reading to learn and broaden 
horizons, encountering other people in the practical and political world of a 
plural society leads to less incomplete understanding of the collective and to 
wiser decisions. This is the main insight to take from Gadamer on upholding 
pluralism as engagement and encounter of the other. 
For Gadamer, encountering the other involves ‘transposing’ of one’s self 
into the horizon of the other. By doing this, one is allowed to see things the way 
the other sees them. The analogue for transposing in hermeneutics is reading a 
historical text, on which Gadamer writes: “if we fail to transpose ourselves into 
the historical horizon from which the traditionary texts speak, we will 
misunderstand the significance of what it has to say to us” (2013, 313). It also 
applies to the practical life: “to that extent this seems a legitimate hermeneutical 
requirement: we must place ourselves in the other situation in order to 
understand it” (Gadamer 2013, 313). It must not be confused with the idea of 
moral respect. Let us consider Gadamer’s case. He writes: 
in a conversation, when we have discovered the other 
person’s standpoint and horizon, his ideas become intelligible 
without our necessarily having to agree with him; so also 
when someone thinks historically, he comes to understand 
meaning of what has been handed down without necessarily 
agreeing with it or seeing himself in it. In both cases, the 
person understanding has, as it were, stopped trying to reach 
an agreement. He himself cannot be reached. By factoring the 
other person’s standpoint into what he is claiming to say, we 
are making our own standpoint safely unattainable (2013, 
314). 
The idea of moral respect usually requires that we detach from our 
particularity. The assumption is that only by transcending from the historical 
moment, from the particular tradition, from our particular social position can we 
see things from the other’s perspective. Moral respect also underlines the idea 
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of universal point of view. In this instance, moral respect underpins the condition 
for seeing things as the other does. To achieve that, one must detach from 
one’s self. For Gadamer, this move results in closure; a closure in which we 
make ourselves unavailable to the other; a kind of closure in which we seal our 
prejudices from being challenged. Truly encountering the other in their 
otherness requires that we put ourselves into their position.  
As Gadamer argues further: 
This is necessary, of course, insofar as we must imagine the 
other situation. But into this other situation we must bring, 
precisely, ourselves, only this is the full meaning of 
‘transposing ourselves’. If we put ourselves in someone else’s 
shoes, for example, then we will understand him – i.e. become 
aware of the otherness, the indissoluble individuality of the 
other person – by putting ourselves in his position (2013, 315). 
Putting ourselves in the other’s position allows us to understand the other 
in their otherness. It also allows us to foreground and challenge our own 
opinions and prejudices. Contrary to the idea of moral respect, the fact that we 
need to see things the way others see them “does not mean that when we listen 
to someone or read a book we must forget all our fore-meanings concerning the 
content and all our ideas” (Gadamer 2013, 281).  
Gadamer falls short of advocating the idea of moral respect as taking a 
detached and universal point of view. Transposing involves bringing ourselves 
into the other so that we can really see its otherness relative to us. Moral 
respect precludes this kind of encounter. That is, if we are to detach from our 
particularities and see things purely as the other sees them, it does not involve 
any encounter at all. It involves our unilateral and monological transposition, 
even a certain appropriation of the other without ourselves being available to be 
encountered by the other. For Gadamer, it is not so much that the idea of moral 
respect is impossible as it is undesirable because it results in making oneself 
unavailable to the other. In taking a universal position we close ourselves from 
the other and avoid foregrounding our prejudices before the other.  
Considering a deliberative setting in which we hold ethical, moral 
debates, by transcending from our particularity we conceal our own prejudices 
from contestation, close ourselves off from the debate, and therefore make 
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ourselves unavailable to the other. So, we deny them the same hermeneutic 
task that we perform in the encounter with them. Usually, our interest in some 
subject matter leads us to encounter the other. In the political sphere, the 
subject matter can be the moral principle of justice, or normative validity of laws, 
or the truthfulness of an opinion, or the rightness of the rule. The interest in 
subject matter serves as a condition for inclusion and exclusion in dialogue for 
both Gadamer and Habermas. For Gadamer, the interpreters’ interest in the 
subject matter serves as the ground for their encounter, whereas for Habermas 
those interested in the subject and affected by the outcome encounter and 
engage with one another. In both cases, encountering the other requires that 
that we are present from within our own finitude, with our opinions and 
prejudices and keep an open mind towards the others in their otherness without 
disregarding the former27.  
When we consider the implications of Gadamer’s idea of ‘transposing’ for 
deliberative theories of democracy, we can see that those who only formulate 
deliberation as sharing and discussion of opinions (Gutmann and Thompson 
1996; Ackerman and Fishkin 2002) fall short in affirming encounter and 
engagement across differences. We have established that for Habermas too it 
is crucial that one represents one’s own interests as truthfully and genuinely as 
possible. However, for Habermas, when it comes to moral discourse, being 
present with one’s own particularity can be an obstacle to reaching 
understanding/consensus. By contrast, for Gadamer, being present with one’s 
own particularity is the condition of possibility for understanding the other in 
their otherness. There is an obvious contrast here. In Habermas, understanding 
is directed at reaching consensus on validity claims. For Gadamer, 
understanding is directed a mutual accord with the other. For Gadamer, it is 
important that the otherness (and so, plurality) is preserved. Neither of the 
positions can be dismissed. The significance of Gadamer’s position is that it can 
show why there is a misunderstanding. There could be a difference in 
interpretation due to situated understanding. As Section 2.3 establishes, this 
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 Although, being present from our own perspective depends on the form of discourse 
in Habermas’ discourse ethics. If we are in moral discourse, then for Habermas the 
particularities that make up our perspective are obstacles to achieving consensus and realizing 




issue becomes more important when norms are challenged from the 
perspective of ethical discourse. 
Let us return to why it is necessary to encounter the other in their 
otherness: 
That is why a hermeneutically trained consciousness must be, 
from the start, sensitive to the text’s alterity. But this kind of 
sensitivity involves neither “neutrality” with respect to content 
nor the extinction of one’s self, but the foregrounding and 
appropriation of one’s own fore-meanings and prejudices. The 
important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the 
text can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its 
own truth against one’s own fore-meanings (2013, 282). 
Gadamer’s focus on encountering the otherness of the text does not 
concern us. It is necessary to take his point on the importance of being “aware 
of one’s own bias” in order to move on to the next section. For Gadamer, an 
encounter between a reader and a text, or people, is an encounter of horizons. 
A process of understanding takes place when two or more horizons encounter 
and engage with one another. Gadamer calls this process ‘fusion of horizons’. 
For ‘fusion of horizons’ to be possible, horizons must be aware of the 
hermeneutical situation they are embedded in. 
As it was established previously, understanding proceeds from self-
understanding. It is necessary to be aware of the hermeneutical situation that 
constitutes the finitude of understanding. It is only possible to become aware of 
such finitude in the encounter and engagement with different horizons. Horizons 
can challenge one another and in that process bring their prejudices to the 
foreground. Without such encounters and engagements, that is, without 
pluralism, we would truly be dogmatic beings blindly believing in the rightness of 
our own world-view. Encountering the other in their otherness, awareness and 
foregrounding of one’s own situated understanding is where the I and the Other 
engage in a process of understanding. Central to that process is fusing of the 
horizons of the two. Thus “understanding is always the fusion of … horizons” 
(Gadamer 2013, 317).  
Gadamer’s notion of ‘fusion of horizon’ is a model for all understanding 
(see Gadamer 2013, 315-318; Lawn and Keane 2011, 51-53; Weinsheimer 
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1985, 183-184). On the one side, the model “explains the nature, and justifies 
the existence, of the philosophical and literary canon” (Lawn and Keane 2011, 
53) and on the other it also explains how understanding takes place at 
interpersonal and inter-cultural level (Lawn and Keane 2011, 52). For Gadamer, 
understanding that takes place in ‘fusion of horizons’ is dialogical because the 
horizons are linguistic. We encounter one another and bring our horizons into 
contact by holding a dialogue. When we have discourse on a subject, be it 
moral principles or ethical values, we bring our horizons into the discourse 
situation and keep within our focus, as Gadamer says, the subject matter itself. 
The understanding we reach about the subject matter results from our fusing 
our horizons.  
This form of understanding does not necessarily mean appropriation of 
one by the other. It means that both undergo a change and expansion in their 
self-understanding. All who are interested and concerned about the subject can 
participate in this fusing in discourse. And since each participant accepts their 
own finitude, they accept that the other might open up something new and 
unexpected about the subject. That is, the other brings into one’s horizon things 
that weren’t in it before. One also brings to the fore and tests the legitimacy of 
one’s own prejudices. This process of understanding is reciprocal and mutual. 
When horizons fuse, we overcome our finitude and are able to reach an 
understanding across difference.  
Fusion of horizons “embodies a measure of agreement” (Lawn and 
Keane 2011, 51). “And this in turn is a partial understanding” (Lawn and Keane 
2011, 51). According to Gadamer’s ‘fusion of horizons’ understanding is never 
complete because horizons themselves are not fixed. They are constantly 
changing, moving, and expanding (Gadamer 2013, 315). Thus, for Gadamer 
there cannot be one final understanding of something because there cannot be 
one complete and final ‘fusion’. We are historical beings that are future oriented. 
We constantly look to our past to understand our present so we can define who 
we are and who we want to be. Thus, our horizon from the present is constantly 
brought into contact with the horizon of the past. And just like in reading 
historical texts and artefacts, our horizons come into contact with the horizons 
of other persons and cultures. Since in both occasions we are assumed by 
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Gadamer to constantly test and revise our fore-meanings and prejudices, our 
horizons are not fixed.  
Gadamer’s ‘fusion of horizons’ reveals a normative aspect of pluralism in 
a fundamental way. It establishes that “understanding is not a question of an 
active subject casting a meaning on an inert and dead object” (Lawn and Keane 
2011, 52). Rather, understanding is treating the other as having a horizon of its 
own with which one needs to come together (Lawn and Keane 2011, 52). Plural 
societies are not just divided by the values and interests people commit to. They 
can be divided more fundamentally by history, interpretations of history, 
languages, culture, religious world-views. ‘Fusion of horizons’ establishes that in 
pluralism, when confronted with a different groups of people, it is one thing to 
count them as part of the collective by studying them, their interests, culture, 
and values as an object of inquiry of social sciences, and it is another thing to 
encounter them as having something to say too, as having some world to 
disclose. The normative revelation ‘fusion of horizons’ makes in pluralism is that 
the other must be encountered as having a horizon that must be included, 
brought together, and reconciled in an engagement that lets the other disclose 
its own otherness. This sort of encounter and engagement can be 
comprehended as pluralism. 
Gadamer’s idea of ‘fusion of horizons’ is not complete without the 
regulative idea of ‘historically effected consciousness’28. He writes, “to bring 
about this fusion in a regulated way is the task of … historically effected 
consciousness” (Gadamer 2013, 317). ‘Historically effected consciousness’ is a 
kind of consciousness that recognizes that one’s concern and interest in the 
subject matter is always already influenced by one’s situated understanding. 
Gadamer breaks up the structure of this regulatory idea into hermeneutical 
situation, hermeneutical consciousness, and hermeneutical experience. In this 
section, it was established that hermeneutical situation accounts for incomplete 
understanding in a fundamental way. In the next section, it will be established 
that Gadamer’s principle of openness enables the kind of engagement and 
encounter that is suitable for beings with incomplete understanding. The 
argument will be supported by establishing the role of hermeneutical experience 
                                            
28
 For Gadamer “historically effected consciousness is an element in the act of 
understanding itself and … is already effectual in finding the right questions to ask” (2013, 312). 
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and consciousness in ‘historically effected consciousness’ and drawing the 
principle of openness from the way Gadamer uses hermeneutical experience.  
2.2 Understanding and encountering the other through openness 
Charles Taylor observed that “the great challenge of the coming century, 
both for politics and for social science, is that of understanding the other” (2002, 
126). Since it was established that we should approach the challenge of 
understanding the other by embracing our finitude and incomplete 
understanding, the first task in understanding the other is understanding 
oneself, i.e. self-understanding. This section establishes the fundamental way in 
which self-understanding is connected to understanding the other and how this 
leads to openness and change in self-understanding. Taylor argued that the 
slogan of the approach to the challenge of understanding in our time should be 
“no understanding the other without a changed understanding of self” (2002, 
141). I agree. 
The reason for significance of Gadamer’s idea ‘understanding’ in 
pluralism has to do with its open-endedness and its basis on bilateral 
engagement. This feature is evident in Taylor’s distinction between knowledge 
and understanding in philosophical hermeneutics. Knowledge is unilateral, 
whereas understanding is bilateral. The goal in each is different. The goal of 
knowledge is to achieve a final explanation of the object. It aims to exclude all 
future surprises. “Coming to an understanding does not have this finality”, 
because we can only come to understanding with definite interlocutors (Taylor 
2002, 127). These interlocutors are humans that may be in similar 
circumstances to ours or in completely different circumstances that may make 
these people different from us. Furthermore, we can never achieve a final 
explanation about humans or their affairs because circumstances and, 
therefore, humans change. Objects do not change the way humans change. It 
is not necessary to agree with an atom about where it will be and how it will 
behave. Understanding is more cooperative and open-ended for the new and 
unexpected. 
Furthermore, in knowledge the “goal is to attain full intellectual control 
over the object, such that it can no longer ‘talk back’ and surprise” (Taylor 2002, 
128); It may require a change in perspective or the framework that may hinder 
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this control. But in all these changes, the goal for finality and intellectual control 
does not change. By contrast, coming to an understanding with an interlocutor 
can change one’s goal. In coming to understanding we do not try to manipulate 
others, at least we do not want to seem like we are or otherwise we would be 
denied the engagement with them. In coming to understanding, the aim, argues 
Taylor, is to live together “and this means listening as well as talking, and hence 
may require that I redefine what I am aiming at” (2002, 128). 
Thus, genuine understanding of the other can change understanding of 
the self. Taylor writes: “in coming to see the other correctly, we inescapably 
alter our understanding of ourselves” (2002, 140; emphasis added). Taylor is 
not suggesting that there is a correct understanding of the other in a way that 
precludes all other understandings as incorrect. Rather, it is necessary to take 
away the point that understanding the other correctly suggests more towards a 
correct way to understand the other. A correct way to understand the other is to 
put prejudgments and prejudices about other at the forefront of the engagement 
and let the otherness of the other challenge them. “Really taking in the other will 
involve an identity shift in us”, and “that is why”, Taylor argues, “it is so often 
resisted and rejected” (2002, 140). The problem is “we have a deep identity 
investment in the distorted images we cherish of others” (Taylor 2002, 140).  
For Gadamer, openness to goal revision is what makes one a better 
human being (see Gadamer 2013, 362-366). For him, this kind of person is an 
“experienced” person. Let us take a closer look at what he means by 
“experience”. 
Gadamer does not follow what he calls the “teleological perspective” of 
experience in human sciences that has been handed down from Bacon (2013, 
358). To distinguish it from what he calls “genuine” experience, he contrasts two 
ways in which the word “experience” is used in language29. First, the word is 
                                            
29
 The precise German translation of experience is Erfahrung. Lawn and Keane suggest 
that its root word fahren as travel or wander adds to its etymology a connotation with a more 
philosophically tinted “voyage of discovery” (2011, 47). In Gadamer’s Truth and Method, it too 
“echoes the idea of travel as an experience that deeply transforms the traveller and it is 
precisely in such an experience that truth exists” (Lawn and Keane 2011, 47). Here he wants to 
overcome not only the theory of experience since the Enlightenment but its Hegelian roots in 
philosophy. The philosophical tint of the term was articulated in Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit. For Gadamer, “the Hegelian system does not accurately represent the true meaning of 
the term Erfahrung, experience, because the movement within the circularity of consciousness 
leads one to believe that the experience is enclosed within itself and not open to actual 
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used to describe experiences that confirm an expectation (Gadamer 2013, 361). 
Second, the word is used to describe new experiences (Gadamer 2013, 361). 
The second type of experience usually shows something in a new way, which 
leads to revision of current understanding. It causes change in understanding of 
the object as well as self-understanding. For Gadamer, this kind of experience 
is a “process” that “is essentially negative” (2013, 361). Because negative 
experience can show “that we have not seen the thing correctly and now know it 
better”, Gadamer argues that “the negativity of experience has a curiously 
productive meaning” (2013, 362). It does not necessarily mean that we correct a 
previously wrong knowledge, which sometimes can be the case. It also means 
that “we acquire a comprehensive knowledge” (Gadamer 2013, 362). For 
Gadamer, negative experience is genuine experience (2013, 362). It 
presupposes a determinate negation, which is otherwise called dialectical 
experience (Gadamer 2013, 362) 
Gadamer ascribes negative experience to the Hegelian understanding of 
experience. However, he rejects the finality that Hegel sees in dialectics. It does 
not “do justice to hermeneutical consciousness” (Gadamer 2013, 364).  For 
Hegel, self-consciousness that comes to know itself can only do so with new 
experiences. However, new experience cannot be one that confirms what is 
already known. Rather, new experience is negative experience – i.e., one that 
unconceals30 something new, previously unknown, and simultaneously 
unconceals the limits of self-consciousness. The negativity of experience is 
what moves self-consciousness towards better consciousness about itself, i.e. it 
overcomes limitations when they are unconcealed by new and negative 
experiences.  
                                                                                                                                
difference or otherness” (Lawn and Keane 2011, 47). Whereas “the ultimate goal of Hegel’s 
dialectic of absolute knowledge, where consciousness brings its wandering to an end”, 
Gadamer pushes to overcome this account by factoring in the fundamentality of human finitude 
(Lawn and Keane 2011, 47).  In other words, Gadamer pushes for a more nuanced notion of 
experience that is sensitive to the changing and transforming circumstances understood in 
terms of hermeneutic situation and horizon discussed above. For Gadamer, this notion of 




 Gadamer reads Hegel through Heidegger. I am faithful to Heidegger’s notion of 





Gadamer retains two things from Hegel and discards the ultimate finality 
of self-consciousness. First, Gadamer retains the phenomenological and 
existential aspects of Hegelian dialectics. Indeed, if our experiences have made 
us into who we are, we need to be aware that that which is unconcealed might 
be due to who we have come to be through our experiences31. The new thing 
that is unconcealed can only be unconcealed to the consciousness that is 
experiencing it. Thus, we need to be aware that what we are finding out through 
our new experience, the newness that we find in experience, is new for us. 
Second, Gadamer retains the openness of dialectics. Thus, it is clear that 
Gadamer rejects the finality of Hegel’s dialectics. For him “the dialectic of 
experiences has its proper fulfilment not in definitive knowledge but in the 
openness to experience that is made possible by experience itself” (Gadamer 
2013, 364). 
By retaining both of these aspects of the dialectics of experience, 
Gadamer opposes “genuine” experience to absolute knowledge and finality (see 
Gadamer 2013, 364). A genuine experience reveals a distinct kind of truth. That 
truth has to do with self-knowledge and awareness of our own finitude, 
situatedness, and historicity (see Gadamer 2013, 365-366). When Gadamer 
argues that Hegelian dialectic does not “do justice to hermeneutic 
consciousness” (2013, 364), he is factoring in the ontological dimension of 
finitude. Hermeneutical consciousness is consciousness of finitude. Therefore, 
there cannot be any finality or absoluteness in dialectics.  The truth of dialectic 
experience “always implies an orientation toward new experience” and not the 
finality of synthesis (Gadamer 2013, 364). Rather than leading to absolute 
knowledge, experience leads to Socratic doctrine of ignorance32. As Gadamer 
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 On this point, Gadamer writes: “for consciousness its object is in-itself, but what is in-
itself can be known only as it presents itself to the experiencing consciousness. Thus the 
experiencing consciousness has precisely this experience: that the in-itselfness of the object is 
in-itself “for us” (Gadamer 2013, 362). 
 
32
 The experienced man for Gadamer is Socrates. As Socrates encountered people in a 
dialogue from the position of self-conscious awareness of finitude. He sought new experiences 
by engaging in dialogues with others. And it was this experience that kept him open to new 
encounters, new dialogues, and new experiences. Gadamer writes: “The truth of experience 
always implies an orientation toward new experience. That is why a person who is called 
experienced has become so not only through experiences but is also open to new experiences. 
The consummation of his experience, the perfection we call “being experienced”, does not 
consist in the fact that someone already knows everything and knows better than anyone else. 
Rather, the experienced person proves to be, on the contrary, someone who is radically 
undogmatic; who, because of the many experiences he has had an the knowledge he has 
106 
 
writes, genuine experience is “that whereby man becomes aware of his 
finiteness” (2013: 365) and “experience of one’s own historicity” (2013: 366). 
Genuine experience is experience of finitude, situatedness, and 
historicity. From philosophical hermeneutics, we see that ‘historically effected 
consciousness’ fulfils a regulative role in ‘fusion of horizons’. It means that no 
‘fusion’ can achieve finality. For Gadamer, in order for ‘historically effected 
consciousness’ to fulfil this role, “it must reflect the general structure of 
experience” (2013, 366). In the strict sense, ‘historically effected consciousness’ 
is primarily consciousness of tradition and the history of effect contained in 
tradition. In the broader sense, it is also consciousness of situatedness of 
understanding. Since “hermeneutical experience is concerned with tradition” 
(Gadamer 2013, 366), it is the defining feature of ‘historically effected 
consciousness’. Therefore, in order to establish the role of ‘historically effected 
consciousness’ as a regulative idea that prevents finality, Gadamer must show 
how hermeneutical experience is genuine experience (see Gadamer 2013, 
366)33. Showing how hermeneutical experience leads to openness in its 
concern with tradition establishes the way ‘historically effected consciousness’ 
regulates ‘fusion of horizons’ from achieving finality or absolute knowledge. The 
open, dialogical, and fluid character of ‘fusion of horizons’ depends on 
hermeneutical experience being a form of genuine experience.  
Making his case for hermeneutical experience, Gadamer differentiates 
between three types of experience of the other34 (2013, 366-396). The first type 
draws knowledge from the experience and “can make predictions about others 
on the basis of experience” (Gadamer 2013, 366). It establishes the other as a 
means to an end. Gadamer makes a moral judgement against this type of 
experience calling it “purely self-regarding” and that it “contradicts the moral 
                                                                                                                                
drawn from them, is particularly well equipped to have new experiences and to learn from them. 
The dialectic of experience has its proper fulfilment not in definitive knowledge but in the 
openness to experience that is made possible by experience itself” (2013: 364). 
 
33
 Gadamer writes: “Our discussion of the concept of experience thus arrives at a 
conclusion that is of considerable importance to our inquiry into the nature of historically 
effected consciousness. As a genuine form of experience it must reflect the general structure of 
experience. Thus we will have to seek out in hermeneutical experience those elements that we 
have found in our analysis of experience in general” (2013: 366) 
 
34




definition of man” (2013, 367). In relating this type of experience to the 
hermeneutical problem, Gadamer equates it to “naïve faith in method and in the 
objectivity that can be attained through it” (2013, 367). This type of experience 
treats the other as an object with no openness to what it has to say.  
The second type experiences the other in a “false” dialectical way 
(Gadamer 2013, 367). For Gadamer, this experience is also self-regarding but 
in a different way. It takes a form of “self-relatedness”. “Such self-regard derives 
from the dialectical appearance that the dialectic of the I-Thou relation brings in” 
(Gadamer 2013, 367). The other is experienced not in the way that its 
otherness negates something about the person experiencing the other. It is not 
directed at a change in self-understanding. Rather, experience of the other is a 
competition with it, an argument. “One claims to know the other’s claim from his 
point of view and even to understand the other better than the other 
understands himself” (Gadamer 2013, 367). Here, the other does not speak for 
itself, is not given a chance to disclose its otherness: “the claim to understand 
the other person in advance functions to keep the other person’s claim at a 
distance” (Gadamer 2013, 368).  
In relating this type of experience to the hermeneutical problem, 
Gadamer equates it to “historical consciousness” (2013, 368). Historical 
consciousness treats tradition as an object. It attempts to know everything there 
is to know about the otherness of its object. It situates it in the context of the 
historical horizon that the object belongs to. Through historical consciousness, 
tradition is studied by separating, distancing, and isolating its historicity from the 
present. But the way historical consciousness experiences the other is not a 
genuine experience. “By claiming to transcend its own conditionedness 
completely in knowing the other, it is involved in a false dialectical experience, 
since it is actually seeking to master the past” (Gadamer 2013, 368). This type 
of experience does not treat the other as an object like the first type. Yet, it has 
no openness to the other because the person experiencing the other claims to 
understand for the other and reflects him/herself out of the relationship with the 
other35. 
                                            
35
 Gadamer illustrates as thus: “The servant who tyrannizes his master by serving him 
does not believe that he is serving his own aims by doing so. In fact, his own self-
consciousness consists precisely in withdrawing from the dialectic of this reciprocity, in 
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The third type experiences the other in their otherness. Here, one 
approaches the other with awareness of one’s finitude, situatedness, and 
historicity. One does not experience the other as an object, nor does one enter 
into a false dialectical relationship with the other. The other discloses its 
otherness. Gadamer calls this type of experience “the highest” type of 
hermeneutical experience (2013, 369). In relating it to the hermeneutical 
problem, Habermas equates it to historically effected consciousness. Here, 
tradition is treated as a dialogue partner36. In this dialogue, we let tradition 
challenge us and bring our prejudices to the foreground. We bring our own 
horizon to meet with the horizon of the tradition in such a way that we recognize 
our own historicity and finitude. In other words, it is with ‘historically effected 
consciousness’ that we can conceive of understanding similar to Taylor as 
bilateral, party-dependent, and open to goal-revision. Because it leads to 
awareness of one’s own finitude, situatedness, and historicity, hermeneutical 
experience “calls for a fundamental sort of openness” (Gadamer 2013, 369). 
Hermeneutical experience is genuine experience because its openness 
to the otherness of the other leads to negative experience. In experiencing the 
other this way, one “transposes” oneself into the horizon of the other. This kind 
of engagement and encounter allows the otherness to confront and challenge 
one’s prejudices. One comes to awareness of one’s prejudices by encountering 
the other and being open to its otherness. That is a hermeneutical experience. It 
is an experience of negation of one’s prejudices; therefore, it is a genuine 
experience. 
At this moment, it is important not to conceive of hermeneutical 
experience as experience of tradition only. It was established in Section 2.1 that 
tradition is part of one’s hermeneutical situation, which includes situation, 
prejudices, and historicity as well. Therefore, hermeneutical experience is 
experience of one’s hermeneutical situation generally. Hermeneutical situation 
is the point from which we can have a horizon. Hermeneutical experience 
allows us to gain a better self-understanding and awareness of our situatedness 
                                                                                                                                
reflecting himself out of his relation to the other and so becoming unreachable by him” (2013, 
368). 
36
 On this point, Gadamer posits: “I must allow traditions claim to validity, not in the 
sense of simply acknowledging the past in its otherness, but in such a way that it has something 
to say to me. This too calls for a fundamental sort of openness” (2013, 369)  
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within the hermeneutical situation. It unconceals our very own finitude. To be 
aware of this finitude is to have hermeneutical consciousness. Thus, ‘historically 
effected consciousness’ consists in the intricate and intimate relationship 
between hermeneutical situation, experience, and consciousness.  
In section 2.1, we have seen that incomplete understanding, to which 
such challenges as incommensurability of values and moral disagreement are 
attributable, has to do with the ontological dimension of human finitude. We 
have seen that human understanding is finite within the hermeneutical situation 
it belongs to. Understanding is always already situated in the hermeneutical 
situation. We can have a horizon from this situation, which makes things 
understandable in particular ways. In this section, we established that, broadly 
applied, hermeneutical experience is the experience of the other in their 
otherness. It is hermeneutical experience in so far as it involves the to and fro 
movement, a movement of discovery and unconcealment of one’s own edges 
as well as the otherness of the other. 
The role of the new, the alien, the other is integral to hermeneutical 
experience and consciousness. Encountering the other presents us with a 
chance, an opportunity to understand ourselves better, to make our incomplete 
understanding a little less incomplete, to expand our finitude a little further 
outward. This experience depends on our openness to the other, our 
willingness to let the otherness confront us and change our self-understanding. 
In turn, genuine openness can only come from recognition of our own finitude, 
our self-understanding and awareness of our situatedness and particularity. 
Thus, understanding and encountering the other requires self-understanding 
while self-understanding requires encountering and understanding the other. 
We gain entrance into this virtuous circle, if you will, through recognition of our 
finitude that pushes us to be open to the other. This is the hermeneutical insight 
we get for the problems of plurality that come from incomplete understanding 
and our affirmation of pluralism as engagement and encounter in democratic 
politics.  
The following quote from Truth and Method contains the principle of 
openness I draw from Gadamer’s idea of hermeneutical experience. This 
principle of openness is suitable for beings with incomplete understanding and 
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appropriate for committing to the idea of pluralism as engagement and 
encounter inspired by Diana Eck. Gadamer writes: 
A person who does not admit that he is dominated by 
prejudices will fail to see what manifests itself by their light. It 
is like the relation between I and Thou. A person who reflects 
himself out of the mutuality of such a relation changes this 
relationship and destroys its moral bond. A person who 
reflects himself out of a living relationship to tradition destroys 
the true meaning of this tradition exactly the same way. 
Knowing and recognizing this constitutes … hermeneutical 
experience: the openness to tradition characteristic of 
historically effected consciousness. It too has a real analogue 
in the I’s experience of the Thou. In human relations the 
important thing is, as we have seen, to experience the Thou 
truly as a Thou –i.e. not to overlook his claim but to let him 
really say something to us. Here is where openness belongs. 
But ultimately this openness does not exist only for the person 
who speaks; rather, anyone who listens is fundamentally 
open. Without such openness to one another there is no 
genuine human bond. Belonging together always also means 
being able to listen to one another. When two people 
understand each other, this does not mean that one person 
“understands” the other. Similarly, ‘to hear and obey someone’ 
does mean simply that we do blindly what the other desires. 
We call such a person slavish. Openness to the other, then, 
involves recognizing that I myself must accept some things 
that are against me, even though no one else forces me to do 
so (2013, 369). 
To be open to the other means to be open for the other to say something 
new to us. It means to be open to the otherness to challenge our own 
prejudices. We can only learn something new, expand our finitude and broaden 
our horizons if we are willing to put our prejudices to the test37. Gadamer’s 
principle of openness means readiness to revise our prejudices and, if need be, 
revise our self-understanding. We can define the normative function of 
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 For Gadamer, foregrounding and testing one’s own prejudices is part of 
hermeneutically conscious mind. This mind is open and sensitive to the otherness of the text; it 
is prepared for the text to say something new and expects to disclose its own alterity. We learn 
from Gadamer that “this kind of sensitivity involves neither ‘neutrality’ with respect to content nor 
the extinction of oneself, but the foregrounding and appropriation of one’s own fore-meanings 
and prejudices … the important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text can 





openness as such: openness starts with the recognition of one’s finitude and 
incomplete understanding, followed by a question directed at the dialogue 
partner that comes from a genuine interest in his/her otherness, and ends with 
letting the otherness of the other challenge our prejudices and, perhaps, change 
our own self-understanding and understanding the other in his/her otherness. 
What we need to be open for is precisely difference and otherness that 
challenges what we already know, assume, and understand. We need to be 
open to change not just in understanding the other, but also in our self-
understanding because there cannot be a change in understanding the other 
without a change in self-understanding. If we want to expand our incomplete 
understanding at all, then hermeneutical philosophy shows us that to be open to 
negative experience that is only possible when we encounter and engage with 
the other in its genuine otherness. 
In the introduction to my thesis, I presented the three criteria of pluralism 
as engagement and encounter as: active seeking of understanding across 
differences, encounter of commitments, and dialogue. Incomplete 
understanding poses a problem for committing to this idea of pluralism. In this 
chapter, we have seen that Gadamer can be a useful resource in gaining insight 
into the nature of this problem.  
With Gadamer, it was established that incomplete understanding is a 
permanent feature because of the ontological dimension of human finitude. We 
are historical beings, and since we belong to history, a history that started 
without us and will continue without us, we can never claim to have a complete 
understanding. Moreover, our understanding is always influenced by the 
particularities that are contingent to our hermeneutic situation. Gadamer’s 
account of incomplete understanding shows why it is necessary to actually 
uphold pluralism as engagement and encounter in addition to political pluralism. 
If such challenges of plural societies as deep division, moral disagreement, 
incommensurable values are attributable to incomplete understanding, then 
engagement and encounter seems like an appropriate response. For this, 
Gadamer shows the importance of self-understanding, of recognizing that we 
always already have an incomplete understanding due to the ontological 
dimension of finitude. Furthermore, through Gadamer we recognize the 
importance of encountering the other in revealing the edges of our incomplete 
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understanding, the finitude that contains it, the particularity which we should not 
mistake for universality. Gadamer’s philosophy shows that actually the other, in 
their otherness, gives us the possibility to understand ourselves as we are. It 
puts the other in a mutual bond of belongingness with what we consider to be in 
each case I and myself. Difference should not be divisive. Difference is only 
divisive if we make the mistake of forgetting the ontological dimension of our 
finitude and mistake our understanding to have completed itself and come to its 
final being.  
The core ideas of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics have brought 
us to this point. If we accept Gadamer’s account of finitude and incomplete 
understanding, and if we want to commit to pluralism as engagement and 
encounter, we need to find in deliberative democracy the possibility to 
instantiate this principle of openness. In Part II, I establish how Young’s 
“asymmetric reciprocity”, Dryzek’s “reflexivity”, and Mouffe’s “agonism” can be 
understood as instantiations of this principle in democratic politics. They arrive 
at these concepts from critique of discourse ethics based on premises that are 
similar to the hermeneutical critique of critical theory. Hermeneutic critique of 
discourse ethics focuses on the situated conception of understanding and 
argues that reasoning cannot detach from its hermeneutical situation. This 
results in interpretive conflicts that must be accommodated in democratic 
politics. Young, Dryzek, and Mouffe take similar positions on discourse ethics. 
Next, I will look at hermeneutical critique of discourse ethics, which will draw the 
common ground Young, Dryzek, and Mouffe share in their critique and 
appropriation of discourse ethics, and I will examine from Gadamer’s 
perspective the extent to which pluralism can be affirmed through discourse 
ethics. 
2.3 Discourse and the interpretive problem 
In this section, I draw from Georgia Warnke’s critique of Habermas’ 
discourse ethics. Warnke’s critique of discourse ethics is based on Gadamer’s 
philosophy. She looked at Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics in relation to 
themes of justice in democratic politics (1992), feminism (1993, 81-98), 
deliberative democratic politics (2013, 755-770), and, most recently, identity 
(2014, 579-594). She discerns three points from Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics and applies them to democratic politics and feminism. First, given 
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that understanding is interpretation and we interpret the world from a particular 
hermeneutic situation, validity of one interpretation does not preclude the 
validity of another interpretation (1993, 91). Second, in light of the first point, 
there is an educational feature stemming from the competition and conversation 
between various interpretations (for us it would be fusion of horizons as 
described above). Here, we learn the limitations of our own interpretations and 
are able to see the world in new light and dimensions (Warnke 1993, 91). The 
third point that Warnke gathers from Gadamer concerns the role of reasons in 
such a mutual education: we do not dismiss someone as irrational for not 
sharing our interpretation because we have equally valid reasons for our 
interpretations, which might differ in virtue of our different interests, concerns, 
orientations, etc. (1993, 92).  
Warnke accepts Gadamer’s argument that all understanding is 
interpretation. Therefore, she argues that encounter and conflict of 
interpretations is inherent to deliberative democracy. Her critique is that 
deliberative democracy has a blind spot for this dimension. If we take 
Gadamer’s argument that understanding is interpretation, then pluralism as 
engagement and encounter involves encounter and engagement between 
different interpretations. And since we too are considering deliberative 
democracy underpinned by Habermas’ discourse ethics, Warnke’s critique is a 
useful resource to draw from on the implications of pursuing our ideal of 
pluralism through discourse ethics. 
Below I discuss how discourse ethics avoids interpretive conflicts 
because Habermas does not take into account the ontological dimension of 
‘human finitude’. I agree with Warnke’s argument that drawing on philosophical 
hermeneutics brings to the attention of deliberative democracy the importance 
of interpretive dimension of understanding in deliberation. If we, like Warnke, 
take into account Gadamer’s case for human finitude and understanding, then 
“we will acknowledge that we always already understand reasons, 
consideration, actions and practices from particular perspectives, with particular 
interests and concerns that emerge from our particular personal, cultural and 
historical situations and experiences” (Warnke 2013, 765). And if such is the 
case, we can recognize the importance of formulating pluralism as engagement 
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and encounter because if we are limited in such a way, then we depend on 
engaging and encountering the other to expand our limitations. 
It is important to consider the Habermasian argument against highlighting 
the interpretive dimension of understanding in deliberative democracy. Warnke 
is aware that, for Habermas, hermeneutics does not provide standards for 
testing the rationality of interpretations (1992, 88). If all understanding is 
interpretation, then there are certain interpretations that we would consider 
unacceptable but still have to engage with. What if we engage with an 
interpretation that is radically offensive, sexist, racist, and promotes hatred? 
Coming from Gadamer’s side, we do indeed come shorthanded in dealing with 
such interpretations because we will need to engage and reach an 
understanding with them too. From Habermas’ side, this problem requires “a 
return to Kantian moral theory”. The strength of Habermas’ return and 
reformulation of Kantian theory into discourse ethics is that it “does not rely on 
claims about what we believe but rather depends on more formal and formal-
pragmatic features of our communication” (Warnke 1992, 95). Warnke admits 
that “in this way it also seems to provide an independent standpoint for a critical 
assessment of norms and beliefs” (1992, 96).  
For this reason, it cannot be said that deliberative democracy has a blind 
spot on the interpretive dimension. It is fairer to say that it just does not include 
it as part of rational deliberation. Interpretation can evade critical evaluation 
according to the rational standards. However, despite this argument, the 
interpretive dimension persists in deliberation – all understanding is 
interpretation. If it was not, then we would not need discourse situation as a 
problem solving mechanism that restores understanding. It is precisely because 
there is an interpretive element that we need to fall back to discourse to resolve 
our interpretive difference and/or conflict. We can support this argument with 
Gadamer’s essay where he responds to Habermas’ critique with a rebuttal that 
one cannot reflect oneself out of one’s hermeneutical situation (Gadamer in 
2002, 282). That is not to say that misunderstanding or ignorance is 
interpretation as well. If a norm is simply not understood correctly, then it is not 
so much a restoration of agreement as it is (hermeneutic) clarification. In the 
following pages, I examine this problem with interpretation that emerges in 
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discourse ethics and the implications that can be drawn on this issue about the 
way democratic politics can affirm pluralism as engagement and encounter. 
The problem with the principle of openness we drew from philosophical 
hermeneutics is that it can call for openness to the kinds of worldviews that are 
disagreeable. This is the persistent issue that Kantian thinkers bring to bear 
upon hermeneutics and it must be taken seriously. Indeed, Warnke admits that 
encounters and engagements between interpretations that degrade rather than 
educate is a serious problem that the Habermasian deliberative democracy 
does not need to face (1992, 88). That is the gist of Habermas’ concerns about 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics which he expresses in his first review of Truth and 
Method in his On the Logic of Social Sciences. There, Habermas is indeed 
concerned about hermeneutics’ ability to deal with distorted communication 
given its premises about reflection within the hermeneutic situation. Habermas’ 
critique is that, without a critical distance outside the hermeneutic situation, 
reflection re-establishes and reaffirms the same conditions of distorted 
communication. For him hermeneutical standpoint does not offer any critical 
standards against which the interpretations can be evaluated. From his 
perspective, what is necessary is not factoring in particularity for moral 
deliberation but rather abstraction and universalization. That is what is 
necessary in plural societies as we saw his argument in Chapter I. We saw that 
for him difference and plurality means that “the morally justified norms that 
control the individual’s scope of action in the interest of the whole become ever 
more general and abstract” (Habermas 1990, 205). For him, difference and 
plurality require discourse to be deontological, cognitivist, formal, and universal 
(1990, 116-188). To this end, Habermas offers his own reformulation of Kantian 
moral theory as discourse ethics. We saw that his discourse ethics involves the 
formal-pragmatic and procedural means to meet the requirements for discourse 
in modern plural societies. An important aspect of Habermas’ discourse ethics 
is the division of discourse into three forms: pragmatic, ethical, and moral. 
Pragmatic discourses have to do with restoration of consensus on means, 
ethical discourses have to do with (hermeneutic) clarification in the self-
understanding of groups, and moral discourses have a universal character in 
that here consensus applies across differences to different groups, therefore, 
this last form must be universal, abstract, formal, and deontological. 
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The distinction between the types of discourses is useful for the 
problems of contemporary world38. When it comes to interpretations of the way 
people see themselves as a group and want to organize their lives without 
generalizing them to a more global level, they are involved in an ethical debate. 
It need not involve a moral (or universal) application of the outcome of their 
discourse. Moral discourse, on the other hand, requires the application of 
Habermas’ universalization principle (U) because here participants are engaged 
in a moral debate over the validity of normative ideals across differences. (U) 
requires that for a particular interest to be valid, it needs to be assented to and 
accepted by all affected. We also saw how, in formulating discourse ethics 
based on these distinctions and principles, Habermas relies on the formal-
pragmatic rules of discourse which stipulate that our discussion is as close as 
possible to the ideal speech situation. In short, we discussed these rules as 
prescribing that the moral claim of discourse ethics depends on the following: 
participants must be equal, free of coercion, deception, and relations of power; 
they should be ready to redeem their validity claims according to the three tier 
distinction between truth, rightness, and truthfulness/sincerity.  
However we need to ask ourselves whether there can be a distinction 
between discourses. Warnke brings to our attention the ambiguity that resides 
between the ethical and moral forms of discourse in discourse ethics. She 
argues that the interpretive dimension of understanding blurs the distinction 
between ethical and moral discourses. The limitation of Habermas’ program is 
precisely in its avoidance of the interpretative difficulties. If for general norms to 
be valid in pluralist societies they must be universalized but, in turn, the 
universalization depends on the extent of their generality and abstractness, then 
Warnke asks “whether these norms are not so general and abstract that they 
become inadequate to deal with the controversies that arise in such societies 
over the concrete questions”(1992, 100). How do we determine how a general 
norm is interpreted and applied in particular circumstances by particular 
groups? The answer to these questions cannot come from the clear-cut 
distinction between moral and ethical discourses. On this point, Warnke writes 
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  For instance, in the context of influx of migrants into Europe, CDU of Germany and 
CDP of Netherlands are debating internally on how they identify themselves. CDP of 
Netherlands is debating whether their Christian values uphold the Protestant work ethic or the 
Christian value of helping others. These can be said to fall into what Habermas calls the ethical 
form of debate.  
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“even if we reserve notions of rational agreement for abstract and general 
norms [moral discourse] and leave discussion of values to more intimate circles 
[ethical discourse], we must ultimately also determine the meaning of norms for 
particular issues” (1992, 102). Based on the hermeneutical premises that are 
similar to our account above, Warnke concludes that “this attempt seems simply 
again to have to confront differences in interpretation and evaluation” (1992, 
102). Let us look at how she answers our question: 
Habermas cites universal human rights as examples of norms 
of action that can be justified according to the conditions of 
practical [moral] discourse. But what exactly are these rights? 
While we in the West at least, might all agree on a right to free 
speech, it is notorious that we can disagree on what counts as 
speech and hence on what actions are supposed to fall under 
the right to it. Rights to life and liberty have also been very 
differently interpreted in disputes over the morality of abortion 
… Answers to these questions seem to depend on how we 
interpret the meaning of life and liberty and these 
interpretations, in turn, seem to depend, not on the arguments 
and reasons that we appeal to in practical discourse, but on 
our cultural values and religious upbringing (Warnke 1992, 
102-103) 
It is evident that she factors in human finitude within particular 
hermeneutic situation because “cultural values and religious upbringing” are 
within the hermeneutic situation and provide the ready-to-hand prejudices which 
allow us to interpret the world in a certain way. Habermas limits that aspect to 
ethical discourse as distinct from moral discourse that is aimed at evaluating the 
general norms themselves. However, “the question of values, interpretations, 
and sensibilities thus appears to extend beyond” the ethical domain of 
Habermasian discourse and enter the “moral-practical domain itself” (Warnke 
1992, 103).  
Interpretive conflicts must be taken into account if we are to promote 
pluralism as engagement and encounter across differences. They come into 
light when we look at the problems of plural societies from a hermeneutical 
perspective. Through Gadamer, we have seen that hermeneutical situation has 
a constitutive role in one’s understanding (Bildung). That is the main thesis of 
his response to Habermas in “Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and the Critique of 
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Ideology” (in 2002, 274-292). We do interpret the general norms of justice, 
rights to life and liberty, freedom of speech from our own hermeneutical 
situation, our own finite and limited view, when it comes to considering them 
within particular circumstances and issues. However, Gadamer also points at 
the hermeneutical dimensions that push us to engage and encounter the 
interpretations of others in order to overcome this kind of finitude. Thus, when 
considering pluralism, we need to take into account the interpretative 
challenges that are inherent to it. 
 
Having established the significance of Gadamer’s ideas for our problem, 
and having discussed their implications for discourse ethics, next, I revisit the 
problems with discourse ethics established in Section 1.3, Chapter I. There, I 
established that Habermas’ conception of discourse confines understanding to 
understanding a speech act and coming to consensus on norms. Also, I 
established that his requirement for transcendence betrays the ideal of 
engagement and encounter of the other in their otherness.  
Once again, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics demonstrates that 
incomplete understanding is a permanent condition of human understanding. 
We are historical beings, and “to be historically means that knowledge of 
oneself is never complete” (Gadamer 2013, 313). We always already belong to 
history, a history that started without us and will continue without us (Gadamer 
2013: 288-289). History is never complete; therefore we cannot have the final 
knowledge and understanding of ourselves and our affairs, and therefore, our 
understanding is always incomplete. However, we can expand the limits of our 
incomplete understanding by encountering and engaging the different other and 
coming to an understanding with it in discourse. Engaging with the other shows 
us our limitations and expands our horizons. If ‘understanding’ is limited to 
understanding of speech acts and consensus, then we avoid this dimension of 
understanding as disclosure. For Gadamer, understanding is not limited to 
consensus and problem solving. It is a mode of being, a state of openness and 
accord with the other. It is linked to a kind of understanding the other that 
reveals its strangeness and alienation from us, which “is inextricably given with 
the individuality of the Thou” (Gadamer 2013: 186). Therefore, besides being a 
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problem solving mechanism, discourse is also at the same time the medium for 
disclosure of the other and coming to understanding (accord) with the other.  
While both Habermas and Gadamer see the value of intersubjective 
engagement in overcoming incomplete understanding, they see the role of the 
different other in this task differently. What Habermas refers to as “provincial 
limits of their own particular form of life” (1990, 202) is similar to what Gadamer 
refers to by hermeneutical situation. However, while Habermas emphasises 
transcending one’s hermeneutical situation in rational discourse, Gadamer 
emphasises becoming more aware of one’s hermeneutical situation through 
encountering the other in discourse. To some extent, they both ask us that in 
discourse we endeavour to see things the way the other does. However, we 
noted that the “moral point of view” betrays the ideal of engaging the other in 
their otherness. Above, we saw that Gadamer’s notion of “transposing 
ourselves” into the other’s position is more congruent with our ideal. Gadamer 
asks that rather than bracket our own particularity, we transpose ourselves into 
the other’s position with our particularity in order to see the otherness of the 
other. Furthermore, for Gadamer taking a “moral point of view” is an undesirable 
task because, in doing so, we mistake our own particularity as universal. For 
him, when we transcend from our particularity, we still take up some of our 
prejudices with us. Therefore, the “moral point of view” is informed by our 
prejudices. Denying this means denying the ontological dimension of human 
finitude and the permanent incompleteness of understanding. For Gadamer, we 
can expand our finitude and incompleteness not by transcending, but by placing 
“ourselves” in the encounter with the other so that our prejudices come to the 
foreground, and the boundaries of our finitude are highlighted. It is against this 
kind of unconcealment that the other can disclose itself to us in their otherness 
and provide the opportunity for us to have a “negative” experience. Gadamer’s 
principle of openness presupposes this kind of transposition.  
Gadamer’s perspective also reveals a third aspect in discourse ethics 
that was previously unseen by us. This aspect is Habermas’ reliance on 
reflectiveness. For Habermas, reflectiveness has to do with awareness of the 
processes of formation of one’s interests and preferences. Through reflection, 
one situates oneself within the social world, the world of lived experience. It also 
brings about awareness of certain ideological influences that can contribute to 
120 
 
distortion of communication, which can prevent coming to 
consensus/understanding. In virtue of these functions, reflectiveness is an 
important aspect of discourse ethics. We can perceive Habermas’ 
reflectiveness as a form of self-understanding. Thus, in Habermas, 
understanding as a form of consensus is impossible without reflection. Similarly, 
Gadamer argues that there cannot be understanding without self-
understanding.  Habermas relies on discourse to induce reflection. With regards 
to the participants in discourse, he also has to rely on their predisposition of 
good will and willingness to be reflective. Gadamer must trust dialogue partners 
in the same way. However, there are two main differences between them. First, 
Habermas thinks that one can reflect oneself out of the influence of tradition, 
while Gadamer thinks that reflection is possible only within tradition. If Gadamer 
is right, then Habermas cannot maintain a strict division between ethical and 
moral discourses. Second, Gadamer goes further in highlighting the role of the 
different other in reflection and bringing about better self-understanding. Note 
that since we are historical beings, we can never achieve complete self-
understanding. However, encountering and engaging a different other can help 
us achieve better self-understanding because in this encounter our prejudices, 
particularities, and differences are disclosed.  
Finally, if we accept the Gadamerian perspective on reflection, then we 
need to take into account the problem of interpretive conflicts that discourse 
ethics avoids. If our hermeneutical situation informs our transcendence, then it 
means that the domain between ethical and moral discourses is the domain of 
interpretive conflicts. The two forms of discourse cannot be kept apart because 
of this problem. The particularities that make up the ethical discourse get taken 
up in moral discourse because of the way reflection and understanding work 
from Gadamer’s perspective. In Part II, we will see how Young, Dryzek, and 
Mouffe reorient discourse ethics to include interpretive conflicts into 
deliberation.  
Conclusion 
Gadamer helped us understand that incomplete understanding is a 
permanent feature of human understanding because of the ontological 
dimension of human finitude. Incomplete understanding does not only mean 
that something is understood poorly or partially. It also means that 
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understanding is situated and particular within the hermeneutical situation. 
Given Gadamer’s account of incomplete understanding, it was established that 
interpretive conflicts are inevitable in pluralism.  
Based on Gadamer’s account of hermeneutical experience, it was also 
established that his principle of openness is suitable for beings with incomplete 
understanding. The principle posits that one must encounter the other in their 
otherness. One can be open to the other by, first of all, recognizing one’s own 
finitude and incomplete understanding. Then, it is necessary to let the other 
disclose its otherness in a dialogue. In this kind of engagement, one must 
practice openness by being open to be challenged by the other’s otherness and 
ready to put one’s prejudices, partiality, and situated understanding to the test. 
If such an encounter takes place, one practices openness by being ready to 
change one’s self-understanding and revise goals. It does not necessarily mean 
that interpretive conflicts between different people will be resolved. It is only a 
suitable disposition to adopt for beings with incomplete understanding who want 
to live together and partake in the collective democratically.  
If interpretive conflicts are unavoidable and if democratic politics is 
committed to pluralism as engagement and encounter, then it is necessary to 
revise the idea of democracy. In Chapter I, it was established that democratic 
politics can approach the problem of incomplete understanding through 
discourse ethics. Now that it is established that interpretive conflicts are 
unavoidable, Habermas’ avoidance of the interpretive dimension of 
understanding has come under question. Section 2.3 established that the strict 
division between ethical and moral discourses cannot be maintained in a 
commitment to include all groups of people. Such an inclusion results in 
interpretive conflicts because general principles must be applied to concrete 
situations by people with situated understanding. Since in Section 2.2 it was 
established that Gadamer’s principle of openness is suitable for beings with 
incomplete understanding, it is necessary to find in deliberative democracy the 
possibility to instantiate this principle. 
With that purpose, I turn to Young, Dryzek, and Mouffe in Part II. I will 
look at how they approach the problem of interpretive conflicts and establish 
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asymmetric reciprocity, reflexivity, agonism as modes of instantiation of 











Foreword to Part Two 
In the previous part, we have established that one way to address the 
problem of incomplete understanding that does not break the link between 
democracy and pluralism is discourse. We have drawn from Habermas’ 
discourse ethics to specify the role of discourse for this purpose. Then, by 
drawing from Gadamer, we have established that, due to the ontological 
dimension of human finitude, incomplete understanding implicates pluralism in a 
fundamental way. We have established that incomplete understanding is 
situated understanding. As such, incomplete understanding gives rise to 
interpretive conflicts.  
This has several implications for discourse ethics. Discourse ethics 
cannot admit interpretive conflicts due to its strict rationality and requirement for 
detached understanding. However, we have seen that discourse ethics cannot 
avoid interpretive conflicts altogether. Second, discourse ethics must allow the 
expression of situated understanding in its partiality and particularity because 
that is how we can encounter and engage the other in their otherness. Such an 
encounter and engagement is necessary because it helps one in self-
understanding. Self-understanding is a way to mitigate the problems that arise 
from incomplete understanding such as moral disagreement and division. In 
order to achieve better self-understanding, one must be open to the otherness 
of the other. Thus, we have established Gadamer’s principle of openness as 
suitable for beings with incomplete understanding. 
 In Part two, I turn to Iris Young, John Dryzek, and Chantal Mouffe in 
order to understand how discourse ethics can accommodate the hermeneutical 
critique. With Young and Dryzek, we will come to understand how Gadamer’s 
concepts of hermeneutical situation, experience, and consciousness can be 
expressed in a concretized and politicized manner. We will come to understand 
hermeneutical situation as it is expressed in terms of social groups and 
particular discourses and how hermeneutical experience and consciousness 
can be expressed in asymmetric reciprocity and reflexivity. With Mouffe, we will 
consider how pluralism can be possible if we acknowledge the antagonistic 
dimension of human affairs.  
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These theorists weaken the strict rationality of discourse ethics in order 
to allow the expression of situated understanding in its particularity and 
partiality. They also recognize the significance of interpretive conflicts. I show 
the significance of interpretive conflicts for Young by drawing on her concept of 
“social perspective”. For Young, social perspectives are instrumental in fighting 
structural inequality because including them gives a more differentiated picture 
of the collective. I show how interpretive conflicts can be included in discourse 
by appropriating his use of the concept of “social perspective”. Further, I show 
the significance of interpretive conflicts for Dryzek by drawing on his account of 
“contestation of discourses”. For Dryzek, contestation of discourses allows the 
inclusion of different discourses such as environmentalism, free market 
capitalism, feminism, and so on. Inclusion of different discourses leads to 
inclusion of lateral complexities of an issue and consideration of the whole 
system of interconnected elements in the social structure. I show how 
interpretive conflicts can be understood in terms of contestation of discourses 
and how conceiving of interpretive conflicts in such manner prevents identity 
conflicts between people. Last, with Mouffe, I show the significance of 
interpretive conflicts by drawing on her account of agonistic contestation. For 
Mouffe, agonistic contestation gives the antagonistic dimension of human affairs 
a democratic outlet to express itself. I show how this prevents repression of 
antagonism, which otherwise could return as violence.  
 The main focus of Part two, however, is developing an account of modes 
of democratic politics that instantiate Gadamer’s principle of openness. By 
modes, I mean the way in which openness can occur, be practiced, and 
experienced in democratic politics. By drawing on Young, I develop an account 
of asymmetric reciprocity as a mode in which one is required to encounter and 
engage the other in their otherness because of the ontological dimension of 
human finitude. By drawing on Dryzek, I develop an account of reflexivity as a 
mode in which one becomes aware of the partiality and particularity of situated 
understanding by engaging and encountering the other. Finally, by drawing on 
Mouffe, I develop an account of agonism as a mode of openness towards the 





Plurality as social groups and asymmetric 
reciprocity as openness 
Introduction 
Iris Young is an example of Gadamer’s “experienced” person. Her work 
and political activism show self-awareness of her own partiality and openness to 
the otherness of others in order to learn something from them. She advocated 
for these principles in deliberative democracy. She was a radical feminist, 
political activist, and a political theorist who drew broadly from two generations 
of Critical Theory represented by the emancipatory critical theories of 
Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse and Habermas’ discourse ethics 
respectively, the postmodernism of Lyotard, the phenomenologies of Merlau-
Ponty and Heidegger; and the existentialism of Jean Paul Sartre39. Her earliest 
works defend politics of difference in light of the problems in the theoretical 
relationship between democracy and justice (1981), and membership (1986; 
1989). In later works, Young focuses on injustices in plural societies that arise 
from “structural inequality” (see 2000, 6).  
Structural inequality arises from the way social positions affect people’s 
lives. People are positioned differently in the social structure. Every social 
position has enabling and constraining functions. Some social positions are 
more enabling, some are more constraining. People do not choose their social 
position; they are born into it. Social position affects person’s “self-development” 
and “self-determination”, which for Young are the two measurements of justice 
(Young 2000, 31-33). In Inclusion and Democracy (2000), Young’s main 
concern is with injustices that arise from structural inequality in spheres of life 
where democratic politics cannot reach. An obvious solution to this problem is 
the expansion of direct democracy to these spheres of life. Young’s approach 
does not answer the question how to bring democracy into the spheres of life it 
cannot reach. Rather, she shows how they can be brought into democracy: the 
                                            
39
 For a comprehensive introduction and discussion of her influence in various fields of 
social science and political activism, see Ann Ferguson’s and Mechthild Nagel’s Festschrift 
Dancing with Iris: The Philosophy of Iris Marion Young (OUP: 2009) 
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conditions and norms of “deliberative democracy that emphasises the ideals of 
inclusion, political equality, reasonableness, and publicity” make it possible to 
address structural inequality (Young 2000, 17).   
For Young, the inclusion of social groups in deliberation is the way to 
address the problem of structural inequality. Members of social groups find 
each other due to their affinity in experiencing the constraining and enabling 
features of their social positions. Social groups bring into deliberation a 
particular and partial perspective. Allowing them to speak from their particularity 
and partiality gives more possibility and opportunity to identify and address 
structural inequality through collective action. This is where deliberative 
democracy is limited. Deliberation is too constrained in its standards of 
rationality and requirements for universalization and abstraction. Strict 
rationality means that social groups may sometimes be excluded from 
deliberation because rationality is connected to one’s communicative skills, 
which one acquires in virtue of specific social positions. Furthermore, social 
groups cannot express the partiality and particularity of their experience of 
injustice because of the requirements for universalization and abstraction. For 
this reason, Young offers to rethink the norms and conditions of deliberative 
democracy in order to make it more inclusive and appropriate for the conditions 
of modern plural societies. 
Thus, Young defends plurality, particularity, and partiality of social groups 
as a resource for democratic politics. If they are a resource for addressing the 
problems of equality and justice in democracy, then strict standards of 
rationality must be weakened, and universalism and abstraction must be given 
up in favour of the situated knowledge and understanding that social groups 
bring into deliberation. Social groups can bring their perspectives through such 
forms of communication as storytelling and rhetoric, which the discourse ethics 
of deliberative democracy does not favour. Therefore, Young appropriates 
discourse ethics to allow these forms of communication and make deliberative 
democracy more inclusive.  
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Young’s appropriation of discourse ethics speaks to the main points of 
my research in the following manner40. First, it shows Young’s recognition of the 
significance of human finitude and the problem of incomplete understanding for 
deliberative democracy. For Young, collective action against injustice depends 
on turning to social groups in order to get a better understanding of the general 
collective picture. Second, the engagement and encounter of social groups 
shows the significance of interpretive conflicts in democratic politics. At stake in 
interpretive conflicts is the perspective that social groups bring into deliberation. 
Their perspective can shift the playing field and offer a new starting point for the 
discussion. It can change the way the problem is constructed, present it in a 
new way, and include other groups in deliberation because a new perspective 
on a problem often reveals other parties that are affected by it. Third, it shows 
the significance of Gadamer’s principle of openness for democratic politics. 
Young argues that the idea of moral respect in deliberative democracy must be 
expressed through asymmetric reciprocity. In asymmetric reciprocity, we 
recognize that we are finite and cannot understand things the way others do. 
Therefore, we must let them disclose their otherness to us and let it change our 
own understanding. 
In this chapter, I discuss how Young characterizes plurality in terms of 
social groups; show from her perspective, the significance of interpretive 
conflicts in including social groups in democratic politics; and argue that her 
idea of asymmetric reciprocity can be conceived as a mode of instantiation of 
Gadamer’s principle of openness in democratic politics.  
In the first section, I draw parallels between Young’s concept of social 
groups and Gadamer’s concept of hermeneutical situation. For Young, a social 
group consists of members who have affinity in their social position. A social 
group represents a perspective that people have based on their experience, life-
history, and situated understanding. I argue that social groups can be conceived 
as the expression of hermeneutical situation in politics by virtue of these 
features. Based on this argument, I claim that for Young the modern 
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 To discuss Young’s appropriation of Habermas’ discourse ethics, I draw upon a 
variety of sources, two of which must be mentioned as her main and seminal works. They are 
Politics of Difference (1990), from which I draw some her non-idealist and hermeneutic 
dimensions, and Inclusion and Democracy (2000), from which I draw her interpretation of 
Habermas and positive formulation of her own account of deliberative democracy. 
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characteristics and challenges of plurality come from the existence of social 
groups. I also discuss Young’s argument that the abstraction, universalism, and 
standards of rationality in discourse ethics exclude the perspectives of social 
groups from deliberation. In connection to the problem of exclusion, I devote the 
second section to Young’s correctives to discourse ethics that make deliberative 
democracy more inclusive. Young offers three modes of communication that 
allow different social groups to disclose their perspectives. I interpret this as 
communicative plurality that gives means to the other to disclose its otherness.  
In the third section, I examine the significance of interpretive conflicts in 
democratic politics from Young’s perspective. I argue that for Young the 
significance of interpretive conflicts have to do with the inclusion of social group 
perspectives that enrich democratic politics. For her, interpretive conflicts can 
present things in a new way, change our understanding, and provide a different 
starting point for deliberation. They do so because group perspectives function 
that way. Group perspectives come from particular location in the social 
structure, particular experiences and life-histories, and situated understanding. 
These features of group perspectives add to the significance of interpretive 
conflicts because for Young the interpretive conflicts are between social groups 
that represent different perspectives. Including them in deliberation is one way 
to approach the problem of incomplete understanding. But for Young there is a 
different positive outcome. For her, interpretive conflicts disclose differential 
perspectives that constitute the public realm and one way to bring them into 
deliberation is through such modes of communication as greeting, storytelling, 
and rhetoric.   
In the fourth section, I examine Young’s idea of asymmetric reciprocity. 
For Young, asymmetric reciprocity is a mode of relationship between people 
that have differences with regards to their temporality and social positions. I 
argue that asymmetric reciprocity represents a mode in which Gadamer’s 
principle of openness can be instantiated in democratic politics. To support this 
argument, firstly I identify hermeneutical elements of finitude, situated 
understanding, and historically effected consciousness in the way Young 
characterizes difference with regards to temporality and social position. 
Secondly, I show how asymmetric reciprocity supports disclosure, engagement 
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and encounter of the other in their otherness in the way Young argues for the 
primacy of the question in a genuine dialogue. 
3.1 Social groups as an expression of hermeneutical situation and 
the limits of discourse ethics 
Young sought to include social groups in deliberation as a means to 
identify and address structural inequality but saw the strict rationality, the 
requirements for universalisation and abstraction of discourse ethics as an 
obstacle to her goal. Recall that for Habermas, the more complex and plural 
society is, the more abstract and general the principles must be in order to 
apply universally across the differences. Young accepts this argument but she 
is also aware of the interpretive conflicts that complicate democratic politics in 
plural societies. For her too, the principles that we apply to fix particular 
injustices must be general and abstract in order to be applicable across 
differences. Otherwise, we would not reach an agreement on the principles 
themselves. For instance, take her idea of justice based on two principles of 
self-determination and self-development (Young 2000, 31-33). She admits that 
in order for the theoretical argument to get off the ground, it is necessary to 
formulate self-determination and self-development at the abstract and general 
level (Young 2000, 33). However, she immediately notes the interpretive 
problems that arise when abstract principles are applied in concrete situations. 
Though, she writes, the level of abstraction makes her argument acceptable at 
the theoretical level, “interpretation and application of these ideals in a particular 
political situation, however, is always controversial” (Young 2000, 33). While we 
agree on the “goals and values in the most abstract sense”, we will “disagree 
strongly on what the best means of promoting these values in that context, what 
are the acceptable priorities and trade-offs, and so on” (Young 2000, 33). This 
shows her sensitivity to the hermeneutical problem we examined in chapter II; 
namely, her take on discourse ethics is in accord with my Gadamerian account 
of human finitude and incomplete understanding in terms of hermeneutical 
situation and the interpretive problems that arise from them.  
For Young, the complexity of modern plural societies has to do with the 
existence of social groups (1989, 261). The interpretive problems with 
universalization and abstraction in discourses ethics arise because of the way 
social groups are differentially situated in the social structure. If equality is a 
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feature of democracy, then social group differentiation in plural societies poses 
a political problem because the fact is “that some of our groups are privileged 
and others are oppressed” (1989, 261). Discourse ethics comes short in 
addressing this problem because of its emphasis on universality and 
abstraction. To make the problem of social groups clearer, let us look at the way 
Young defines them.  
She distinguishes social groups from groups that form by aggregation on 
the one hand, and by association on the other. Social groups are a product of 
affinity and not aggregation or association (Young 1989, 259). Groups defined 
by aggregation are based on arbitrary characteristics like eye colour, hobbies, 
likes and dislikes, while groups defined by association are a “collectivity of 
persons who come together voluntarily – such as a club, corporation, political 
party, …” (1989, 260). Young defines social groups based on an entirely 
different notion – that of affinity: 
A social group involves first of all an affinity with other persons 
by which they identify with one another, and by which other 
people identify them. A person’s particular sense of history, 
understanding of social relations and personal possibilities, 
her or his mode of reasoning, values, and expressive styles 
are constituted at least partly by her or his group identity. 
Many group definitions come from the outside, from other 
groups that label and stereotype certain people. In such 
circumstances the despised group members often find their 
affinity in their oppression (1989, 259). 
Young argues that one of the mistakes political theorists make is in their 
tendency “to elide social groups with associations rather than aggregates” 
(1989, 260). In associations, individuals “come together as already formed 
persons and set them up, establishing rules, positions, offices” (Young 1989, 
260). However, relationship based on affinity is not chosen. Moreover, affinity is 
not a fixed feature of one’s life. It may change.  
Let us consider Young’s point for a moment. The complexity of plurality is 
such that a person can belong to different groups based on aggregation, 
association, and affinity at the same time. It is not controversial to assume that 
in modern society a person can be a member of football club, of a housing 
association and the Labour Party, and find affinity with such social groups as 
LGBT, working mothers, single parents, etc. Though membership in aggregate 
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or association groups “fundamentally affects one’s life”, it does not “define one’s 
very identity in the way, for example, being Navajo might” (1989, 260). We may 
begin to appreciate Young’s hermeneutical aspect with regards to human 
finitude when she writes that in social groups “one finds oneself as a member of 
a group, whose existence and relations one experiences as always already 
having been” (1989, 260). The hermeneutical aspects become highlighted even 
more so, when we note that Young’s notion of affinity is linked to Heidegger’s 
notion of thrownness41. Young writes:  
For a person’s identity is defined in relation to how others 
identify him or her, and others do so in terms of groups which 
always already have specific attributes, stereotypes, and 
norms associated with them, in reference to which a person’s 
identity will be formed. From the thrownness of group affinity it 
does not follow that one cannot leave groups and enter new 
ones. Many women become lesbian after identifying as 
heterosexual, and anyone who lives long enough becomes 
old. These cases illustrate thrownness precisely in that such 
changes in group affinity are experiences as a transformation 
in one’s identity” (1989, 260). 
Gadamer’s account of human finitude is underpinned by his 
interpretation of Heidegger’s “thrownness”, which denotes the situated nature of 
our understanding. If we accept Young’s characterization of social groups 
based on her interpretation of Heidegger’s thrownness, then we should accept 
that we cannot start from very general and abstract universals as Habermas 
suggests. Rather, as Young argues, we must start from the particularity of 
social groups, and the contextuality and historicity of their differentiation. “This 
means that we must develop participatory democratic theory not on the 
assumption of an undifferentiated humanity, but rather on the assumption that 
there are group differences and that some groups are actually or potentially 
oppressed or disadvantaged” (1989, 261). Here, Young is targeting theories 
that start from the assumption of what a completely just society would be like, 
because for her, such a starting point would a priori start from a position that is 
blind to particularities. The reason is that such an assumption is impossible. As 
we have seen in the previous chapter, the way understanding works is that it 
takes up particularities from the hermeneutical situation. 
                                            
41
 Gadamer’s account of human finitude is based on his interpretation of Heidegger’s 
notion of thrownness. See page 79 N19 of this thesis  
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Now, let us return to the political problem with social groups and Young’s 
proposed political solution for it. The problem is that in plural societies some 
social groups are oppressed. Young argues that a critical theory of such 
societies must not start from abstractions and universalizations. However, here 
she is torn between critical theory and hermeneutics. On the one hand, she 
recognizes that a certain degree of universalisation and abstraction purchases 
the necessary critical distance to evaluate injustice. On the other hand, she 
recognizes that the critical distance must not be acquired by a principle so 
abstract that it is removed from and blind to the conditions of injustice that arise 
due to historical and contextual dimensions. Therefore, Young looks for a 
framework that would yield a general principle of justice and also allow one to 
start from particularities of concrete groups in concrete societies. In other 
words, she wants a balance between ideal and non-ideal, universal and 
particular, general and concrete. For her this balance can be struck in 
Habermas’ discourse ethics.   
Young’s argument against theories that assume independence and 
transcendence from particularity to have a universal appropriateness across 
differences is premised by her idea of social groups. Her premise chimes with 
Gadamer’s historically affected consciousness; namely, that one’s particularity 
is taken up in one’s act of transcending the particularity much in the same way 
one’s hermeneutical situation informs and is taken up in all understanding. From 
this premise, Young takes the position against theories of justice and 
democracy that start from a transcendent point of view and formulates a 
universal argument. She holds that traditional arguments oriented from a 
Kantian perspective maintain that theories of justice and democracy “should be 
held independently of a particular social or historical circumstances, or 
practices, as a necessary condition for objectivity” (1981, 291). Furthermore, “in 
the effort to achieve this universality and objectivity, most modern philosophical 
accounts seek correct normative principles of social life by adopting a strategy 
of deriving such principles from a hypothetical starting point” such as the state 
of nature, the original position, the moral point of view, the ideal observer, etc. 
(Young 1981, 291).  
As we have seen with Habermas, the pretext for the argument in favour 
of universalization and abstraction usually has to do with the problems of plural 
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societies in which normative principles can be contested and disagreed. 
Therefore, the alternative is to derive of a starting point which eschews 
difference and particularity and which “escapes the specificity of actual historical 
circumstances” (Young 1981, 291). As a result, “political theorists can claim to 
derive the correct conception of the just social order from this universal and 
formal starting point” (Young 1981, 291). While Young strengthens her position 
against such theories by relying on the critiques by Fisk (1976) and Wolff 
(1977), we can draw parallels from her position to our Gadamerian position in 
chapter II. For instance, the argument Young makes is comparable to ours: 
as we have seen, however, Fisk and Wolff point out that each 
account smuggles into the starting point substantive premises 
derived more or less directly from the theorist’s social 
circumstances. The theory of the social order which emerges, 
then, merely reflects in idealized and systematized form the 
actual structure of society in which the theorist dwells (1981, 
292).  
I do not think a Gadamerian would object to such an argument given 
that, as we have seen previously, for philosophical hermeneutics, hermeneutical 
situation is taken up and informs understanding. If we accept the argument in 
chapter II, then we agree with Young too because the nature of understanding 
is such that transcendence carries up the substantive elements of one’s 
hermeneutical situation.  
Having established that, it is important to underline that Young does not 
want to do away completely with transcending the particular to achieve 
universality and abstractness. That would mean her giving up critical theory. 
She recognizes that transcendence purchases the critical distance necessary to 
evaluate the injustices of society.  For her, it is necessary to theorize about 
democratic politics based on a framework that allows transcendence as well as 
recognition of the role of particularities. We can say that Young is looking for a 
hermeneutically informed critical theory in order to balance out the ideal and the 
non-ideal42. For this reason she turned towards Habermas’ discourse ethics as 
a framework that yields a theory of justice that “both stands independent of a 
given social context and yet measures its justice” (1990, 4). However, as I will 
                                            
42
 She maintained this position in her most recent work Global challenges: War, self-
determination, and responsibility for justice (2007). She argues that the impact of particular 
historicism and social positions must be taken into account when transcending and so critiques 
Rawls, Dworkin, Murray, and Meads for not considering particularities. 
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discuss in a moment, she is aware of Habermas’ own tendency towards 
universalism and abstractness. Her reason for appropriating Habermas from 
this critical angle is in line with our own position in chapter II. Namely, similar to 
Warnke, she thinks that universal and abstract principles are unsuitable in plural 
societies because they are subject to interpretative conflicts by groups whose 
differences are contingent to history, culture, and tradition. For this reason, I 
locate her right between Gadamer and Habermas because she turns towards a 
more hermeneutical critical theory which emphasises historicity, contextuality, 
particularity that was more explicit in the first generation of the Frankfurt School 
critical theory: “critical theory rejects as illusory the effort to construct a universal 
normative system insulated from a particular society” (Young 1990, 5). Instead, 
“it is a normative reflection that is historically and socially contextualized” (1990, 
5). It is precisely in the tension between universal and particular, ideal and non-
ideal that I find Young torn between Habermasian deliberation and Gadamerian 
conversation because she is at the same time accepting the value of 
transcendence while remaining sensitive to its hermeneutical constraints. 
I now turn to examining the way Young appropriates Habermas’ 
discourse ethics for her understanding of plurality in modern societies in terms 
of social groups. She finds Habermas’ discourse ethics as both enabling one to 
acquire a critical distance while being aware of the hermeneutical constraints 
that such transcendence inherently has. For Young, Habermas’ ideal speech 
situation offers a theoretical foundation which can help avoid the problems she 
identifies with the Kantian formulation. Even though Young’s primary argument 
is to bring into our focus on injustices the “questions of institutional relations and 
domination” as well as distribution of material goods, I think that her argument 
can be extended to the general problems of plural societies (see 1981, 281). 
According to Young, Habermas’ discourse ethics allows inclusion of 
particularities, critical evaluation against the status quo, having general 
principles that are not too abstract and universal for the particularities of plural 
societies. She argues “that the application of the ideal speech situation to 
particular social configurations constitutes a means for solving the problem of 
how to construct an objective and critical conception of justice which does not 
merely reflect actual social circumstances at the same time that it remains 
historically specific” (1981, 281). In this sense, it allows for participants to take 
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part in deliberation from their concrete circumstances rather than bracket them. 
For this reason, Young takes discourse ethics as appropriate framework for 
theorizing democratic politics in plural societies.  
Since plurality has to do with social groups (in addition to associations 
and aggregations), for Young discourse ethics is a framework within which the 
problem of structural inequality that social groups experience can be addressed 
(1981, 286). It is suitable for the problem because while Habermas’ discourse 
ethics presupposes a regulative ideal speech situation which itself is abstract 
and formal enough to purchase the necessary critical distance, it also allows 
introduction of historically and materially specific circumstances. In Habermas’ 
discourse ethics, the ideal speech situation itself is not the goal of justice; it 
“does not itself constitute a standard or set of principles by which actual social 
arrangements ought to be evaluated” (Young 1981, 291), rather it “offers the 
vision of social relations free from domination, the ideal of pure democracy and 
social reciprocity” (Young 1981, 295) that is purely formal and “abstracts from 
all particular and historical content” (Young 1981, 291). However, to make it 
work, “we must introduce material premises derived from actual social 
circumstances” (Young 1981, 291). Thus, in Young’s interpretation of the ideal 
speech situation, discourse ethics, allows and requires a plurality of conceptions 
of general and normative principles derived from the particular historical and 
cultural circumstances and, as Young concludes, “applicable only to them” 
(1981, 297). In other words, discourse ethics presupposes an ideal which 
requires that people come into discourse knowing their own material and 
physical conditions to the best degree possible, knowing their own interests and 
values, and their own ethical concerns that are naturally tied to their historical 
and cultural heritage43.  
Thus, we see that Young’s appropriation highlights the hermeneutical 
dimensions of discourse. She takes the capacity of discourse ethics to include 
                                            
43
 We can find a stronger push towards a more hermeneutically nuanced discourse 
ethics in her Justice and Politics of Difference (1990). There she affirms the impossibility of 
transcending particularity, historicality, and context because “the call to ‘be just’ is always 
situated in concrete social and political practices that precede and exceed the philosopher. The 
traditional effort to transcend that finitude towards a universal theory yields only finite constructs 
which escape the appearance of contingency usually by recasting the given as necessary” 
(1990, 5). She adds “normative reflection must begin from historically specific circumstances 
because there is nothing but what is, the given, the situated interest in justice, from which to 
start” (1990, 5). 
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particularities while rejecting Habermas’ emphasis on universality, abstraction, 
and impartiality in discourse. Similar to our argument on the way hermeneutical 
situation informs and is taken up in one’s understanding, Young argues that the 
impartial point of view is impossible because people cannot and should not 
detach themselves from their own context and particularities (1990, 97). The 
rationale behind Habermas’ appeal for impartiality and universal point of view is 
understandable. It calls for a deliberation from the ‘public’ point of view, i.e. from 
a point of view that is not one’s private interest but the interest of all affected. 
However, Young argues that impartiality is based on a false dichotomy of the 
universal and particular, of the public and private, of reason and passion (see 
1989, 253-57, 1990, ch. 4). The ideal of impartiality, for Young, is what exposes 
propensity for a homogenous society in discourse ethics because it excludes 
those who cannot adopt the public point of view, and those whose particular 
circumstances are a result of oppression and domination in the structural 
organization and institutions.  
A good example of the problems with this universal point of view is in 
Young’s critique of the concept of citizenship. Citizen, Young argues, is a 
concept that presupposes a universal status. It transcends particular interests of 
every person. When we speak and act as citizens, we speak and act on behalf 
of the collective. The term citizen refers to a universal point of view, a position 
that is detached from one’s social/economic position, culture, religion, history, 
and language. A citizen’s position is all-inclusive and does not discriminate 
against particularities. When law applies to citizens, it applies to all members 
across their differences. When a leader addresses the citizens, she/he 
addresses all members across their differences and not particular groups. 
Young’s critique of the moral claim of universal citizenship is thus: 
The attempt to realize an ideal of universal citizenship that 
finds the public embodying generality as opposed to 
particularity, commonness versus difference, will tend to 
exclude or to put at a disadvantage some groups, even when 
they have formally equal citizenship status. The idea of the 
public as universal and the concomitant identification of 
particularity with privacy makes homogeneity a requirement of 
public participation. In exercising their citizenship, all citizens 
should assume the same impartial, general point of view 
transcending all particular interests, perspectives, and 
experiences (1989, 257). 
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The idea is that if one can assume the status of a citizen that requires 
one to disregard personal interest in favour of the public interest, then it is also 
possible for one to disregard the influence of one’s particular world-views, 
culture, history, and traditions. To put it in Gadamer’s terms, the citizen is not 
situated in the hermeneutical situation and does not have historically effected 
consciousness. To be clear, I do not stand against the idea of universal 
citizenship. What I contest from a Gadamerian point of view, and find support in 
Young, is the assumption that taking the position of a citizen grants one a 
universal and impartial point of view. It does not. Even if it is possible that one 
sheds his/her personal interest when one assumes the position of citizen, I 
argue that it is impossible for one to shed the particular ways in which culture, 
history, and traditions has shaped one’s understanding44. A universal point of 
view means a view without a horizon, and understanding that has no history or 
culture. If we accept the argument on human finitude in chapter II, then we 
accept that any point of view is situated and has a horizon within which one 
sees and understands things in a certain way.  Young maintains a similar line of 
argument when she points at the constitutive role particular circumstances take 
in one’s attempt to take a universal point of view.  
Naturally I agree with Young that we must not be misled that our 
transcendence from particularities grants us an impartial point of few. Such a 
mistake results in our imposing our own horizon as universal, our world view 
and judgements as universally applicable. It denies pluralism. If we recognize 
that our transcendence takes up with itself and is informed by our historical and 
cultural context, prejudices, and traditions, then we can participate in a kind of 
conversation that is open to different others. Only by doing so,  can we affirm 
pluralism. Young’s argument against impartiality not only resonates with 
Gadamer’s position during his debate with Habermas, it also pushes us towards 
a kind of modesty that Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics requires. Grondin 
remembers that in his last years Gadamer emphasized that “the soul of 
                                            
44
 It does not mean that one’s understanding never changes. In fact, that would be a 
very un-Gadamerian conclusion. Understanding changes by means of fusion of horizons. This 
means that understanding changes in virtue of appropriation of the alien, the different other, or 
the new, by means of what one already knows and understands. That is why Gadamer 
maintains the universality of the hermeneutic dimension: all understanding is interpretation. This 
is also the basis of my argument for taking interpretive conflicts seriously. Habermas’ discourse 
ethics will do well if it turns to the interpretive problems without apriori prejudgment that 
interpretive conflicts arise from systematic distortions of communication.   
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hermeneutics … consists in the possibility that the other might be right” (2003, 
317). Thus, with Gadamer we understand the nature of openness to different 
others and with Young we see how such openness translates in a political 
deliberation without giving up the critical distance Habermas’ discourse ethics 
purchases us.  
In a political conversation, Young argues, groups must not be dismissed 
for failing to take an impartial (i.e. universal) point of view. Rather, they need 
and must make themselves heard from their partiality, their particular 
experiences of injustice: “full and free expression of concrete needs and 
interests under social circumstances where some groups are silenced or 
marginalized requires that they have a specific voice in deliberation and 
decision making” (1989, 263). With Young, we get the sense that one’s partial 
view is actually their perspective, and that one’s perspective is always partial. It 
is a resource for democratic politics because of its partiality, because of its 
differentiated location within the social structure. Young does not conclude that 
if all perspectives are accounted for, we get a complete picture of the structure. 
Rather, in public participation from partial perspectives we get differential 
perspectives that constitute the public realm. In the next section, we will see 
that she offers to revise the standards of rationality in discourse ethics to 
include a plurality of forms of communication that allow these perspectives to be 
disclosed.  
For the present, it is important to note the way Young’s argument on 
including partial perspectives links to my argument about incomplete 
understanding and how it gives rise to interpretive conflicts. We can understand 
her argument on partiality in terms of how human finitude is constituted by the 
hermeneutical situation and the way finitude manifests as incomplete 
understanding. Indeed, one’s partiality is constituted by one’s hermeneutical 
situation. For Young, what we lose in impartial discourse are the interpretive 
conflicts. The most important interpretive conflicts are the ones between social 
groups because they allow the disclosure and encountering of perspectives that 
are partial. I elaborate more on Young’s take on interpretive conflicts in terms of 
group representation in the third section. 
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In Young’s appropriation of discourse ethics, I see a kind deliberation 
that recognizes hermeneutical dimensions of understanding. A deliberation that 
does not require impartial and universal positions can be reflexive against 
particularities disguised as universal and impartial. We need not to worry that a 
deliberation that does not assume impartial and universal point of view may 
disintegrate into opinion sharing between radically divided groups. We need not 
to worry that admitting the hermeneutical dimensions of discourse results in 
renunciation of its critical capacities. For Young, group representation and 
deliberative democracy based on Habermasian discourse ethics leads to a 
deliberation that does not appeal to the particular interest of particular groups 
but by appeal to general principles and norms like justice. For Young, “the 
introduction of such differentiation and particularity into democratic procedures 
does not encourage the expression of narrow self-interest”; rather, group 
represented deliberation according to discourse ethics “is the best antidote to 
self-deceiving self-interest masked as an impartial or general interest” (1989, 
263). Discourse ethics requires that one’s interest be linked to a valid general 
principle, therefore: “in a democratically structured public where social inequality 
is mitigated through group representation, individuals or groups cannot simply 
assert that they want something; they must say that justice requires or allows 
that they have it” (Young 1989, 263). What we carry over from philosophical 
hermeneutics into discourse ethics is awareness that we neither hold the 
ultimate truth nor can claim full impartiality and universality of our position.  
Thus, Young’s contestation of the internal connection between 
impartiality and the idea of universal citizenship based on her argument that 
people cannot transcend without taking up their particularities is similar to 
Gadamer’s argument on the way ‘historically effected consciousness’ prevents 
a Habermasian critical theorist from taking a position outside tradition. From 
Young we receive additional support for Warnke’s argument that Habermas’ 
discourse ethics cannot do away with interpretive conflicts by relegating them 
away from moral discourse into ethical discourse. Thus, we will now explore the 
way in which Young incorporates interpretive conflicts into discourse ethics and 
at the same time fights Habermasian tendencies for homogenization, exclusion, 
and abstraction. Our exploration will focus on the ways Young shows different 
social groups can be included in deliberation. I contend that Young’s inclusion 
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of different social groups also includes interpretive conflicts. This is because 
she defines social groups in terms of Heidegger’s concept of ‘thrownness’. Of 
course, this concept underpins Gadamer’s theme of human finitude on which 
we based our argument about the inherent possibility of interpretive conflicts in 
Habermasian deliberation. Her proposition is that a plurality of social groups 
requires a plurality of forms of communication instead of a single form of 
(rational) communication that the standards of discourse ethics accept. 
Therefore, from Young we derive an understanding that pluralism requires not 
only giving up the ideas of impartiality and universality of discourse ethics, but 
also expanding the narrowness of its rationality. The rationality of Habermas’ 
discourse ethics tends to favour dispassionate, neutral, detached, and objective 
argumentation and forms of speech. This runs the risk of favouring one group 
over others. Therefore, Young proposes to expand the rationality of discourse 
ethics in order to include a variety of forms of communication in order to support 
communicative plurality that allows a variety of channels to introduce 
differentiation, particularity, and partial – as opposed to impartial – and specific 
experiences. 
In her various works, Young generally points at two limitations of 
discourse ethics when it comes to affirming pluralism in the deliberative fora 
(see 1996; 1997; 2000). The first limitation, as was pointed earlier, comes from 
the rational character of deliberation in Habermasian discourse ethics. The 
second limitation has to do with the assumption of unity under the aegis of 
appeal to shared understandings of the participants (1996, 125-6). Young 
proposes to expand the rationality of discourse ethics to include a broader 
plurality of forms of communication in order to counter these limitations. Her 
proposition is to include such forms of communication as greeting, rhetoric, and 
narrative as supplementary rather than alternative to the rational-argumentative 
form of communication in Habermas’ discourse ethics. As she puts it in 
Inclusion and Democracy (2000), such a communicative plurality adds a 
normative force to promote the inclusion of marginalized, undervalued, 
unrecognized, and/or underrepresented peoples and groups in pluralist 
democracies (58-81)45. 
                                            
45
 It will do well to remind ourselves once more that, just like Young, we should not seek 
to replace the standards of Habermas’ discourse ethics. That has not been the purpose of this 
142 
 
According to Young, inclusion of the said forms of communication 
counters the two exclusionary tendencies of deliberative democracy that result 
from the two limitations she identifies in Habermas’ discourse ethics. First of all, 
the assumption of unity and consensus has a tendency for external exclusion. 
This type of exclusion is the most regular form of exclusion in plural societies in 
which certain peoples and groups are simply prevented from participating in 
deliberation (2000, 53). As Young puts it, external exclusion simply means that 
some people and groups are “kept outside the process of discussion and 
decision making” (2000, 56). While it seems that Young tones down her critique 
of external inclusion in Habermas discourse ethics in Inclusion and Democracy 
(2000) compared to her essay in Benhabib’s Democracy and Difference (1996) 
and her own Intersecting Voices (1997), she nevertheless maintains that an 
appeal to consensus under shared values would result in an exclusion of people 
and groups that do not share in those values or are not part of the consensus. 
Once again, Young sees deliberative democracy based on Habermas’ 
discourse ethics as the most inclusive and appropriate for countering this kind 
of exclusion in virtue of Habermas’ principles of discourse.  
However, there is a second type of exclusion from which, Young claims, 
discourse ethics is not immune. It is a more subtle kind of exclusion, which she 
terms as ‘internal exclusion’. Internal exclusion has to do with cultural and/or 
highly intellectual/technical character of deliberation promoted by the normative 
force of rationality in Habermas’ discourse ethics (1996, 122; 2000, 55). It is 
subtler and therefore less noticeable, and thus harder to remedy in 
Habermasian deliberative democracy that may risk advocating only nominal 
inclusion in virtue of the discourse principles (2000, 53). It is less noticeable 
because according to the discourse principle, all who are affected by the 
                                                                                                                                
research. I think that the value of Habermas’ discourse ethics can be demonstrably positive for 
formulating deliberative democratic practices in the complex conditions of what he terms as 
post-metaphysical world. Young, on her part, is crystal clear that she does not wish to do away 
with the values of rationality that underpin Habermas’ deliberative model (see Young 2000: 80). 
Her goal is not to substitute but to supplement because the dispassionate, neutral and rational 
deliberation required by Habermas’ standards must be more accepting of other forms of 
communication and persuasion if the normative requirement for maximum inclusion by the 
discourse principle (D) is to be achieved. Therefore, Young’s three modes of communication are 
to “accompany” rational argument rather than to replace it (ibid.). What we are seeking here is 
the realization of the normative function of the discourse principle itself (D), which requires that 
all affected by the outcome are included in the deliberation. Groups can bring to the attention 
the effects that observation of a general principle can have on them by means of telling their 
stories and using rhetorical devises such as metaphorical analogies, figurative speech, similes 
and etc.  
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decision may be nominally included in the deliberation but internally excluded 
from participating because only one form of communication is accepted in the 
deliberative process according to discourse ethics. This situation cannot be 
overcome because, as Young notices, it is usually hard to assert oneself 
against a very subtle exclusion that is often inadvertently imposed by the 
heightened cognitive and oratory skills of a privileged class of group of 
predominantly white males (1996, 122; 2000, 55). Young is afraid that due to 
these exclusions, deliberative democracy cannot bring about respect and trust 
among all participants and may fail to reach an “understanding across structural 
and cultural difference, and motivate acceptance and action” (2000, 58). I think 
we should also take notice of Young’s caution with discourse ethics and ask 
whether discourse ethics really promotes a democratic politics that can affirm 
the ideal of pluralism as engagement and encounter. For if we do conceive of 
pluralism normatively as a process of engagement and encounter across 
difference, then we also need to go into the process of deliberation itself and 
ask whether deliberation ought to be uniformly governed by a kind of rationality 
that we would expect in an academic setting or whether we should allow other 
means of communication as well. For Young, the communicative rationality of 
discourse ethics supplemented by greeting, rhetoric and narrative can bring 
about a democratic politics that affirms pluralism that we wish to see in modern 
societies.  
3.2 Communicative plurality in discourse ethics 
We would do well to reconstruct Young’s take on greeting, rhetoric, and 
narrative as well as her reasons for believing that they provide the necessary 
supplements for the limitations of discourse ethics. We can understand them as 
Young’s procedural correctives in her appropriation of discourse ethics. In the 
next pages I present them in more detail and then turn to the way Young’s 
appropriation of discourse ethics covers the problem of interpretive conflicts.  
According to Young, greeting is a “specific communicative gesture with 
important and not sufficiently noticed functions for democratic practice” (2000, 
57). Drawing from Levinas’ distinction between ‘Saying’ and ‘Said’, Young 
characterizes the act of greeting someone as opening up to them without 
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mediating the content46 (2000, 57). It is an act of saying, without the said, in 
which the speaker simultaneously recognizes and accepts the presence of the 
others as well as she “announces her presence as ready to listen and take 
responsibility for her relationship to her interlocutors” (Young 2000, 59). 
Absence of greeting the other in the second person is the sign of their absence 
in deliberation and thus greeting is an act whereby one is included and 
recognized as a participant in the dialogue. This is resonant with my 
Gadamerian interpretation of pluralism where one does not discuss the other as 
an object, rather as another subject who has something to say to us. Greeting is 
an important indicator for when deliberation does not affirm pluralism and thus, I 
take from Young that it “adds something important to the ideals of inclusive 
public reason”: “it is not simply that participants in public discussion should have 
reasons that others can accept, but that they must also explicitly acknowledge 
the others whom they aim to persuade” (2000, 62; emphasis as in original).  
The other form of communication that must be allowed in discourse is 
rhetoric. Since Plato, rhetoric has had a bad reputation. Especially in 
Habermasian circles, rhetoric is conceived as a strategic use of speech and 
therefore not part of communicative action. The form of speech that is usually 
contrasted with rhetoric is a dispassionate, neutral, detached from private 
interests and values. Young, like Gadamer, views rhetoric as an inherent part of 
deliberation47. It is, for her as well as Dryzek and Mouffe, a permanent “feature 
of political expression to which we ought to attend in our engagement with one 
another, rather than an aspect of expression we try to bracket in order to be 
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 Young argues that international politics is filled with almost ritualized acts of greeting 
that are very important in conflict resolution settings. The most prominent one she mentions is 
the moment of greeting between Yasir Arafat and Yitzak Rabin in 1993: “the moment was and 
remains a historical turning-point, however, as the moment when Israel for the first time gave 
greeting to the Palestinians as a group with whom they are obliged to discuss their mutual 
problems and conflicts” (Young 2000, 62). However, she notes that the situation in inter-social 
relationships among different groups and the political decision making between them is 
different. For instance, she cites the case with the American welfare reform in which women 
were referred to in the third person, which marks their absence in deliberation. 
47
 See Gadamer’s “Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Critique of Ideology” in Mueller-
Vollmer’s The Hermeneutics Reader (2002: 274-290). There, Gadamer argues that rhetoric is 
inherent to communication because it is the natural part of the suasive power of language. 
Rhetoric helps overcome misunderstanding as well as disclose an otherwise unknown world 
much in the same way sciences use rhetorical devices to describe and explain complex 
phenomena. For a brief history of the concept, also see Susan Shapiro’s “Rhetoric as Ideology 
Critique” (1994: 123-150) where she distils the concept of rhetoric from the distortions that it has 
acquired through time. She employs Habermas’ terms to argue that our understanding of 
rhetoric has been “systematically distorted” and if one reverses the inauguration of rhetoric by 
Cicero as ornamental speech, one can conceive rhetoric in its pure dialectical form. 
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truly rational” (Young 2000, 64). In her mind rhetoric is a category that 
distinguishes between what has been said in deliberation and how it has been 
said.  
Political expression always involves figurative speech, similes, and 
metaphors. In his 2008 presidential run, Rudolph Giuliani, an American lawyer 
and politician, equated healthcare to a product using the metaphoric example of 
a flat screen TV. In a common-sense manner, he argued that though everyone 
is free to buy a TV, not everyone works hard enough to buy one, therefore not 
everyone deserves one. By the same logic, while everyone is free to purchase 
healthcare, not everyone deserves it. By equating healthcare to a product, he 
further argued against healthcare reform in terms of liberal free market 
economy: if somebody does not want to buy a product, it is unconstitutional for 
the government to force that person into purchasing. Barack Obama, on the 
other hand, used the same metaphor to advance his own views on healthcare 
reform: “In formulating his healthcare act, President Obama placed the product 
metaphor in the context of commerce clause of the Constitution, Article I, 
Section 8, which gives Congress the right to regulate commerce. If healthcare is 
a product that is bought and sold across state lines, then Congress can regulate 
the selling and buying of it. The Affordable Care Act is based on that metaphor 
and Obama’s interpretation of it” (Lakoff and Wehling 2012, 12). Here we can 
see the vices and benefits of rhetoric. On the one hand, as pointed by George 
Lakoff48, “notice what is not in the frame: if healthcare is a product, it is not a 
right. Providing healthcare is thus not a moral concern; it is an economic matter. 
The word affordable fits the economic frame, as do words like market, 
purchase, and choice” (2012, 12; emphasis as in the original). On the other 
hand, as we will now follow Young’s lead, this example shows how “rhetoric 
constitutes the flesh and blood of any political communication” (Young 2000, 
65).   
From this example, we can understand the way rhetoric allows us to 
distinguish between what is said and how it is said. In other words, “rhetoric 
concerns the way content is conveyed as distinct from the assertive value of the 
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 Lakoff is a cognitive linguist known in the political sphere for his book on formulating 
discursive strategies for the promotion of the progressive movement in the USA. 
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content”, and so “understanding the role of rhetoric in political communication is 
important precisely because the meaning of a discourse, its pragmatic operation 
in a situation of communicative interaction, depends as much on its rhetorical as 
its assertoric aspects” (Young 2000, 65). Of course, one can focus on the 
distortions that rhetoric brings into discourse, and one can study rhetoric as a 
category which purchases one a critical access to what Habermas would call 
the ideological character of political communication as systematically distorted 
communication. Young would not challenge this (see 2000, 66, 77-80). Rather, 
she wants to look at three positive functions that are also characteristic of 
rhetoric and that also allow a more inclusive deliberation. First, “rhetorical 
moves often help to get an issue on the agenda for deliberation” (Young 2000, 
66)49. Second, “rhetoric fashions claims and arguments in ways appropriate to a 
particular public in a particular situation” (Young 2000, 67). Here, Young hints at 
the constructive function of rhetoric by which a speaker appeals to particular 
experiences, histories, and values of the particular audience in order to get 
his/her message across. Rhetoric constructs not just the message, but also “the 
speaker, the audience, and the occasion by invoking or creating specific 
connotations, symbols, and commitments” (Young 2000, 68). Thus, it allows us 
to “construct our positions and messages in a way appropriate to the particular 
context and audience to which we are speaking” (Young 2000, 69). Third, 
“rhetoric motivates the move from reason to judgement” (Young 2000, 69). For 
Young, “political argument usually aims ultimately at making judgements about 
institutions, situations, people, and solutions to problems” (Young 2000, 69). 
Hence, “the good rhetorician is one who attempts to persuade listeners by 
orienting proposals and arguments towards their collective and plural interests 
and desires, inviting them to transform these in the service of making a 
judgement together, but also acceding to them as judges, rather than claiming 
himself or herself to know” (Young 2000, 69). These functions make rhetoric an 
important category to designate as a form of communication that discourse 
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 The forms of communication Young has in mind here are: “demonstration and 
protest, the use of emotionally charged language and symbols, publicly ridiculing or mocking 
exclusive or dismissive behaviour of others, are sometimes appropriate and effective ways of 
getting attention for issues of legitimate public concern, but which would otherwise not be likely 
to get a hearing, either because they threaten powerful interests or because they particularly 
concerned a marginalized or minority group” (Young 2000, 67) 
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ethics must attend to “in order to criticize exclusion and to foster inclusion” 
(Young 2000, 70).  
The last form of communication with which Young supplies discourse 
ethics is narrative. By narrative, she means a hybrid combination between a 
testimony in court and colloquial storytelling. For Young, narratives are 
influential in a political setting. I think we should consider Young’s account of 
narrative as the most conducive to a deliberative democracy that is to affirm 
pluralism for the five functions which narratives have as a form of political 
communication. In order to do so, we must take from Young that “the general 
normative functions of narrative in political communication … refer to teaching 
and learning” (2000, 77). Telling the story of one’s experience, history, and 
culture is a teaching and learning experience that reaches across differences in 
the way that would be most compatible with our ideal of pluralism. If we are to 
pursue the ideal of pluralism as a process of engagement and encounter, then 
we must deal with the problem that might be endemic to modern plural 
societies. It may be the case that different groups and people may not share the 
same values, experience, and histories that give certain assumptions, 
perspectives, and world-views their validity. It may also be the case that in 
modern society the values, experience, and history of one group may dominate. 
By implication, it may be the case that the assumptions, perspectives, and 
world-views of this group may dominate discourse. It may also be the case that 
often rational argument fails in conveying a certain message or a demand for 
justice; rational argument may not be enough to challenge the dominant 
assumptions and perspectives. The best example that Young points at is the 
invention of sexual harassment. According to her, it took women who have 
experienced harassment to tell their stories to address it as a problem and 
initiate deliberation and judgement on the issue. For this reason Young values 
narrative; narrative can help where rational argument may fail. Therefore, let me 
briefly summarize five political functions of narrative that Young deploys in order 
to persuade us about its value for discourse ethics. We can see these five 
functions as five ways narrative can reach across differences in places where 
rational argument of discourse ethics may not (see Young 2000, 72ff).  
First, narrative offers a way to express injustices experienced by a 
radically marginalized and excluded group, and thus narrative is a form of 
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disclosure50 (Young 2000, 72). Certain groups may have experiences that the 
contemporary language cannot express in a way that complies with the 
standards of discourse ethics. Here, telling one’s story discloses the problem 
and furthers deliberation on the issue. Second, narratives function in “facilitation 
of local publics and articulation of collective affinities” (Young 2000, 73). This 
function is closely related to social groups by affinity. For Young, deliberations 
in plural societies can be dispersed in space and time. Therefore, assembling 
people affected by the decision can be problematic. In these cases, people 
most often tend to gather into localized publics or groups based on affinity with 
the issue or topic at hand. Therefore, “storytelling is often an important means 
by which members of such collectives identify one another, and identify the 
basis of their affinity” (Young 2000, 73). Third, narratives help in promoting 
“understanding the experience of others and countering pre-understandings51” 
(Young 2000, 73). Fourth, narratives are more conducive to deliberation than 
rational argument when it comes to “revealing the source of values, priorities, or 
cultural meanings” (Young 2000, 75). As Young notes, “for an argument to get 
off the ground, its auditors must accept its premises” (2000, 75). However, the 
problem with furthering rational argument is exacerbated in pluralist settings 
where there are “serious divergences in value premises, cultural practices, and 
meanings, and these disparities bring conflict, insensitivity, insult, and 
misunderstanding” (Young 2000, 75). When there is a lack of shared source of 
values and premises, narrative is more conducive because “values, unlike 
norms, often cannot be justified through argument” (Young 2000, 75). 
Therefore, narrative can serve as a mode of explanation to the others what 
certain values, priorities, and cultural practices mean to them. Fifth, narratives 
“aid in constituting the social knowledge that enlarges thought” (Young 2000, 
76).  
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 Young equates this function to the meaning of Lyotard’s “differend”. In my 
understanding, Young’s equivocation of how narrative brings issues to public view with 
‘differend’ suggests how certain experiences disclose themselves and make themselves known 
to the public. Therefore, to maintain clarity, I will refer to the first function as disclosure without 
altering the meaning that Young intended.  
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 Young illustrates this function by bringing to our attention the example with disabled 
people. Not only does their storytelling promote our understanding of their everyday experience 
when they are out and about, but also their storytelling can counter our pre-understandings of 




There is a Gadamerian tone in this formulation. Young argues that 
narrative “exhibits the situated knowledge available from various social 
locations, and the combination of narrative from difference perspectives 
produces a collective social wisdom not available from any one position” (2000, 
76)52. Both Gadamer and Young see the value of sharing a story in a dialogical 
manner, rather than monological, as most beneficial in enlarging thought. Just 
as Gadamer points at the way one can overcome his/her finitude by listening to 
others, Young points at the way listening to others overcomes the finitude of 
one’s view of political and social issues. A dialogue, in which people are not 
restricted to rational-argumentative justification of their position but also allowed 
to tell their story, can in fact produce a collective perspective within a horizon 
that can encompass the subject of the discourse in a more wholesome way.  
3.3 Social perspectives as interpretive conflicts  
I now turn the way in which Young’s appropriation of discourse ethics 
allows for recognition of interpretive conflicts. We will see that the significance 
of interpretive conflicts for democratic politics has to do with inclusion of group 
perspectives.  
Our argument on interpretive conflicts is premised by Gadamer’s account 
of incomplete understanding in terms of hermeneutical situation. We 
established that incomplete understanding gives rise to interpretive conflicts 
when different others encounter and engage with one another. We saw that 
discourse ethics is limited in recognizing the significance of interpretive conflicts 
for democratic politics. A Habermasian argument against interpretive conflicts is 
based on two premises. The first premise is the separation between ethical and 
moral discourses that divide between subjective and objective claims of validity 
respectively. The second premise argues that if interpretive conflicts are 
included in the moral discourse it will result in partial and distorted 
communication. 
In Warnke’s critique of Habermas, we saw that there cannot be a strict 
division between ethical and moral forms of discourse. General principles that 
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Helene Landemore make about the epistemological benefits of collective narratives from a 
variety of social positions. See Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the 




are agreed upon in the moral discourse still need to be interpreted and applied 
through the ethical discourse. Interpretive conflicts exist in the overlap between 
ethical and moral discourses and do not let them be strictly separated. Our 
reason for thinking so has to do with the hermeneutics of understanding that we 
looked at in the first and second sections of chapter II. Young’s account of 
social groups is consonant with our premises. In the first section of this chapter, 
we discussed Young’s characterisation of plurality as consisting in social groups 
and the role of their involvement in democratic politics based on their particular 
experiences, histories, and cultures. Based on her idea of social groups, Young 
would concur with the argument that general principles are subject to 
interpretive conflicts and that we need to take interpretive conflicts into account 
in democratic politics. For her, what is at stake in interpretive conflicts is the 
inclusion of particularity as a resource for democratic politics. Also at stake is 
the particularity that social groups represent as a resource for expanding 
incomplete understanding. Recall that in her appropriation of discourse ethics, 
she argues that general principles must not be abstract and removed from 
particular circumstances by a form of understanding that claims a universal and 
transcendent status. What we must be aware of is that understanding is 
situated and our discussions must not require abstractions, transcendence, and 
impartiality. Young writes:  
Appeals to principle have a place in such discussion, but they 
must be applied to particular situations in the context of 
particular social relationships. Thus participants in political 
discussion cannot transcend their particularity. If participants 
are to make objective judgements appropriate for their 
context, they must express their own particularity to others 
and learn of the particularity of those differently situated in the 
social world where they dwell together (2000, 113). 
We know that application of a principle to particular situations is an act of 
understanding. It is a hermeneutical task and as such, it is an act of 
interpretation53. Young also recognizes that particular groups apply general 
principles in particular situations by interpreting them from their own 
perspectives. For Young, what is at stake in interpretive conflicts is the 
disclosure of partiality, of particular perspective that comes from particular 
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history, culture, and social position. This is consonant with our idea of 
hermeneutical situation. Partial perspectives are a resource for democratic 
politics because they disclose the plural and differentiated constitution of the 
public realm. Since each perspective has a location within a structure it 
discloses, the significance of interpretive conflicts lies in the inclusion of 
partiality as a resource in democratic politics:  
Inclusion of and attention to socially differentiated positions in 
democratic discussions tends to correct biases and situate the 
partial perspective of participants in debate. Confrontation with 
different perspectives, interests, and cultural meanings 
teaches each the partiality of their own and reveals to them 
their own experiences as perspectival. Listening to those 
differently situated from myself and my close associates 
teaches me how my situation looks to them, in what relation 
they think I stand to them. Such a contextualizing of 
perspective is especially important for groups that have 
power, authority, or privilege. Those in structurally superior 
positions not only take their experience, preferences, and 
opinions to be general, uncontroversial, ordinary, and even an 
expression of suffering or disadvantage, as we all do, but also 
have the power to represent these as general norms. Having 
to answer to others who speak from different, less privileged, 
perspectives on their social relations exposes their partiality 
and relative blindness.  By including multiple perspectives, 
and not simply two that might be in direct contention over an 
issue, we take a giant step towards enlarging thought (Young 
2000, 116)  
Young’s argument for including other perspectives shows the 
significance of Gadamer’s hermeneutical consciousness and experience for 
democratic politics. There are political benefits to encountering the other in their 
otherness, letting the other challenge our prejudices and change our self-
understanding. Critical distance from particular circumstances is achieved not 
by transcendence and universalization, but by confronting the other in their 
otherness with awareness of our own hermeneutical situation.  
So, what are the terms in which Young includes interpretive conflicts in 
democratic politics? The primary mode of including interpretive conflicts is 
inclusion of social perspectives that each social group brings into deliberation. 
For Young, perspectives can be included in deliberation as part of group 
representation, which I take to be a form of institution she defends in terms of 
politics of difference. In Inclusion and Democracy (2000, chapter 3), Young 
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defends her version of politics of difference against theories that uphold the idea 
of ‘common good’. Her politics of difference is about recognizing difference in a 
positive formulation, rather than negative. Young notes that the supporters of 
the idea of common good mistakenly argue that recognizing difference is in 
reality just attending to the special interest of certain groups while disregarding 
the common good. She counters that with an argument that in the modern plural 
world there cannot be a common good in the strong sense because different 
people have different claims of injustice that they have experienced. They must 
be given a chance to express the particular ways in which they experience 
injustice. Appeals to common good may block such an expression. Therefore, 
democratic theory must uphold the value of difference as a resource for 
democratic politics. 
Furthermore, through Young’s defence of politics of difference, we get a 
sense of how interpretive conflicts in the form of social perspectives cannot be 
reduced to clash of identities. Since interpretive dimension of understanding is 
linked to the hermeneutical situation54, and since Young’s idea of social groups 
is linked to hermeneutical situation, we can follow her in her disassociation of 
politics of difference from the logic of identity politics in two ways: “first, we 
should conceptualize social groups according to a relational rather than 
substantialist logic”; “secondly, we should affirm that groups do not have 
identities as such, but rather that individuals construct their own identities on the 
basis of social group positioning” (Young 2000, 82). In the first instance, she 
emphasises that we cannot assume that there is a common denominator that all 
individuals in a social group share. Its members can consist in people who can 
be differentiated according to their gender, colour, culture, education, class, etc. 
Nothing warrants the application of identity politics here because the members 
of this collective gather according to relational affinity with each other in their 
experiences of inequality as, for instance, homosexuals. In the second instance, 
Young wants to ensure that we do not conceive of social groups as groups with 
identity in themselves. Otherwise we would roll back into the logic of identity 
politics in the first instance. It is important for deliberative democracy that we 
conceive of individuals as capable of constructing their own identities. There is 
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 It will do well to recall and keep in mind that in chapter II we discussed that 
hermeneutic situation has a horizon, and horizons are not fixed; they are fluid, and therefore 
one’s understanding is not fixed.  
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no point for deliberative politics if people cannot be trusted to be reflective and 
change their minds about certain things. However, it is important to recognize 
that “social groups … position individuals, but a person’s identity is her own, 
formed in active relation to social positions, among other things, rather than 
constituted by them” (Young 2000, 99). We need to recognize that “individual 
subjects make their own identities, but not under conditions they choose” 
(Young 2000, 99).  
Based on her characterization of politics of difference in terms of social 
groups and its difference from identity politics, it is reasonable to suppose that 
Young would not see interpretive conflicts as a matter of identity. Rather, she 
would see them in hermeneutical terms as part of situated understanding, which 
influences the way we see political matters and informs our deliberation. This is 
similar to the argument in chapter II about the way one’s hermeneutical situation 
serves as the background which informs and is taken up in one’s interpretation. 
It is the totality of one’s lived-experience that constitutes one’s finitude, one’s 
incomplete understanding, and partiality with which one understands practical 
matters. Our lived-experience gives us a perspective in the same manner our 
hermeneutical situation gives us a horizon. Young argues that social 
perspectives must be represented as part of group representation in democratic 
politics (see 2000, 121-148). For Young, representing the social perspective of 
a group is an important aspect of inclusive and legitimate representation that is 
different from representing group interests and opinions. 
A social perspective is that which people have based on their 
experience, history, and situated knowledge. Social perspectives vary due to 
social positions that are always differentiated by colour, gender, class, physical 
disability, education, etc. Every person has a differentiated social location based 
on these aspects. A good illustration of this point is Young’s critique of 
feminism. She argues that the concept of woman in feminism is not 
differentiated enough to include the social positions of women other than white, 
middle class, Christian women. The social positions of women are always 
differentiated, so one needs to keep in mind the experiences of different 
women. The kind of sexism that white, middle class, Christian women are 
attuned to notice and experience is different from the kind of sexism that black, 
and/or lower class, and/or Muslim women experience. Hence, their social 
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perspectives on women’s rights and what feminist movements need to achieve 
might differ. Young writes, “because of their social locations, people are attuned 
to particular kinds of social meanings and relationships to which others are less 
attuned” (2000, 136). Much like the finitude delineated by one’s hermeneutical 
situation which limits one’s horizon, people may not be in the social position to 
notice the particular meanings of general principles in particular situations. Even 
though social positioning can be differentiated at the individual level, social 
groups and perspectives can emerge because, as Young writes, “following the 
logic of the metaphor of group differentiation as arising from differing positions 
in social fields, the idea of social perspective suggests that agents who are 
‘close’ in the social field have a similar point of view on the field and the 
occurrences within it, while those who are socially distant are more likely to see 
things differently” (Young 2000, 136).  
Young argues for the inclusion of perspectives into representation for the 
same reasons that Gadamer argues for the role of the other in hermeneutical 
experience. She writes:  
Representing an interest or an opinion usually entails 
promoting certain specific outcomes in the decision-making 
process. Representing a perspective, on the other hand, 
usually means promoting certain starting points for discussion. 
From a particular social perspective a representative asks 
certain kinds of questions, reports certain kinds of experience, 
recalls a particular line of narrative history, or expresses a 
certain way of regarding the positions of others. These 
importantly contribute to the inclusion of different people in the 
decision-making process and nurture attention to possible 
effects of proposed policies on different groups (2000, 140). 
Hermeneutical experience has the structure of genuine experience, 
which is a negative experience. It is an experience that lets us understand 
something in a new way. If social perspectives offer a different starting point, 
then encountering social perspectives is a hermeneutical experience because 
they disclose things in a new light. Social perspective is finite. Its finitude is its 
value to democratic politics. Social perspective represents specific location in 
the social structure and a specific lived-experience of a group. Young’s idea of 
social perspective brings home the argument that the significance of interpretive 
conflicts is in enriching deliberation with transformative and world disclosing 
dialogue. The reason we need to engage and encounter the other in their 
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otherness is precisely because the other discloses the question at hand from a 
new perspective. A different “starting point for discussion” is possible when the 
other presents its partiality, particularity by speaking from its otherness. Part 
and parcel of interpretive conflicts is presentation of something from one’s point 
of view against a different position. Interpretive conflicts are about disclosing 
one’s otherness relative to others. The standards of rationality and the 
requirements for universalism and abstraction in discourse ethics preclude this 
possibility. For Young, social perspective enters discussion not through rational 
deliberation but through greeting, storytelling, and rhetoric. This is the reason 
her procedural corrections are so important for democratic politics. 
Communicative plurality in deliberation allows a shift in the very way a problem 
is expressed and perceived. As in the case with sexism, it also allows the 
construction of a problem. It is the social perspective from the lived-experience 
of women that was expressed in their testimonies that made sexism an issue 
and constructed the debate on women’s rights and equality. Social perspective 
cannot be expressed in a rational discourse. It can be expressed in a discourse 
where one is allowed to share a lived-experience by telling one’s story and 
using rhetorical devices to construct, as Young puts it, “the speaker, the 
audience, and the occasion by invoking or creating specific connotations, 
symbols, and commitments” (2000, 68).  
Genuine experience, Gadamer argues, is an experience that comes from 
openness to the otherness of the other. His principle of openness is about 
engagement and encounter of the other in their otherness. It is about letting the 
other challenge our prejudices and changes our understanding as well as self-
understanding. In Young, engagement and encounter of perspectives that is 
congruent with Gadamer’s principle of openness is supported by her idea of 
asymmetric reciprocity. Next, I examine asymmetric reciprocity as a mode for 
instantiating Gadamer’s principle of openness in democratic politics.  
3.4 Asymmetric reciprocity as instantiation of openness in 
democratic politics 
In “Asymmetrical reciprocity: on moral respect, wonder, and enlarged 
thought” (1997), Young critiques Benhabib’s idea of moral respect outlined in 
Situating the Self (1991). It is worth noting that both Benhabib and Young 
accept Habermas’ discourse ethics as a suitable framework for deliberative 
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democratic politics in plural societies. They both take issue with Habermas’ 
requirement that participants bracket their particularities to make rational 
consensus possible. For them, this requirement risks serving as a pretext for 
exclusion on the one hand and for homogenizing plurality on the other. Both 
think that deliberative democracy and consensus on general principles can be 
possible without bracketing particularities. However, their approaches to this 
problem are different. Both think that the idea of moral respect must be changed 
in order to allow partiality and particularity in deliberation. Benhabib offers to 
think about moral respect in terms of symmetric reciprocity; Young offers to 
think about it in terms of asymmetric reciprocity. 
Benhabib offers to reformulate Habermas’ idea of moral respect in terms 
of symmetric reciprocity in order to include partiality and particularity in 
deliberation. Drawing from Arendt’s “enlarged thought”, Benhabib conceives of 
symmetric reciprocity as achieved by the moral act of assuming the other’s 
position, or looking at socio-political matters the way others would look at them. 
Thus, deliberative democracy need not bracket particularities in upholding 
Habermas’ idea of moral respect. Actors achieve moral respect by 
symmetrically reciprocating in looking at things from each other’s point of view 
(see Benhabib 1991, 137). If each of us reciprocated in this moral act, then, for 
Benhabib, we would not need to leave our particularities behind and still be able 
to come to consensus on general norms. 
Young is critical of Benhabib’s idea of moral respect in terms of 
symmetric reciprocity. I claim that Benhabib’s idea precludes the principle of 
openness while Young’s idea of asymmetric reciprocity instantiates it in 
democratic politics. There are three ways in which symmetric reciprocity 
precludes openness. First, symmetric reciprocity risks obscuring difference 
because imagining how another person may view things must presuppose a 
great degree of sameness between two people (Young 1997, 45). Second, it is 
ontologically impossible to accurately imagine what it is like to be somebody 
else and view things as they would from their perspective (Young 1997, 46). 
Every person and group has a life-story, a totality of historical experience that 
cannot be reduced to one event or cannot be represented wholly from one of its 
parts. This life-story partly makes up the other’s situatedness that one cannot 
just imaginatively occupy and “get”. Assuming the view of somebody else 
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presupposes an overlap of historical experiences and situatedness. However, 
for Young, no matter how much two “stories” overlap, there is always a 
remainder, a difference between the two that account for the otherness of the 
other. The other’s perspective can be imagined only partially and only within a 
particular situation. The whole totality of one’s life-story and perspective cannot 
be grasped fully because the whole is not reducible to any of its parts. Since we 
cannot relive one’s life, we must accept that we cannot symmetrically 
reciprocate in imagining what it is like to be the other55. Third, relying on 
symmetrical reciprocity as moral justification for judgement can yield “politically 
suspect” results (Young 1997, 47). If it is ontologically impossible to accurately 
assume another’s position, it means that we might be filling in the parts that we 
do not “get” by what we already know and presume – i.e. prejudices. For 
example, “when people obey the injunction to put themselves in the position of 
others, they too often put themselves, with their own particular experiences and 
privileges, in the positions they see the others” (Young 1997, 48). Young 
continues, “when members of privileged groups imaginatively try to represent to 
themselves the perspective of members of oppressed groups, too often those 
representations carry projections and fantasies through which the privileged 
reinforce a complementary image of themselves” (Young 1997, 48). In each of 
the three points Young makes about symmetric reciprocity, we see that there is 
no sense of letting the otherness of the other present itself and confront us as 
the principle of openness prescribes. Instead of symmetric reciprocity, Young 
proposes to uphold moral respect in terms of asymmetric reciprocity.  
For Young, we are asymmetric in two main ways: with regards to our 
temporality and position. Temporal asymmetry has to do with the history of each 
position. Young writes “each person brings to a communication situation the 
particular experiences, assumptions, meanings, symbolic associations, and so 
on, that emerge from a particular history, most of which lies as background to 
the communicative situation” (1997, 51). This “history is inexhaustible, always 
subject to possible retelling in new contexts” (Young 1997, 51). She argues that 
temporal asymmetry makes it impossible for one person to adopt another’s 
perspective “because he or she cannot live another person’s history” (Young 
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 Indeed, Young points at three examples that demonstrate the impossibility of 




1997, 51). Second, there is asymmetry that comes from what Young calls “the 
specificity of position”. Young’s notion of “position” as based on Heidegger’s 
idea of ‘thrownness’ and is linked to her idea of “social groups”. Though in this 
particular essay the idea remains the same, Young does not elaborate it in 
reference to Heidegger’s ‘thrownness’ as she did it in her previous works (see 
1989, 260). Rather, this time Young refers to Hegel’s ontology of self and other 
to make her point: “each social position is structured by the configuration of 
relationships among positions” (1997, 52). The relatedness between family, civil 
society and state in Hegel’s ontology illustrate Young’s notion well. We can see 
how one’s position as a family member can be understood in relationship to 
one’s position in the civil society, which in turn can be understood in its 
relationship to the state. However, as Sandel shows (2014, 91), Hegel’s 
ontology is similar to Heidegger’s account of the structure of the world, which in 
my view means that Young does not depart from her original formulation of 
‘social position’ based on Heidegger’s facticity. Young brings together the 
philosophies of these two thinkers: “persons can flow and shift among 
structured social positions, and the positions themselves cannot be plucked 
from their contextualized relations and substituted for one another” (1997, 52). 
The second part of this sentence echoes Heidegger in the way he argues that 
Dasein is its world and cannot be separate from it. To me, retaining Heidegger’s 
voice in Young is important for understanding the hermeneutical dimensions of 
her thought in the next paragraph.  
Young’s idea of asymmetric reciprocity has four hermeneutical aspects 
that help in making it an instantiation of Gadamer’s principle of openness. First, 
it is based on Young’s recognition of human finitude (see 1997, 49). Second, it 
is based on the recognition of situatedness evident in her idea of social position. 
Third, we can see that Young’s idea of temporality resembles Gadamer’s 
historically effected consciousness. Temporality has a similar regulative function 
to historically effected consciousness given that she argues that it is impossible 
to place oneself in another’s historical horizon fully. Fourth, asymmetric 
reciprocity recognizes the primacy of the question in a dialogue. I would not say 
that the primacy of the question is exclusively a hermeneutical idea. However, 
Gadamer recognizes it as an important part of openness in dialogue (see 
159 
 
Gadamer 2013: 370-387). An open person asks questions that invite the other 
to disclose its otherness. 
Young argues that symmetric reciprocity is ontologically impossible 
because we are finite.  We cannot relive the totality of life-history of another 
person or a group. We can only understand part of it or, perhaps, share in living 
a part of that history together. However, the whole is not reducible to its parts. 
This argument presupposes human finitude in the sense that our own 
perspectives are bound within our own life-history. Our perspective, as Young 
refers to it, or horizon, as Gadamer refers to it, is bound within this finitude. 
When viewed from the point of view of finitude, we can see that for Young moral 
respect conceived as symmetric reciprocity reveals itself as the opposite of 
openness. Our finitude within our own hermeneutical situation means that we 
cannot understand something from the perspective of another person as he/she 
might. Ignoring this impossibility means that that we risk engaging with the other 
person without encountering his/her otherness. If I can just represent to myself 
the other person’s view and understand things from his/her perspective, I am 
not in a dialogical relationship with this person. The understanding I achieve in 
this manner is not bilateral. Therefore, symmetric reciprocity is not according to 
the principle of openness and does not bring about understanding across 
differences.  
Asymmetric reciprocity also recognizes situatedness of understanding 
and the regulative function of historically effected consciousness in virtue of 
Young’s ideas of social position and temporality. As we saw above, social 
position constitutes one’s social perspective, which is partial and particular. 
Therefore, it recognizes that understanding is situated. Historically effected 
consciousness, if you recall, is a regulative idea in Gadamer’s ‘fusion of 
horizons’. It means that the consciousness experiencing the object of 
understanding, as well as the object itself, have had a history of effect. Young’s 
idea of temporality is similar. She writes: “each person brings to a 
communication situation the particular experiences, assumptions, meanings, 
symbolic associations, and so on, that emerge from a particular history, most of 
which lies as background to the communicative situation” (1997, 51).  
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The most important element in asymmetric reciprocity that makes it a 
counterpart to Gadamer’s principle of openness is its emphasis on the primacy 
of questions (see 1997, 55). For Young, the proper expression of moral respect 
is asking the other questions to encounter its otherness rather than assume an 
answer for it. A question invites the other to disclose its otherness to us. In 
Young’s terms, a question precedes the inclusion of a different perspective. 
Indeed, for Young our finitude obliges us to ask questions because there is no 
other way for us to understand and see things wholly as the other does. No 
matter how much we share in common, there is always a remainder that 
accounts for the otherness between us. Young notes that Habermas too forgets 
about the primacy of questions and focuses overwhelmingly on the answers 
(see 1997, 55). Thus, we see how asymmetric reciprocity instantiates the 
principle of openness that enables bilateral understanding and transformative 
dialogue. Similar to Gadamer, Young argues that we need to maintain dialogue 
because we are finite. 
Recognition of finitude, situated understanding within a social position, 
temporality, and the primacy of the question are the elements that help 
understand asymmetric reciprocity as an instantiation of Gadamer’s principle of 
openness. Yet, the argument can be made stronger once we see that Young is 
defending openness in her argument against symmetric reciprocity. I claim that 
Young proposes asymmetric reciprocity instead of symmetric reciprocity 
because openness is at stake, as well as engagement and encounter of the 
other in their otherness. For Young, taking one’s point of view can lead to an 
illusion that one already knows the other (1997, 49). It can impede 
communication rather than aid it because “if you think you already know how 
the other people feel and judge because you have imaginatively represented 
their perspective to yourself, then you may not listen to their expression of their 
perspective very openly” (Young 1997, 49). The idea of moral respect 
conceived as looking at things from other’s point of view may actually reinforce 
one’s identity investment in the established understanding of the other. Taking 
another’s point of view has a moral appeal but it may end up preserving our 
mistaken or incomplete view of others. It denies Gadamer’s idea of genuine 
experience. It precludes opening up to the other, asking him/her questions and 
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letting his/her otherness challenge our prejudices, change our self-
understanding, and expand our incomplete understanding.  
Previously, I argued that Gadamer’s idea of “transposing ourselves” into 
the horizon of the other falls short of the principle of moral respect. This is 
because for Gadamer moral respect means closing ourselves off from the 
dialogue partner and making ourselves unavailable to the challenge our 
partner’s otherness poses. For Young, the idea of moral respect conceived in 
term of symmetric reciprocity leads closure of the self from the other too. For 
example, Young writes “if you think you can look at things from their point of 
view, then you may avoid the sometimes arduous and painful process in which 
they confront you with your prejudices, fantasies, and misunderstandings about 
them, which you have because of your point of view” (1997, 49). Thus, Young 
defends openness in asymmetric reciprocity and her defence includes the role 
of hermeneutical (and genuine) experience in engagement and encounter of the 
other56. Young writes: 
It is more appropriate to approach a situation of 
communicative interaction for the purpose of arriving at a 
moral or political judgement with a stance of moral humility. In 
moral humility one starts with the assumption that one cannot 
see things from the other person’s perspective and waits to 
learn by listening to the other person to what extent they have 
had similar experiences. If I assume that there are aspects of 
where the other person is coming from that I do not 
understand, I will be more likely to be open to listening to the 
specific expression of their experience, interests, and claims. 
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 I appreciate the fact that in her essay Young brings Derrida to bear against 
Benhabib’s conception of moral respect. Young takes Derrida’s notion of gift-giving as a model 
for reciprocity in communication. I am offering a tendentious reading by drawing parallels to 
Gadamer’s terms and concepts. Concerning the conflict of interpretation that my reading raises 
with regards to Young’s identifiable source, from Gadamer’s perspective, he is not in 
disagreement with Derrida with regards to “understanding” (see Gadamer 1989). Derrida’s 
method of deconstruction relies on Heidegger but he did not associate himself with the 
hermeneutic tradition. Derrida was highly suspicious of it because for him hermeneutics 
harboured the Western tradition’s will to dominate the other by understanding it. However, 
Grondin observes that Gadamer started highlighting “openness” in hermeneutic experience 
after his debate with Derrida. During this debate, Derrida questioned Gadamer’s reliance on 
“good will” in understanding the other. Derrida thought that there is no reason that this 
understanding would not involve or hide a form of “appropriation” of the other. For Derrida, there 
is no reason to disbelieve that “good will” can masquerade as the will to dominate the other. 
Gadamer conceded but added that any question directed at dialogue partner expresses the 
good will to understand (see 1989). Grondin notes how Gadamer admitted that “understanding 
implied some form of application, which can indeed be read as a form of appropriation” (Grondin 
in 2005: 982-987). As a result, Gadamer pressed heavily that hermeneutic experience is about 




Indeed, one might say that this is what listening to a person 
means. (Young 1997, 49) 
Dialogue is essential for Gadamer. For him, the condition of possibility for 
a genuine dialogue is the Socratic admission of one’s own ignorance (see 
Gadamer 2013, 370-387)57. Not just philosophy, but openness to difference 
starts with the recognition of one’s finitude and incomplete understanding 
followed by a question directed at the dialogue partner. For Gadamer, Socrates 
was the genuinely experienced philosopher and dialogue partner. For Young, 
like for Gadamer, true moral respect and openness are expressed by two 
things: admission of one’s finitude, situated understanding, temporality, and 
asking a question that invites the other into a transformative dialogue. Thus, I 
propose Young’s asymmetric reciprocity as a mode of instantiating Gadamer’s 
principle of openness in democratic politics committed to the idea of pluralism 
as engagement and encounter of the other. 
Since all engagement presupposes directedness towards understanding, 
Young also proposes her own conception of understanding. However, her 
conception is underspecified and needs to be worked out if we are to perceive 
asymmetric reciprocity as the instantiation of the principle of openness. 
Gadamer’s principle of openness is underpinned by understanding conceived 
as ‘fusion of horizons’. It is bilateral and a result of each person being present 
from within their own particularity, with their own prejudices and fore-structures. 
Young underpins asymmetric reciprocity with a conception of understanding 
that falls short of ‘fusion of horizons’. She differentiates between two types of 
understanding. One kind of understanding involves engagement with the other 
directed at finding similarities between the parties. They engage to find common 
grounds and proceed further in deliberation. In this kind of engagement, parties 
construct “identification and reversibility” with the each other, which, Young 
argues, means that they never transcend their “own experience” (1997, 52). 
The second way of understanding the other involves a sense of wonder and 
“getting out of ourselves and learning something new” (Young 1997, 52). In this 
mode, parties are open to hear something new and something unexpected. For 
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 Robert Sullivan offers a useful commentary on Gadamer’s early writing on Plato’s 
dialectics. Sullivan notes how while Gadamer’s contemporaries looked for the “superman” in 
Nietzsche, Gadamer found his “superman” in Socrates, whose superiority consisted in his 
admission of his own ignorance. See Sullivan Political Hermeneutics (1989, 169-176).  
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Young, this kind of openness requires suspending one’s assumptions “in order 
to listen” (1997, 53). Suspension of assumptions opens one up to “new 
variations, new modalities on some practice or action or situation that is related 
to but beyond [one’s] experience” (Young 1997, 53). Young advocates the 
second one as appropriate for asymmetric reciprocity. I worry that it falls short 
of Gadamer’s conception of understanding in the principle of openness and can 
pose a problem for instantiating the principle of openness as asymmetric 
reciprocity in democratic politics.  
The conception of understanding Young upholds does not seem so 
different from Habermas’ argument that understanding (consensus) between 
different others can only be reached when all sides have bracketed their 
particularities. This equivalence poses a threefold problem. First, it may pose 
problems to the criterion of pluralism as encounter of commitments. Since 
Young leaves “suspending” one’s assumptions underspecified, it might mean 
that we leave our commitments and experience behind. Second, suspending 
one’s assumptions when encountering something new falls short of the principle 
of openness because that would mean that we need to suspend our 
particularity, partiality, and “legitimate” prejudices too. If openness is being open 
to the otherness of the other, and the otherness is other only in relation to our 
own particularity, then we need to be specific about what we need to suspend. 
Three, if I were to suspend my assumptions, then openness has no meaning 
because my assumptions are not available to be challenged by the other. 
“Suspension” of my assumptions can be one more way I can make myself 
unavailable to the otherness of the other58. Unless I am mistaken in my reading 
                                            
58
 It puzzles me that Young turns to this kind of division of understanding given that her 
earlier work involving the same concept of “social position” draws heavily from Heidegger. It is 
hard to see how her earlier formulation of “social position” based on Heidegger’s thrownness 
ends up requiring a conception of understanding where one should suspend assumptions and 
transcend one’s own experience.  If I understand Heidegger’s philosophy correctly, then it is 
clear how first, one cannot assume the position of the other because in each of our cases our 
Dasein, in one of its senses, is a totality of a lived story and, therefore, no one can live it for us 
representatively. Second, it is not necessary to leave my own assumptions behind to 
understand the otherness of the other because Heidegger’s basic point shows that any 
distinctive characteristics of something, i.e. its otherness, shows itself in relation to others. Thus, 
the otherness of the other can be understood precisely in relation to my own assumptions and 
experience. It is harder still to imagine that in this specific essay, the reference to Hegel’s 
ontology of the self and the other doesn’t prevent this confusing division of understanding. Is not 
Hegel’s ontology of self and the other indicative of the relatedness between the self and the 
other? It seems to me the Hegel’s account of ethical life within family, civil society, and state 
shows that the self and other can be differentiated only in reference to each other. That is, each 
has to retain rather than leave behind that which makes it distinct so that it can be understood in 
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of Young, there is a way to rescue her from this confusion because she does 
not specify what suspending one’s assumptions might involve or what kinds of 
assumptions require “suspending”.  
It strikes me that there are two things that Young wants to happen in 
“understanding across difference” (see 1997, 52ff). One, there must be genuine 
interest and openness to the other. Two, the otherness of the other must be 
understood in their own otherness, i.e. we should not appropriate it. Both are 
possible in asymmetric reciprocity. She writes:  
We meet and communicate. We mutually recognize one 
another and aim to understand one another. Each is open to 
such understanding by recognizing our asymmetry. A 
condition of our communication is that we acknowledge the 
difference, interval, that others drag behind them shadows 
and histories, scars, traces, that do not become present in our 
communication. Thus, we each must be open to learning 
about the other person’s perspective, since we cannot take 
the other person’s standpoint and imagine that perspective as 
our own. This implies that we have the moral humility to 
acknowledge that even though there may be much I do 
understand about the other person’s perspective through her 
communication to me and through the constructions we have 
made common between us, there is also always a remainder, 
much that I do not understand about the other person’s 
experience and perspective (1997, 53). 
In this passage, Young is at her closest to Gadamer’s principle of 
openness and fusion of horizons. The argument is that each must acknowledge 
the way in which their understanding finite and be open to challenge by the 
otherness of the other. It is possible to weaken Young’s requirement to suspend 
assumptions based on this passage. Suspending assumptions can mean that 
we suspend the quick judgements made about the other based on ready-to-
hand prejudices. Thus, the assumptions we suspend are the ones that may 
                                                                                                                                
their otherness. And so again, it does not make sense that one must leave behind one’s 
assumption and experience in order to understand the other in his/her otherness. Yet, what is 
more puzzling to me is Young’s choice – Hegel. If I am not mistaken, ultimately, if Young wants 
to draw the relationship of self and other from Hegel for her purposes in this essay, then she 
needs be clearer on the conception of understanding that is necessary for this relationship. It 
seems to me that the concept of understanding based on Hegel would imply a sense of 
integration of the other with oneself. That would mean appropriation of the other rather than 
understanding across differences. Is not Hegel’s dialectics based on a “return home” from 
encountering something new, alien, different, or negative that makes synthesis possible? 
Doesn’t the basic movement of understanding consist in an excursion-like experience whereby 
consciousness leaves but always returns to itself and therefore makes it possible to recognize 




prevent us from being open59. This clarification brings Young’s conception of 
understanding and asymmetric reciprocity to accord with Gadamer’s fusion of 
horizons and the principle of openness. Since we are asymmetrically related, 
we need to approach the other according to the principle of openness through 
hermeneutical experience and consciousness. Young also argues that the value 
of different positions is how their partiality brings about a negative experience. 
Previously, we saw that a group’s perspective offers a new starting point of the 
discussion. It can change the way the problem is perceived and presents things 
to our understanding in a new way. The partiality of a position also shows our 
own partiality, which is hermeneutical consciousness. Asymmetric reciprocity is 
the condition of possibility for such experiences in the same manner the 
principle of openness allows hermeneutical experience and consciousness. 
Thus, from Young, we get a sense of how we are asymmetrically 
positioned due to our finitude, situatedness, and temporality. She proposes to 
conceive of moral respect in terms of asymmetric reciprocity, an idea that 
translates hermeneutical situation, experience, and consciousness into 
democratic politics. Asymmetric reciprocity brings the transformative dialogue 
between different social groups and fusion of horizons into democratic politics. 
The principle of openness starts with recognition of finitude, which asymmetric 
reciprocity does with regards to social group positions and perspectives. The 
principle requires encounter of the other in their otherness, which asymmetric 
reciprocity does because it preserves the primacy of question in letting the other 
disclose its otherness to us. The principle requires openness to challenge by 
the otherness and consequent change in self-understanding, which asymmetric 
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 This, of course, raises questions about suspending our experience with sexist, racist, 
destructive, disruptive, etc. groups. One could make an Aristotelian argument, as Gadamer 
does (2013: 330), i.e. that the subject would have enough practical sense to make a judgement 
when to suspend and be open to encounter and when not to. However, encountering something 
that is not just different but radically opposite to us can be illuminating. For instance, in her 
paper titled “Hearing the Other’s Voice” (2013), Cynthia Nielsen highlights how according to 
Gadamer’s “fusion of horizons”, new understandings can surface from encountering the 
interpretations and horizons of those with whom we would have a very deep and, perhaps, 
exclusive, disagreement: “a conversation with a Black Nationalist, who, while respecting King, is 
critical of his method of non-violent active resistance and advocates in certain severe situations 
the use of force for emancipatory purposes, may alert me to shortcomings in King’s approach. I 
may continue, however, to believe in the ethical merits of King's non-violent strategies to effect 
social reform, and yet by genuinely listening to my dialogue partner's perspective, my own 
horizon has been enriched and broadened. What I formerly saw as simply a ‘wrong’ strategy on 
the part of the Black Nationalist is now understood as more intelligible, even if I disagree with 
such an approach in the end. Stated differently, I am now able to see the Black Nationalist’s 




reciprocity does in virtue of the kind of understanding it aims to achieve. Thus, 
asymmetric reciprocity is a mode in which Gadamer’s principle of openness can 
be instantiated in democratic politics. Its significance comes from the way it 
recognizes the value of interpretive conflicts. Because we are asymmetric, we 
need to allow the other to disclose itself through greeting, storytelling, and 
rhetoric. Through these modes of communication, the other not only discloses 
its otherness, but also brings about change in our self-understanding.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter we examined three aspects of Iris Young’s work. First, we 
saw that she questions abstraction, universality, and rationality in discourse 
ethics from premises that are similar to the one’s in Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics. Namely, Young recognizes that discourse ethics cannot pretend 
to transcend the influences of particular histories, cultures, and social positions 
because we always understand the object of discourse and engage with others 
from the perspective of our own circumstances. We saw that in making this 
argument, Young has a similar ontology to Gadamer; that is, she starts with 
recognition of finitude and incomplete understanding. Young expresses these 
ideas through her notion of social groups. Social groups, for Young, 
characterize the plurality in modern societies and they are different from other 
kinds of groups because membership in a social group is based on affinity 
rather than aggregation or association. Affinity, as a term in Young’s thought, is 
related closely to thrownness, because relationship based on affinity can be 
involuntary: the experience of two people can just resonate with one another 
like in the case of handicaps. Second, we saw that through her idea of social 
groups, Young recognizes the significance of interpretive conflicts in democratic 
politics. For her, interpretive conflicts allow social group perspectives to be 
included as a resource for democratic politics. Discourse ethics comes short in 
including perspectives because of its requirements of rationality, universalism, 
and abstraction. Thus, Young offers procedural correctives that allow greeting, 
storytelling, and rhetoric as modes of communication through which the other 
can disclose its otherness. We practice openness to otherness by allowing the 
others to tell their stories and use rhetorical devices in ways that influence and 
change our understanding. Third, we examined Young’s asymmetric reciprocity 
as a mode of instantiation of Gadamer’s principle of openness in democratic 
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politics. Asymmetric reciprocity is a type of moral respect in which we allow 
social groups to present their perspectives through different modes of 
communication, allow them to challenge our prejudices because we recognize 
our own finitude, and allow the otherness of the other change our self-
understanding. Next we turn to Dryzek’s work to examine how he understands 
plurality, discourse ethics, and the manner in which he is willing to 





Plurality as discourses and reflexivity as 
openness 
Introduction 
Besides social groups, plurality of modern societies consists in different 
discourses. Discourses also exert influence on people’s understanding, 
constrain and enable action in a similar manner to social positions. Dryzek 
appropriates Habermas’ discourse ethics because the standards of 
communicative rationality can induce people to reflect on, problematize, and 
change the discourses that in part constitute their understanding of politics and 
others in society. Dryzek accepts Young’s correctives in discourse ethics but 
worries that including particularity through storytelling and greeting can turn 
interpretive conflicts into conflict of identities. In order to avoid this, he offers to 
think of interpretive conflicts in terms of contestation of discourses. Contestation 
among discourses removes the personal element from the conflict and in a way 
sublimates identity conflicts. This kind of contestation, when it follows the 
standards of communicative rationality, is capable of inducing reflexivity. 
Through reflexivity, people can become aware of how their understanding is 
constituted by the precepts of particular discourses and know what kinds of 
further actions are made available to them by their situatedness. This chapter 
establishes Dryzek’s idea of reflexivity as a suitable mode of instantiation of 
Gadamer’s principle of openness in democratic politics. 
In the deliberative camp, Dryzek is known as a “cautious” Habermasian 
(see Scheuerman 2006, 92). He is critical of the merger between deliberative 
democracy and liberal constitutionalism that followed the debate between 
Habermas and Rawls (see Dryzek 2000, 27ff). For him, the merger resulted in 
the narrowing of deliberation in two ways. First, liberal constitutionalism 
narrowed down the criteria for “authentic deliberation”. Deliberative democracy 
adopted a singular form of public reason. This restricted forms of 
communication that can be included in deliberation to rational argumentative 
forms of speech. For Dryzek, this results in exclusion of different groups of 
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people. Thus, it can be established that Dryzek is concerned with preserving the 
presence of plurality in democratic politics. He favours “a more tolerant 
position”, which “would allow argument, rhetoric, humour, emotion, testimony or 
storytelling, and gossip” (Dryzek 2000, 1). As it was established in the previous 
chapter, allowing different forms of communication is conducive to the inclusion 
of plurality and supporting pluralism. The second way deliberative democracy 
has narrowed down has to do with the way liberal constitutionalism has 
imposed itself as a foundational framework for deliberative democracy. In effect, 
the merger put liberal institutions beyond critique and evaluation in the process 
of deliberation (Dryzek 2000, 27-30; see also Scheuerman 2006, 85ff). For 
Dryzek, liberal constitutionalism is just another discourse among others that 
constitute identity and politics, and thus, make one’s understanding situated and 
partial. Therefore, it should also be subject to reflexivity and critique.  
In light of this, Dryzek formulates his own strand of deliberative 
democracy which he styles as “discursive democracy”. It relies on Habermas’ 
critical theory founded on the theory of communication action and discourse 
ethics, and (“loosely”) on Foucault’s conception of discourses as structures that 
harbour power (see Dryzek 1990; 2000). It is also influenced by Young’s and 
Mouffe’s critiques of deliberative democracy (see Dryzek 1996; 2005; 2006; 
2010a; 2010b). Thus, Dryzek formulates a form of ‘discursive democracy’ “in 
which Habermas’ ideas about uncoerced speech and communication typically 
loom in the background” (Scheuerman 2006, 86) but without the strict limits of 
its rationality, and which adopts a critical attitude towards liberal institutions as 
deserving “more in the way of critique than celebration” (Dryzek 2000, 28).  
It is necessary to note that there are two ways Dryzek uses the term 
‘discourse’. First, drawing from Habermas, he uses discourse as unconstrained 
communication that functions as a problem solving mechanism when 
understanding breaks down. Second, Dryzek uses discourse as historically and 
culturally specific linguistic constructions that allow people to interpret the world 
in particular ways. There are political discourses, economic discourses, 
spiritual, and so on. What Dryzek refers to as political and economic discourses, 
we used to understand as ideologies. Neo/liberalism, neo/conservatism, 
neo/realism, socialism, free market capitalism, environmentalism – all are 
particular discourses that constitute politics and identities. Thus, when we say 
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situatedness of understanding, from Dryzek’s perspective, it should be 
conceived as situatedness within particular discourses. 
To maintain clarity in using ‘discourse’ in these two distinct ways, I have 
made a stylistic differentiation in the following manner. Henceforth, I refer to 
Habermas’ conception of discourse as unconstrained communication with 
capitalized ‘Discourse’; and I refer to particular discourses with a lower-cased 
‘discourses’. 
This chapter consists in three sections. The main aim is to establish 
Dryzek’s idea of reflexivity as a suitable mode of instantiation of Gadamer’s 
principle of openness in democratic politics. In order to achieve this aim, it is 
necessary to highlight the hermeneutical aspects of discursive democracy.  
Section 4.1 establishes Dryzek’s characterization of particular discourses 
as the expression of hermeneutical situation in politics. This argument will be 
supported by showing how Dryzek conceives of discourses as capable of 
constructing meaning, exerting particular and partial influence on 
understanding, and constituting politics and identities. For Dryzek, Discourse 
ethics is limited in addressing these features of discourses because of the 
rationality and universalization it requires. His worry is that Discourse ethics 
itself is blind to the way it may reinforce certain discourses over others due to its 
strict standards of rationality. Therefore, he argues that rationality and 
universalization must give way to a more differentiated and particularistic 
deliberation in order to purchase the critical edge against dominant discourses.  
One way to do that is to allow for “discursive representation” in the public 
sphere. Dryzek offers to conceive of the public sphere as a “home to 
constellation of discourses”. In the public sphere, discourses can contest one 
another according to the standards of communicative rationality. In effect, this 
contestation induces reflexivity, which Dryzek conceives as an act of reason 
that helps counter the constitutive influence discourses exert on politics, 
identity, and, we will add, understanding. Dryzek’s idea of reflexivity is 
significant because it reveals the hermeneutical aspect of discursive 
democracy. For Dryzek, reflexive action can only be possible from within a 
given system like the hermeneutical situation. It cannot be autonomous. Thus, 
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this section will conclude with drawing parallels between Gadamer’s 
hermeneutical concepts and Dryzek’s idea of reflexivity.  
Section 4.2 establishes the significance of interpretive conflicts for 
Dryzek. He allows particularity to be expressed in deliberation because partiality 
is a resource for democratic politics. However, Dryzek worries that including 
particularity in deliberation can devolve interpretive conflicts into conflict of 
identities. Therefore, he argues that interpretive conflicts must take place as 
contestation of discourses. Particularity and partiality must be expressed as part 
of a discourse because this way it is not personal. For Dryzek, people are more 
amenable to changing their preferences when their identity is not at stake. 
Contestation between discourses removes the element of identity from 
contestation without ceasing its participation in politics because identities are in 
part constituted by discourses. The significance of interpretive conflicts as 
contestation of discourses has to do with the way it allows discursive 
democracy to include the lateral complexities of any issue and provides the 
picture of the whole system of interconnected elements in the social, economic, 
and political structures.  
Section 4.3 establishes reflexivity as a suitable mode of instantiation of 
Gadamer’s principle of openness. For Dryzek, reflexive action is capable of 
reconstituting particular discourses. Reflexive action can be induced in an 
intersubjective interaction, particularly in the public sphere where discourses 
contest one another. It has its own distinct logic which has to do with “reflexive 
intelligence” and “constitutive reasoning”. Reflexive intelligence is awareness of 
the partiality of one’s understanding, its situatedness, and of the constraining 
and enabling features of the discursive fields, historical moment, and 
circumstances. Constitutive reasoning is an act of reason that guides action 
with intention for constituting a desired world. The section shows how this act of 
reason does not break with the relatedness between hermeneutical situation 
and understanding on the one hand, and the relatedness between peoples on 
the other. It shows how these two aspects have the elements of hermeneutical 




4.1 Discourses as expression of hermeneutical situation and the 
limits of Discourse ethics 
I do not presume to argue Dryzek out of the Habermasian universalist 
camp. Undoubtedly, he belongs there (see Blaug 1996, 74-75). I do, however, 
want to clarify the terms in which he assumes his “membership” in this group 
because he is aware of the limits of universalization. Dryzek rethinks the high 
level of abstraction and universalization in Habermas’ Discourse ethics because 
he wants to take into account the role of concrete contexts of meaning. In doing 
so, Dryzek subscribes to Habermas’ universalism only in terms of the 
assumptions that Habermas makes about the universality of communicative 
ethics in all forms of communication. Similar to Young, who asserts 
communicative ethics as naturally linked to democratic values in virtue of the 
“moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity” that they implicitly harbour (Young 
1997, 41), Dryzek argues that the democratization of civil society and state 
institutions should draw from the inherently democratic features of Habermas’ 
discourse ethics rather than historically and culturally specific democratic 
models (see 1990, 113, 220; 2006, 160-1; 2010a, 114).  
In short, the universalism of Dryzek’s discursive democracy has to do 
with the communicative ethics and standards of  Discourse ethics. However, he 
wants to reorient it to take into account the concrete particularities of different 
contexts of meaning that arise from particular historicity, culture, social and 
political circumstances of concrete groups rather than steer Discourse ethics 
away from them up into abstraction. The terms in which Dryzek characterises 
context, particularity, and situation are, however, different from the way Young 
understands them. Whereas Young recognizes particularities in terms of 
facticity of social position and social groups, Dryzek recognizes particularities in 
terms of different discourse formations. To contrast, if for Young one’s 
particularity is constituted by social position, for Dryzek one’s particularity is 
partly constituted by discourses. Dryzek writes:  
Discourses construct meaning, distinguish agents (with the 
capacity to take effective action) from those who can only be 
acted upon, establish relations between actors and others, 
delimit what counts as legitimate knowledge, and define 
common sense (Milliken, 1999). Discourses are a matter of 
practice as well as words, for actions in the social realm are 
always accompanied by language that establishes the 
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meaning of action. So practices help constitute, reconstitute, 
and sometimes challenge discourses. Even something as 
simple as presenting a passport at immigration control helps 
reinforce the discourse of sovereignty. Discourses can 
embody power in that they condition norms and perceptions of 
actors, suppressing some interests while advancing others. 
Discourses pervade, constitute, and help explain the structure 
of international affairs. The power of discourses arises in their 
ability to structure and coordinate the actions of individuals 
subject wholly or partly to them. This coordination can apply to 
individuals who otherwise have no formal relationship in that 
they never meet face to face, are not part of the same 
organization or same state, and have no direct interaction 
(2006, 3). 
Dryzek emphasises the role of particular contexts of meaning by drawing 
“loosely” from Foucault’s conception of discourse60. This puts his discursive 
democracy at the crossroads between Habermas’ and Foucault’s conceptions 
of discourse. As a result, he retains the Habermasian conception of discourse 
as a problem solving mechanism with awareness that participants deliberate 
from the perspectives of particular discourses like liberalism, conservatism, 
socialism, etc. For Dryzek, particular discourses partly structure identities and 
constitute the world (see Dryzek 1990, 171; 2006, 4). However, it is worth 
noting that Dryzek does not subscribe to Foucault’s pessimism about our ability 
to overcome the constitutive features of discourses. Instead, he argues that the 
universal pragmatic standards of everyday communicative ethics are rational 
means by which participants can change their minds and take some agency in 
reconstituting their identity and the world (2006, 6, 24; 2010a, 32).  
Accordingly, his position between Habermas and Foucault purchases 
Dryzek a critical edge to question whether Discourse ethics itself reinforces  
particular discourses. Furthermore, it supports his argument on discursive 
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 Dryzek does not subscribe to Foucault’s position fully. He turns to him to only 
highlight the constitutive features of particular discourses: “Here it is necessary to think of 
‘discourse’ in (loosely) Foucauldian rather than Habermasian terms: a discourse is a shared set 
of assumptions that enables its adherents to assemble bits of sensory information into coherent 
wholes” (2000, 51). Through Foucault, Dryzek only wishes to highlight the power of discourses 
in constituting a certain reality. But the emphasis he wants to make is on his own concept of 
“reflexive modernization” as a force against that power (Dryzek 2000, 75). For Dryzek, 
openness to contestation between discourses is a means for reflexively countering the 
constitutive power of particular discourses (2000, 75). Dryzek writes: “To Foucault and 
Foucauldians discourses are the prime causal factors in human affairs, including politics. My 
account of the contestation of discourses is quite different, because it allows that there is much 
more to life and politics than discourses. The claim is only that the contestation of discourses in 
the public sphere is the most defensible way to think about discursive democracy on a society-
wide basis” (2000, 79). 
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democracy. If discourses have constitutive influence, then contestation between 
different agents is contestation between discourses. For Dryzek, “contestation 
of discourses in the public sphere is the most defensible way to think about 
discursive democracy on a society-wide basis” (2000, 79). Discursive 
democracy is about contestation of discourses and as such it offers democratic 
practices through which actors can reconstitute themselves and the world. One 
of those practices is reflexivity.  
With regards to the conception of discourse, in Dryzek we are working in 
the tension between two conflicting claims: one claim is that discourses 
structure the world; the other claim is that they are amenable to conscious 
agency. The following paragraphs draw attention to how Dryzek’s sensitivity to 
particularity, partiality, and situated understanding in the first claim makes 
discourses an expression of hermeneutical situation in democratic politics. 
Central to the second claim is the idea of reflexivity, which will be discussed in 
more detail in Section 4.3 
For Dryzek, discourses consist in five elements: ontology, agency, 
motivation, relationships regarded as natural, and rhetoric. These elements 
influence Discourse by framing problems in particular ways, providing 
underlying assumptions such as the ideally rational consumer, or offering a 
framework for justification of certain values, norms and principles (1990, 174; 
2006, 3, 165). The ontological elements of discourses usually have to do with 
recognizing or not recognizing “key entities” such as “God, individuals, social 
classes, or nations” (Dryzek 2006, 165). Agency refers to those entities, who 
are “recognized as having the capacity to act, others treated as only capable of 
being acted upon” (Dryzek 2006, 165). For example, “traditional realist 
discourse in international relations emphasizes states as the key agents, 
ignoring NGOs and transnational corporations”; “Marxists, in contrast, would 
see social classes as the key agents, with the state as the instrument of the 
dominant class” (Dryzek 2006, 165). Motivation is as an element that allows 
discourses to explain how the “agents can be seen as moved by self-interest, 
perhaps in narrow material terms, or by concern for some common good” 
(2006, 165). Discourses tend to have particular specifications about what 
counts as natural and unnatural relationships: “so market liberals regard 
competition as natural. Realists regard violent conflict as part of the natural 
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order. Feminists would stress more empathetic and cooperative relationships. 
Other possibilities include equality, cooperation, and hierarchies based on race, 
gender, wealth, or intelligence” (Dryzek 2006, 165). Finally, rhetoric is an 
element that every discourse employs. Discourses often draw upon “metaphors 
and other rhetorical devices” such as “the idea that states interact like billiard 
balls on the table, the idea that the Earth is like a ‘spaceship’ in its fragile life 
support systems” (Dryzek 2006, 166). (Recall the illustrative example of 
Rudolph Giuliani’s and Obama’s use of the metaphor of TV for healthcare which 
shows their embeddedness in market liberal discourse.) Rhetoric is an 
important part of every discourse, especially when we consider understanding 
“public opinion in terms of the outcome of contestation within the public sphere” 
(Dryzek 2000, 50). Rhetorical devices not only disclose the particularity of 
underlying discourses but also serve an important function in forming and 
rallying public opinion and transmitting it to the state (Dryzek 2000, 50). 
Thus, the particularity of every discourse is expressed by these five 
elements. These elements as well as Dryzek’s emphasis on their constitutive 
influences point at the interpretive dimension, which will be discussed in Section 
4.2. For if discourses contest over such things as justice, then each will differ in 
ways the general principle translates according to the five elements. To be more 
concrete, if we return to the same metaphor on healthcare, we can understand 
the way in which the issue is taken into the discourse of market economy via 
the analogy of healthcare with TV. The analogy frames, draws equivalences, 
and ultimately interprets the issue according to the discourse of market 
economy. Other discourses with different ontologies, agency, relationships, 
motivations, and rhetorical devices can do the same. They can contest their 
interpretations, creating interpretive conflicts as a result of this plurality. 
Suppose that the constraints of the market economy discourse can be 
challenged in deliberation by the more traditional liberal democratic discourse. 
Suppose that by denying the TV metaphor, a liberal hijacks healthcare into a 
discourse within which it can be rendered as imperative to individual liberties 
and freedoms. Often, problems with health can be a permanent impediment to 
fulfilling and exercising one’s freedom and liberty to pursue one’s happiness. 
According to the rationality of the liberal discourse, not market economy, the 
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(US) government has a constitutional obligation to provide and secure universal 
healthcare in order to protect individual rights and liberties.  
Thus, similar to the hermeneutical situation, discourses let agents 
interpret the world in particular ways. One’s understanding, as is with 
healthcare, is situated within a discourse. Thus, interpretive conflicts emerge as 
contestation between discourses for Dryzek. General principles can also be 
subject to interpretation by discourses and so Dryzek is consonant with the 
hermeneutical critique of Discourse ethics on interpretive conflicts. For Dryzek,  
A discourse may be defined in somewhat un-Habermasian 
terms as a shared way of comprehending the world 
embedded in language. In this sense, a discourse is a set of 
concepts, categories, and ideas that will always feature 
particular assumptions, judgements, contentions, dispositions, 
intentions, and capabilities. These common terms mean that 
adherents who subscribe in whole or in part to a given 
discourse will be able to recognize and process sensory 
inputs into coherent stories or accounts, which in turn can be 
shared in intersubjectively meaningful fashion. Accordingly, 
any discourse will have at its center a story line, which may 
involve opinions about both facts and values. Discourses 
involve practices, not just words, as social actions are 
generally accompanied by words that indicate the meaning in 
action. […] 
Any discourse embodies some conception of common sense 
and acceptable knowledge it may embody power by 
recognizing some interests as valid, while repressing others. 
However, discourses are not just a surface manifestations of 
interests, because discourses help constitute identities and 
their associated interests. The relevant array of discourses 
depends upon the issue at hand (though some discourses can 
apply to a range of different issues), and can evolve with time. 
For example, when it comes to economic issues, relevant 
discourses might include market liberalism, antiglobalization, 
social democracy, and sustainable development. When it 
comes to international security, pervasive discourses might 
include realism, counterterrorism, Islamic radicalism, and neo-
conservatism (2010, 32). 
There are a number of relevant aspects here. First, similar to Gadamer’s 
hermeneutical situation and Young’s idea of social group perspective, Dryzek 
recognizes that the particular precepts of every discourse inform and are taken 
up in one’s political communication. In other words, one interprets and 
appropriates general principles and norms from within the discourse(s) one is 
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part of. Second, it provides a sense of how plurality of discourses may lead to 
interpretive challenges regardless of the consensus on general principles. 
Before moving the discussion to interpretive conflicts in the next section, it is 
necessary to consider how, according to Dryzek, Discourse ethics is limited in 
recognizing the significance of constitutive influence of discourses and the 
constraints they impose on Discourse itself.  
According to Dryzek, every paradigm, be it normative or empirical is 
essentially rooted in some particular discourse(s). Discourses constitute, 
maintain, and reconstitute paradigms that serve as justificatory and legitimizing 
frameworks for forms of politics, political practices, institutions, and forms of 
relationships. Take, for instance, the liberal paradigm of democratic theory. The 
constitution of the liberal paradigm is a function of its organization around the 
idea of individual liberty. Thus, the liberal paradigm rests on a particular 
discourse that serves, as Dryzek would put it, as a “shared set of capabilities 
that enable the assemblage of words, phrases, and sentences into meaningful 
‘texts’ intelligible to readers and listeners” (Dryzek 1990, 159). Thus, due to 
precisely these functions, discourses link paradigms and political practices into 
coherent and meaningful wholes with their own rationality. The specifically 
Western liberal discourse constitutes a liberal paradigm in which such divisions 
between private and public property, individual rights, freedoms, and interests 
give rise to the elaborate Western liberal multiparty democracies with 
institutional checks and balances.  
It is demonstrable that discourses specific to culture, context, and history 
can produce paradigms with other specificities. A convincing example to 
illustrate this point can be gained from the discourse that embodies the African 
paradigm of one-party democracy described the political theories of Leopold 
Senghor and Julius Nyerere (Nursey-Bray 1983, 96-111). In contrast with the 
liberal paradigm, the “traditional African” (Nursey-Bray 1983, 99) paradigm of 
one-party democracy is a function of its organization around the ideas of 
community and communal consensus. The discourse within which this 
paradigm rests simply does not allow the combination of words “individual 
liberty” to form the same kind of coherency as it does in the West. In Gadamer’s 
terms, the people for whom it will not make sense simply do not have the 
‘prejudices’ to understand and apply them in the way they are normally 
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understood in the Western liberal democracies. Whereas the West has 
‘prejudices’ that allow the phrase ‘individual liberty’ to have a positive meaning, 
the traditional African ‘prejudices’ give the phrase a negative meaning as a 
highly unwelcome way of life. Looking at this example through Gadamer’s 
terminology illustrates that Dryzek’s recognition of the way discourses constitute 
one’s understanding of politics is consonant with Gadamer’s recognition of the 
role ready-to-hand ‘prejudices’ play in understanding. 
In this example, we see that particular discourses can play constitutive 
and sometimes oppressive roles in Discourse ethics. They can constrict 
Discourse ethics within a single paradigm. This way of understanding the role of 
particular discourses is consonant with the main thrust of criticism that Warnke 
and Young express about Discourse ethics. Dryzek also recognizes that 
Discourse ethics defines a very narrow scope for deliberation in virtue of its 
embeddedness in the rationalism of Enlightenment (see Dryzek 1990).  
Now, Dryzek’s appropriation of Discourse ethics as a framework for 
contestation of discourses in the public sphere will be examined. Particularly, 
Dryzek appropriates of the idea of “authentic reflection” as a means to counter 
the constitutive tendencies of particular discourses that otherwise Discourse 
ethics might reinforce.  
It is necessary to recall the two claims Dryzek makes about the 
conception of discourse. He claims that particular discourses constitute and 
reconstitute identities, politics and political practices. They might even play into 
the argumentative-rational standards of Discourse ethics and constrain 
deliberation within one particular paradigm. Particular discourses can be 
constitutive this way and the rationality of Discourse ethics might end up 
reinforcing their dominance. His other claim draws from Discourse ethics to 
show how agents can counter the constitutive influence of discourses through 
reflecting intersubjectively on inclusive and equal. The form of that this 
intersubjective reflection takes is contestation of discourses. This approach, 
according to Dryzek, is called discursive democracy. In his words, it 
rests on a tension between two related phenomena: first, the 
importance of discourses in ordering the world (and its 
conflicts); second, the potential for the structure of discourses 
to itself become the target of popular reflection and conscious 
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action. The tension here arises because if discourse were in 
reality manipulable by human agents they would lack any 
independent ordering force of their own. But they are not 
manipulable at will. Human action takes place within the 
context that discourses provide: discourses themselves both 
enable and constrain actions (2006, 24). 
Agents can counter the constitutive influence of discourses through 
Discourse ethics. That is, reflection on one’s constitudedness can only occur in 
an intersubjective communication with other people61. One can rarely become 
fully aware of one’s own prejudices without being exposed to people who have 
a different view of things. This kind of communicative engagement, for Dryzek, 
must be according to the rationality of Habermas’ communicative action (1990, 
29).  
The public sphere, distinct from the state institutions, is the proper venue 
for such deliberation. There are several reasons Dryzek gives for this. First, the 
public sphere is not directly part of the state institutions where communication 
takes an instrumental character. Rather, it is home for Habermas’ ideal speech 
situation (see Dryzek 1990, 38; 1987). Participants of deliberation in the public 
sphere can be much more amenable to changing their minds about their 
opinions, interests, and preferences (see Dryzek 1996). Often, in deliberation in 
a state institution like the parliament, the stakes are very high. Deliberation in 
such venues is much more consequential. It must come to judgement 
eventually and a decision must be made. Deliberators resist changing their 
minds almost deliberately in these kinds of institutionalized settings. By 
contrast, when deliberation occurs outside the state institutions, deliberators 
tend to be much more reflective and open to others’ points of view. They are 
much more likely to change their mind about something outside formal and 
official deliberative institutions such as the parliament. Therefore, the perfect 
place for deliberators to contest particular discourses is the public sphere 
because it sets the conditions most conducive for Habermas’ ideal speech 
situation. Second, the state institutions cannot accommodate a plurality of 
discourses. Rather, they tend to enforce and institutionalize the ideals and 
values of one discourse like liberal constitutionalism. Therefore, the public 
sphere is the proper home for discursive representation of many discourses. 
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 Notice that here too the role of encountering the other as described by Gadamer 
comes back into picture. 
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For Dryzek, the public sphere can be home to what he calls “constellation” of 
contested discourses (1990, 38). With these two features, the public sphere is 
not subject to the state. Rather, it serves as a medium between the individual 
and the state (Dryzek 1990, 40; 1987) and be home to what Dryzek calls 
authentic reflection.  
Authentic reflection can be affirmed in a deliberation that is inclusive and 
non-coercive; a deliberation that links particular experiences to a general point 
or norm (see Dryzek 2000, 68), and one that is “capable of inducing reflection” 
(Dryzek 2006, 52), and is consequential in the sense that deliberation should 
actually result is a judgement with an outcome (Dryzek 2010, 11). Dryzek offers 
these criteria as tests for determining the legitimacy of deliberation and for 
including other forms of communication such as greeting, rhetoric, and 
narratives (see Dryzek 2000, chapter 3). With these specifications, Dryzek 
pushes towards a means that can counter the constitutive features of 
discourses and specifies terms under which he accepts Young’s communicative 
plurality specified in the previous chapter. If any of the rhetorical devices or 
narratives fail these criteria, they are not included in the deliberation of Dryzek’s 
discursive democracy.  
There is no disagreement between Young and Dryzek on these criteria. 
Synonymous with Dryzek’s criteria, Young also proposes that forms of 
communication not fail the criteria of “inclusion, political equality, 
reasonableness, and publicity” (see Young 2000, 17). Therefore, I will proceed 
on to the role of authentic reflection in countering the influence of discourses 
without going into technical differences in the general consensus between 
Dryzek and Young on the significance of communicative plurality for a more 
inclusive democratic politics.  The fact of the matter is both Young and Dryzek 
are admissive of forms of communication other than the neutral and 
dispassionate rational argument so long as they pass their mutually consistent 
criteria.  
For Dryzek, like for any deliberative democrat, reflection is endogenous 
to deliberation. So, one may rightly ask: if reflection is endogenous to 
deliberation, then why is it necessary to thematise Dryzek’s take on it? Wouldn’t 
it be in all forms of deliberation regardless of Dryzek’s mediation? What is 
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gained from Dryzek is the significance of reflection with regards to situated 
understanding that comes from particular discourses and, by implication, its 
significance to interpretive conflicts in the form of contestation of discourses. 
For the idea of pluralism this thesis is promoting, Dryzek highlights the 
significance of reflection for different agents in their role as representatives of 
different discourses when engagement and encounter is between discourses. 
Being reflective, though natural to many, is something that needs to be 
specifically induced if engagement and encounter among people that interpret 
things differently is to be pursued. Therefore, Dryzek gives the significance of 
reflection as a “conscious action” (Dryzek 2006, 24) to reconstitute the 
constitution by particular discourses. Dryzek calls it “reflexivity”. “Reflexivity is 
by definition sensitivity to the degree to which actions themselves help create 
the contexts for action – that is, they are constitutive of the actor’s social 
situation”; and “to the extent that this situation is defined by the relative weight 
of competing (or complementary) discourses, action should be sensitive to how 
it reinforces, undermines, or reconstructs a particular discursive field” (Dryzek 
2006, 85). The intersubjective process in which situated understanding can be 
addressed is “reflexive modernization”. It is “a process whereby individuals 
become aware of the traditions, rules, and understandings that govern their 
lives – and see them as potentially open to change” (Dryzek 2006, 117). This 
resonates with Gadamer’s ‘historically effected consciousness’. However, in 
drawing this parallel between Gadamer and Dryzek, it is necessary to work out 
their differences.  
While for Gadamer reflection naturally occurs and proceeds from within a 
tradition, for Dryzek this leads to political problems. Dryzek would call 
Gadamer’s approach “reflexive traditionalization” in contrast to “reflexive 
modernization”. Reflexive traditionalization can entrench individuals and groups 
deeper and more fundamentally into their worldviews (see Dryzek 2006, 119). 
Dryzek’s example to illustrate his argument is the reflexive reaction induced by 
globalization and modernity that “leads individuals to seek shelter in 
fundamentalist religion, ethnic identity, or nationalism” (2006, 119).  Dryzek is 
concerned with the threats that such “reflexive traditionalization” poses for 
transnational democracy (see 2006, 119). His concern must be taken seriously. 
I claim that Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics does not lead to reflexive 
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traditionalization. Let us look at the following argument Dryzek makes to which 
philosophical hermeneutics cannot object: 
Reflexive action is engaged from within a system, not from the 
outside. That system inevitably imposes constraints on action 
as well as providing opportunities for action. Indeed, it is the 
presence of these constraints which makes action “reflexive” 
as opposed to “autonomous,” for “autonomy” implies the 
absence of constraints. In discourse terms, the structure of 
what Bourdieu (1993) calls “discursive field” helps constitute 
who actors are and what they can do – though this field is also 
amenable to reconstruction through their actions (Dryzek 
2006, 119-120). 
Given Gadamer’s account of the hermeneutical situation, consciousness, 
and experience discussed in chapter 2, and given his argument defending 
hermeneutical reflection in the debate with Habermas, it is reasonable to claim 
that here Dryzek is consonant with philosophical hermeneutics. For Gadamer, 
reflection is always from within a hermeneutical situation. Reflection comes from 
within tradition, and traditions are part of one’s hermeneutical situation. For 
Gadamer, reflection is constrained within the hermeneutical situation in a similar 
manner “reflexive action is engaged from within a system”. However, for 
Gadamer, the constraint has a positive function because the hermeneutical 
situation gives reflection its epistemic substance. By taking this position, 
Gadamer does not come to the conclusion that Habermas and Dryzek conclude 
about him62.  
Hermeneutics does not end up reinstating the same tradition and giving 
way to “reflexive traditionalization”. Reflexive traditionalization is precisely the 
kind of an outcome that would not be the result of a hermeneutical reflection 
because hermeneutical reflection is about openness to the new and the other in 
virtue of one’s awareness of the finitude of one’s reflection; a finitude within 
one’s hermeneutical situation. This finitude can only be overcome if one 
recognizes one’s debt to tradition and opens up to the others in a genuine 
dialogue. “Reflexive traditionalization” would be a result of one closing off 
his/her horizon, making himself/herself unavailable in a dialogue with others, 
                                            
62
 In Discursive Democracy (1990) Dryzek accepts the hermeneutical argument that 
“communicative rational discourse can involve the reconstruction, rejection, synthesis, or even 
creation of traditions, not just their extension” (18-19). But then he states “here I part company 
from … Gadamer … who does not recognize the possibility of rationality that transcends 
particular traditions” (Dryzek 1990, 19).  
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and perceiving one’s own finitude/hermeneutical situation as the ultimate 
position that gives the final answer and truth. Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics is consistent with Dryzek’s call for “reflexive modernization”, 
which, just like Gadamer’s “historically effected consciousness”, is “a process 
whereby individuals become aware of the traditions, rules, and understandings 
that govern their lives – and see them as potentially open to change” (Dryzek 
2006, 117). I will discuss Dryzek’s harmony with philosophical hermeneutics 
more substantially in Section 4.3. To conclude this section, it is necessary to 
focus back on Dryzek’s appropriation of Discourse ethics. 
Discourse ethics does not make the distinction that Dryzek draws 
between “reflection” and “autonomy”. For Habermas, reflection and autonomy 
are linked in the principle of impartiality. The requirement for impartiality in 
Discourse ethics presupposes the possibility of autonomous reflection, i.e. 
reflection that is not bound within one’s situation in tradition, discourse, history, 
culture, etc.  If the significance of interpretive conflicts in the form of 
contestation of discourses is to be taken seriously, then it is necessary to 
distinguish between autonomy, impartiality, and authentic reflection.  
In Discourse ethics, the assumption is that the deliberator’s ability to 
redeem validity is outside the context of meaning. The ability to reflect 
presupposes a kind of rationality that is autonomous from any system, 
discourse, or tradition. It is autonomous because this reflective ability is part of 
the apriori discourse ethics which we possess in virtue of our species-wide 
capacity to coordinate action via communication. Our ability to reflect and 
redeem validity claim does not come with some discourse, tradition, or system. 
However, reflection itself occurs from within discourses, traditions, or system. 
We cannot presume that apriori ability to reflect leads by default to reflection 
that is not bound within a certain discourse or tradition.  
Authentic reflection is not the Habermasian kind of autonomous reflection 
outside tradition. In Dryzek’s formulation, it does not seem to be the 
transhistoric and transcultural action that delivers one to an impartial point of 
view. Rather, authentic reflection is something that brings one to become aware 
that his/her way of understanding the world is bound within a discourse or 
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tradition. Reflection means situating oneself within the social world, the world of 
lived experience. 
I claim that awareness about one’s situatedness, in the sense of 
hermeneutical consciousness, is what constitutes Dryzek’s “authentic 
reflection”. Such an authentic reflection can only be induced in an 
intersubjective interaction. Deliberation in plural societies can be authentic when 
it cannot be reduced to an internal cognitive reflection of one person (e.g.: 
original position, categorical imperative). It must be intersubjective for it to 
induce authentic reflection because only in dialogue with others can one be 
aware of the constitutive influence discourse has had on one’s understanding.  
Another aspect of Dryzek’s appropriation of Discourse ethics in his 
approach to the problem of plurality lays the foundation for understanding the 
significance of interpretive conflicts in discursive democracy. Dryzek focuses on 
the pragmatic problem of scale of inclusion in deliberation. His solution is similar 
to Young’s idea of “group representation”, in which Young posits that it is 
necessary to represent group interests, opinions, and perspectives for a more 
inclusive deliberation. For Dryzek, the pragmatic problem of inclusion can be 
resolved through “discursive representation” (2010, 42). Since Dryzek 
establishes that there is a plurality of discourses, and discourses partially 
constitute identities, it is sufficient to represent discourses in the public sphere. 
Discourses contest with one another in deliberation and then relate the outcome 
to the state institutions. 
For Dryzek, “discursive representation” is capable of reflecting the 
general public opinion. It is also capable of representing the differentiated 
collective because one one’s opinion can be partially constituted by several 
discourses. The differentiated picture of the collective is represented by the 
constellation of different discourses. Given that there is a constitutive 
relationship between identity and discourses, it can be established that 
“discursive representation” is equal to representation of actual people. Even if a 
person’s opinion is divided between, for instance, the concern for economic 
growth and environmental protection, both sides of this person are represented 




4.2 Contestation of discourses as interpretive conflicts  
I will now look at how Dryzek’s discursive democracy recognizes the 
significance of interpretive conflicts in democratic politics. Previously, it was 
established that Dryzek is sensitive to the idea that people approach general 
norms and principles with situated understanding. Therefore, he must accept 
that interpretive conflicts are inevitable.  
Yet, Dryzek is wary of situated understanding and interpretive conflicts. 
For him, they can manifest as deep division and moral disagreement in plural 
societies (see Dryzek 2013). His reservations about interpretive conflicts are 
also evident in his response to difference democrats (Young) and agonistic 
democrats (Mouffe) (Dryzek 2000, chapter 3). Against them, he questions the 
priority of particularity and situated understanding over general principles. If 
particularity is prioritized, then interpretive conflicts risk manifesting as conflict 
between identities (Dryzek 2000, 74f). Focusing on particularity and situated 
understanding forces deliberation to mediate division and disagreement 
between groups of people. Such a deliberation can lead to further entrenchment 
of people within their own particular interpretations. Accordingly, this deepens 
division and stymies deliberation.  
In order to avoid interpretive conflicts taking the form of identity conflicts, 
Dryzek posits to conceive interpretive conflicts as “contest of discourses” (2000, 
74). This argument builds on his characterisation of plurality in terms of 
discourses, as we have seen in the previous section. Let us take a closer look 
at how contest of discourses can take place. 
For contestation to take place, discourses must be present in their 
partiality and particularity. In the previous section, we have seen that Dryzek 
recognizes that the strict rationality of discourse ethics is exclusionary. 
Therefore, he too supports including such forms of communication as greeting, 
narrative, and rhetoric. They are conducive to including particularities of 
discourses. For instance, for Dryzek, the environment and animals cannot 
represent themselves in democratic politics (see Dryzek 2006, 16ff). Discourses 
of environmentalism rely on such metaphorical devices as Earth as a Spaceship 
to convey the significance of their message (Dryzek 2006, 166 n1). So, Dryzek 
admits plurality of communications in the contest of discourses. They can bring 
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into deliberation partial and particular perspectives that can influence 
deliberation.  
However, Dryzek admits partiality and particularity with reservations. For 
him, the implication of Gadamerian approach to deliberation such as Warnke’s, 
or Young’s attention to partiality and situated understanding, risks the 
“everything goes” attitude that can blow out of proportion the contestation 
between different interpretations. Once more, the problem with partial and 
situated understanding for Dryzek is that it ends up in deeper division, 
entrenchment, and identity conflicts. 
To avoid this problem, Dryzek argues that partial and situated claims 
must connect to the relevant general principle (2000, 68). For example, the 
narratives and rhetoric of pro-choice and pro-life discourses on abortion enter 
into deeper disagreement if they keep articulating their positions in terms of 
their own particular circumstances. Rather, it helps their engagement and 
encounter if they appeal to some general principle. For him, appealing to a 
general principle is what makes one’s concerns, position, and interest political 
(Dryzek 2000, 69).  
However, in making this argument, Dryzek ignores the interpretive 
conflict that arises when one connects one’s partial and particular claim to the 
general principle. Soon after stating the importance of the general principle in 
keeping interpretive conflicts from becoming identity conflicts, he explains that 
the particular claim can be connected to the general principle in the following 
manner: “the story must be capable of resonating with individuals who do not 
share that situation – but do share other characteristics (if only a common 
humanity) … thus truly effective story about a particular repression will also 
involve implicit appeal to more universal standards” (Dryzek 2000, 69). There is 
no further specification of how the general principle might be arrived at by the 
contesting parties63. Suppose that we require that a pro-choice advocate links 
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 One way to understand how one can appeal to general principle is through Dryzek’s 
use of “resonate”. Young uses a similar word to show how a subjective story can become 
political. However, in Young “resonance” is more of a term than a general word because in her 
work it has a much more precise and measurable meaning. For Young (see 2000, 68-69; 1990, 
182) particular experiences, become political only when they resonate with others. That is, 
expressing one’s particular experience need not to make some truth claim about or connect to a 
general principle in order to become political. Rather, it must strike a chord with others much in 
the same way we find that quote from Dryzek. When one’s experience resonates with others, it 
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her particular story and circumstances to some general principle? Which one 
should she appeal to that the contesting party will accept? Is not abortion such 
a contested issue because there are multiple general principles to which each 
group appeals? If pro-choice groups connect their narratives to women’s rights 
and individual liberty and pro-lifers to right to life, which general principle has 
priority? Usually, the substance of interpretive conflicts consists in determining 
which general principle is applicable in the concrete situation.  
Dryzek assumes that there are already pre-given general principles that 
we have all agreed on prior to our deliberation. His example (2000, 69) 
illustrates the point well but it does not help resolve the problem of interpretive 
conflicts in plural societies. Dryzek shows the significance of appealing to 
general principles in examples such as retelling one’s story of suffering war 
crimes. If the side that suffered keeps telling the story about their suffering 
without appeal to such general principles as crimes against humanity, then this 
form of communication can deepen and promote mutual hatred between the 
conflicting sides.  
War crimes are clear in most cases. It is just a matter of the guilty side 
admitting their fault. They do not dispute the general principle itself.  However, 
interpretive conflicts in plural societies are not so clear cut. How does appealing 
to general principles of freedom of speech, religious freedom, rights to life, 
freedom of choice, individual liberties solve the problems of modern plural 
societies on such issues as abortion, marriage equality, gay rights, practice of 
certain religious rites if groups are going to contest (interpretive) 
appropriateness of the general principle for their concrete situation? That is the 
interpretive problem that worries Warnke. Therefore, it is not clear how 
appealing to a general principle mitigates interpretive conflict if the conflict is 
precisely about the interpretive appropriateness of the general principles. It is 
true that there are general principles that almost everyone agrees on: equality, 
                                                                                                                                
becomes public, and therefore political. It is not so much the appeal to general principle, but the 
resonance of experience itself that makes it political. Thus, it makes more sense to admit forms 
of communication based on their resonance with others. For Dryzek, resonance presupposes a 
general principle, i.e. somebody’s experience might resonate with me in virtue of my upholding 
of certain values and principles. For a detailed discussion of Young’s “resonance” see Michaele 
Ferguson’s “Resonance and Dissonance: The role of Personal Experience in Iris Marion 
Young’s Feminist Phenomenology” in Ann Ferguson and Mechthild Nagel (eds.) Dancing with 




freedom, rule of law. It is not true that plural societies will agree on the 
interpretive relevancy of a general principle to a particular situation. Neither will 
they agree on order-ranking of values, norms, and principles. Abraham Lincoln 
had to engage in interpretive conflicts about the general principles of equality 
and freedom during the Civil War. Appeals to general principles do not resolve 
the problem of interpretive conflicts because the appropriateness of general 
principles themselves is questioned in interpretive conflicts. 
Despite his reservations, Dryzek preserves the role of interpretive 
conflicts in democratic politics. Based on his defence of discursive democracy 
against Popper’s rationalism (see Dryek 1987: 656-679; 1990: 57-77), it is 
possible to establish the significance of interpretive conflicts as contestation of 
discourses for him. He argues that that it is necessary to approach the issues 
and problems in the social and political sphere in a more wholesome way. This, 
according to him, is not possible in the instrumental and objectivist approach of 
Popper’s rationalism. Popper’s rationalism is effective in offering piecemeal 
solutions to issues. However, it ignores how one issue can affect other 
elements in the social structure. The advantage of discursive democracy is that 
it includes lateral complexities of an issue and considers the whole system of 
interconnected elements. That is made possible in discursive democracy by two 
things: communicative rationality and discursive representation. The 
constellation of discourses in the public sphere allows each discourse to contest 
substantive matters from its perspective. An environmental discourse brings 
crucial understanding about economic growth, stability, and security from its 
own partiality. Feminist discourse brings crucial understanding of social justice 
from its partiality. The presence of plurality of discourses in the public sphere 
ensures that deliberation includes many perspectives and proceeds on the 
basis of a more differentiated picture of the collective. 
Thus, Dryzek’s idea of “contest of discourses” preserves interpretive 
conflicts in democratic politics while mitigating them from devolving into identity 
conflicts. For Dryzek, the expression of particular experience from a partial point 
of view can find an easier way to connect to some general principle if it is 
expressed as part of a particular discourse. For example, the particular 
experiences of injustice of women must be expressed through an appropriate 
discourse to make their experience public, and therefore political. The 
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appropriate discourse for such expression would be feminism. Therefore, in 
discursive democracy partiality, particularity, and situated understanding of 
different groups of people must partake in democratic politics through particular 
discourses. 
The public sphere can be inclusive of many perspectives because, as we 
established earlier, for Dryzek it is a home to a constellation of discourses. This 
is where interpretive conflicts play out as “contest of discourses”. Such a form of 
engagement does not result in entrenchment and isolation because it “highlights 
contestation across discourses rather than engagement across identities” 
(Dryzek 2000, 75). Here, he is not cutting identity out of the problem because 
identity and discourses are mutually constitutive. Identity is represented without 
having to clash as such. 
Comparison and contestation between discourses is less of a threat to 
one’s identity. It is not personal. For Dryzek (2000, chapter 7), the significance 
of conceiving of interpretive conflicts as contestation of discourses has to do 
with reflexivity and openness. If identities clash in deliberation, then people tend 
not to be reflexive and refuse to be open to others. In such clashes, their 
identity is at stake and so they might be prone to taking categorical positions on 
their own values, culture, particular experiences, partial and situated 
understanding. 
On the other hand, if democratic politics works out interpretive conflicts in 
terms of contestation of discourses, then it is, in some sense, a sublimation of 
clash of identities. For Dryzek, people are more prone to openness when their 
differences are engaged and encountered as particular discourses (see 2000, 
chapter 7). Even if discourses constitute identities, people are not prisoners to 
them. Contestation of discourses induces reflection and helps overcome the 
influence of discourses on identity. For Dryzek, “the essence of engagement 
and challenge across discourses is that individuals can be brought to reflect 
upon the content of discourses in which they move” (2000, 163). Further, 
reflection enables democratic control of discourses because it gives people 
agency over the constitutive forces of discourses (Dryzek 2000, 163). 
Contestation of discourses also promotes openness because the reflexivity it 
induces does not result in a static outcome. Rather, “it is the (provisional) 
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outcome of this contest that determines the meaning of ‘public opinion’ at any 
given time” (Dryzek 2000, 163). 
Thus, the significance of interpretive conflicts between discourses is in 
the reflexivity and openness it promotes. Furthermore, its significance is in the 
epistemic advantages it offers by bringing many perspectives into deliberation. 
Based the premise that Dryzek characterizes plurality in terms of discourses, 
the premise that discourses are the expression of hermeneutical situation, and 
the premise that his idea of “contestation of discourses” recognizes the 
significance of interpretive conflicts that emerge in the engagement and 
encounter between different discourses in the public sphere, I will now establish 
how Dryzek’s idea of “reflexivity” can be considered as instantiation of 
Gadamer’s principle of openness in democratic politics. 
4.3 Reflexivity as instantiation of openness in democratic politics 
For Dryzek, reflexivity suits the world where discourses exert partial and 
particular influences on politics and identity. In other words, reflexivity is suitable 
for beings with situated understanding within particular discourses. Dryzek 
draws his idea of reflexivity from Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition, 
and Aesthetics (Beck et al 1994). In appropriating this idea, he distinguishes 
himself from Habermas’ version of deliberative democracy. Since Dryzek 
focuses on the role of discourses in politics, “reflexivity” suits his version of 
deliberative democracy styled as discursive democracy64.  
Dryzek posits the normative function of reflexivity as “sensitivity to the 
extent to which key entities and actors, their interests and goals, the shared 
norms that constrain them, the relationships that either suppress or empower 
them, are themselves continually constituted and reconstituted” (Dryzek 2006, 
85). Reflexivity is required because “all actors, be they states, international 
bodies, corporations, activists, ordinary people, or non-governmental 
organizations, are constrained by the discursive field in which they operate, that 
helps condition who they are and what they think” (Dryzek 2006, 122). This 
section will establish how the idea of reflexivity is consonant with the argument 
                                            
64
 Dryzek’s reflexivity can be found in two works. First, a paper titled “Reflexive action in 
International Politics” (2000) co-written with Jeffrey Berejikian and second, his book titled 
Deliberative Global Politics (2006). I focus on the latter because it reproduces his argument in 
the original paper in part and develops on it more fully in terms of his goals to outline 
translational discursive democracy.  
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on human finitude in Chapter II. Based on that premise, it will be argued that 
reflexivity is a suitable instantiation of the principle of openness in democratic 
politics.  
It is necessary to distinguish between my purposes in adapting the idea 
of reflexivity and Dryzek’s. It will bring the role of reflexivity in democratic politics 
to sharper view. I aim to include reflexivity as part of a democratic politics that 
affirms pluralism as engagement and encounter. Dryzek is concerned with 
including reflexivity as part of transnationally applicable discursive democracy 
(Dryzek 2006). His focus is global. My focus is more local; it concerns pluralism 
in well-defined societies. For Dryzek, the normative idea of reflexivity enables 
actors to engage and encounter one another discursively across nationalities, 
which may include differences in culture, values, histories, and world-views. The 
success of “discursive democracy” depends on the extent that reflexivity is 
upheld by actors and the fact that the world is actually constituted by 
“discourses amenable to reflective engagement” (Dryzek 2006, 91). It is hard to 
imagine discursive engagement with radical and fundamentalist discourses that 
claim the ultimate truth.  
We both use “reflexivity” in relation to the same question. Namely, what 
kind of practices and what manner of their execution can promote engagement 
and encounter between people that have little in common. Dryzek’s argument 
that reflexivity makes his discursive democracy applicable across different 
nations indicates the applicability of reflexivity in the case with pluralism and 
democratic politics. Though the goal in transnational politics might be different 
from pluralism, “reflexivity” serves an identical purpose in each. In the former, 
the aims of engagement are usually instrumental and strategic, whereas the 
aim in pluralism is understanding across differences. These are two qualitatively 
different aims. However, the idea of “reflexivity” fulfils the same normative 
function in both. In transnational politics the normative role of “reflexivity” is to 
allow for understanding across differences. Achievement of instrumental goals 
is subject to this condition.  
The reason “reflexivity” fulfils the same normative function is because 
reflexive action has its own distinctive logic compared to other types of action. 
Drawing on Thomas Risse (2000), Dryzek identifies three types of logics that 
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constitute three types of actions in politics: “the logic of strategy associated with 
rational choice theory, the logic of appropriateness characterizing 
constructivism, and a logic of arguing based on Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action” (Dryzek 2006, 170 n4). “Reflexive action represents a 
fourth type, so we can speak of ‘logic of reflexivity’” (Dryzek 2006, 170 n4).  
Though, Dryzek does not explicitly develop the “logic of reflexivity”, it can 
be interpreted as consisting in two aspects: reflexive intelligence and 
constitutive reasoning. Reflexive intelligence has to do with actors’ “critical 
awareness” of the “consequences of their actions” as well as the constitutive 
influence of “circumstances” on their understanding (Dryzek 2006, 112). 
“Circumstances” can be understood as consisting in the elements of discourses 
that were established in Section 4.1. Constitutive reasoning requires the actor to 
ask: “does action X help constitute the world I find attractive” (Dryzek 2006, 
113). It is a qualitatively different question compared to strategic and 
instrumental questions. To further illustrate that reflexivity makes understanding 
superior to instrumental goals, Dryzek argues “constitutive concerns should 
often override instrumental ones” (2006, 113). Thus, whether it is an element of 
transnational politics or democratic politics in pluralist societies, “reflexivity” is 
more conducive to understanding for its own sake rather that achieving some 
instrumental aims. 
However, the “logic of reflexivity” does not allow constitution of just any 
kind of world. By definition, reflexivity limits and constrains acts of constitution 
and re-constitution because actors “are themselves situated within a discursive 
field that constrains who they are and what they do” (Dryzek 2006, 85). This is 
where the hermeneutical aspects of Dryzek’s work become visible. Reflexivity is 
constrained within a discursive field in a similar manner hermeneutical situation 
constrains understanding. Hence, the distinction between reflexive action and 
autonomous action that was established in Section 4.1. For Dryzek, reflexive 
action takes place within a system that “inevitably imposes constraints on action 
as well as providing opportunities for action”, whereas autonomous action 
presupposes “the absence of constraints” (Dryzek 2006, 120). Reflexive action 
is preferable to autonomous action in a world where discourses constitute 
politics and identity because “reflexivity never forgets that structures and 
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discourses are constraining as well as enabling, and cannot be transcended” 
(Dryzek 2006, 85). 
Thus, the two aspects of Dryzek’s idea of “reflexivity” make it consonant 
with Gadamer’s principle of openness. First one has to do with “reflective 
intelligence”. It means that actors are critically aware of the constitutive 
influence of their “circumstances”, the constraints and opportunities their 
discursive field contains, and awareness that their actions have constitutive and 
re-constitutive consequences for their life-world and politics. For instance, 
Dryzek writes that “even the most routine action helps perpetuate the discourse 
in which it is located by affirming the precepts of that discourse (for example, a 
financial transaction reinforces the monetary system)” (2006, 112). Since 
reflexivity is induced intersubjectively, the idea of “reflexive intelligence” has the 
elements of hermeneutical experience and consciousness. This makes its 
function similar to Gadamer’s “historically effected consciousness”. Therefore, it 
is suitable to think of Dryzek’s “reflexivity” as fulfilling in deliberative politics a 
role similar to ‘historically effected consciousness’, which is a regulative idea in 
‘fusion of horizons’. It denotes a similar kind of critical awareness about one’s 
situated understanding. 
The second aspect has to do with “constitutive reasoning”. It gives actors 
a critical sense of future-orientedness. A reflexive actor asks ‘does this action 
help constitute the world I want?’ It is a forward oriented reasoning that is 
distinct from forward oriented reasoning in instrumental and strategic actions. It 
is not related to the kind of reasoning employed in achieving short-term goals 
and objectives. It is directed at the constitution of “the world”. If “reflexive 
intelligence” is awareness that actions constitute and reconstitute discourses, 
then “constitutive reasoning” is the intentionality in taking actions that constitute 
and reconstitute particular “precepts” of discourses that influence the world. It is 
an act of reason that preserves, changes, and propagates discourses. It has 
elements of reason, freedom, agency, and autonomy that are at work in 
Gadamer’s defence of the authority of tradition as it is passed down from past to 
present and forward into the future. Gadamer argues: 
The fact is that in tradition there is always an element of 
freedom and of history itself. Even the most genuine and pure 
tradition does not persist because of the inertia of what once 
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existed. It needs to be affirmed, embraced, cultivated. It is, 
essentially, preservation and it is active in all historical 
change. But preservation is an act of reason, though and 
inconspicuous one. For this reason, only innovation and 
planning appear to be the result of reason. But this is an 
illusion. Even where life changes violently, as in ages of 
revolution, far more of the old is preserved in the supposed 
transformation of everything than anyone knows, and it 
combines with the new to create a new value. At any rate, 
preservation is as much a freely chosen action as are 
revolution and renewal (Gadamer 2013, 293). 
Because “constitutive reasoning” is an aspect of “reflexivity”, its 
orientation to the future is constrained by what is possible in the given 
circumstances, the historical moment, the discursive field. It makes reflexivity an 
action of preservation as well as renewal through openness to change (by 
reconstitution) in discourses that constitute political practices and identities. For 
Gadamer, traditions preserve their authority by being open to change, not by 
claiming immutability. A true tradition is dynamic; it is fluid. A static tradition is 
not a true tradition; it is dogmatic. Discourses persevere as dynamic 
constructions in the same manner through “constitutive reasoning”. 
Thomas Jefferson’s lines in his letter to John Cartwright are illustrative of 
Gadamer’s point and the idea of “constitutive reasoning”:  
Can one generation bind another, and all others, in 
succession forever? I think not. The Creator has made the 
earth for the living, not the dead (1824)65. 
Through “constitutive reasoning”, actors free themselves from the past 
not by denying its authority but by orienting themselves towards the future made 
possible by it. It is a mode of change and transformation that does not betray 
the idea of ‘historically effected consciousness’. The two sides of reflexivity, 
reflexive intelligence and constitutive reasoning, help in this respect. Reflexive 
intelligence draws attention to the effect discourses have had on one’s 
understanding. Constitutive reasoning builds on that knowledge towards a 
desired future. In effect, it is an act of reason that seizes the world from “the 
dead” and hands it over to “the living”. It is an act of reason that breaks the 
binds of previous generation not by breaking the relatedness between the past 
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and present, but by recognizing the effect the past has had on the present. It is 
an act of reason oriented towards the future that can be projected from this 
historical moment (i.e., hermeneutical situation). Thus, constitudedness by 
discourses does not necessarily mean that the discourses that dominated 
previous generations exert the same influence on the present and reproduce 
the same social system. It is by virtue of “constitutive reasoning” of reflexivity 
that Dryzek asserts that discourses are amenable to reconstitution and 
preserves agency and freedom of the actors. “Constitutive reasoning” takes up 
the horizon discourses project into the future. It constitutes a world with 
awareness of incomplete understanding and finitude. 
Thus, it can be established that Dryzek’s idea of “reflexivity” is a suitable 
mode of instantiating Gadamer’s principle of openness in democratic politics. 
Gadamer’s principle requires that one practices genuine openness towards the 
other because one’s understanding is incomplete in virtue of its situatedness 
within a hermeneutic situation. Dryzek’s idea of reflexivity is possible through 
intersubjective engagement, i.e. engagement and encounter of the other. To be 
sure, for Dryzek it is the discourses that engage and encounter one another. 
However, since it is actors that are doing the engaging and encountering 
between discourses, it is they who must practice reflexivity. Dryzek states, “in 
an unreflective world – one where traditions are treated as immutable and taken 
for granted – the norm is one of obedience to and so reinforcement of dominant 
discourses” (Dryzek 2006, 86-87).  “Reflective actors are aware of their status 
‘inside’ the world, and of the fact that their actions and messages help constitute 
or re-constitute the world in which they are operating” (Dryzek 2006, 112). 
Given that plurality consists of particular discourses that exert 
constitutive influence on politics and identity, they situate understanding in 
particular ways (Section 4.1), and given that interpretive conflicts in a world of 
discourses plays out as “contestation of discourses” (Section 4.2), “reflexivity” 
serves as a suitable idea for engagement and encounter between persons 
whose understanding is situated in part within discourses. It has more appeal 
for pluralism than Habermas’ idea of reflection because it does not result in 
reflecting oneself out of one’s particularity but to be present as a particular entity 
with openness towards the other. Reflexivity does not presuppose autonomy. It 




Dryzek contributed to our understanding of plurality by showing how 
politics and identity in plural societies can be constituted by different discourses. 
This chapter established three aspects of Dryzek’s work. First, it has been 
established that Dryzek’s characterization of particular discourses can be 
considered as the expression of hermeneutical situation in politics. For Dryzek, 
discourses are historically and culturally specific. As such, they situate human 
understanding through the way they partially constitute identity. This has led 
Dryzek to refocus discourse ethics from universalism, abstraction, and strict 
rationality towards sensitivity to the way particular discourses influence 
universalization and rationality in deliberation.  
Second, the chapter established the significance of interpretive conflicts 
for Dryzek. Given his argument on particular discourses, Dryzek sees 
particularity as a resource for democratic politics. Therefore, he allows the 
expression of particularity through such forms of communication as Young’s 
storytelling and rhetoric. However, Dryzek worries that expression of 
particularity can escalate interpretive conflicts into conflict between identities. 
This can result in entrenchment and isolation. In order to avoid this problem, 
Dryzek posits that interpretive conflicts should take place in the form of 
contestation of discourses. Discourses are not personal but are still 
representative of concrete people because of the way they constitute identities. 
Therefore, in a contestation of discourses, the identity conflicts are sublimated. 
The significance of contestation of discourses has to do with the way different 
discourses can lead to inclusion of lateral complexities of an issue and 
consideration of the whole system of interconnected elements in the social 
structure. 
Third, the chapter established Dryzek’s idea of reflexivity as a suitable 
instantiation of Gadamer’s principle of openness. Contestation between 
discourses leads actors to reflexivity because through engaging and 
encountering different discourses, one becomes aware of the way 
understanding is situated and partial within particular discourses. Reflexivity 
consists in two aspects, ‘reflexive intelligence’ and ‘constitutive reasoning’, 
which help in instantiating it as the principle of openness. ‘Reflexive intelligence’ 
denotes a kind of intelligence about the way one’s understanding is situated. 
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This intelligence can be acquired only in an engagement and encounter of 
others who represent other discourses. This, in effect, contains elements of 
hermeneutical experience and consciousness. ‘Constitutive reasoning’ denotes 
an act of reason that does not break from one’s situatedness but builds on it 





Antagonism in pluralism and agonism as 
openness 
Introduction 
Engagement and encounter of the other in politics may not always be 
about reaching understanding across differences. The stuff of politics is about 
conflict over rank-ordering incommensurable values. So, sometimes, 
engagement and encounter entails a struggle, an uncompromising conflict in 
which the principles of openness and democratic politics can be at stake. If we 
are to instantiate Gadamer’s principle of openness in democratic politics, then 
the constituency of plural societies guarantee that we are bound to encounter 
the kinds of others that will challenge the very principles of openness and 
democratic politics. We are bound to encounter nationalists, racists, and 
religious extremists. The encounter with them might involve an uncompromising 
conflict. The question is, how do we practice openness towards those that deny 
the principle of openness, democratic politics, those who deny the right to be to 
others on the basis of their own claims of supremacy and ultimate positions. In 
this chapter, I draw on Mouffe to answer this question. Drawing on her, I 
develop an account of agonism as a mode of openness towards those, with 
whom we can be in a conflictual relationship that entails mutual exclusion.  
Mouffe is an odd choice to include among Young and Dryzek, who 
advocate the Habermasian strand of deliberative democracy. However, I argue 
that Mouffe is closer to the deliberative democracy than she is willing to admit 
because agonistic contestation requires discourse ethics. It has already been 
noted by Keith Breen (2009) and Andrew Knops (2007) that Mouffe’s agonism 
resembles deliberative democracy. In Section 5.3, I show why Mouffe’s 
agonism requires the core ideas of discourse ethics. In doing so, I follow Nancy 
Fraser, who posits that the opposition between deliberative democracy and 
agonistic models of democracy is over-exaggerated and that they have 
complementary parts to play in democratic politics (2008, 74). In joining my 
account of agonism as a mode of instantiation of openness along with 
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asymmetric reciprocity and reflexivity, I also follow Ricardo Blaug (1996) who 
argues that ‘deliberation’ cannot be understood as a term monopolized by 
deliberative democrats such as Habermas and Dryzek. I follow him in his 
argument that deliberative and agonistic theorists must be read in 
complementary mode rather than in opposition. For Blaug, ‘deliberation’ is a 
term that includes a wide variety of democratic politics that involve various 
forms of (dialogical) contestations and interactions on intersubjective basis. 
Hence, for him, the ‘postmodern’ strand of deliberative democracy that includes 
agonists such as Mouffe uncovers modes of conflict and power relations that 
orthodox deliberative theorists overlook. As far as he is concerned, there should 
be a more general theory of deliberative democracy based on a complementary 
reading of different types of democratic politics that emphasise dialogue and 
contestation (he identifies three: republican, postmodern, universal66). Blaug 
shows that Mouffe helps in pointing out the shortcomings, risks, and dangers of 
reliance on the rationalism and universalism of deliberation (1996, 74). This can 
be confirmed by Dryzek himself, who takes into account Mouffe’s critique of 
deliberative democracy (see Dryzek 2006).  
Mouffe helps understand the antagonistic dimension of human affairs 
and bring to the fore the dangers that pluralism can pose to itself. We can 
understand this problem from her critique of deliberative democracy. Mouffe 
argues that the characteristic rationalism and universalism of deliberative 
democracy represses the dimensions of antagonism and power relations. The 
reason antagonism must be accounted for is because it has an ontological 
dimension to human affairs, in which there is always a differentiation between 
“us” and “them”. If democratic politics does not provide an outlet for the 
expression of antagonism and instead represses it, there is a possibility that 
antagonism asserts itself in the form of extremist articulations such as right 
wing/left wing populism, or as violence. However, if we are to acknowledge the 
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 In his paper, Blaug understands the theory of deliberative democracy as consisting in 
three main currents: republican deliberative theories that opt for a contextual mode of 
justification of moral validity, postmodern deliberative theories that “reject the notion of moral 
validity altogether” and argue on the basis that “knowledge and truth are merely configurations 
of power”, and universalist deliberative theories, one of which is Habermas’ argument that we 
can build normative deliberative theory based on universal assumptions we can make about the 
way we communicate. Blaug thinks that rather than keep separate camps, a more unified theory 
of deliberative democracy needs to take into account all three camps. For him, if “deliberative 
politics is to be both legitimate and realistic, their gains must somehow be brought together” 
(1996: 75).  
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antagonistic dimension, then how can pluralism as engagement and encounter 
of the other in their otherness be possible in politics?  
I answer this question by drawing from Mouffe’s theory of radical 
democracy known as ‘agonistic pluralism’67. I develop an account of agonism in 
the sense of struggle between equals as a mode of openness in democratic 
politics. Unlike in the previous chapters, here I do not give an account of 
plurality as consisting in groups or discourses. My primary focus is to work out 
how antagonism implicates pluralism and how we can respond to it in a way 
that does not betray the principle of openness. Thus, I develop an account of 
agonism based on three features. First, its recognition of relationality between 
identities as subject to differential positions in the social structure, which makes 
it consonant with Young and Dryzek as well as points at the requirement for 
Gadamer’s principle of openness. Second, its recognition of fluidity of tradition 
in a way that is consonant with philosophical hermeneutics. For Mouffe, 
democracy is an example of such tradition. Third, I appropriate the “quasi-
republican constitutionalism” of agonism, which allows the use of its central 
categories of “enemy” and “adversary” to protect pluralism and democratic 
politics.  
The chapter consists in four sections. 
Section 5.1 gives a general outline of the concept of ‘the political’ in its 
antagonistic dimension and the central categories of “enemy” and “adversary” in 
Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism. I draw the implications of acknowledging the 
antagonistic dimension for pluralism and democratic politics from Mouffe’s 
critique of discourse ethics. For Mouffe, the rationalism and universalism of 
discourse ethics make it blind to the antagonistic dimension.  
In Section 5.2 I evaluate Mouffe’s alternative to deliberative democracy 
and argue that agonistic pluralism must rely on discourse ethics. For Mouffe, 
agonism is possible through a normative move from enemies to adversaries. 
Enemies become adversaries when they agree to respect each other as equals, 
follow the same rules of contestation, and pledge their allegiance to the same 
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 I am grateful for my understanding of agonistic democracy to the workshop 
“Conditions of Agonistic Politics” organized by Andrew Schaap and hosted by the Centre for 
Political Thought at the University of Exeter in the summer of 2015. 
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ethico-political principles and values. Once they establish this type of meta-
consensus, the sides engage as adversaries who disagree about each other’s 
interpretations of the principles and values. I show why Mouffe has to rely on 
discourse ethics in order to make this normative move possible. 
I develop Section 5.3 based on the preceding section. Here, I show the 
terms in which Mouffe recognizes the significance of interpretive conflicts. In 
agonism, there can be interpretive conflicts only between adversaries. 
Interpretive conflicts are significant because they provide a democratic outlet for 
the expression of antagonism in the form of agonism.  
In section 5.4 I develop my account of agonism based on the three 
features listed above and by rejecting Mouffe’s emphasis on “conversion”. I 
argue that it must be rejected because it runs contrary to the principle of 
openness. Rather, agonism must accept the forms of persuasion accepted in 
the deliberative democracies of Young and Dryzek, who posit that persuasion 
can be in the forms of greeting, storytelling/narrative, and rhetoric. This way, 
agonism can be conceived as a mode of instantiation of openness in 
democratic politics. 
5.1 ‘The political’ and the limitations of discourse ethics 
 ‘The political’ is a concept that refers to the ontological dimension of 
antagonism and power relations between people. In On the Political (2005), 
Mouffe posits that the antagonistic dimension of ‘the political’ is inherent to 
pluralism (10). Therefore, it is necessary to ask how Mouffe’s argument 
implicates the idea of pluralism as engagement and encounter of the other in 
their otherness. It is also necessary to consider the problems that Mouffe’s 
concept of ‘the political’ poses for a democratic politics that is committed to such 
an idea of pluralism. Since it has been established that discourse helps 
democratic politics in its commitment to pluralism, Mouffe’s critique of discourse 
ethics is particularly instructive for this consideration. 
Mouffe formulated the concept of ‘antagonism’ in Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy (1985), co-written with Ernesto Laclau. Yet, this chapter does 
not draw its ideas from this book. The main ideas are drawn from Mouffe’s 
Return of the Political (1993), The Democratic Paradox (2000), and On the 
Political (2005). In these works, as Mouffe explains in the interview published in 
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Agonistics (2013), she develops the main ideas in Hegemony and Social 
Strategy into what she calls ‘agonistic pluralism’ and proposes to call the 
“ineradicable condition of antagonism ‘the political’” (130).  
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy is useful for introducing Mouffe’s main 
ideas. This work elaborates on anti-essentialist discourse theory. Laclau and 
Mouffe posit radical contingency, negativity, and incompleteness against idealist 
ontologies aimed at understanding the nature of the social in stable and fixed 
terms. The central concepts used in this work are ‘antagonism’ and ‘hegemony’. 
They also constitute the core idea of Mouffe’s understanding of ‘the political’. 
Antagonism is the ontological dimension of ‘the political’, which means that 
every objectivity, be that a group or social order, is established over against an 
external opposition, to which they refer as the ‘constituent outside’. In her later 
work (2000), Mouffe draws from Schmitt to characterize this dimension as a 
‘we/they’ relationship that takes the form of ‘friend/enemy’ relationship in ‘the 
political’ domain. For Laclau and Mouffe, the fact that ‘antagonism’ is ontological 
means that that there cannot be a final totality of identity, groups, particular 
discourses, and political orders such as liberal democracy. It means that there 
cannot be a final harmonious and transparent society (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 
125ff). This conclusion is possible because of the way antagonism constitutes 
the ontological indeterminacy and contingency of every order.  
An identity, collectives, groups, discourses, social and political orders are 
temporally constituted by hegemonic articulations. A hegemony is a specific 
ordering of the symbolic content of the discursive field. Because of the 
ontological dimension of antagonism, it can still be challenged by a different 
hegemonic articulation. An example of hegemony Mouffe refers to throughout 
her work is the hegemony of Western liberal democracy that Francis Fukuyama 
mistakes as the final answer to the question of how we should order our social 
and political constitutions68. For her, liberal democracy is a hegemony that can 
be changed by new hegemonic re-articulations of the symbols in the discursive 
field. 
The consequences of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory are radical 
because it means that there can never be a society that has constituted itself 
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 Mouffe is not against liberalism. She is for more radical version of it. See 1993, 145 
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fully. It means that there cannot be a final answer to the question of balance 
between the opposing individual liberty and popular sovereignty in the liberal 
democracy or Habermas’ deliberative democracy set out in Between Facts and 
Norms (1996). It means that no agent or group can assume representation of 
any totality, and that there cannot be a final understanding and knowledge of 
the social and political. In this way, ‘the political’ can be considered as an 
alternative conceptualization of the ontological dimensions of human finitude in 
politics. 
Based on this framework, Mouffe posits ‘antagonism’ as the ontological 
dimension of ‘the political’. She appropriates ‘hegemony’ as part of ‘politics’. 
Thus, ‘the political’ and ‘politics’ must be distinguished accordingly. In On the 
Political, Mouffe elaborates:  
Some theorists such as Hannah Arendt envisage the political 
as a space of freedom and public deliberation, while others 
see it as a space of power, conflict and antagonism. My 
understanding of ‘the political’ clearly belongs to the second 
perspective. More precisely this is how I distinguish between 
‘the political’ and ‘politics’: by ‘the political’ I mean the 
dimension of antagonism which I take to be constitutive of 
human societies, while by ‘politics’ I mean a set of practices 
and institutions through which an order is created, organizing 
human coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by 
the political (2005, 9).  
Here ‘politics’ is the result of hegemonic articulations of the symbolic 
content of the discursive field. Thus, democratic politics can only be assumed to 
be the result of specific hegemonic articulations. And if we think in this manner, 
we are doing what Mouffe calls “thinking politically”; that is, we do not take any 
form of politics for granted but as a specific rank-ordering of discursive symbols 
through hegemonic articulation. And because of the ontological dimensions of 
‘the political’, that rank-ordering faces the constant possibility of contestation 
and reformulation. As Mouffe puts it, “to think politically requires recognizing the 
ontological dimension of radical negativity” (2013, xi).  
Mouffe is critical of theorists that do not “think politically”. In The Return 
of the Political (1993), she argues that liberal theorists cannot think politically 
because their universalism and rationalism hinders them from recognizing the 
constitutive dimension of antagonism. She extends this critique to the 
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deliberative camp too. In The Democratic Paradox (2000, chapter 4) Mouffe 
traces the influence of the universalism and rationalism of the liberal tradition on 
deliberative democracy, especially in Rawls. For her, Habermas’ deliberative 
democracy also shares the same universalism and rationalism that is 
characteristic of the liberal tradition. Moreover, she argues that Habermas’ 
deliberative democracy is a promotion and defence of the liberal hegemony.  
Mouffe’s critique of the liberal democratic and deliberative traditions is 
based on her careful interpretation of Carl Schmitt’s critique of liberalism69. In 
his The Concept of the Political, Schmitt argues that the liberal tradition’s focus 
on the individual precludes it from taking into account how collective identities 
are formed. For him, groups form differentially in opposition to others based on 
the friend/enemy logic. That is, a ‘we’ is always constituted by differentiating 
and opposing a ‘they’. Mouffe draws from Schmitt’s account of collective 
identities. She posits that the specificity of ‘the political’ for collective identities 
has to do with the criteria of friends and enemy (Mouffe 2005, 11). Thus, for 
Mouffe, the ontological dimension of antagonism in ‘the political’ has to do with 
the decision that discriminates between friends and enemy. 
Mouffe notes that “a key point of Schmitt’s approach is that, by showing 
that every consensus is based on acts of exclusion, it reveals the impossibility 
of a fully inclusive ‘rational’ consensus” (Mouffe 2005, 11). This implicates 
discourse ethics because, as Mouffe argues further, any belief on the 
availability of universal consensus based on reason is bound to deny the 
antagonistic dimension of ‘the political’ (2005, 11). According to her, discourse 
ethics must deny ‘the political’ because it wants to “present political debate as a 
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 By “careful”, I wish to convey Mouffe’s awareness of some of the problems that might 
be raised with respect to her turn to Schmitt. In drawing on the grammar of Schmitt’s criteria of 
the political as the basis for critique of liberalism, Mouffe does not want to subscribe to Schmitt’s 
denial of pluralism in the democratic society. For Schmitt, democracy presupposes a 
homogenous demos, and thus precludes any possibility for pluralism. As Mouffe explains, 
Schmitt thought that liberalism and democracy could never be reconciled because the former 
promotes denial of a homogenous society and common good in order to create the conditions of 
possibility for pursuing plurality of individual interests while the latter requires equality, 
homogeneity, and a singular common good. The only kind of plurality that could exist for 
Schmitt was plurality of states. Mouffe wants to go around this conclusion in Schmitt’s thought 
(see Mouffe 2005: 14f) and she does so by turning to Derrida (see 2005: ch. 1). Another point I 
would like to raise pre-emptively in Mouffe’s defence is on Schmitt’s membership with the Nazi 
Party. I think I’m with Mouffe when she argues: “I am perfectly aware that, because of Schmitt’s 
compromise with Nazism, such a choice might arouse hostility. Many people will find it rather 
perverse if not outright outrageous. Yet, I believe that it is the intellectual force of theorists, not 
their moral qualities, that should be the decisive criteria in deciding whether we need to 
establish a dialogue with their work” (2005: 4).  
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specific field of application of morality and believe that it is possible to create in 
the realm of politics a rational moral consensus by means of free discussion” 
(2005, 13).  
Given Habermas’ counterfactual regulative idea of ‘ideal speech 
situation’, he must deny the antagonistic dimension of ‘the political’. However, 
he does not deny the dimension of antagonism in discourse altogether. Given 
the three tier division between forms of discourse, the place where the 
antagonistic dimension can show itself is the ethical form of discourse. 
Antagonism prevents consensus on the matters of justice in the moral form of 
discourse. Habermas argues, “if questions of justice cannot transcend the 
ethical self-understanding of competing forms of life, and if existentially relevant 
values, conflicts and oppositions must penetrate all controversial questions, 
then in the final analysis we will end up with something resembling Carl 
Schmitt’s understanding of politics” (Habermas 1996 qtd. in Mouffe 2005, 13).   
Based on this argument, Mouffe concludes that for Habermas, affirming 
‘the political’ undermines democracy itself. Conversely, she argues that “only by 
acknowledging ‘the political’ in its antagonistic dimension can we pose the 
central question for democratic politics” (2005, 14). In the permanent conditions 
of antagonism in pluralist societies, the question “is not how to negotiate a 
compromise among competing interests, nor is it how to reach a ‘rational’, i.e. 
fully inclusive, consensus, without any exclusion” (Mouffe 2005, 14)70. Rather, 
the question is, once we acknowledge the dimension of ‘the political’, how can 
we envisage politics and practises that maintain pluralism in ways that are 
compatible with democracy (Mouffe 2005, 14; 1993, 4).  
Mouffe’s answer is that the antagonistic dimension of ‘the political’ must 
be transformed into agonism where competition takes the form of engagement 
between adversaries rather than enemies. This is Mouffe’s version of agonistic 
democracy which she refers to as ‘agonistic pluralism’. It is worth noting that 
with regards to the idea of pluralism as engagement and encounter of the other, 
with Mouffe ‘the other’ is specified either as an enemy or as an adversary. This 
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 For Mouffe, there can never be a fully inclusive rational consensus: “Politics, as the 
attempt to domesticate the political, to keep at bay the forces of destruction and to establish 
order, always has to do with conflicts and antagonisms. It requires an understanding that every 
consensus is, by necessity, based on acts of exclusion and that there can never be a fully 
inclusive ‘rational’ consensus” (Mouffe 1993, 141). 
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kind of specificity makes engagement and encounters a qualitatively different 
process. This one is not aimed at understanding the other in their otherness. 
Agonistic pluralism is aimed at struggling against the other. I work around this 
problem in Section 5.4, where it will be established how agonism can be 
understood as a mode of instantiation of openness in democratic politics.  
To get there, it is necessary to establish how Mouffe recognizes human 
finitude expressed as hermeneutical situation. Then, it is necessary to show 
how her critique of discourse ethics is similar to Warnke’s hermeneutical critique 
and the terms in which she recognizes the significance of interpretive conflicts.  
Chapter 2 established that incomplete understanding is a kind of 
understanding that is situated within a hermeneutical situation. It established 
that incomplete understanding is partial and particular depending on the 
historical, cultural, and linguistic contingencies. Chapter 3 established that for 
Young one’s understanding of the social and political is situated, partial, and 
particular with regards to one’s social position. Chapter 4 established that for 
Dryzek one’s understanding is situated, partial, and particular with regards to 
the particular discourses. The argument on incomplete understanding was 
drawn from the way Young and Dryzek posit the influence of social position and 
discourses on ‘the self’. For every person ‘the self’ is a concept formed in the 
process of self-understanding.  Mouffe makes a similar argument on the 
constitution of the self. For her, one of the characteristics of plurality in modern 
society is “the multiplicity of subject positions which constitute a single agent” 
(Mouffe 1993, 12). For that reason, ‘the self’ can consist in multiple selves. 
Based on that, it can be established that Mouffe presupposes a similar idea of 
incomplete understanding too.  
Furthermore, it is possible to conceive of Mouffe’s understanding of the 
constitution of the self as a combination of Young’s and Dryzek’s arguments 
about how social position and discourses have a constitutive influence on 
people’s understanding of the social and political world. Mouffe accepts that the 
divided and plural constitution of the self has to do with one’s situatedness in 
the social structure and the discursive formations because she considers  
the social agent as constituted by an ensemble of ‘subject 
positions’ that can never be totally fixed in a closed system of 
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differences, constructed by a diversity of discourses among 
which there is no necessary relation, but rather a constant 
movement of overdetermination and displacement. The 
‘identity’ of such a multiple and contradictory subject is 
therefore always contingent and precarious, temporarily fixed 
at the intersection of those subject positions and dependent 
on specific forms of identification. It is therefore impossible to 
speak of the social agent as if we were dealing with a unified, 
homogeneous entity. We have rather to approach it as a 
plurality, dependent on the various discursive formations … 
(1993, 77).  
The plurality of selves in one “social agent” differentiates in terms of 
gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, social occupation and etc. Each 
aspect puts one in a specific ‘social position’ within a distinct locale that is 
constituted discursively by respective discourses such as feminism, Christian 
conservatism, LGBT, etc. Thus, one can be a woman, whose social position vis 
a vis gender relationships might affiliate her with the feminist group, the locale 
of which is discursively constituted by feminism. The same woman can also 
identify herself with a religious collective vis a vis her beliefs. In the discursive 
field of the social, these two positions can often conflict with one another; hence 
the idea of divided self. The implication of acknowledging the idea of divided 
self means that there cannot be a democratic politics that presumes a unitary 
idea of the subject. For this reason, Young offers group representation and 
Dryzek offers discursive representation which allow the representation not just 
of plurality of groups but of different aspects of the self too.  
With Mouffe, we do not gain a contrasting idea for political practice. 
Rather, we gain an insight that Young and Dryzek lack. We gain the insight that 
such differentiation entails antagonism. Because of the antagonistic dimension, 
human relationships can entail a we/they discrimination.  Here, forms of 
identification are realized by the exclusion and opposition to a ‘constitutive 
outside’. In other words, every form of identity is constituted by an exclusion and 
opposition to another identity. There is an antagonistic dimension in the 
constitution of the divided self too because the self is constituted by excluding 
the kinds of identities that the self is not. However, for antagonism to have its 
ontological dimension, Mouffe must presuppose the idea of thrownness the way 
Young does. One must always already find oneself in some kind of social 
structure made up of differentiated positions. One is thrown into the social as 
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male or female, black or white, into a class, into a culture, religion, and historical 
moment. Thus, it is possible to make Mouffe’s argument that a one is 
“constituted by an ensemble of ‘subject positions’” by founding it on the idea of 
thrownness (1993, 77).  
That being said, it must not be concluded that antagonism is present in 
all aspects of human affairs. It doesn’t mean that there is constant conflict 
between groups and individual agents. Rather, for Mouffe antagonism is always 
a possibility in human affairs. That is because all identities are contingent and 
temporal, just as all political regimes and orders are. It means that no single 
agent, group, or politics can claim any kind of ultimate positions or finality. Their 
establishment can only be the result of acts of power (hence, hegemony) but 
only contingently and temporarily. Mouffe writes:  
coming to terms with the constitutive nature of power implies 
relinquishing the ideal of democratic society as the realization 
of a perfect harmony or transparency. The democratic 
character of a society can only be given by the fact that no 
limited social actor can attribute to herself or himself the 
representation of the totality and claim to have the ‘mastery’ of 
the foundation (2000, 100).  
Antagonism, and therefore ‘the political’, cannot be eradicated (Mouffe 1993, 5; 
2000, 12). For Mouffe, it means that the very condition of possibility for pluralist 
democracy is given by the ontological dimension of ‘the political’. To eradicate it 
means to eradicate pluralist democracy. Thus, “in coming to terms with 
pluralism, what is really at stake is power and antagonism and their ineradicable 
character” (2000, 21).  
Another noteworthy point in the quote is “that no limited social actor can 
attribute to herself or himself the representation of the totality and claim to have 
the ‘mastery’ of the foundation” (Mouffe 2000, 100). It comes close to the idea 
of human finitude established in Chapter 2 and the way human finitude 
constricts the idea of ‘moral respect’. It has already been noted several times 
that the foundational idea of radical negativity in Mouffe’s work can be 
considered as an alternative to the ontological idea of human finitude 
established in chapter 2. These are two different ideas that posit a similar 
conclusion based on the logic of the whole and parts: the whole cannot be 
reduced to any of its parts and the part cannot be representative of the whole in 
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isolation. The important thing is that Mouffe’s and Gadamer’s perspectives lead 
to a similar idea about human affairs: nothing is static, no agent can claim 
ultimate positions even in the moral universe, and there cannot be a 
“Philosopher King” who has figured out the normative universe of a world 
without a common measure of value. Human affairs in the social and political 
sphere depends on engagement and encounter with those that will present 
something that was not previously available within one’s horizon, or perhaps 
points at something that was previously unseen. The only difference is that 
Gadamer wants to learn by holding a dialogue with the other, whereas Mouffe 
wants to learn by “fighting” the other. The point to be taken from Mouffe is that 
conflict is inevitable in politics. ‘The political’ can always “return”71. 
According to Mouffe, discourse ethics has to eradicate ‘the political’ to 
make deliberative democracy possible. There is no rational solution to the 
antagonistic dimension of the political. ‘The political’ precludes the possibility for 
rational consensus. But, for Mouffe, the rejection of ‘the political’ in order to 
theorize a condition of possibility for universal rational consensus threatens 
democracy (2000, 22). In contrast to Young and Dryzek, who want to weaken 
the rationalism of discourse ethics, Mouffe argues that rationalism constitutes 
an obstacle to understanding how a stronger adherence to democratic values 
can be established (Mouffe 2000, 70). However, her grounds for making this 
argument are similar to Young’s and Dryzek’s because like them she argues 
that it precludes the possibility for further challenges. Challenges are precluded 
by the presuppositions of Habermasian consensus because conceptually it 
requires homogenous and uniform demos.  
For Mouffe, Habermasian consensus is possible in two ways. First, its 
possibility requires antagonism between the members of society to be ignored. 
Second, elimination of antagonism requires transcendence and abstraction from 
particularities. In Chapter 2, discourse ethics was criticized from a 
hermeneutical perspective. It was established that abstraction is impossible 
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given the situated character of incomplete understanding. Chapters 3 and 4 
established that Young and Dryzek criticize discourse ethics on similar terms. 
Mouffe accepts that one cannot transcend one’s hermeneutic situation fully with 
specific reference to Gadamer72 (1993, 15). Thus, it is possible to establish that 
Mouffe’s view of discourse ethics is consonant with the hermeneutical critique73.  
The difference between the hermeneutical argument and Mouffe’s 
argument is that Mouffe takes a much more radical position against discourse 
ethics. She denies any possibility for rational consensus. She denies that 
agents can transcend their particular circumstances at all. For her to require 
agents to transcend their particularities in order to hold a discourse on rational 
grounds and achieve consensus is to enact an un-democratic and un-pluralistic 
principle. That is, transcendence and abstraction serve one purpose for 
discourse ethics: to achieve homogeneity and unanimity (see 2000, 19). For this 
reason Mouffe is wary that discourse ethics threatens pluralistic democracy. It 
requires eradication of difference in favour of consensus and closure.  
Mouffe argues that it is necessary to give up on the idea that ‘rational 
universal consensus’ because first, it pretends to be all inclusive which the 
ontological dimension of ‘the political’ makes impossible74 (see 1993, 140; 2000, 
32), and second it cannot eradicate the antagonistic dimension because ‘the 
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 She writes: “It is always possible to distinguish between the just and the unjust, the 
legitimate and the illegitimate, but this can only be done with within a given tradition, with the 
help of standards that this tradition provides; in fact, there is no point of view external to all 
tradition from which one can offer a universal judgement. Furthermore, to give up the distinction 
between logic and rhetoric to which the postmodern critique leads – and where it parts with 
Aristotle – does not mean that ‘might makes right’ or that one sinks into nihilism. To accept with 
Foucault that there cannot be an absolute separation between validity and power (since validity 
is always relative to a specific regime of truth, connected to power) does not mean that we 
cannot distinguish within a given regime of truth between those who respect the strategy of 




 This is also evident from her discussion and analysis of the debate between 
universalists and communitarians. See Chapter 2 in The Return of the Political where Mouffe 
accepts the hermeneutic aspects of the communitarian critique; namely that any 
universalisation takes with itself substantive ideas of the good. It is also evident in her 
celebration of Rawls’ admission that his theory of justice refers to specific communities that 
adhere to liberal values.  
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hegemony. Antagonism implies a radical negativity. It means that all acts of establishing any 
kind of objectivity depends on we/they discrimination. There cannot be consensus without 
exclusion because consensus implies an act of power that establishes certain objectivity, be 
that consensus on certain form institution or general principle. Such an act of power always 




political’ is always beyond rationality (1993, 123)75. Mouffe points at 
contemporary politics to illustrate the ineradicability of ‘the political’. It used to 
be that ‘the political’ played out in the antagonistic relationship between the left 
and right. It used to be about the two competing views of the way the world 
should be constituted. Today, argues Mouffe, the “the political is played out in 
the moral register” and the blurring between left and right politics by the parties 
that occupy centre positions cannot be presented as an overcoming of ‘the 
political’ (2005, 5). That is, ‘the political’ has not been eradicated by the “centre” 
positions that the left and right occupy as a point for bipartisan consensus. For 
Mouffe, there is still a we/they discrimination but “instead of being defined with 
political categories”, the discrimination “is now established in moral terms” 
(Mouffe 2005, 5). That is, nowadays ‘the political’ manifests itself not in the 
struggle and opposition between left and right but as a “struggle between right 
and wrong” (Mouffe 2005, 5).  
For Mouffe, discourse ethics attempts to achieve a closure in politics that 
‘the political’ cannot allow. In responding to Habermas’ admission that there are 
empirical obstacles for discourse ethics regulated by the ideal speech situation, 
Mouffe notes that due to the ontological dimension of ‘the political’, there are 
ontological obstacles too (2000, 48). That is, if Habermas is willing to take into 
account that discourse ethics can be constrained by the fact that people cannot 
fully transcend their hermeneutic situation, Mouffe posits further that 
“democratic logic itself” denies the possibility for Habermasian discourse (2000, 
48). For this reason, Mouffe’s critique of discourse ethics is more radical than 
Warnke’s hermeneutical critique. Nevertheless, the next section argues that 
when it comes to laying out the theoretical framework for “agonistic pluralism”, 
Mouffe is forced to make concessions to the Habermasian deliberative 
democracy. The section establishes that Mouffe’s requirement for consensus on 
the ethico-political must presuppose procedural consensus entailed in discourse 
ethics. Therefore, Mouffe appropriates discourse ethics in order to address the 
problem of ‘the political’ in plural societies.  
                                            
75
 For Mouffe, politics is the limits of rationality: “The rationalist longing for an 
undistorted rational communication and for a social unity based on rational consensus is 
profoundly antipolitical because it ignores the crucial place of passions and affects in politics. 
Politics cannot be reduced to rationality, precisely because it indicates the limits of rationality” 
(Mouffe 1993, 115; emphasis as in the original).  
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Even though Mouffe argues that in order to take pluralism seriously, it is 
necessary to give up on rationalism and consensus (2000, 98), she retains 
some aspects of rationalism and consensus in discourse ethics. They are 
necessary in the normative move that she makes from antagonism to agonism. 
This is evident in her The Return of the Political (1993). Similar to Young and 
Dryzek, who argue that rationalism must be weakened to allow the expression 
of plurality and particularity, Mouffe argues that we must affirm that rationalism 
and consensus are plural, discursively constructed, and entangled with power 
relations (1993, 7). Let us look at Mouffe’s appropriation of discourse ethics 
more closely in the following section. 
5.2 Discourse ethics in Mouffe’s normative move from antagonism 
to agonism 
In her three main works, The Return of the Political (1993), The 
Democratic Paradox (2000), and On The Political (2005), Mouffe proposes 
‘agonistic pluralism’ that acknowledges the dimensions of antagonism and 
power in ‘the political’ as endemic to plural societies. This acknowledgement 
implies several things that are different from Habermas but bears resemblance 
to Young’s and Dryzek’s appropriations of his discourse ethics. Mouffe’s 
recognition of ineradicability of antagonism does not negate communicative 
ethics that Young and Dryzek rely on to accommodate the extra-rational 
aspects of ‘the political’. ‘Agonistic pluralism’ recognizes that antagonism cannot 
be resolved by rationalism and accepts that antagonism precludes any kind of 
final reconciliation. Previously, it was noted that Mouffe characterizes the 
antagonistic dimension between human beings by drawing on Schmitt’s concept 
of ‘the political’ as a domain where groups identify one another according to the 
friend/enemy discrimination. For Mouffe antagonism involves the relationship 
between enemies that are set out to destroy each other.  
The first step in Mouffe’s theory, and it is a normative move, is to assert 
that the friend/enemy distinction is not the only form that antagonism can take 
(see 2000, 13). Antagonism can also be between adversaries. Mouffe makes a 
normative move when she distinguishes between ‘enemy’ and ‘adversary’. 
There can be antagonism “between enemies, that is, persons who have no 
common symbolic space” and antagonism between ‘adversaries’, “adversaries 
being defined in a paradoxical way as ‘friendly enemies’, that is, persons who 
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are friends because they share a common symbolic space but also enemies 
because they want to organize this common symbolic space in a different way” 
(Mouffe 2000, 13). Elsewhere, Mouffe defines ‘adversary’ in similar terms: “an 
adversary is a legitimate enemy, an enemy with whom we have in common a 
shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of democracy” (1999, 755). For 
Mouffe, if we share a common bond in our allegiance to such things as liberty 
and equality, then the struggle between us is a struggle between adversaries. If, 
on the other hand, I contest your allegiance to liberty and equality, that is, we do 
not have a “common symbolic space” that consists of such symbols as liberty 
and equality, then we are enemies76.  
By definition, adversaries compete in organizing the common symbolic 
space as equals. That is the fundamental thing to keep in mind about ‘agonistic 
pluralism’ – the struggle presupposes equality between the competitors.  If 
antagonism is a constant possibility in plural democracy and we want to 
maintain political practices that adhere to democratic values and principles, then 
we must engage not as enemies but as adversaries. This is Mouffe’s normative 
move. ‘Adversary’ has a normative function as a key category that defines 
‘agonistic pluralism’. Thus, antagonism can take two forms: one that occurs 
between enemies that do not share a common symbolic space (antagonism 
proper) and one that occurs between adversaries that share a common 
symbolic space. Mouffe establishes the second form antagonism as agonism. 
Etymologically, the term ‘agonism’ denotes competition and struggle between 
equals, usually competitors that follow the same rules of the competition. Hence 
Mouffe’s ‘agonistic pluralism’, which “requires that the opponent should be 
considered not as an enemy to be destroyed, but as an adversary whose 
existence is legitimate and must be tolerated. We will fight against his ideas but 
we will not question his right to defend them” (1993, 4).  
                                            
76
 From a Gadamerian perspective, “common symbolic space” is a technical term 
specific to the postmodern discourse theory that bears a family resemblance to Gadamer’s 
‘historically effected consciousness’. Recall that the structure of ‘historically effected 
consciousness’ consists of hermeneutic situation, hermeneutic experience, and hermeneutic 
consciousness. It also implies Gadamer’s hermeneutic phenomenology of prejudice, tradition, 
and authority. In other words, “common symbolic space” and “historically effected 
consciousness” share the idea that we need a common continuity of history and traditions in 
order to understand things in ways where we can recognize that our disputes are a matter of 
interpretation rather than epistemology.  
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In making this normative move for the category of ‘adversary’, Mouffe 
must rely on the basic precepts of discourse ethics: communicative ethics and 
procedural consensus. This argument can be supported by looking at the 
definitions of Mouffe’s terms. Given the way Mouffe defines and distinguishes 
antagonism from agonism by making a normative move from the category of 
enemies to the category of adversaries, it can be established that antagonism 
can be transformed into agonism only when enemies agree to become 
adversaries by agreeing to follow the same rules and adhere to the same 
symbols like liberty and equality. This resembles the procedural consensus that 
Young and Dryzek rely on. In other words, there must be some form of, even if 
only contingent, consensus on the rules of the game. Discourse ethics specifies 
exactly the kind of pragmatic assumptions we must make as language users in 
order to make consensus on the rules achievable. This must be the 
presupposition for the possibility of transforming enemies into adversaries and 
antagonism into agonism.  
Before turning to this argument, let us first look at the problems Mouffe 
finds with Habermas’ discourse ethics in coming to terms with antagonism. 
Above, it was established that Habermas’ discourse ethics must negate the 
antagonistic dimension of ‘the political’ in order to make the procedural 
conditions for consensus possible. Since ‘the political’ entails relationship 
between ‘enemies’ and/or ‘adversaries’, and since ‘the political’ is the domain 
where the extra-rational and passions manifest themselves (see Mouffe 2005, 
24), it poses a real problem for using the principles of discourse to reach 
universal consensus on the validity of any given norm, rule, or principle. 
Therefore, Habermas must distinguish between ethical and moral discourses 
and relegate the antagonistic dimensions of ‘the political’ into the ethical form of 
discourse. Thus, the moral form of discourse requires that we leave passions, 
historical and cultural particularities, ethics behind when we come to discuss the 
validity of universalizable norms. Let us now look at the issues that Mouffe 
raises.  
Mouffe makes her argument for why she thinks Habermas’ deliberative 
democracy cannot grasp the real nature of democratic politics and provide a 
real alternative to the aggregative models of democracy in her article 
“Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism” (1999, 745-758). She puts 
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forward two critical arguments against Habermas. In the first one, she draws on 
Wittgenstein to challenge Habermas’ “conception of procedure and to challenge 
the very idea of a neutral or rational dialogue” (Mouffe 1999, 749ff). Here 
Mouffe raises issues with the distinction that Habermas makes between moral 
and ethical discourses. She relies on Wittgenstein’s argument on procedures as 
consisting in specific ethics to support her argument. Mouffe argues:  
According to him [Wittgenstein], procedure only exists as a 
complex ensemble of practices. Those practices constitute 
specific forms of individuality and identity that make possible 
the allegiance to the procedures. It is because they are 
inscribed in shared forms of life and agreements in 
judgements that procedures can be accepted and followed. 
They cannot be seen as rules that are created on the basis of 
principles and then applied to specific cases. Rules for 
Wittgenstein are always abridgements of practices, they are 
inseparable of specific forms of life. Therefore, distinctions 
between ‘procedural’ and ‘substantial’ or between ‘moral’ and 
‘ethical’ that are central to the Habermasian approach cannot 
be maintained and one must acknowledge that procedures 
always involve substantial ethical commitments (1999, 749). 
In the previous chapters, it was established that Habermas’ distinction 
between ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ discourses cannot be maintained. Namely, it 
cannot be posited that procedures and the conditions for reaching agreement 
cannot be the result of impartiality and neutrality because understanding is 
situated within specific ethics and forms of life. Mouffe’s argument above is 
similar. She points out that procedures themselves are ready to hand and 
already present in the specific forms of life. Our agreement on the procedures, 
before there is consensus on the validity of any norms, must be the result of our 
sharing in a common (ethical) form of life. Therefore, consensus on the validity 
of the norms also depends on how the way they are understood is informed by 
the hermeneutical situation. The implications Mouffe draws from this are also 
similar to the hermeneutical critique of Habermas: “such an approach requires 
reintroducing into the process of deliberation the whole rhetorical dimension that 
the Habermasian discourse perspective is precisely at pains to eliminate” 
(Mouffe 1999, 749). Both Young and Dryzek concede that the rhetorical 
dimensions, along with storytelling, must be admitted into discourse. These 
kinds of elements enter deliberation because of the overlap between the moral 
and ethical discourses.  
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We have seen in Chapter 2, Section 2.3 that in this overlap the 
application of the principle as well as its appropriateness for concrete situations 
can be contested. When appropriateness is contested, it might be necessary to 
decide between two competing principles backed by the ethical discourses. The 
issue of whether right to life or freedom of choice or human (women’s) rights is 
appropriate in the case of abortion is illustrative of these kinds of interpretive 
conflicts. Mouffe amplifies these concerns when she quotes Wittgenstein: 
 where two principles really do meet which cannot be 
reconciled with one another, then each man declares the 
other a fool and an heretic. I said I would ‘combat’ the other 
man, but wouldn’t I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far 
do they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion 
(Wittgenstein 1969, 81e qtd. in Mouffe 1999, 750; emphasis 
as in the original).  
The point at which narratives/storytelling and rhetoric enter deliberation, 
discussion becomes persuasion. This is one of the points at which Mouffe’s 
‘agonistic pluralism’ bears resemblance to Young’s and Dryzek’s deliberative 
democracies. All three affirm, based on arguments that are hermeneutical at 
their core, that there cannot be democratic politics based on neutral and 
impartial procedures, and there cannot be purely rational argumentation. They 
are hermeneutical at their core because their argument is based on the 
recognition of the contextuality and historicality of understanding and language.  
In the second critical argument, Mouffe takes issue with the regulative 
function of Habermas’ ‘ideal speech situation’. Here she draws on Lacan to 
show that ‘ideal speech situation’ is not as free from coercion as Habermas 
intends. She argues that “a Lacanian approach reveals how discourse itself in 
its fundamental structure is authoritarian since out of the free-floating dispersion 
of signifiers, it is only through the intervention of a master signifier that a 
consistent field of meaning can emerge” (1999, 751). In the paper Mouffe relies 
on Zizek’s interpretation of Lacan. The idea is that in addition to being sensitive 
to coercion and authoritarian influence by agents in discourse, it is necessary to 
be aware that discourse is based on the authoritarian ordering of signifiers such 
as equality, liberty, and individual rights. Thus, discourses such as 
libertarianism are constituted by an authoritarian form of subjection of a 
multitude of signifiers such as popular sovereignty, equality, and rights by the 
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master signifier ‘individual liberty’. The master signifier distorts the discursive 
field that contains those signifiers to create a meaningful whole that we can 
identify as libertarianism. Mouffe draws to our attention that such constitutions 
can distort the shared discursive field itself. There must be a distortion because 
distortion constructs meaningful wholes from the symbolic content of the 
discursive field. Mouffe concludes, “Lacan undermines in that way the very 
basis of Habermasian view, according to which the inherent pragmatic 
presuppositions of discourse are non-authoritarian, since they imply the idea of 
a communication free of constraint where only rational argumentation counts” 
(1999, 751).  
Mouffe’s second argument expresses Young’s and Dryzek’s concerns 
that communication might already be taking place in terms and rationality 
ordered by a particular way of life or discourse that favours the dominant group. 
In other words, what these three thinkers bring to our attention in their own 
distinct ways is the fact that unconstrained communication can be constrained 
by the limited ways we understand such things as liberty, equality, justice and 
the very rationality that is specific to our (ethical) form of life. Young expresses 
this in terms of her concerns that some groups may even lack the language to 
express their experience and make a rational argument to support their appeal. 
Dryzek also expresses this concern in his notion of ‘reflexivity’ by which he 
wants to draw our attention that rationality may be influenced by the constitutive 
features of particular discourses as structures of power. All three thinkers see in 
Habermas’ discourse ethics a tendency to favour one form of reason that can 
erase the conditions of possibility for pluralism.  
For Mouffe, the main question that Habermas cannot answer is how 
should we engage antagonism and constitute forms of power that are 
compatible with democracy if we cannot and should not eliminate them? Her 
own answer to this question consists of four parts that define her theory of 
democratic politics as agonism. First, it is necessary to “de-universalize” political 
subjects and “break with all forms of essentialism” (Mouffe 1999, 754). Second, 
it is necessary to reject extreme forms of particularism and contextualism. Here 
she calls to break “not only the essentialism that penetrates to a large extent the 
basic categories of modern sociology and liberal thought and according to 
which every social identity is perfectly defined in the historical process of the 
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unfolding of being; but also with its diametrical opposite: a certain type of 
extreme post-modern fragmentation of the social that refuses to give the 
fragments any kind of relational identity” (Mouffe 1999, 754). For Mouffe, it is 
important that we don’t fall into the extreme kind of heterogeneity and 
incommensurability because “such a view impedes recognition of how certain 
differences are constructed as relations of subordination and should therefore 
be challenged by radical democratic politics” (1999, 754). In other words, we 
must be careful that our celebration of difference for difference’s sake does not 
ignore the constitutive dimension of power. Third, it is necessary to distinguish 
between ‘the political’ and ‘politics’. By ‘the political’ Mouffe refers “to the 
dimension of antagonism that is inherent in all human society” and by ‘politics’ 
she refers “to the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions that seek to 
establish a certain order and to organize human coexistence in conditions that 
are always potentially conflictual because they are affected by the dimension of 
‘the political’” (1999, 754). Finally, fourth, we need to distinguish between 
‘antagonism’ and ‘agonism’ based on the distinction of the categories ‘enemy’ 
and ‘adversary’. These four are the characteristics of Mouffe’s ‘agonistic 
pluralism’ that reckons with ineradicability of antagonism.   
These characteristics mark the difference between ‘agonistic pluralism’ 
and Habermas’ version of deliberative democracy. First, in making the 
normative move from antagonism to agonism by getting the enemies to adhere 
to the “ethico-political principles of democracy”, Mouffe rejects the rational 
standards of discourse ethics. She writes, “contrary to the model of ‘deliberative 
democracy,’ the model of ‘agonistic pluralism’ that I am advocating asserts that 
the prime task of democratic politics is not to eliminate passions nor to relegate 
them to the private sphere in order to render rational consensus possible, but to 
mobilise those passions towards the promotion of democratic designs” (1999, 
755-756). Second, Mouffe denies the possibility universal rational consensus. 
To assume that there can be consensus is to contradict modern democratic 
logic. For Mouffe, “modern democracy’s specificity lies in the recognition and 
legitimation of conflict and the refusal to suppress it by imposing an 
authoritarian order” (1999, 756). For ‘politics’ to be democratic, it must allow 
“the expression of conflicting interests and values” (Mouffe 1999, 756). 
Habermas’ discourse ethics requires that such conflicts be kept outside ‘moral 
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discourse’ in order to make rational consensus on universal norms possible. 
Young and Dryzek take issues with this requirement but they do not reject it 
fully. Rather they argue to expand the rationality to allow the expression of 
conflict without losing the overall (procedural) constitution of discourse ethics. I 
argue that Mouffe makes a similar move. There is evidence in her work to 
support this claim.  
Throughout her main body of works (1993; 2000; 2005; 2013), and 
especially in the paper on Habermas (1999), Mouffe concedes that consensus 
is necessary. She takes a nuanced position on consensus, just as Young and 
Dryzek do. She writes, “to be sure, pluralist democracy demands a certain 
amount of consensus, but such a consensus concerns only some ethico-
political principles” (1999, 756). However, for Mouffe, it is important that 
consensus remains open as “conflictual consensus” (1999, 756). It must remain 
open to further challenges. In other words, we will agree that we want to adhere 
to democratic principles like liberty and equality but we will disagree about our 
interpretations of them and we will compete as adversaries in trying to 
constitute ‘politics’ in terms of our interpretation of the values. That is how we 
establish ‘hegemony’. Ultimately, it is an act of power. But the prior agreement 
on the values themselves is necessary. It is precisely this agreement that keeps 
us as ‘adversaries’ without becoming ‘enemies’. Also, being ‘adversaries’ does 
not simply require adherence to the symbols such as liberty and equality without 
having to agree on what those symbols mean. Being ‘adversaries’ in an 
agonistic struggle that is true to its own definition requires that the adversaries 
are equal, that is, one does not exercise coercive power over another and it 
also requires that we ‘struggle’ according to the same rules. In other words, 
adversaries follow the same “democratic rules of the game” (see Wenman 
2003, 181-182).   
Habermas must be aware that deliberation is not always a friendly 
exchange between like-minded intellectuals.  After all, discourse for Habermas 
is a problem solving mechanism, a sort of domain where conflicting claims can 
be resolved. As such, it requires that the sides do not coerce one another or 
threaten with violence. It also requires that the sides follow the same rules and 
regulations in exchanging their arguments such as giving each side equal 
opportunity to speak, etc. It is the strict rationality, tendency to abstract and 
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universalize, and pretence for neutrality and impartiality that I am quarrelling 
with. The value of Habermas’ theory of communicative action is in finding these 
kinds of normative regulations strictly in our capacity as beings that 
communicate and use communication as means to induce and organize action. 
Mouffe has to rely on similar grounds to postulate that there can be adversaries 
instead of enemies, and that there can be transformation of antagonism into 
agonism.  
It may be strange to consider Mouffe along with deliberative democrats 
because she argues for an alternative to the theory of deliberative democracy. 
However, I interpret her as an appropriator of discourse ethics in a way that 
addresses its shortcomings on the problems that come with antagonism. Thus, I 
read her as someone who appropriates discourse ethics rather than proposes 
something radically different because she recognizes that “in the end what is 
necessary for a democratic society to function is a set of institutions and 
practices which constitute the framework of a consensus within which pluralism 
can exist” (Mouffe 1992, 13-14).  
All deliberative democracies rely on consensus and adherence to some 
ethico-political ideals. Young argues that inclusion of extra-rational forms of 
communication must still be regulated by common adherence to respecting 
‘self-determination’ and ‘self-development’ and a kind of meta-consensus that 
communication should follow democratic values of “inclusion, political equality, 
reasonableness, and publicity” (2000, 17). Dryzek offers similar kinds of tests 
for checking on what kinds of extra-rational forms of communication can be 
included in deliberation. He also concedes to Mouffe and acknowledges the 
dimensions of antagonism and power (Dryzek 2010, 113-114). He allows 
antagonism but argues that it must be subject to “meta-consensus” (Dryzek 
2010, 114). In similar terms with Mouffe, meta-consensus means adherence to 
democratic values and accepting different interpretations of these values as 
legitimate.  
Mouffe’s ‘agonistic pluralism’ involves appropriation of discourse ethics in 
a way that is similar to Young’s politics of difference and Dryzek’s discursive 
democracy. Particularly, Mouffe’s push for common adherence to ethico-
political norms depends on a form of consensus. Wenman interprets it as a form 
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of “quasi-republican political constitution” (see Wenman 2003, 165-186). He 
suggests that “Mouffe reworks the civic-republican tradition in order to develop 
a theory of single sovereign authority, which is constitutive of the agonistic 
games of a diverse citizenry” (2003, 178). He shows that for Mouffe the main 
question is about having a framework and a constitution that is compatible with 
pluralism and that such a framework is possible within a quasi-republican 
constitution of agonistic politics. The ‘republican’ part of Mouffe’s agonism is in 
her argument that it is possible to have a community not based on substantive 
idea of common good but on common bond and adherence to ethico-political 
principles. That is a form of overlapping consensus because to engage as 
adversaries, the enemies must have an overarching agreement on the 
“democratic rules of the game” (Wenman 2003, 181). However, this consensus 
is not final and can always be renegotiated. 
5.3 Agonistic contestation as interpretive conflicts 
Building on the previous discussion, I now show how agonism can be 
appropriated to include interpretive conflicts as a resource. Based on Mouffe’s 
theoretical framework, it can only be argued that interpretive conflicts occur 
between ‘adversaries’. ‘Enemies’ cannot have interpretive conflicts because 
they do not share the symbols in the discursive field. Adversaries share a 
common allegiance to the democratic principles of ‘liberty and equality for all’ 
while disagreeing about their interpretation.  
Mouffe argues that “in a pluralist democracy, disagreements about how 
to interpret the shared ethico-political principles are not only legitimate but also 
necessary” (2013, 8). They are necessary because they make democratic 
politics more inclusive of difference. The “stuff of democratic politics”, as Mouffe 
refers to it, is the conflicts of interpretation of values and principles to which 
everyone should pledge their allegiance. Allowing interpretive conflicts permits 
“different forms of citizen identification” (2013, 8). Namely, it allows the other to 
contest one’s understanding from its own particular perspective. If interpretive 
conflicts are not allowed, then there is no “democratic outlet” for difference to 
express itself. Mouffe warns that a politics without interpretive conflicts turns 
into “various forms of politics articulated around essentialist identities of a 
nationalist, religious or ethnic type, and for the multiplication of confrontations 
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over non-negotiable moral values, with all the manifestations of violence that 
such confrontations entail” (2013, 8) 
Today, it is uncertain what will come with the general election in the USA 
but one thing is certain: some factions are just off the political spectrum and 
they do not even want to recognize the interpretive aspects of politics. Extreme 
right is on the rise in Europe. Russia is longing for Stalinist monism. In China, 
the established interpretation of free market capitalism according to socialist 
ideals cannot be challenged. In all cases, there is a move away from 
interpretive conflicts which signals that democratic politics and pluralism are in 
danger. I think it is necessary to take Mouffe’s warning seriously. She warns 
that if we do not give democratic expression to interpretive conflicts, they can 
transform into violent conflict. The two kinds of conflict are different in nature. 
The former presupposes dialogue and persuasion while accepting that the 
different other is valid, whereas the latter presupposes undermining the validity 
of the different other altogether.  
Hence, interpretive conflicts is not just the stuff of democratic politics but 
the only way in which adversaries can engage and encounter one another. 
Another kind of conflict would transform them into enemies. Having taken the 
problems and dangers of disregarding interpretive conflicts from Mouffe, it must 
be noted that her solution is not fully in line with our ideal of pluralism. Mouffe 
wants to establish agonistic contestation in the form of a dia-logue between left 
and right, whereas the dialogue in pluralism as engagement and encounter is 
more in the sense of a pluri-logue. One could say that Mouffe’s idea of 
interpretive conflicts is purely political. In politics, there cannot be anything but 
the left and right. She wants the return of ‘the political’ in terms of the 
interpretive conflicts between the Left and the Right.  
However, in plural societies interpretive conflicts over values involve 
such issues as women’s rights, freedom of speech, right to life, where the 
antagonism between the left and the right does not clarify anything. In light of 
these problems that show a more complex picture of plurality in modern 
societies, I wish to appropriate agonism as a mode of interpretive contestation 
when the ethico-political consensus comes under question and communication 
breaks down because there are competing interpretations of the guiding values 
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and principles themselves. For instance, we can engage in an agonistic mode 
of contestation over concrete ways of interpreting and instantiating openness. It 
does not need to be a conflict between left and right. It is a conflict between 
understandings, and therefore, a conflict of interpretations. 
5.4 Agonism as instantiation of openness in democratic politics 
If we accept the argument in chapter 2 that pluralism as engagement and 
encounter entails interpretive conflicts because of the nature of understanding, 
then in my view it is necessary to take into account that the dimension of 
“conflict” can take another form. If we accept Mouffe’s account of ‘the political’, 
then we need to acknowledge that engagement between, for instance, social 
groups or discourses can be based on a we/they discrimination in two forms 
(see Mouffe 1993, 77): antagonistic (as enemies) and agonistic (as 
adversaries). Antagonism is inherent and always a possibility, hence its 
ontological dimension, and agonism depends on the normative move specified 
in Section 5.2. I think in politics it is necessary to be ready for openness to a 
kind of other that poses an antagonistic relationship, i.e. the kind of other that 
denies the very principles by which we are open to it and are willing to 
encounter it. As Mouffe writes, “indeed, we approach the moment of 
antagonism when the ‘other’, who up until now has been considered as 
different, starts to be perceived as someone who is rejecting ‘my’ identity and 
who is threatening ‘my’ existence” (Mouffe 1994, 108).  
When pushing for engagement and encounter of the other, it is 
necessary to be aware of the possibility that there is a we/they plurality that can 
turn into friend/enemy confrontation. Mouffe’s argument that antagonism cannot 
be eliminated or confined to the private sphere is compelling (see Mouffe 1993, 
111; 2000, 21)77. Liberal democrats as well as Habermas are aware of this 
problem. That is why the former promote the principle of tolerance and the latter 
advocates leaving our particularities behind. Obviously, the idea of pluralism I 
pursue in this research overrides these “measures”. If we still want to promote 
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 Mouffe writes: “The novelty of democratic politics is not the overcoming of this 
us/them opposition – which is an impossibility – but the different way in which it is established. 
The crucial issue is to establish this us/them discrimination in a way that is compatible with 
pluralist democracy. Envisaged from the point of view of ‘agonistic pluralism’, the aim of 
democratic politics is to construct the ‘them’ in such a way that it is no longer perceived as an 
enemy to be destroyed, but as an ‘adversary’, that is, somebody whose ideas we combat but 




that participants do not leave their particularities behind and encounter each 
other’s commitments, we need to have a normative idea that can prevent 
“interpretive conflicts” from turning into antagonism, which Mouffe has shown as 
a constant possibility78. Neither Gadamer’s principle of openness, nor 
asymmetric reciprocity or reflexivity give us guidance on how to practice 
openness towards an “enemy”.  
For this reason I find Mouffe’s argument to transform antagonism into 
agonism through a normative move from enemy to adversary particularly useful. 
Drawing on Mouffe, in this section, I develop an account of ‘agonism’ as a mode 
of openness that can complement asymmetric reciprocity and reflexivity in 
democratic politics.  
Previously, ‘agonism’ was defined as struggle between adversaries. An 
adversary, is a “legitimate enemy, an enemy with whom we have in common a 
shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of democracy” (Mouffe 1999, 
755)79. On this basis, antagonism as a form of conflictual relationship between 
enemies can be transformed into agonism as a form of conflictual relationship 
when enemies become adversaries. That is, once we agree that we all adhere 
to follow such principles as openness, liberty, equality, we do not contest the 
principles themselves, only our interpretations of them and the way we want to 
organize our common discursive field in relationship to them. Thus, the 
normative move from enemies to adversaries involves us recognizing that we all 
adhere to the same principles and agree to contest according to set rules. 
Agonism implies a struggle between equal adversaries, and therefore 
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  For example, “In a pluralist democracy, disagreements about how to interpret the 
shared ethico-political principles are not only legitimate but also necessary. They allow for 
different forms of citizenship identification and are the stuff of democratic politics. When the 
agonistic dynamics of pluralism are hindered because of a lack of democratic forms of 
identifications, then passions cannot be given a democratic outlet. The ground is therefore laid 
for various forms of politics articulated around essentialist identities of a nationalist, religious or 
ethnic type, and for the multiplication of confrontations over non-negotiable moral values, with 
all the manifestations of violence that such confrontations entail” (Mouffe 2013: 8). 
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 More specifically, Mouffe defines adversary as “an enemy, but a legitimate enemy, 
one with whom we have some common ground because we have a shared adhesion to the 
ethico-political principles of liberal democracy: liberty and equality. But we disagree concerning 
the meaning and implementation of those principles, and such a disagreement is not the one 
that could be resolved through deliberation and rational discussion. Indeed given the 
ineradicable pluralism of value, there is no rational resolution of the conflict, hence its 




eliminates strategic contestations that can be supported by financial resources, 
power relations and etc.  
Further drawing on Mouffe, we should not think of adversaries in liberal 
terms as competitors. Competitors can compete with regards to different 
economic and political interests without challenging the underlying political 
institutions or hegemonic interpretations of set values and principles (see 
Mouffe 2013, 8f). The category of adversary maintains a critical edge that 
“competitors” does not because it allows for articulations that challenge the 
underlying institutions and hegemonic establishments. It is a radical form of 
dissent without threatening the underlying principles of openness, liberty, and 
equality. An adversarial confrontation is “a real confrontation, but one that is 
played out under the conditions regulated by a set of democratic procedures 
accepted by the adversaries” (Mouffe 2013, 9). It is on the basis of this term 
that, for instance, Fraser notes a fundamental similarity between Mouffe and 
deliberative democrats80.  
However, there is a crucial difference between the deliberative 
democrats we have looked at here and Mouffe81. It has to do with Mouffe’s 
emphasis that her formulation of agonistic struggle in terms of confrontation 
between adversaries entails a certain form of “conversion”, whereas deliberative 
democrats of the Habermasian strand emphasise on the “process of rational 
persuasion” (Mouffe 2000, 102; emphasis added). This distinction raises an 
important problem for my own approach based on Gadamer’s principle of 
openness. On the one hand, the hermeneutic premises on which I rely to 
develop an account of asymmetric reciprocity and reflexivity do not allow 
“conversion” per se; on the other hand, however, given the argument that 
“hermeneutic experience” entails a shift in self-understanding, there is certainly 
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 Dryzek, for instance, argues (or, perhaps, even frustrated) that he cannot identify a 




 Of course, there are other ways to differentiate deliberative democrats from agonists. 
Wenman, for instance, argues that agonists have three aspects in common: constitutive view of 
pluralism, tragic view of the world, and value of conflict for democratic politics (see Wenman 
2013). According to him, those who see Mouffe and deliberative democrats in similar terms 
ignore that there is a “basic incommensurability between a model of democracy where contest 
and fallibility are understood as contingent limitations on otherwise potentially rational forms of 
democratic will formation, and the wholeheartedly tragic vision of agonistic democracy where 
conflict is understood as intrinsic to political life” (Wenman 2013: 85). 
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conversion in the sense of an aspect change present in the encounter with the 
other.  
It is necessary to understand the difference between these two forms of 
conversion. I wish to reject Mouffe’s idea of “conversion” for two reasons. First, 
it can preclude bilateral understanding presupposed in Gadamer’s ‘fusion of 
horizons’. Two, I think the Gadamerian argument for a shift in self-
understanding is based on a conception of reason that resembles more closely 
persuasion (recall that for Gadamer the heart of hermeneutics has to do with 
assumption that the other might be right) rather than conversion. I imagine that 
Mouffe’s idea of conversion does not sit well with Gadamer’s philosophy 
because it implies a certain form of “appropriation” of the other. Let us resolve 
this by first looking at Mouffe’s argument. For Mouffe,  
To accept the view of the adversary is to undergo a radical 
change in political identity. It is more a sort of conversion than 
a process of rational persuasion (in the same way as Thomas 
Kuhn has argued that adherence to a new scientific paradigm 
is a conversion). Compromises are, of course, also possible; 
they are part and parcel of politics, but they should be seen as 
temporary respites in an ongoing confrontation” (Mouffe 2000, 
102; emphasis as in the original). 
Mouffe’s line “to accept the view of adversary is to undergo a radical 
change in political identity” bears resemblance to what Taylor draws from 
Gadamer as “goal-revision”. Recall that for Taylor it is necessary to be ready to 
undergo a change in ourselves because we have an identity investment in our 
view of the other. This feature of “conversion” keeps democracy vibrant. If 
“conversion” is defined as accepting the adversary’s view, then not accepting 
the other’s view constitutes the we/they differentiation. This differentiation is the 
stuff of adversarial struggle in Mouffe’s agonism. The struggle is to convert the 
other, which the antagonistic dimension never brings to completion.  
I am concerned that Mouffe’s conversion falls short of Gadamer’s idea of 
‘fusion of horizons’, which I have taken as a model of understanding in this 
research. According to Mouffe’s definition of the term, it is not necessary that 
conversion is bilateral. It is enough that one of the adversaries undergoes a shift 
in identity, rather than both. My Gadamerian position is different. I would rather 
think about conversion as bilateral in the sense of ‘fusion of horizons’ in which 
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both sides undergo a change. Recall that for Gadamer’s “fusion” both horizons 
must undergo a shift and change. I think a Gadamerian articulation of 
conception is more conducive and committed to the ideal of pluralism than 
Mouffe’s because it promotes engagement and encounter to reach 
understanding between parties rather than strategic conversion and 
appropriation of the other. I am aware that in the political field Mouffe’s idea of 
“conversion” is a more realistically descriptive term. If struggles between 
adversaries persist on conversion, I think that at least it is necessary to maintain 
Gadamer’s ‘fusion of horizons’ as a normative ideal against which Mouffe’s 
conception of “conversions” can be evaluated82.  
The other question then is: if Gadamerian premise draws me away from 
Mouffe’s idea of “conversion”, where does it put me in relation to Habermasian 
“persuasion”? In Habermasian terms, persuasion is always the result of rational 
argumentation, i.e. rational redeeming of validity claims. In a certain sense, I am 
obliged to be persuaded when presented with a rational argument. In the end, I 
am the judge of whether I am persuaded or not, however, I also need to offer 
rational argument for rejecting persuasion. Given the dangers of Habermasian 
rationality that I identified previously, “persuasion” also depends on certain 
qualifiers.  
 According to Gadamer, ‘fusion of horizons’ involves the relationship 
between reason, prejudice, and tradition. From his perspective, Habermasian 
emphasis on persuasion is based on the Enlightenment’s conception of reason 
as diametrically opposed to authority and tradition. That is, persuasion must be 
accepted by the other side only when reason appeals to rational principles 
rather than to the authority of any particular tradition or prejudice. In this way, 
Habermasian deliberative democrats make sure that no one blindly obeys any 
general norms and principles based on arbitrary authority and the will of any 
individuals or traditions. 
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 An issue rises here: fusion of horizons can then mean that all competing 
interpretations at some point converge into one single view (which would be an un-Gadamerian) 
and eradicate conflict, whereas Mouffe’s “conversion” implies a certain resistance between 
adversaries because precisely accepting the articulation of one would convert the other. 
Therefore, Mouffe preserves the role of adversarial conflict as conditions of possibility for 
democratic politics. With Gadamer, fusion does not necessarily mean that the two parties 
ascend, so to speak, to a common understanding. They do not “walk away” with identical 
understanding. Therefore, there is no final and complete understanding to be arrived at when all 




Gadamer challenges the opposition between reason and tradition. For 
him, authority indeed cannot be arbitrary. “The authority of persons is ultimately 
based not on the subjection and abdication of reason but on an act of 
acknowledgement and knowledge – the knowledge, namely, that the other is 
superior to oneself in judgement and insight and that for this reason his 
judgement takes precedence – i.e. it has priority over one’s own” (Gadamer 
2013, 291). It is easy to conclude that the difference between Gadamer and 
Habermas is that the former has in mind the authority of a definite subject such 
as a teacher, a lawyer, an expert and the latter has in mind the authority of the 
subjectless rationality in general and rule of law in particular83. However, 
according to Gadamer, authority cannot just be bestowed upon anybody (see 
2013, 291ff). It must be backed by reason, otherwise it is arbitrary. On this 
basis, he argues that the person who simply obeys something without reason is 
slavish and one who obeys authority backed by reason is undogmatic 
(Gadamer 2013, 364-369).  
I do not assume to reconcile Habermas’ opposition to Gadamer on this 
matter. However, there is certain sense of persuasion that must take place 
Gadamer’s ‘fusion of horizons’ too. That is, one must be persuaded by the 
authority and tradition to take into account what it has to say and perhaps even 
give it priority on the account of that persuasion. For this reason I am more 
inclined to lean towards “persuasion” rather than Mouffe’s “conversion”. 
Especially, given that in chapters 3 and 4 it has been established that forms of 
communication such as greeting, narratives, and rhetoric are also a form of 
persuasion rather than conversion of the other.  Thus, persuasion can maintain 
difference. It does not preclude ‘fusion of horizons’, or engagement and 
encounter across difference, or result in the appropriation of the other. With 
persuasion, it is possible to retain an aspect change that comes about with 
“goal-revision” or a change in self-understanding.  
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 Gadamer too is a proponent of rule of law and he would object to interpreting him as 
someone who promotes something other than the rule of law. For instance, Gadamer argues 
that legal hermeneutics would be impossible if there was no rule of law: “Thus it is an essential 
condition of the possibility of legal hermeneutics that law is binding on all members of the 
community in the same way. Where this is not the case – for example in an absolutist state, 
where the state will of the absolute ruler is above the law – hermeneutics cannot exist” 




Having identified the aspect of Mouffe agonism to which I think we 
should not subscribe, I will now focus on the aspects of agonism that I 
appropriate as a mode of openness. First, it is the ethico-political bond that 
agonism requires (see Mouffe 1993, 69-73). Agonism requires that parties are 
equal, that they follow the same rules, and have well-defined boundaries for 
their engagement. The analogue to agonism is a sports game or a competition, 
for instance a boxing match, in which both fighters must be equally matched 
and fight each other according to set rules. Otherwise, it is not boxing. Similarly, 
adversaries agree that they will adhere to, for instance as Mouffe suggests, 
“liberty and equality”, they agree to respect each other’s interpretations of these 
principles and respect each other’s rights to fight for this interpretations, and 
they also agree to fight for it on equal terms. When defined in such a way, 
agonism gives a definite political boundary to democratic politics that 
instantiates openness in the modes of asymmetric reciprocity and reflexivity.  
In chapter 1, I noted that Gutmann and Thompson critique of prioritizing 
procedures over constitutional constraints must be taken into account (see 
Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 17, 200, 216; see also 2005, chapter 3). They 
argue that it is important to impose some constitutional constraints on the 
procedure. I also noted that it is worth turning to Mouffe in addressing this 
critique because she gives a better account of what is at stake in establishing 
constitutional constraints.  
Part of the problem in the challenge of plurality is to constitute a 
commonality between people that have little in common. In part, politics is about 
rank-ordering values that are otherwise incommensurable and cannot be rank-
ordered. This task entails conflict between different sources of values. What 
Mouffe puts on the table is that commitment to pluralism does not only entail an 
engagement and encounter to reach understanding. It also entails a sense of 
confrontation, so there is a conflictual dimension to engaging and encountering 
the other. Mouffe helps me answer the question: if there is a conflictual 
dimension in the relationship with the other, how is it possible to practice 
openness towards the other who contests the very principles that allow our 
engagement and encounter. Agonism contains the categories of enemy and 
adversary that are important in answering this question. 
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However, turning to Mouffe’s agonism poses certain issues for my 
project. My research assumes a position within Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics and claims that what should take place above and beyond 
engagement and encounter is understanding. Mouffe’s agonism is not 
concerned with understanding. Rather, it is concerned with strategic discursive 
articulations by different groups; it is concerned with practices and activities that 
constitute identity (Wenman 2003, 167) and, above all, Mouffe’s agonism is 
concerned with preventing the “return of the political” in its antagonistic form: an 
uncompromising conflict between enemies that are out to destroy each other. 
Therefore, it is necessary to address the question how to appropriate agonism 
as a mode of openness that somehow does not eliminate the need for 
understanding, engagement, and encounter of the other in their otherness and 
whether, given its strategic orientation to dominate the shared discursive field, 
agonism runs contrary to the principle of openness. In other words, if we are to 
introduce agonistic struggle as an element of democratic politics, do we not 
nullify the normative function of openness in plurlaism?  
I think rejecting Mouffe’s emphasis on conversion softens this problem. 
As I argued above, conversion resembles appropriation of the other rather than 
understanding the other and therefore runs contrary to Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics. However, just rejecting conversion as the force that fuels 
agonistic struggle does not make it conducive to understanding and the criteria 
of pluralism I am promoting here. Additionally, I think it is necessary to amplify 
first, her argument that subject positions are relational (be they individual 
identities or social groups as in Young) because it allows Gadamer’s 
hermeneutical experience and openness, second, her emphasis on the role of 
tradition, and third, what Wenman identifies as the “quasi-republican” features in 
Mouffe’s thought (Wenman 2003). 
Recall that the ontological dimension of antagonism points at the radical 
negativity of the social. This means that construction of identities, articulation of 
discourses, establishment of objectivities – all are relational and cannot be in 
isolation. In the Return of the Political, Mouffe argues that in order to make 
democratic politics capable of meeting the challenges of growing plurality in the 
contemporary world,  
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it is indispensible to develop a theory of the subject as a 
decentred, detotalized agent, a subject constructed at the 
point of intersection of a multiplicity of subject positions 
between which there exists no a priori or necessary relation 
and whose articulation is the result of hegemonic practices. 
Consequently, no identity is ever definitively established, there 
always being a certain degree of openness and ambiguity in 
the way the different subject positions are articulated (1993, 
12).  
In my opinion, this prevents the sense of finality that the strategic aspects of 
agonistic struggle entails and allows a certain level of hermeneutical 
experience. It does so because the impossibility of finality and the radical 
negativity must presuppose the inevitability of negative experience the way 
Gadamer means it. In the book, a few pages later Mouffe accepts the 
importance of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics for understanding the 
conception of divided self (see 1993, 16-17)84. More importantly, she accepts 
how situatedness and finitude of understanding make it necessary for us to turn 
to Gadamer’s model of understanding outlined above: “it is precisely these 
prejudices that define our hermeneutical situation and constitute our condition of 
understanding and openness to the world” (Mouffe 1993, 17)85. Emphasising 
this point brings Mouffe closer to the way Young (2000)86 and Dryzek (2010b, 
6)87 understand divided self and exposes the compatibility of central features of 
agonism with the ontological dimension of human finitude, which points towards 
the necessity of openness. 
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 In this work, Mouffe points at the importance of conservative philosophy for better 
ways to think politically on the relationship between tradition and democratic politics. She writes: 
“This importance afforded to tradition is also one of the principal themes of Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics, which offers us a number of important ways of thinking about the 
construction of the political subject” (1993: 16-17) 
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 Though she explicitly turns to Wittgenstein in order to make the “conception of 
tradition found in Gadamer … more specific and complex” (see 1993: 17f) 
 
86
 For Young the complexity of divided self is constituted by perspectives, interests, 
opinions, and groups. 
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  However, Mouffe is not interested in the problems the idea of divided self poses for 
representation. While Mouffe is concerned with it in terms of the problems it poses in thinking 
about politics generally, Dryzek and Young are concerned with the problems it poses for 
representation. Dryzek understands himself and Young to be consistent with what Castiglione 
and Warren put: “From the perspective of those who are represented, what is represented are 





Still building on Gadamer’s rehabilitated conception of tradition, Mouffe 
argues that it is necessary to think of tradition as fluid and amenable to change. 
For Mouffe, the democratic tradition is an exemplar of what counts as a 
Gadamerian view of tradition. The democratic tradition is “composite, 
heterogeneous, open, and ultimately indeterminate”; “several possible 
strategies are always available, not only in the sense of the different 
interpretations one can make of the same element, but also because of the way 
in which some parts or aspects of tradition can be played against others” 
(Mouffe 1993, 17-18). For Gadamer, hermeneutics can only be possible in such 
a tradition. In the section on legal hermeneutics, one can understand Gadamer, 
as Michael Marder does (2010, 307), as arguing that hermeneutics requires a 
tradition like the democratic tradition. Gadamer writes: “thus it is an essential 
condition of the possibility of legal hermeneutics that law is binding on all 
members of the community in the same way. Where this is not the case – for 
example in an absolutist state, where the state will of the absolute ruler is above 
the law – hermeneutics cannot exist” (2013, 338). Recall that for Gadamer the 
bridge between tradition and reason is built by reflection: reflection, as he 
argued against Habermas, can only be from within tradition not outside it and 
tradition can have legitimate authority when it allows reflection and reflexive 
change. Democratic tradition is an example of this. It is crucial to underline that 
Mouffe understands tradition in these terms in order to amplify the “quasi-
republican” features of Mouffe’s agonism, the third aspect to draw from in 
develop an account of “agonism” as a mode of instantiation of openness. 
We have seen that in order to agonism to be possible, plural political 
community needs to be based on a certain common bond on ethico-political 
principles. I follow Wenman (2003) in conceiving Mouffe’s emphasis on ethico-
political principles as a reworking of the “civic-republican model in order to 
develop a theory of single sovereign authority, which is constitutive of agonistic 
games of a diverse citizenry” (178)88. He calls it a “quasi-republican 
constitutionalism”, which “imposes neither a culturally homogenous 
Gemeinschaft model of the political nor any spurious liberal notion of cultural 
neutrality” (Wenman 2003, 181). The “quasi-republican constitution” that we get 
from Mouffe resembles the function of meta-consensus in deliberative 
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 See, for example, Mouffe 1993: 19-20 
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democracy (see Dryzek and Niemeyer 2006; Dryzek 2010, chapter 5). Both 
establish the necessary democratic rules of the game in which exclusions can 
occur but they can always be renegotiated (see Wenman 2013, 182). It is this 
conception of conflictual and temporary consensus and a sense for unity that 
separates Mouffe from other agonists (see Wenman 2013, 197-201) and offers 
the basis for Breen (2009) and Knops (2007) to argue that Mouffe’s agonism 
resembles deliberative democracy.  
The internal debate within agonistic tradition with regards to Mouffe 
notwithstanding, the “quasi-republican constitutionalism” of agonism makes it a 
suitable mode of openness towards the kinds of others with whom there is a 
possibility of antagonism. By appropriating agonism, we retain the crucial 
distinction between antagonism and agonism, enemies and adversaries that are 
helpful in defining the relationship with the other and the boundaries for the 
conflict that might emerge. Given the inherent interpretive conflicts in pluralism, 
it is necessary to take seriously the different forms interpretive conflict can take. 
Agonism is a suitable mode of openness that protects the principle of openness 
itself.  
I insist on including Mouffe in a predominantly Habermasian corps of 
thinkers because she points out the dimensions of human relations I would 
otherwise ignore. She poses the problem of the dimension in human affairs that 
is hard to solve. What Wenman identifies as her exclusive focus on avoiding 
“the return of the political by sublimating the irreducible potential of antagonism” 
(2013, 182) is a bit too narrow indeed. Yet, Mouffe poses a problem that, I think, 
is staring us in the face today. If we want to remain true to pluralism, then we 
must be ready to engage and encounter the kinds of others that deny pluralism 
its rightful place in democratic societies. Agonism is the way to be open towards 
them. It offers categories that establish boundaries within which this encounter 
takes place: we either encounter the otherness within a shared discursive field 
and common political bond, and proceed as adversaries, or we encounter the 
otherness with which we do not share a discursive field or allegiance to 
principles that give us a common political bond, and on that basis the other 
denies our right to be, and so we proceed as enemies. 
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In appropriating agonism as a mode of openness, I have rejected 
Mouffe’s emphasis on conversion and amplified her argument that in order to 
think agonistically we need to think of subject positions as relational, we need to 
take into account the role of tradition, and we need to conceive of unity in the 
political field in terms of political bonds in adherence to ethico-political 
principles. For us, they would be openness, liberty, and equality.  
This last point is consistent with Gadamer’s idea of wholeness and 
completeness. For Gadamer, the extent of mutual benefits in engagement 
between different interpretations of a text depends on fitting one’s interpretation 
(differentially) within the whole meaning of the text. Every interpretation 
anticipates certain completeness and wholeness. It is interesting how Wenman 
observes that Mouffe’s agonism offers a quasi-republican constitution that gives 
an overlapping order, unity, and authority to the complex plurality that plays out 
in the political field (see Wenman 2013, 200-201). It gives an anticipation of 
completeness, even if completeness is never achieved, wholeness, and 
directedness to different interpretations, practices, articulations, activities that 
would otherwise look chaotic. Difference, contestation, and plurality in 
democratic theory make it seem like democracy overall is hopeless. However, 
the fact that we agree that we want “democratic politics” and “pluralism” gives a 
certain unifying discursive field within which we offer one or another ways to 
rank-order values and principles.  
With Mouffe, we can answer the question how can there be pluralism 
and democracy if we accept the dimension of ‘the political’. The dimension of 
‘the political’ shows that pluralism as engagement and encounter may not 
always be about understanding across differences. If politics is about rank-
ordering incommensurable values, and there will always be a conflict with gains 
and cost, then pluralism can also entail a struggle and competition between 
different sources. The question is, how openness can be practiced if in such 
political struggle openness can result in a cost one is not ready to accept. The 
answer we get with Mouffe is to differentiate between enemies and adversaries. 
If the struggle consists in interpretive conflicts over common values and 
principles, then we compete as adversaries. Adversaries want to adhere to 
pluralism and democracy, they just disagree about the specific ways of 
instantiating them and the rank-ordering of other principles. It does not mean 
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that understanding across differences is eliminated. To be sure, there could not 
be a struggle if the sides did not understand each other’s differences in their 
otherness. But the goal in agonism is not reaching understanding. It is 
establishing a commonality in a such a way that will allow the other to contest it. 
So, in the agonistic mode of openness, we are open to the other’s otherness, 
we accept its validity, and its right to express itself. It is a mode of openness 
because agonism is about struggle that lets sides challenge each other’s 
prejudices. Only, this struggle does not have understanding as its end. This 
struggle must have a winner, albeit a temporary one.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have developed an account of agonism as a protective 
mode of openness that protects pluralism and democratic politics from the kinds 
of others that might challenge the principles of pluralism and democracy. If we 
are committed to be open to the other in their otherness, then we need to know 
how to be open to those that take extremist positions and claim ultimate truths 
that can override the principles of openness and democracy. I have developed 
this account by drawing from Mouffe’s work. In section 5.1 I drew the 
implications of the antagonistic dimension of ‘the political’ for pluralism and 
discourse ethics. The danger of pluralism is engaging and encountering the 
other who might pose an antagonistic relation. Discourse ethics endangers 
democracy because it does not let antagonism express itself through such 
democratic outlets as interpretive conflicts. In Section 5.2, I brought Mouffe 
closer to the core ideas of deliberative democracy by arguing that agonistic 
contestation must rely on discourse ethics. In order to transform enemies into 
adversaries, there must be a procedural consensus between the sides and an 
agreement to adhere to the same ethico-political principles. I argued that in 
order to make this a possibility, it is necessary to rely on discourse ethics. In 
light of this premise, I have appropriated ‘agonism’ with its normative function in 
creating a common ethico-political bond and transforming enemies into 
adversaries. In Section 5.3, I looked how interpretive conflicts can be 
understood in the agonistic framework. I established that interpretive conflicts 
allow a democratic outlet for the passions and the expression of the 
antagonistic dimension in such a way that does not threaten democracy and 
pluralism. In Section 5.4, I have amplified three aspects of agonism that help 
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instantiate it as a mode of openness and rejected its emphasis on “conversion” 
because it consonant with Gadamer’s principle of openness. I amplified her 
argument that subject positions are relational because it allows Gadamer’s 
principle of openness. I amplified her emphasis on the fluidity of the democratic 
tradition, which is in accordance with Gadamer’s view of tradition. This has 
allowed to amplify the quasi-republican features of agonism in the way it 
requires a commonality in the ethico-political principles. The last feature is 
useful in practicing openness to the kinds of others that pose a threat to 






In the course of this dissertation, I have argued that democratic politics 
requires a commitment to pluralism as engagement and encounter of the other 
in their otherness in order to address the problem of incomplete understanding. 
I have established Gadamer’s principle of openness as a guide for such a 
commitment. I have suggested that democratic politics can instantiate the 
principle of openness in the modes of asymmetric reciprocity, reflexivity, and 
agonism.  
In Part 1, I established the connection between discourse, pluralism, and 
democratic politics by drawing on Habermas’ discourse ethics and clarified how 
incomplete understanding complicates the commitment to pluralism by drawing 
on Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. I have highlighted the significance of 
encountering and engaging the other in their otherness in addressing the 
problem of incomplete understanding, showed why incomplete understanding is 
a permanent feature of human understanding and how it gives rise to 
interpretive conflicts, and established the significance of Gadamer’s principle of 
openness for a democratic politics that is committed to pluralism. 
With Habermas’ help, we have understood that one of the implications of 
incomplete understanding can be the breakdown of communicative action. 
Communicative action is important for coordinating social and political affairs in 
modern societies. A breakdown occurs due to misunderstanding between 
parties or misunderstanding of the general values and norms. When this occurs, 
participants enter into discourse situation in order to restore understanding. As 
Habermas puts it, the challenges of plural societies leave us “no alternative 
except to locate normative basis for social interaction in the rational structure of 
communication itself” (Habermas 1993, xx). Thus, we have looked at discourse 
as a problem solving mechanism in plural societies, which makes it central for 
democratic politics in plural societies. Without discourse, democracy and 
pluralism can be endangered as the alternatives are restoration through the 
principle of majority rule or coercion. So long as there is discourse to fall back to 
in the cases of moral disagreement and division that come from incomplete 
understanding, pluralism and democratic politics can be maintained. This 
signalled us the mutual relationship between discourse, pluralism, and 
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democratic politics in the context of modern politics. Without discourse, 
democratic politics cannot commit to pluralism as engagement and encounter. It 
can only commit to pluralism as power sharing and processes of government on 
the basis of the normative functions of such ideas as separation of powers, 
separation of church and state, checks and balances, and individual liberties.  
Thus, we adopted two features of discourse: first, discourse as problem 
solving mechanism when incomplete understanding results in the breakdown of 
coordinated action, and second discourse as a medium in which participants’ 
understanding can go “beyond the provincial limits of their particular form of life” 
(Habermas 1990, 202). In this manner, we understood discourse as a medium 
for intersubjective engagement and encounter that mitigates the problem of 
incomplete understanding because it “excludes surreptitious privileging of 
individual viewpoints and demands the coordination of all of the interpretive 
perspectives that tend toward individualism and pluralistic fragmentation” 
(Habermas 1993, 52).  
With Gadamer’s help, we saw how the problem of incomplete 
understanding complicates commitment to pluralism through discourse in a 
fundamental way. For Gadamer, incomplete understanding is a permanent 
feature of human understanding because we are historical beings. This means 
that incomplete understanding gives rise to interpretive conflicts, which 
Habermas relegates from moral discourse into ethical discourse. However, 
since incomplete understanding is a feature of understanding itself, interpretive 
conflicts become unavoidable and blur the distinction between ethical and moral 
discourses.   
Discourse itself is the medium where engagement and encounter across 
differences can happen, and therefore, it is necessary to expand the strict 
standards of rationality of Habermas’ discourse ethics which govern it. We saw 
that the ontological dimension of human finitude and the hermeneutic 
dimensions of understanding require the rethinking of discourse ethics. For 
instance, a Gadamerian perspective on discourse makes the Kantian idea of 
moral respect problematic because we cannot assume to view things from the 
perspective of the other because we cannot fully occupy their hermeneutic 
situation – the totality of their life-story. Rather, we must depend on them to 
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disclose their perspective to us, which requires that we abandon the 
requirement of abstraction and strict rationality of Habermas’ discourse ethics. 
For the other to disclose itself to us, we need to allow particularities.  
This has shown the importance of Gadamer’s principle of openness in 
addressing the problem of understanding. We have seen that the principle is 
suitable for beings with incomplete understanding by drawing from Gadamer’s 
use of hermeneutical experience as “genuine experience”. Thus, we have 
sought to appeal to deliberative theory of democracy and work out how the 
principle of openness can be instantiated in democratic politics. 
To this end, in Part 2, we turned to three theorists that critically engaged 
with discourse ethics: Young, Dryzek, and Mouffe. By drawing from them, we 
have developed accounts of asymmetric reciprocity, reflexivity, and agonism as 
modes of instantiation of the principle of openness in democratic politics.  
For a liberal commitment to pluralism, a democratic politics consisting in 
separation of powers, checks and balances, separation of church and state, 
neutral processes of government, strict distinction between the private and the 
public, individual rights and freedoms are sufficient. If we accept that this does 
not solve the problem of incomplete understanding in plural societies, and that 
to solve it we need a kind of pluralism as engagement and encounter of the 
other, then it is necessary to instantiate the principle of openness in democratic 
politics. I suggest my account of asymmetric reciprocity, reflexivity, and agonism 
as a way for democratic politics to do so and commit to pluralism as 
engagement and encounter of the other.  
Asymmetric reciprocity 
In chapter 1, we saw that in discourse ethics for agreement to be 
possible in moral discourse, the universalization principle (U) requires that 
participants take the “moral point of view”, which “requires that maxims and 
contested interests be generalized, which compels the participants to transcend 
the social and historical context of the particular form of life and particular 
community and adopt the perspectives of all those possibly affected” 
(Habermas 1993, 24). By taking the moral point of view participants can 
transcend the “provincial limits of their own particular form of life” (Habermas 
1999, 202). In chapter 2, we have seen from Gadamer’s perspective that this 
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kind of Kantian transcendence is impossible due to the ontological constraints 
of human finitude and the hermeneutic dimensions of understanding. With 
Gadamer we saw that incomplete understanding is a permanent feature of 
human understanding because we are historical beings and, as historical 
beings, we are finite in our understanding. Therefore, the very problem which 
discourse ethics is set up to address in plural societies constrains it. 
We are finite within our hermeneutic situation. And our transcendence 
from this situatedness cannot be achieved monologically. Habermas is correct 
to underline the intersubjective feature of discourse which helps one to leave 
the “provincial limits of their own particular form of life”; however he ignores the 
role of the other in this task. Gadamer highlights the role of encountering and 
engaging with the other in expanding our finitude. The strangeness of the other 
illuminates our own prejudices and our own individuality. We are always already 
alienated by this strangeness because in each case “alienation is inextricably 
given with the individuality of the Thou” (Gadamer 2013, 186).  
In making this argument, Gadamer was responding to Schleiermacher, 
who universalized hermeneutics as a method for interpreting not just texts but 
the discourse of everyday life. For Schleiermacher it was important to 
understand the context and author’s idiosyncrasies in order to fully transpose 
oneself to the author’s perspective, to see things as s/he did, and understand 
her work within its own horizon. This is similar to taking the moral point of view, 
which requires the presumption that we know and understand fully the person 
whose perspective we are taking. Gadamer argued that Schleiermacher’s task 
is not possible. That is because we are distant from the author not just by time 
and space but, more importantly, because we cannot relive the same life as the 
author. Same goes for encountering and understanding the other. Habermas’ 
moral point of view presupposes the mistaken view that we can adopt 
accurately “the perspectives of all those possibly affected”. Taking the moral 
point of view this way means elimination of the strangeness of the other, 
appropriation of the other into our own horizon, and erasing the otherness of the 
other. This undermines pluralism. To encounter, engage and understand the 
other in their otherness, Gadamer shows, it is precisely ourselves in our own 
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individuality that we must bring to this encounter89. Asymmetric reciprocity does 
just that. 
Asymmetric reciprocity helps to genuinely encounter and engage the 
other in their otherness as instantiation of Gadamer’s principle of openness in 
democratic politics. We have followed Gadamer in his argument that in order to 
truly learn from the text and expand our horizon from this experience, we need 
to be open to its otherness, we need to be open for it to say something new to 
us, and we need to be open to its otherness to challenge our own prejudices. 
We can only learn from the text if we are willing to put our prejudices to the test. 
Gadamer’s concept of openness means readiness to revise our prejudices and, 
if need be, revise our own self-understanding.  
Habermas’ discourse ethics requires us to transcend ourselves rather 
than make ourselves available to the encounter with otherness. That is required 
in order to realize the ideal speech situation and achieve understanding. As we 
have seen in chapter 2, the hermeneutical dimensions of understanding show 
that not only is it impossible to transcend and detach from our particularity, but 
that it is also undesirable. It is impossible because the particularities still inform 
our understanding and draw the lines of its finitude and it is undesirable 
because by detaching from ourselves we make our own prejudices unavailable 
to the other, we do not let the other illuminate our finitude, and we do not 
encounter the other in their otherness. Following Young, we have established 
that this kind of transcendence brings about “politically suspect” results.  
Thus, if we accept the Gadamerian account of finitude and incomplete 
understanding, and if we accept his principle of openness as suitable for beings 
with incomplete understanding, then it is necessary to appeal to deliberative 
democracy with something different from the Kantian formulation of moral 
respect. In chapter 3, I have developed an account of asymmetric reciprocity as 
a substitute for Kantian moral respect that is consonant with Gadamer’s 
principle of openness.  
                                            
89
 Gadamer writes: “This is necessary, of course, insofar as we must imagine the 
other’s situation. But into this other situation we must bring, precisely, ourselves, only this is the 
full meaning of ‘transposing ourselves’. If we put ourselves in someone else’s shoes, for 
example, then we will understand him – i.e. become aware of the otherness, the indissoluble 




Drawing on Young, I have developed an account of asymmetric 
reciprocity as mode of instantiating openness in democratic politics. This has 
been possible because of the three hermeneutic aspects of Young’s concept of 
asymmetric reciprocity that come from her recognition of human finitude, 
situatedness, and historically effected consciousness respectively. These 
aspects add to the normative function of asymmetric reciprocity as instantiation 
of openness because in the mode of asymmetric reciprocity one starts with the 
recognition of one’s finitude and incomplete understanding, followed by a 
question directed at the dialogue partner that comes from a genuine interest in 
his/her otherness, and ends with letting the otherness of the other challenge 
one’s prejudices and, perhaps, change one’s self-understanding and 
understanding of the other in his/her otherness. In the mode of asymmetric 
reciprocity, one is open to difference and otherness that challenges what one 
already knows, assumes, and understands.  
If we want to expand our incomplete understanding at all, then 
hermeneutical philosophy shows us that we need to be open to negative 
experience that is only possible when we encounter and engage with the other 
in their genuine otherness. In the mode of asymmetric reciprocity, one is open 
for the other to express its otherness in different forms of communication, not 
just rational. They are narration/storytelling and rhetoric.  
Asymmetric reciprocity requires two things from us when we are set out 
to engage with and understand the other: we need to be genuinely interested 
about the otherness of the other and the other must be understood in their 
otherness. Now, “genuine” interest, I claim, suggests a certain inwardness and 
selfishness. That is, our interest is genuine when we are interested in the other 
to teach us something, to say something new to us, to help us have a negative 
experience which will illuminate our prejudices and limits of understanding. That 
is, genuine interest not just for the sake of the other, but for our own sake too. 
For that to be possible, the other must be encountered in their otherness. 
Genuineness of any motivation has to do with the self of the one who expresses 
it, it denotes certain selfishness. The selfishness that I advocate is selfishness 
in self-understanding, that is, our selfish interest in encountering and engaging 
with the other should first of all be in the interest that the other will expand our 
incomplete understanding and make our prejudices present-to-hand. If we are 
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open to the idea that the other will show us something about ourselves in a new 
light, we are genuinely interested in it. Fusion of horizons is achieved when 
each side has learned something new from the other and walked away with an 
expanded horizon, a shift in their perspective, and incomplete understanding 
that is less incomplete. 
Reflexivity 
Reflexivity is another mode of instantiation of Gadamer’s principle of 
openness in democratic politics. It complements asymmetric reciprocity. In 
chapter 2, it was established that Gadamer’s hermeneutic experience enables 
hermeneutic consciousness of the hermeneutical situation. That is, being open 
to experiencing the otherness of the other makes one aware that one’s 
understanding is finite and limited within the historical, cultural, discursive 
contingencies of the time. This awareness comes from the encounter of the 
other. Encountering the other, on the other hand, requires an awareness of our 
finitude. Therefore, asymmetric reciprocity and reflexivity mutually complement 
one another.   
Towards the end of Chapter 2, we noted that the concept of 
reflectiveness that Habermas’ uses in discourse ethics risks breaking the 
relationship between reflection, understanding, and the hermeneutical situation. 
While reflection for Habermas means situating oneself within the life-world, 
according to him, it must allow one to transcend from that situatedness. Given 
the ontological dimension of human finitude, Gadamer has helped us question 
whether through reflection one can really achieve the status of detached 
understanding that discourse ethics requires. Two differences emerge between 
Habermas and Gadamer on this account. First, for Habermas reflectiveness 
takes on the function of transcending one out of the influence of tradition, and 
historical and cultural contingencies, whereas for Gadamer this function is 
impossible because reflection can only be possible within tradition and it starts 
from definite hermeneutical situation. Based on this difference we concluded 
that if one takes the Gadamerian position, then it becomes hard to maintain a 
strict distinction between ethical and moral discourses and that interpretive 
conflicts are unavoidable. The second difference is that while Habermas sees 
reflectiveness as inherent to discourse situation, Gadamer goes further in 
highlighting the role of the different other in reflection and in bringing about 
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better self-understanding. If we are finite in our understanding, then our 
reflection depends on the engagement with a different other whose otherness 
illuminates our own individuality and finitude. The otherness of the other 
illuminates our prejudices, particularities, and differences (but only if we are 
open to this kind of experience, hence the importance of asymmetric reciprocity 
for reflexivity).  
In chapter 4, I developed an account of “reflexivity” as a mode of 
instantiation of openness in democratic politics by drawing on Dryzek’s 
discursive democracy. I have shown that reflexivity fulfils a similar regulative 
function in democratic politics as does Gadamer’s notion of ‘historically effected 
consciousness’.  
Reflexivity fulfils this role in virtue of its two aspects: reflexive intelligence 
and constitutive reasoning. Reflexive intelligence means that actors are critically 
aware of the constitutive influence that their circumstances have had on their 
understanding of the social and political world. In other words, it is awareness 
about the situatedness of understanding. Reflexively intelligent actors are aware 
of the opportunities and constraints that their discursive fields have. Reflexive 
intelligence can only be acquired through an intersubjective interaction with 
different others because it is only possible to know about the particularity and 
partiality of one’s understanding by encountering a different other. Furthermore, 
reflexive intelligence allows for constitutive reasoning that is future-oriented, yet 
does not break the relatedness between understanding, reflection, and the 
hermeneutical situation. We established that constitutive reasoning proceeds 
from the awareness of the opportunities and constraints within the 
hermeneutical situation. In Dryzek’s case, constitutive reasoning allows for re-
constitution of discourses.  
These two features of reflexivity make it distinct from Habermas’ idea of 
reflection. For Habermas, the purpose of reflection is autonomy and 
autonomous action. Drawing on Dryzek, we have established reflexivity as 
distinct from autonomous action as a mode of openness that is aware of its own 
constraints and opportunities within the hermeneutical situation. It comes close 
to ‘historically effected consciousness’ because it is aware of the influences that 
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one’s understanding has had and does not break the relation between reflection 
and hermeneutical situation.  
Reflexivity and asymmetric reciprocity are mutually complementary 
because together they instantiate Gadamer’s concepts of hermeneutical 
experience and consciousness. Recall, that hermeneutical experience is a 
negative experience through which one’s prejudices become present-to-hand. It 
leads to hermeneutical consciousness. Now, hermeneutical experience creates 
its own conditions of possibility because it is a kind of experience by which one 
expands one’s horizon and therefore is open for new experiences. It is a kind of 
experience that shows the value of negative experience, and so makes one 
open to new experiences. An experienced person is open to new experiences, 
to encounter something strange and alien, and try to engage with it in a way 
that puts the status quo of the person’s own understanding at risk. This kind of 
experience can be acquired through the engagement and encounter of a 
different other. Thus, asymmetric reciprocity leads to reflexivity while reflexivity 
creates the conditions of possibility for asymmetric reciprocity. In other words, 
what I am trying to say is that by being open to the otherness, we become 
aware of our finitude and are able to expand our incomplete understanding. 
This kind of experience reinforces further openness to different others because 
the previous encounter was illuminating. There is a positive reinforcement 
between asymmetric reciprocity and reflexivity in the similar manner that 
openness to other leads to more openness.  
Since we define reflexivity as awareness of the situated nature of 
understanding, and awareness of how understanding is constituted by particular 
discourses, as Dryzek uses it, then it must mean that a reflexive person must 
admit that there are many different ways of understanding something. A 
reflexive person accepts that there are different and equally valid ways of 
justification, especially in the context of rank-ordering incommensurable values 
in politics. Thus, a reflexive person is an open person and approaches others 
not through the Kantian idea of moral respect, but through asymmetric 
reciprocity that allows the other to disclose its otherness. One engages and 
encounters the other on that basis. Given that we have defined incomplete 
understanding as partial and particular, reflexivity is suitable for beings with 
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incomplete understanding as a mode of instantiation of Gadamer’s principle of 
openness in democratic politics.  
Agonism 
Instantiation of the principle of openness in democratic politics does not 
give guidance for engaging and encountering the kinds of others that pose a 
threat to pluralism and democratic politics. If we want to admit particularity and 
allow the expression of particular and partial understanding, and conceive 
conflict in terms of interpretive conflicts, then we preclude the possibility to 
appeal to discourse ethics alone for addressing these others since discourse 
ethics requires detachment and bracketing of particularities. Drawing on Mouffe, 
we have acknowledged the antagonistic dimension of human affairs and 
developed an account of agonism that helps answer the question of being open 
towards the kinds of others who pose an uncompromising conflict and a 
relationship of mutual exclusion. Agonism is also helpful in allowing different 
justifications and interpretations of pluralism and the principle of openness itself.  
Specifically, we have appropriated agonism as a kind of constitutional 
framework within which antagonism (conflict) can be transformed into agonism 
(struggle) according to the central categories of enemies and adversaries. 
These categories are particularly useful if we acknowledge that in politics 
engagement and encounter is not always about reaching understanding across 
differences. Since politics is, in part, about rank-ordering incommensurable 
values, and since there is no guarantee that values will not be rank-ordered 
without a cost to someone, politics can entail strategic struggles or just an 
outright confrontation. Thus, when communication breaks down because of 
contestation of the very principles and values that all must adhere to (such as 
openness), agonism is a mode of openness towards the other in a strategic 
struggle to establish one’s own interpretation.  
Since we have characterized plurality in terms of social groups and 
discourses, it is possible to apply Mouffe’s categories and posit that 
engagement and encounter between different groups and discourses can be 
threatened by antagonism. If we push for pluralism according to the principle of 
openness, we are bound to encounter some groups and discourses that deny 
the others’ right to be and threaten their rightful position in the social structure, 
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or, to put is as dramatically as Mouffe, threaten the others’ existence (1994, 
108). We will be open to them in an agonistic struggle once we establish that 
we are contesting each other’s interpretations of the guiding principles and 
values.  
In agonism, we might forgo reaching understanding across differences in 
competition against each other, but we do not lose respect for the other, the 
other’s right to have its otherness, express and defend this otherness, and we 
remain open to their particularity and reflexive of our own particularity. It is a 
protective mode of openness that prevents pluralism from collapsing in on itself 
because by definition it has to be open to those who deny its principles, yet 
allows for there to be different justifications for accepting pluralism and 
democratic politics and different ways of instantiating them. To be more precise, 
the kinds of groups and discourses I seek protection from are radical religious 
groups and religious fundamentalism, extreme right/left wing populists and 
discourses, groups and discourses that deny their members the possibility for 
encountering and engaging others, misogynists, and chauvinists. When 
encountering such groups and discourses, agonism is a way to struggle against 
them because to defeat them, we need to fight their ideas, not them. To fight 
their ideas, we need a democratic outlet that allows them to express their 
particularities and partiality that they mistake for ultimate reason and truth. 
One could argue that Habermas’ discourse ethics has better means to 
fight them. And this person would be right. It is possible to appeal to the logic of 
“performative contradiction” if we fear that some groups will appeal to our 
principle of openness in order to override the principle itself. However, this logic 
leads to exclusion of those groups from the struggle, which Mouffe has shown is 
a form of repression of antagonism that is bound to return in the form of 
violence. Either way, I wish to work out the problem of how to be open in such a 
way that would not betray Gadamer’s principle of openness towards those that 
threaten me.  
To this end, I have drawn from Mouffe’s agonistic perspective, in which 
“the central category of democratic politics is the category of the ‘adversary’, the 
opponent with whom one shares a common allegiance to the democratic 
principles of ‘liberty and equality for all’, while disagreeing about their 
248 
 
interpretation” (Mouffe 2013, 7) by following Wenman’s (2003) suggestion that 
Mouffe offers a quasi-republican constitutional framework for democratic 
politics. In this manner, while openness denotes a certain disposition on the 
personal level of each participant, agonism provides a framework with 
categories for engagements and encounters that have strategic political goals 
apart from reaching understanding across differences. We recognize that we 
might compete and struggle against one another in interpreting how exactly we 
want our common ethico-political values reflected in our democratic politics, but 
we do so as friendly enemies that do not forget that each speaks from a finite 
position, has an incomplete understanding of the other, the situation, and 
him/herself. So, what I would like to bring in along with agonism are: recognition 
of the ontological dimension of antagonism between different others, the 
categories of enemy and adversary, and the normative move (the quasi-
republican idea) that enables transforming enemies into adversaries.  
 
Now, it is time to answer the question how does instantiating the principle 
of openness in the modes of asymmetric reciprocity, reflexivity, and agonism 
help address the problem of incomplete understanding, to which some 
problems and challenges of plural societies are attributable?  
Gadamer has shown us that incomplete understanding is a permanent 
feature of human understanding. He has shown that incomplete understanding 
must be conceived not only in terms of ability to understand something fully. 
Incomplete understanding is partial and particular. It is incomplete in virtue of its 
situatedness within the hermeneutical situation. We will always have incomplete 
understanding because it is part of our individuality. It does not matter how 
much we share in common, there is always a remainder between us which 
makes us strangers to each other. In each case, our strangeness constitutes 
our otherness in relation to the other. In part, that strangeness is where 
understanding becomes incomplete. 
However, incomplete understanding emerges as a problem when we try 
to answer the question ‘what ought we do’ as a collective and engage in politics 
because our answer requires rank-ordering values. This is where incomplete 
understanding gives rise to moral disagreements and division. These problems 
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can become acute if we forget that our understanding is always already 
incomplete and make the mistake of forgetting of the ontological dimension of 
human finitude. If we accept the incompleteness of our understanding from 
Gadamer’s perspective, then we recognize that actually others can help us 
expand it. Others can help us push the boundaries of our finitude further out; 
they are helpful to us in gaining perspective and expanding our horizons. 
To this end, we need to be open to others. We need to be open to their 
otherness, that which strikes us as odd, strange, and alien, because it is the 
otherness of the other that will help our self-understanding by illuminating the 
prejudices and other elements within our hermeneutical situation. This is the 
feature of what Gadamer calls “genuine” experience, the experience of 
negation. Prejudices illuminate when something challenges them and 
contradicts them. Our openness enables the other to contradict our prejudices 
and assert its otherness against us. Asymmetric reciprocity allows for this kind 
of experience because in this mode we let the other assert its otherness. We 
gain reflexivity from it. We can reflect from within our own boundaries and 
achieve better self-understanding.  
For example, for a person who loves poetry and is convinced that poetry 
reveals some kind of truth, reading Plato for the first time can be an 
“experience” in the hermeneutical sense. This person can either put the book 
down and declare Plato as someone who wants to ban poetry, or open up to 
Plato’s text and let the text challenge one’s prejudice about poetry. This can be 
a fruitful engagement as this negative experience causes one to be reflexive of 
one’s understanding of poetry as well as push the reader to re-read and 
interpret Plato’s text. Therefore, openness is a virtue for beings whose 
understanding is always already incomplete. Its instantiation in the modes of 
asymmetric reciprocity and reflexivity transfers this function into democratic 
politics where people might have little in common but hold prejudiced (and 
therefore incomplete) understandings of each other.  
What use are they for a discourse as an element of democratic politics? 
At its simplest articulation, discourse solves problems that come from 
misunderstanding or lack of understanding. But solutions to ethical and moral 
disagreement do not only depend on understanding speech acts and norms. 
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Understanding speech acts and norms is only part of discourse. The other part 
is understanding the other, for which self-understanding is an important 
foundation. As Taylor put it, we cannot understand the other without 
understanding ourselves first. To this end, asymmetric reciprocity and reflexivity 
are important. By being open to the encounter and engagement with the other 
and reflexive about what the other reveals about ourselves, we can fulfil the 
fuller scope of possibilities that discourse offers to us; we can understand 
ourselves better. 
Agonism is a mode of openness that helps sustain pluralism despite the 
antagonistic dimension of human affairs that can show itself in political 
engagement and encounter. I have shown that it offers us a framework within 
which we can encounter and engage the other when pluralism itself is at stake. 
Its categories help adopt a protective mode of openness that does not betray 
our commitment to pluralism when ‘the political’ “returns”.  
Finally, how do asymmetric reciprocity, reflexivity, and agonism assist in 
committing to pluralism in democratic politics? Democratic politics is well 
equipped to commit to political pluralism through power sharing and processes 
of government. We have the principles of separation of powers, checks and 
balances, separation of church and state, neutrality of the processes of 
government. However, they do not help in commitment to pluralism as 
engagement and encounter of the other in their otherness because they cannot 
address the problem of understanding that is central to this idea of pluralism. To 
this end, I have developed an account of asymmetric reciprocity, reflexivity, and 
agonism as instantiations of openness. Gadamer’s principle of openness has 
shown itself to be conducive to reaching understanding in philosophical 
hermeneutics. It is a principle that is most suitable for beings with incomplete 
understanding. If I have been successful in showing how the three concepts 
resemble Gadamer’s principle, then they should enable openness to the other 
and letting the other disclose its otherness in democratic politics. If they let the 
other disclose its otherness in a way that reveals something about ourselves, 
then asymmetric reciprocity, reflexivity, and agonism help us address the 
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